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ISLAM, LA DEMOCRACIA & EE.UU:

Fundación Córdoba

Abdullah Faliq

Introducción ,


A pesar de ser un debate perenne y complejo, Arches Quarterly reexamina desde bases teológicas y prácticas, el importante debate sobre la relación y compatibilidad entre Islam y Democracia, como se refleja en la agenda de esperanza y cambio de Barack Obama. Mientras que muchos celebran el ascenso de Obama a la Oficina Oval como una catarsis nacional para EE. UU., otros siguen siendo menos optimistas sobre un cambio de ideología y enfoque en el ámbito internacional. Si bien gran parte de la tensión y la desconfianza entre el mundo musulmán y los EE. UU. puede atribuirse al enfoque de promover la democracia, favoreciendo típicamente las dictaduras y los regímenes títeres que hablan de boquilla de los valores democráticos y los derechos humanos, la réplica de 9/11 realmente ha cimentado aún más las dudas a través de la posición de Estados Unidos sobre el Islam político. Ha creado un muro de negatividad según lo encontrado por worldpublicopinion.org, según la cual 67% de los egipcios cree que, globalmente, Estados Unidos está jugando un papel “principalmente negativo”.
Por lo tanto, la respuesta de Estados Unidos ha sido apta. Al elegir a Obama, muchos en todo el mundo están poniendo sus esperanzas en el desarrollo de una menos beligerante, pero una política exterior más justa hacia el mundo musulmán. La prueba para Obama, mientras discutimos, es cómo Estados Unidos y sus aliados promueven la democracia. ¿Estará facilitando o imponiendo?
Es más, ¿Puede ser un intermediario honesto en zonas prolongadas de confl ictos?? Aprovechar la experiencia y el conocimiento de prolifi
c eruditos, académica, periodistas y políticos experimentados, Arches Quarterly saca a la luz la relación entre el Islam y la democracia y el papel de Estados Unidos, así como los cambios provocados por Obama, en la búsqueda del terreno común. Anas Altikriti, el director general de la Fundación Córdoba ofrece el gambito de apertura de esta discusión, donde reflexiona sobre las esperanzas y los desafíos que quedan en el camino de Obama. Siguiendo a Altikriti, el ex asesor del presidente Nixon, El Dr. Robert Crane ofrece un análisis exhaustivo del principio islámico del derecho a la libertad. Anwar Abraham, ex viceprimer ministro de Malasia, enriquece la discusión con las realidades prácticas de la implementación de la democracia en las sociedades musulmanas dominantes, a saber,, en Indonesia y Malasia.
También contamos con la Dra Shireen Hunter, de la Universidad de Georgetown, EE.UU., que explora los países musulmanes rezagados en democratización y modernización. Esto se complementa con el escritor de terrorismo., La explicación del Dr. Nafeez Ahmed sobre la crisis de la posmodernidad y la
desaparición de la democracia. Dr. Daud Abdalá (Director de Monitor de Medios de Oriente Medio), alan hart (ex corresponsal de ITN y BBC Panorama; autor del sionismo: El verdadero enemigo de los judíos) y Asem Sondos (Editor del semanario Sawt Al Omma de Egipto) concentrarse en Obama y su papel frente a la promoción de la democracia en el mundo musulmán, así como las relaciones de Estados Unidos con Israel y la Hermandad Musulmana.
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Maldivas, Ahmed Shaheed especula sobre el futuro del Islam y la democracia; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlain
– un miembro del Sinn Féin que soportó cuatro años de prisión por actividades republicanas irlandesas y un activista de Guildford 4 y Birmingham 6, reflexiona sobre su reciente viaje a Gaza, donde fue testigo del impacto de la brutalidad y la injusticia cometida contra los palestinos; Dra. Marie Breen-Smyth, Director del Centro para el Estudio de la Radicalización y la Violencia Política Contemporánea analiza los desafíos de la investigación crítica del terror político; Dr. Khalid al-Mubarak, escritor y dramaturgo, analiza las perspectivas de paz en Darfur; y, finalmente, el periodista y activista de derechos humanos Ashur Shamis analiza críticamente la democratización y politización de los musulmanes en la actualidad..
Esperamos que todo esto sea una lectura comprensiva y una fuente de reflexión sobre temas que nos afectan a todos en un nuevo amanecer de esperanza..
Gracias

Cultura política islámica, Democracia, y Derechos Humanos

Daniel E. Precio

Se ha argumentado que el Islam facilita el autoritarismo., contradice los valores de las sociedades occidentales, y afecta significativamente importantes resultados políticos en las naciones musulmanas. Como consecuencia, eruditos, comentaristas, y los funcionarios del gobierno señalan con frecuencia al “fundamentalismo islámico” como la próxima amenaza ideológica para las democracias liberales. Esta vista, sin embargo,, se basa principalmente en el análisis de textos, teoría política islámica, y estudios ad hoc de países individuales, que no consideran otros factores. Es mi opinión que los textos y tradiciones del Islam, como los de otras religiones, se puede utilizar para apoyar una variedad de sistemas políticos y políticas. Los estudios descriptivos y específicos de países no nos ayudan a encontrar patrones que nos ayuden a explicar las diversas relaciones entre el Islam y la política en los países del mundo musulmán.. Por eso, un nuevo enfoque para el estudio de la
Se requiere una conexión entre el Islam y la política..
yo sugiero, a través de una evaluación rigurosa de la relación entre el Islam, la democracia, y derechos humanos a nivel transnacional, que se está poniendo demasiado énfasis en el poder del Islam como fuerza política. Primero utilizo estudios de casos comparativos, que se centran en factores relacionados con la interacción entre grupos y regímenes islámicos, influencias economicas, divisiones étnicas, y desarrollo social, para explicar la variación en la influencia del Islam en la política en ocho naciones. Argumento que gran parte del poder
atribuido al Islam como la fuerza impulsora detrás de las políticas y los sistemas políticos en las naciones musulmanas puede explicarse mejor por los factores mencionados anteriormente. yo tambien encuentro, contrario a la creencia común, que la creciente fuerza de los grupos políticos islámicos a menudo se ha asociado con una modesta pluralización de los sistemas políticos.
He construido un índice de la cultura política islámica, sobre la base de la medida en que se utiliza la ley islámica y si y, si es así, cómo,ideas occidentales, instituciones, y se implementan tecnologías, para probar la naturaleza de la relación entre el Islam y la democracia y el Islam y los derechos humanos. Este indicador se utiliza en el análisis estadístico., que incluye una muestra de veintitrés países predominantemente musulmanes y un grupo de control de veintitrés países en desarrollo no musulmanes. además de comparar
Naciones islámicas a naciones en desarrollo no islámicas, el análisis estadístico me permite controlar la influencia de otras variables que se han encontrado que afectan los niveles de democracia y la protección de los derechos individuales. El resultado debería ser una imagen más realista y precisa de la influencia del Islam en la política y las políticas..

PRECISIÓN EN LA GUERRA GLOBAL CONTRA EL TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Siete años después de septiembre 11, 2001 (9/11) ataques, muchos expertos creen que al-Qaeda ha recuperado fuerza y ​​que sus imitadores o afiliados son más letales que antes. La estimación de inteligencia nacional de 2007 afirmó que al-Qaeda es más peligrosa ahora que antes 9/11.1 Los emuladores de Al-Qaeda continúan amenazando a Occidente, Medio este, y naciones europeas, como en la trama frustrada en septiembre 2007 en Alemania. Bruce Riedel afirma: En gran parte gracias al afán de Washington de entrar en Irak en lugar de perseguir a los líderes de Al Qaeda., la organización ahora tiene una sólida base de operaciones en las tierras baldías de Pakistán y una franquicia efectiva en el oeste de Irak. Su alcance se ha extendido por todo el mundo musulmán y en Europa . . . Osama bin Laden ha montado una exitosa campaña de propaganda. . . . Sus ideas atraen ahora más seguidores que nunca.
Es cierto que siguen surgiendo diversas organizaciones salafistas-yihadistas en todo el mundo islámico. ¿Por qué las respuestas con muchos recursos al terrorismo islamista que llamamos yihad global no han demostrado ser extremadamente efectivas??
Pasando a las herramientas de “soft power”,¿Qué pasa con la eficacia de los esfuerzos occidentales para reforzar a los musulmanes en la Guerra Global contra el Terror? (GWOT)? ¿Por qué Estados Unidos ha ganado tan pocos “corazones y mentes” en el mundo islámico más amplio?? ¿Por qué los mensajes estratégicos estadounidenses sobre este tema juegan tan mal en la región?? Por qué, a pesar de la amplia desaprobación musulmana del extremismo, como se muestra en encuestas y declaraciones oficiales de líderes musulmanes clave, ¿Ha aumentado el apoyo a Bin Laden en Jordania y Pakistán??
Esta monografía no repasará los orígenes de la violencia islamista. En cambio, se refiere a un tipo de falla conceptual que construye erróneamente la GWOT y que desalienta a los musulmanes a apoyarla.. No pueden identificarse con las contramedidas transformadoras propuestas porque perciben algunas de sus creencias e instituciones centrales como objetivos en
este esfuerzo.
Varias tendencias profundamente problemáticas confunden las conceptualizaciones estadounidenses de la GWOT y los mensajes estratégicos elaborados para pelear esa guerra.. Estos evolucionan de (1) enfoques políticos poscoloniales hacia los musulmanes y las naciones de mayoría musulmana que varían mucho y, por lo tanto, producen impresiones y efectos contradictorios y confusos; y (2) ignorancia generalizada residual y prejuicio hacia el Islam y las culturas subregionales. Agregue a esta ira estadounidense, miedo, y la ansiedad por los eventos mortales de 9/11, y ciertos elementos que, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Los partidos de oposición islamistas y el potencial para el compromiso de la UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

A la luz de la creciente importancia de los movimientos islamistas en el mundo musulmán y

la forma en que la radicalización ha influido en los acontecimientos mundiales desde el cambio de siglo, eso

Es importante que la UE evalúe sus políticas hacia los actores dentro de lo que puede

llamado el "mundo islámico". Es particularmente importante preguntarse si y cómo involucrar

con los diversos grupos islamistas.

Esto sigue siendo controvertido incluso dentro de la UE.. Algunos sienten que los valores islámicos que

se encuentran detrás de los partidos islamistas son simplemente incompatibles con los ideales occidentales de democracia y

derechos humanos, mientras que otros ven el compromiso como una necesidad realista debido a la creciente

importancia doméstica de los partidos islamistas y su creciente participación en

asuntos. Otra perspectiva es que la democratización en el mundo musulmán aumentaría

seguridad europea. La validez de estos y otros argumentos sobre si y cómo el

La UE debe comprometerse solo puede probarse estudiando los diferentes movimientos islamistas y

sus circunstancias politicas, país por país.

La democratización es un tema central de las acciones de política exterior común de la UE, como se puso

en el artículo 11 del Tratado de la Unión Europea. Muchos de los estados considerados en este

informe no son democráticos, o no totalmente democrático. En la mayoría de estos países, islamista

partidos y movimientos constituyen una oposición significativa a los regímenes imperantes, y

en algunos forman el mayor bloque de oposición. Las democracias europeas han tenido que

hacer frente a los regímenes de gobierno que son autoritarios, pero es un fenómeno nuevo para presionar

para la reforma democrática en estados donde los beneficiarios más probables podrían haber, desde el

El punto de vista de la UE, enfoques diferentes y a veces problemáticos de la democracia y su

valores relacionados, como los derechos de las minorías y de las mujeres y el estado de derecho. Estos cargos son

a menudo contra los movimientos islamistas, por lo que es importante que los responsables políticos europeos

tener una imagen precisa de las políticas y filosofías de los socios potenciales.

Las experiencias de diferentes países tienden a sugerir que cuanto más libertad islamista

se permiten fiestas, cuanto más moderados son en sus acciones e ideas. En muchos

casos Hace tiempo que los partidos y grupos islamistas se han alejado de su objetivo original

de establecer un estado islámico regido por la ley islámica, y han llegado a aceptar lo básico

principios democráticos de la competencia electoral por el poder, la existencia de otras políticas

competidores, y pluralismo político.

Islam político en el Medio Oriente

Si Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, en

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(nombra y destituye a los gobernadores 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

ESTRATEGIAS PARA PARTICIPAR EN EL ISLAM POLÍTICO

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarmente, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. EE.UU.. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Mientras tanto, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

Partes islamistas : participación sin poder

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. In Egypt, la Hermandad Musulmana (MB) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

LOS MOVIMIENTOS ISLAMISTAS Y EL PROCESO DEMOCRÁTICO EN EL MUNDO ÁRABE: Explorando las zonas grises

Nathan J. Marrón, , Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Los movimientos islamistas, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, sin embargo,, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordania, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Política, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

RADICALIZACIÓN ISLAMISTA

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Islam político y política exterior europea

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Partes islamistas , SON DEMÓCRATAS? ¿Importa ?

Tarek Masoud

Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. Es más, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Por ejemplo, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.

Contra transformaciones en el centro y la periferia de la sociedad turca y el surgimiento del Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo

Ramin Ahmadov

The election results on November 3, 2002, which brought the Justice and Development Party into power, shocked many, but for varying reasons. Afterwards, some became more hopeful about future of their country, while others became even more doubtful and anxious, since for them the “republican regime” came under threat. These opposing responses, along with the perceptions that fueled them, neatly describe the two very different worlds that currently exist within Turkish society, and so it is important to think through many of the contested issues that have arisen as a result of these shifting political winds.
The winning Justice and Development Party (JDP) was established in 2001 by a group of politicians under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, many of whom split from the religio-political movement of Necmetiin Erbakan, the National Outlook Movement, and the Welfare Party. Curiosamente, in less than two years after its establishment, and at the first general election it participated in, the JDP received 34.29 % of the vote when all other established parties fell under the 10 % threshold. The only exception to this was the Republican People’s Party (19.38 %). The JDP captured 365 out of 550 seats in the parliament and therefore was given the opportunity of establishing the government alone, which is exactly what happened. Two years later, in the 2004 local elections, the JDP increased its votes to 41.46 %, while the RPP slightly decreased to 18.27 %, and the Nationalist Action Party increased to 10.10 % (de 8.35 % en 2002). Por último, in the most recent general elections in Turkey in 2007, which was marked by intense debate over presidential elections and an online military note, the JDP won nearly half of all votes, 46.58 %, and began its second term in power.

Turquía y la UE: Una encuesta sobre la visión de la UE miembros del Parlamento turco

Poder Bulbul

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (EU) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

demócratas celosos : ISLAMISMO Y DEMOCRACIA EN EGIPTO, INDONESIA Y TURQUÍA

Anthony Bubalo
Greg Fealy
Pentecostés Mason

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. Al mismo tiempo, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. En efecto, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

El éxito del Partido AK de Turquía no debe diluir las preocupaciones sobre los islamistas árabes

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on howIslamistscan pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “islamista” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamistsin the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenderswere always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamistalleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. De hecho, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhoodaside from the common faith of its membersthat it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, la “Oeste”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

reclamando el centro: Islam político en transición

John L. Edwards

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Irán, Sudán, Afganistán), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudán, Turquía, Irán, Líbano, Kuwait, Yemen, Jordania, Pakistán, Bangladesh, Malasia, Indonesia, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.