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demócratas celosos : ISLAMISMO Y DEMOCRACIA EN EGIPTO, INDONESIA Y TURQUÍA

Anthony Bubalo
Greg Fealy
Pentecostés Mason

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. Al mismo tiempo, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. En efecto, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

ELECCIONES DE INDONESIA

Bernhard Platzdasch

AS INDONESIA gears up for its elections next April, making sense of developments can be a challenge.
Take, for example, the latest election forecasts. In a recent opinion poll, the Indonesian Survey Institute named President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s DemocratsParty (PD) as the leading contender with an approval rating of 16.8 per cent. The party was followed by Vice-President Jusuf Kalla’s Golkar Party with 15.9 per cent and Ms Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) con 14.2 per cent. But several surveys had earlier this year put PDI-P and
Golkar first and second, with PD taking third or fourth place. Another noteworthy difference in the latest survey is the meagre 4.9 per cent for the Islamist Justice and Welfare Party (PKS). Earlier surveys put the PKSshare a few points higher and the party has even claimed that it can achieve some 20 per cent of the total vote.
Without forgetting that the forecasts have limited credibility due to the large number of undecided voters, what conclusions can be drawn from the varying results of these surveys?
Primero, it is almost certain that no party will secure an outright victory, thus paving the way for yet anotherand again potentially brittlecoalition government. With no party gaining an absolute majority, contenders for the presidential elections in July
will need the endorsement of other parties. As for Dr Yudhoyono, he and Golkar will probably continue their partnership. But Ms Megawati has already made it clear that she is not willing to serve as vice-president. This means a coalition made up of Golkar
and the PDI-P is unlikely.

BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL

ANTHONY Bubalo

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Este Dia, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islamismo, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

Progreso de pensamiento islámico, la sociedad civil y el movimiento Gülen en el contexto nacional

Greg Barton

Fethullah Gülen (nacido 1941), Hodjaeffendi o como se le conoce cariñosamente por cientos de miles de personas en su país natal, Turquía y en el extranjero, es uno de los pensadores islámicos más importantes y activistas que han surgido en el siglo XX. Su pensamiento optimista y con visión de futuro, con su énfasis en el desarrollo personal de corazón y mente a través de la educación, de participar de forma proactiva y positiva con el mundo moderno y de llegar en el diálogo y un espíritu de cooperación entre las comunidades religiosas, los estratos sociales y las naciones se puede leer como una reformulación contemporánea de las enseñanzas de Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, y otros maestros sufíes clásicos (Michel, 2005a, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Unal y Williams, 2005). Más específicamente, Gülen se puede ver que se lleven a donde Said Nursi (1876-1960), otro gran intelectual islámica de Anatolia, dejó: manera chartinga de activistas musulmanes en Turquía y más allá de contribuir eficazmente al desarrollo de la sociedad moderna, que evita las trampas y los compromisos de activismo político-partidista y sustituye a la estrechez de islamistas pensamiento con un inclusiva real y la comprensión humanitaria del papel de la religión en el mundo moderno (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham y Ozdemir, 2005; La toxina botulínica, 2005, Yavuz, 2005a).