Усі записи в "ХАМАС" Категорія

Від повстанського руху до політичної партії

Аластер Крук

Багато хто на Заході вважає, що трансформація від збройного руху опору до політичної партії має бути лінійною, повинна передувати відмова від насильства, має бути сприяно громадянським суспільством і за посередництва поміркованих політиків, мало реального для випадку ісламського руху опору (ХАМАС). Це не означає, що ХАМАС не зазнав політичної трансформації: it has. Але ця трансформація була досягнута, незважаючи на зусилля Заходу, а не сприяна цими зусиллями. Залишаючись рухом опору, ХАМАС став урядом Палестинської автономії та змінив свою військову позицію. Але ця трансформація прийняла інший курс, ніж той, який окреслений у традиційних моделях вирішення конфліктів. ХАМАС та інші ісламістські групи продовжують вважати себе рухами опору, але дедалі частіше вони бачать перспективу того, що їхні організації можуть перетворитися на політичні течії, які зосереджені на ненасильницькому опорі. Стандартні моделі вирішення конфліктів значною мірою покладаються на західний досвід вирішення конфліктів і часто ігнорують відмінності підходів в ісламській історії встановлення миру.. Не дивно, підхід ХАМАС до політичних переговорів відрізняється за стилем від підходу Заходу. Також, як ісламістський рух, який поділяє ширший погляд на вплив Заходу на їхні суспільства, ХАМАС має вимоги щодо автентичності та легітимності в межах свого електорального округу, які впливають на важливість підтримки збройних сил. Ці фактори, разом із величезним впливом тривалого конфлікту на психологію громади (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. В додаток, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

Арабський бюлетень реформ

group of researchers

Єгипет: Регрес у партійній платформі Братів-мусульман?

Амр Хамзавий

Претензія Центру: Перехідний політичний іслам

Джон Л. Еспозіто

In the 1990s political Islam, what some call “Islamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Іран, Sudan, Афганістан), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Туреччина, Іран, Ліван, Kuwait, Ємен, Йорданія, Пакистан, Bangladesh, Малайзія, Індонезія, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

Є ТАЙИП ЕРДОГАН НОВИМ НАСЕРОМ

Минулого четверга ввечері, Турецький прем'єр-міністр Таїп Ердоган раптом став центром усіх новинних каналів країни. Причиною було те, що він штурмував дипломатичну сцену на панелі Всесвітнього економічного форуму в Давосі, звинувативши президента Ізраїлю Шимона Переса в “вбивство людей,” і нагадуючи біблійну заповідь, “Не вбивай.”

Це були не просто останні новини для ЗМІ, а також музика для вух мільйонів турків, яких глибоко вразило недавнє кровопролиття, яке Ізраїль спричинив у секторі Газа. Some of them even hit the streets in order to welcome Erdoğan, who had decided to come to Istanbul right away after the tense debate. Thousands of cars headed toward the Atatürk airport in the middle of the night in order to welcome “the conqueror of Davos.

” ’Turkey is proud of you’

I personally had a more mundane problem at that very moment. In order to catch my 5 a.m. flight, I had left home at a quite reasonable time, 2.30 a.m. But the traffic to the airport was completely locked because of the amazing number of cars destined toward it. So, after leaving the taxi at the start of the long river of vehicles, I had to walk on the highway for about two kilometers, my hands on my luggage and my eyes on the crowd. When Erdoğan finally stepped out of the terminal, while I just walking into it, thousands applauded him and started to chant, “Turkey is proud of you!”

Залучення політичного ісламу для просування демократії

Шаді Хамід

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans have struggled toarticulate an overarching, long-term strategy for fighting religious extremism and terror in the Middle East. Most experts on both the left and right agree that promoting democracy will help address the root causes of terrorism in theregion, though they differ on to what degree. The reasoning is simple: If Arabs and Muslims lack legitimate, peaceful outlets with which to express their grievances, they are more likely to resort to violence. In one important 2003study, Princeton University’s Alan Krueger and Czech scholar Jitka Maleckova analyzed extensive data on terrorist attacks and concluded that “the only variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties. Countries with more freedom were less likely to be the birthplace of international terrorists.

Іслам і демократія

Даля Могахед

Islam in politics has been asserted in many countries in the Muslim world through democratic elections. Islamist parties have gained varying degreesof political power in Turkey, Єгипет, Ліван, and the occupied Palestinian territories, and have widespread influence in Morocco and Jordan. Now, more than ever, Western governments, alarmed by this outcome, have raised the perennial question: Is Islam compatible with democracy?A recent in-depth Gallup survey in 10 predominantly Muslim countries,representing more than 80% of the global Muslim population, shows that whenasked what they admire most about the West, Muslims frequently mention political freedom, liberty, fair judicial systems, and freedom of speech. When asked to critique their own societies, extremism and inadequate adherence to Islamic teachings were their top grievances.However, while Muslims say they admire freedom and an open political system,Gallup surveys suggest that they do not believe they must choose between Islam and democracy, but rather, that the two can co-exist inside one functional government.

Ескалація на Близькому Сході: довготривалої шкоди миру та демократії

Паоло Котта

The rapid and dangerous escalation of war operations in the Middle East has resulted in a very significant loss of life among Lebanese, Palestinians and Israelis, and serious damage to civilian infrastructures. Major operations began with a low-level conflict around Gaza,that involved the launching of some missiles into Israel, some (more deadly) Israeli retaliation on Gaza, and the attack on an Israeli military post outside Gaza to which Israel reacted swiftly and very strongly. In the chain reaction that followed, admittedly Israel’ sintention was, and is, to inflict on the other side a far heavier punishment than that taken by Israel—which may appear as a militarily sound posture aimed at avoiding incidents andattacks, але, in fact, it is the civilian population that has been mainly affected. В результаті,the suffering of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations (in terms of deaths,wounded and destroyed infrastructures) has to date been largely disproportionate to that of Israel. When, in the case of Palestine, this discrimination already follows about 40 years of discrimination in the same direction, hostility and adversarial relations are bound toincrease. So while Israel’s heavy deterrence through punishment may work temporarily and occasionally in preventing or reducing attacks, the general sentiment of hostility in the region is increased, and creates in the long range a bigger obstacle to peace.

Примусовий вибір

Regardless of what happens in future Palestinian parliamentaryelections, Hamas has already won a historic victory. The organization, whosename is an acronym for “the Islamic Resistance Movement,” enjoyed tremendoussuccess in municipal elections, and its readiness to participate onthe national level constitutes nothing less than an earthquake in Palestinianpolitics, signaling the clear end of one-party rule. For a movement that hasmorphed from a militant organization into a political party in less than a generation,Hamas’s participation on the national level is evidence of theorganization’s adaptability and durability within Palestinian society and politics.Among the United States, Ізраїль, і Європа, as well as Arab governments,speculation and uneasiness has surrounded Hamas’s newfound role.Skeptics argue that electoral politics do not make one democratic, and thatHamas’s electoral ambitions mask the group’s true intention of establishingan Islamic state in all of historic Palestine—a goal that includes Israel’s destruction.1 These critics believe that, once Hamas has secured its positionwithin the Palestinian Authority (ПА) and institutions of the Palestine LiberationOrganization (PLO), the movement will resume its campaign of terrorand attempt to control the Palestinian national agenda by force.Despite the inherent risks, proponents of expanding Hamas’s role in Palestiniannational politics argue that political activity will ultimately moderatethe movement. These advocates point to the fact that Hamas’s leadershave long called for transparent and accountable governing institutions andhave demonstrated political pragmatism, suggesting that the group could acceptless than its absolutist demands.

Це Політика, Дурний

Джон Л. Еспозіто

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Буш. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. Однак, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, тероризм, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Таким чином, for example, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?

ХАМАС і політичні реформи на Близькому Сході

Починається суд над Фондом Святої Землі

Абдус Саттар Газалі |

липень 24, 2007 – The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development went on trial today in Dallas, Texas as the federal agents were raiding two other Muslim charities in Dearborn, Michigan. The Holy Land was being tried on suspicion of aiding terrorism by helping the Palestinian militant group Hamas while the two Michigan charities – the Goodwill Charitable Organization and Al-Mabarrat Charitable Organization were suspected of having ties to extremist groups in Lebanon. Just like the Holy Land, assets of the two Michigan charities have been frozen.

The Holy Land, founded in 1989 was one of the largest Muslim charities in the nation before it was shut down under executive orders in December 2001. It was one of six Muslim major charities in the country that have been shut in recent years as the Muslim charities were scrutinized and persecuted as part of a broader backlash against Muslims after the 9/11 напади. Other five shut down charities are: Global Relief Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Islamic American Relief Agency and Kind Hearts USA.

Under a provision of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, the government has largely unchecked power to designate any group as a terrorist organization. When that happens, a group’s property may be seized and its assets frozen. The charity is unable to see the government’s evidence and thus understand the basis for the charges. And it has only a limited right of appeal. So, the government can target a charity, obtain indictments against its leaders, and then delay a trial indefinitely.

The Bush administration froze the Holy Land Foundation’s assets charging it with funneling money to Hamas, an allegation strongly refuted by the Holy Land officials. According to its mission statement, the Foundation is a humanitarian organization that works to find “solutions to human suffering,” primarily focusing on providing urgent nutritional and medical care to the destitute and displaced Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Палестини, and Lebanon.

The government says Hamas’ support organization in the United States, known as the “Palestinian Committee,” organized the “Occupied Land Fund” в 1988. The name was later changed to the Holy Land Foundation. First based in California, the foundation moved to Richardson, Texas in 1992.

The defendants named in a 42-count indictment in 2004 are Holy Land Foundation, which federal authorities raided and shut down in December 2001; Shukri Abu Baker, the charity’s president; Ghassan Elashi, its chairman; Abdulrahman Odeh; Mohammad El-Mezain; and Mufid Abdulqader. Two other men named in the indictment remain fugitives.

This is the third trial involving Ghassan Elashi brothers. The court, because of the complexities of the investigation, decided to break the proceedings into three trials, with the one beginning today being the most expansive and the one directly related to the Holy Land Foundation. In summer 2004, five brothers who ran Infocom were convicted of selling computers to countries that support terrorism. In April 2005, three of the brothers were convicted of conspiracy, money laundering and “dealing in the property of a terrorist.”

Перемога ХАМАС на виборах у Палестині

Riaz Hassan

The parliamentary election triumph of Hamas surprised almost everybody, including the Hamas leadership, if the press reported correctly. The Bush Administration is blaming its intelligence services for failing to predict Hamas’ victory. Most observers forecast that Fatah would win theelections because of its political dominance in Palestinian affairs. чому, then, did most politicalobservers in the West get it so wrong? This political miscalculation will be the subject of much analysis and commentary in the coming months.A number of specific local issues delivered Hamas its historic electoral victory. Credit must goto the Palestinian people, who turned out to be astute voters. A significant number of Palestinians were simply unable to accept the corruption and cronyism that allegedly flourished under the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah. While most Palestinians remember well and admire the sacrifices made by Fatah leaders in the past, they were simply deterred by their in ability to institute political and economic reforms to better the lives of ordinary people. Hamashad a much better reading of the Palestinian political pulse. It was not difficult for Hamas to doso: Hamas delivers health, educational and social services to large numbers of Palestinians,making daily life bearable.Unlike Fatah, which had several candidates contesting the same constituency, resulting in asplitting of Fatah’s votes, Hamas ran an extremely disciplined political campaign. Hamas alsomade use of its female supporters, sending them door-to-door to canvass voters and to pollingstations to campaign for Hamas’ candidates. These election strategies obviously worked in Hamas’ favor. Hamas has also amassed political capital through its resistance and military campaigns against the Israeli occupation. It was these actions which led to Hamas’ being labelled and treated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union andseveral other western countries. In a political environment in which ordinary Palestinians feelcompletely powerless, Hamas’ acts of resistance and tough rhetoric gave Palestinians a senseof empowerment that may well be the reason for its electoral victory over its opponents.

Міжнародні консультації мусульманської інтелігенції з ісламу & політика

Центр Стімсона & Інститут політичних досліджень

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Єгипет, India,Індонезія, Kenya, Малайзія, Пакистан, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Нарешті, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

Життя з демократією в Єгипті

Даніель Консолаторе

Hosni Mubarek was almost elected president of Egypt in September 2005. Not that the seventy-seven-year-old secular autocrat who has ruled that nationfor the past twenty-four years lost the election; by the official count, he took nearly 85 percent of the vote.His nearest competitor, Айман Нур, the upstart headof the fledgling opposition party al-Ghad (“Tomorrow”),managed less than 8 відсотків. The only other candidate to take any significant tally was the aged NomanGamaa of the venerable al-Wafd (“Delegation”)party, who managed less than 3 відсотків. The Ikhwanal-Muslimeen (“Muslim Brotherhood”), feared by somany Westerners for its purist Islamic social and politicalagenda, didn’t even field a candidate.Mubarek’s decisive victory would seem to be reassuringto most people—particularly secular Americans—worried for the future of the few Westernfriendly,moderate Arab regimes, threatened as theyare by the Islamicization of politics in the region. The Bush administration would also seem to have reasonto be pleased, given its recent change of heart aboutArab democracy. The missing chemical weapons in Iraq and subsequent justification of the war thereas precedent for democratization have inspired theWhite House to push for as many elections as possible in the region. Насправді, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke at the American University inCairo in June, she announced to some surprise that“for sixty years” the United States had been mistakenin “pursu[ing] stability at the expense of democracy”in the Middle East. For generations, U.S. pundits weresure that the “Arab street” couldn’t be trusted with the vote, as they might hand over power to communistsor fundamentalist Islamists. Realpolitik dictated that autocrats and dictators, like Mubarek and Saddam Hussein, had to be coddled in order to maintain “stability”in the region. If they would then stage election sor dispense with them altogether, deny free speech,and let loose secret police to terrorize the population,the White House would likely turn a blind eye. But ifMubarek could now claim a true democratic mandate,that would be the best of all worlds.

Політичні зміни в арабському світі

Діна Шехата

Рік 2007 ознаменував кінець короткого інтервалу політичної лібералізації в арабському світі, який почався незабаром після окупації Іраку і який був результатом переважно зовнішнього тиску на арабські режими з метою реформування та демократизації. Зовнішній тиск під час 2003-2006 період створив політичну відкритість, яку активісти в усьому регіоні використовували для висування давніх вимог політичної та конституційної реформи. Зіткнувшись із поєднанням зростаючого зовнішнього та внутрішнього тиску на проведення реформ, Арабські режими змушені були піти на деякі поступки своїм противникам.В Єгипті, за поданням Президента, Парламент прийняв поправку до конституції, яка передбачає проведення прямих конкурентних президентських виборів. У вересні 2005р, У Єгипті відбулися перші конкурентні президентські вибори, і, як і очікувалося, Мубарак був обраний на п'ятий термін із 87% голосів. Більше того,протягом листопада 2005 парламентські вибори,які були вільнішими, ніж попередні вибори, Брати-мусульмани, найбільший опозиційний рух в Єгипті, виграв 88 місць. Це була найбільша кількість місць, здобута опозиційною групою в Єгипті з часів 1952 революція.Так само, в січні 2006 Парламентські вибори в Палестині, ХАМАС отримав більшість місць. Таким чином ХАМАС зміг встановити контроль над Палестинською законодавчою радою, в якій домінував ФАТХ з моменту створення Палестинської влади в 1996. В Лівані, після вбивства Рафіка Харірі 14 лютого 2005 року, коаліція про-Харірі політичних сил змогла за допомогою широкої масової мобілізації та зовнішньої підтримки змусити сирійські війська вивести з Лівану, а просирійський уряд піти у відставку. Відбулися вибори, а коаліція 14 лютого змогла отримати більшість голосів і сформувати новий уряд. У Марокко, Король Мохамед VI спостерігав за створенням комітету правди та примирення, який мав на меті розглянути скарги тих, хто зазнав насильства під час правління його батька. Країни Ради співробітництва Перської затоки (GCC) також під час проведення деяких важливих реформ 2003-2006 період. в 2003 Катар вперше в своїй історії оприлюднив письмову конституцію. У 2005 році Саудівська Аравія вперше за п'ять десятиліть скликала муніципальні вибори. І в 2006, У Бахрейні відбулися парламентські вибори, на яких шиїтське товариство Аль-Вефак отримало 40% місць. Згодом, було призначено першого шиїтського заступника прем'єр-міністра в Бахрейні. Ці події, яка стала відомою як «арабська весна».,’ змусив деяких оптимістів повірити, що арабський світ перебуває на порозі демократичних перетворень, подібних до тих, що відбулися в Латинській Америці та Східній і Центральній Європі протягом 1980-х і 1990-х років.. Однак, в 2007, оскільки політична лібералізація поступилася місцем посиленню поляризації та поновленню репресій,ці надії розвіялися. Несправність отворів 2003-2006 Період для створення стійкого імпульсу до демократизації можна пояснити рядом факторів. Погіршення ситуації з безпекою в Іраку та неспроможність Сполучених Штатів створити стабільний і демократичний режим послабили підтримку зусиль з просування демократії в американській адміністрації та зміцнили погляди тих, хто вважав, що безпека та стабільність мають стояти перед демократією.. Більше того, Успіхи ісламістів на виборах у Єгипті та Палестині ще більше послабили підтримку Заходом зусиль з просування демократії в регіоні, оскільки лідери цих рухів вважалися такими, що суперечать інтересам Заходу..

Виклики демократії в арабському та мусульманському світі

Алон Бен-Меїр

President Bush’s notions that democratizing Iraq will have a ripple effect on the rest ofthe Arab world, bringing prosperity and peace to the region, and that democracy is the panaceafor Islamic terrorism are unsubstantiated as well as grossly misleading. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. Насправді, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. В додаток, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.