RSSTodas las inscripciones en el "Marruecos" Categoría

El mañana árabe

david b. OTTAWAY

Octubre 6, 1981, estaba destinado a ser un día de celebración en Egipto. Marcó el aniversario del momento más grandioso de la victoria de Egipto en tres conflictos árabe-israelíes., cuando el ejército desvalido del país atravesó el Canal de Suez en los primeros días del 1973 Guerra de Yom Kippur y envió a las tropas israelíes tambaleándose en retirada. en un fresco, mañana sin nubes, El estadio de El Cairo estaba repleto de familias egipcias que habían venido a ver a los militares pavonearse con su hardware. En el estrado de revisión, Presidente Anwar el-Sadat,el arquitecto de la guerra, observó con satisfacción cómo hombres y máquinas desfilaban ante él. yo estaba cerca, un corresponsal extranjero recién llegado. De repente, uno de los camiones del ejército se detuvo justo frente a la plataforma de revisión justo cuando seis jets Mirage rugían sobre su cabeza en una actuación acrobática, pintando el cielo con largas estelas de rojo, amarillo, violeta,y humo verde. sadat se puso de pie, aparentemente preparándose para intercambiar saludos con otro contingente de tropas egipcias. Se convirtió en blanco perfecto para cuatro sicarios islamistas que saltaron del camión, subió al podio, y acribillaron su cuerpo a balazos. Mientras los asesinos continuaban durante lo que pareció una eternidad rociando el stand con su fuego mortal, Consideré por un instante si golpear el suelo y arriesgarme a ser pisoteado hasta la muerte por espectadores aterrorizados o permanecer en pie y arriesgarme a recibir una bala perdida.. El instinto me dijo que me quedara de pie, y mi sentido del deber periodístico me impulsó a ir a averiguar si Sadat estaba vivo o muerto.

islam, Islam político y América

Árabe penetración

¿Es posible la “hermandad” con Estados Unidos??

khalil al anani

“No hay posibilidad de comunicarse con ningún estadounidense. administración mientras Estados Unidos mantenga su visión de larga data del Islam como un peligro real, una visión que pone a los Estados Unidos en el mismo barco que el enemigo sionista. No tenemos nociones preconcebidas sobre el pueblo estadounidense o los EE. UU.. sociedad y sus organizaciones cívicas y think tanks. No tenemos problemas para comunicarnos con el pueblo estadounidense, pero no se están haciendo los esfuerzos adecuados para acercarnos,dijo el Dr.. Issam al-Iryan, jefe del departamento político de los Hermanos Musulmanes en una entrevista telefónica.
Las palabras de Al-Iryan resumen los puntos de vista de la Hermandad Musulmana sobre el pueblo estadounidense y los EE. UU.. gobierno. Otros miembros de la Hermandad Musulmana estarían de acuerdo, como lo haría el difunto Hassan al-Banna, que fundó el grupo en 1928. Alabama- Banna veía a Occidente principalmente como un símbolo de decadencia moral.. Otros salafistas, una escuela de pensamiento islámica que se basa en los antepasados ​​como modelos ejemplares, han tenido la misma visión de los Estados Unidos., pero carecen de la flexibilidad ideológica propugnada por los Hermanos Musulmanes. Mientras que la Hermandad Musulmana cree en involucrar a los estadounidenses en el diálogo civil, otros grupos extremistas no ven ningún sentido en el diálogo y sostienen que la fuerza es la única forma de tratar con los Estados Unidos.

ISLAM, LA DEMOCRACIA & EE.UU:

Fundación Córdoba

Abdullah Faliq

Introducción ,


A pesar de ser un debate perenne y complejo, Arches Quarterly reexamina desde bases teológicas y prácticas, el importante debate sobre la relación y compatibilidad entre Islam y Democracia, como se refleja en la agenda de esperanza y cambio de Barack Obama. Mientras que muchos celebran el ascenso de Obama a la Oficina Oval como una catarsis nacional para EE. UU., otros siguen siendo menos optimistas sobre un cambio de ideología y enfoque en el ámbito internacional. Si bien gran parte de la tensión y la desconfianza entre el mundo musulmán y los EE. UU. puede atribuirse al enfoque de promover la democracia, favoreciendo típicamente las dictaduras y los regímenes títeres que hablan de boquilla de los valores democráticos y los derechos humanos, la réplica de 9/11 realmente ha cimentado aún más las dudas a través de la posición de Estados Unidos sobre el Islam político. Ha creado un muro de negatividad según lo encontrado por worldpublicopinion.org, según la cual 67% de los egipcios cree que, globalmente, Estados Unidos está jugando un papel “principalmente negativo”.
Por lo tanto, la respuesta de Estados Unidos ha sido apta. Al elegir a Obama, muchos en todo el mundo están poniendo sus esperanzas en el desarrollo de una menos beligerante, pero una política exterior más justa hacia el mundo musulmán. La prueba para Obama, mientras discutimos, es cómo Estados Unidos y sus aliados promueven la democracia. ¿Estará facilitando o imponiendo?
Es más, ¿Puede ser un intermediario honesto en zonas prolongadas de confl ictos?? Aprovechar la experiencia y el conocimiento de prolifi
c eruditos, académica, periodistas y políticos experimentados, Arches Quarterly saca a la luz la relación entre el Islam y la democracia y el papel de Estados Unidos, así como los cambios provocados por Obama, en la búsqueda del terreno común. Anas Altikriti, el director general de la Fundación Córdoba ofrece el gambito de apertura de esta discusión, donde reflexiona sobre las esperanzas y los desafíos que quedan en el camino de Obama. Siguiendo a Altikriti, el ex asesor del presidente Nixon, El Dr. Robert Crane ofrece un análisis exhaustivo del principio islámico del derecho a la libertad. Anwar Abraham, ex viceprimer ministro de Malasia, enriquece la discusión con las realidades prácticas de la implementación de la democracia en las sociedades musulmanas dominantes, a saber,, en Indonesia y Malasia.
También contamos con la Dra Shireen Hunter, de la Universidad de Georgetown, EE.UU., que explora los países musulmanes rezagados en democratización y modernización. Esto se complementa con el escritor de terrorismo., La explicación del Dr. Nafeez Ahmed sobre la crisis de la posmodernidad y la
desaparición de la democracia. Dr. Daud Abdalá (Director de Monitor de Medios de Oriente Medio), alan hart (ex corresponsal de ITN y BBC Panorama; autor del sionismo: El verdadero enemigo de los judíos) y Asem Sondos (Editor del semanario Sawt Al Omma de Egipto) concentrarse en Obama y su papel frente a la promoción de la democracia en el mundo musulmán, así como las relaciones de Estados Unidos con Israel y la Hermandad Musulmana.
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Maldivas, Ahmed Shaheed especula sobre el futuro del Islam y la democracia; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlain
– un miembro del Sinn Féin que soportó cuatro años de prisión por actividades republicanas irlandesas y un activista de Guildford 4 y Birmingham 6, reflexiona sobre su reciente viaje a Gaza, donde fue testigo del impacto de la brutalidad y la injusticia cometida contra los palestinos; Dra. Marie Breen-Smyth, Director del Centro para el Estudio de la Radicalización y la Violencia Política Contemporánea analiza los desafíos de la investigación crítica del terror político; Dr. Khalid al-Mubarak, escritor y dramaturgo, analiza las perspectivas de paz en Darfur; y, finalmente, el periodista y activista de derechos humanos Ashur Shamis analiza críticamente la democratización y politización de los musulmanes en la actualidad..
Esperamos que todo esto sea una lectura comprensiva y una fuente de reflexión sobre temas que nos afectan a todos en un nuevo amanecer de esperanza..
Gracias

El islamismo revisitado

MAHA Azzam

Hay una crisis política y de seguridad en torno a lo que se denomina islamismo., una crisis cuyos antecedentes preceden mucho 9/11. sobre el pasado 25 años, ha habido diferentes énfasis en cómo explicar y combatir el islamismo. Analistas y formuladores de políticas.
en las décadas de 1980 y 1990 se habló de las causas fundamentales de la militancia islámica como el malestar económico y la marginación. Más recientemente, ha habido un enfoque en la reforma política como un medio para socavar el atractivo del radicalismo.. Cada vez más hoy, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. La umma existe potencialmente dondequiera que haya comunidades musulmanas.. El sentido compartido de pertenencia a una fe común aumenta en un entorno donde el sentido de integración en la comunidad circundante no está claro y donde la discriminación puede ser evidente.. Cuanto mayor es el rechazo a los valores de la sociedad,
ya sea en Occidente o incluso en un estado musulmán, mayor será la consolidación de la fuerza moral del Islam como identidad cultural y sistema de valores.
Después de los atentados en Londres el 7 Julio 2005 se hizo más evidente que algunos jóvenes afirmaban su compromiso religioso como una forma de expresar su etnicidad. Los vínculos entre los musulmanes de todo el mundo y su percepción de que los musulmanes son vulnerables han llevado a muchos en muy diferentes partes del mundo a fusionar sus propios problemas locales con los musulmanes más amplios., haber identificado culturalmente, ya sea principal o parcialmente, con un Islam ampliamente definido.

Desafiando el autoritarismo, Colonialismo, y desunión: Los movimientos de reforma política islámica de al-Afghani y Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. En particular,, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Por lo tanto, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, pero
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (ley islámica). Sin embargo, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Por otra parte, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. En efecto,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, la

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Sin embargo, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, que

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Los partidos de oposición islamistas y el potencial para el compromiso de la UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

A la luz de la creciente importancia de los movimientos islamistas en el mundo musulmán y

la forma en que la radicalización ha influido en los acontecimientos mundiales desde el cambio de siglo, eso

Es importante que la UE evalúe sus políticas hacia los actores dentro de lo que puede

llamado el "mundo islámico". Es particularmente importante preguntarse si y cómo involucrar

con los diversos grupos islamistas.

Esto sigue siendo controvertido incluso dentro de la UE.. Algunos sienten que los valores islámicos que

se encuentran detrás de los partidos islamistas son simplemente incompatibles con los ideales occidentales de democracia y

derechos humanos, mientras que otros ven el compromiso como una necesidad realista debido a la creciente

importancia doméstica de los partidos islamistas y su creciente participación en

asuntos. Otra perspectiva es que la democratización en el mundo musulmán aumentaría

seguridad europea. La validez de estos y otros argumentos sobre si y cómo el

La UE debe comprometerse solo puede probarse estudiando los diferentes movimientos islamistas y

sus circunstancias politicas, país por país.

La democratización es un tema central de las acciones de política exterior común de la UE, como se puso

en el artículo 11 del Tratado de la Unión Europea. Muchos de los estados considerados en este

informe no son democráticos, o no totalmente democrático. En la mayoría de estos países, islamista

partidos y movimientos constituyen una oposición significativa a los regímenes imperantes, y

en algunos forman el mayor bloque de oposición. Las democracias europeas han tenido que

hacer frente a los regímenes de gobierno que son autoritarios, pero es un fenómeno nuevo para presionar

para la reforma democrática en estados donde los beneficiarios más probables podrían haber, desde el

El punto de vista de la UE, enfoques diferentes y a veces problemáticos de la democracia y su

valores relacionados, como los derechos de las minorías y de las mujeres y el estado de derecho. Estos cargos son

a menudo contra los movimientos islamistas, por lo que es importante que los responsables políticos europeos

tener una imagen precisa de las políticas y filosofías de los socios potenciales.

Las experiencias de diferentes países tienden a sugerir que cuanto más libertad islamista

se permiten fiestas, cuanto más moderados son en sus acciones e ideas. En muchos

casos Hace tiempo que los partidos y grupos islamistas se han alejado de su objetivo original

de establecer un estado islámico regido por la ley islámica, y han llegado a aceptar lo básico

principios democráticos de la competencia electoral por el poder, la existencia de otras políticas

competidores, y pluralismo político.

ESTRATEGIAS PARA PARTICIPAR EN EL ISLAM POLÍTICO

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarmente, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. EE.UU.. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Mientras tanto, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

LOS MOVIMIENTOS ISLAMISTAS Y EL PROCESO DEMOCRÁTICO EN EL MUNDO ÁRABE: Explorando las zonas grises

Nathan J. Marrón, , Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Los movimientos islamistas, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, sin embargo,, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordania, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Política, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

RADICALIZACIÓN ISLAMISTA

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Islam político y política exterior europea

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Movimiento Islámico: Libertad política & Democracia

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Islámica) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, la democracia. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Egipto, Siria, Irak, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

Islam radical en el Magreb

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Líbano, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. En 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.

la 500 musulmanes más influyentes

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

La publicación que tiene en sus manos es la primera de lo que esperamos sea una serie anual que proporcione una ventana a los que mueven y agitan el mundo musulmán.. Nos hemos esforzado por destacar a las personas influyentes como musulmanes., eso es, personas cuya influencia se deriva de su práctica del Islam o del hecho de que son musulmanes. Creemos que esto brinda información valiosa sobre las diferentes formas en que los musulmanes impactan en el mundo., y también muestra la diversidad de cómo las personas viven como musulmanes hoy en día. La influencia es un concepto engañoso. Su significado deriva de la palabra latina influens que significa fluir hacia adentro, apuntando a una vieja idea astrológica de que las fuerzas invisibles (como la luna) afectar a la humanidad. Las figuras en esta lista también tienen la capacidad de afectar a la humanidad.. En una variedad de formas diferentes, cada persona en esta lista tiene influencia sobre la vida de un gran número de personas en la tierra.. El 50 se perfilan las figuras más influyentes. Su influencia proviene de una variedad de fuentes.; sin embargo, están unificados por el hecho de que cada uno de ellos afecta a grandes sectores de la humanidad. 500 líderes en 15 categorías—Académico, Político,Administrativo, Linaje, predicadores, Las mujeres, Juventud, Filantropía, Desarrollo,Ciencia y Tecnología, Arte y Cultura, Medios de comunicación, radicales, Redes Islámicas Internacionales, y Temas del día: para ayudarlo a comprender los diferentes tipos de formas en que el islam y los musulmanes impactan en el mundo de hoy. Dos listas compuestas muestran cómo la influencia funciona de diferentes maneras.: InternationalIslamic Networks muestra a las personas que están al frente de importantes redes transnacionales de musulmanes, y Temas del día destaca a las personas cuya importancia se debe a los problemas actuales que afectan a la humanidad..

VIAJES ENTRE LOS VECINOS MUSULMANES DE EUROPA

Joost Lagendijk

Jan Marinus Wiersma

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union [], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, sin embargo,. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 De septiembre 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase

Yusuf Al-Qardhawi

What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?

Por “Movimiento Islámico”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heartthe latter being theweakest of beliefsso that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.

Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 De septiembre 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Sin embargo, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.