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El mañana árabe

david b. OTTAWAY

Octubre 6, 1981, estaba destinado a ser un día de celebración en Egipto. Marcó el aniversario del momento más grandioso de la victoria de Egipto en tres conflictos árabe-israelíes., cuando el ejército desvalido del país atravesó el Canal de Suez en los primeros días del 1973 Guerra de Yom Kippur y envió a las tropas israelíes tambaleándose en retirada. en un fresco, mañana sin nubes, El estadio de El Cairo estaba repleto de familias egipcias que habían venido a ver a los militares pavonearse con su hardware. En el estrado de revisión, Presidente Anwar el-Sadat,el arquitecto de la guerra, observó con satisfacción cómo hombres y máquinas desfilaban ante él. yo estaba cerca, un corresponsal extranjero recién llegado. De repente, uno de los camiones del ejército se detuvo justo frente a la plataforma de revisión justo cuando seis jets Mirage rugían sobre su cabeza en una actuación acrobática, pintando el cielo con largas estelas de rojo, amarillo, violeta,y humo verde. sadat se puso de pie, aparentemente preparándose para intercambiar saludos con otro contingente de tropas egipcias. Se convirtió en blanco perfecto para cuatro sicarios islamistas que saltaron del camión, subió al podio, y acribillaron su cuerpo a balazos. Mientras los asesinos continuaban durante lo que pareció una eternidad rociando el stand con su fuego mortal, Consideré por un instante si golpear el suelo y arriesgarme a ser pisoteado hasta la muerte por espectadores aterrorizados o permanecer en pie y arriesgarme a recibir una bala perdida.. El instinto me dijo que me quedara de pie, y mi sentido del deber periodístico me impulsó a ir a averiguar si Sadat estaba vivo o muerto.

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| Sep 26, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Desafiando el autoritarismo, Colonialismo, y desunión: Los movimientos de reforma política islámica de al-Afghani y Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first

quarter of the twentieth century. En particular,, the Ottoman Empire’s

power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.

But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and

sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.

Por lo tanto, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called

for political reform even before the European encroachment upon

Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, pero

also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (ley islámica). Sin embargo, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Por otra parte, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. En efecto,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, la

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Sin embargo, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, que

emphasized education and undermined politics.

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| Sep 02, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Continuidad organizacional en la Hermandad Musulmana de Egipto

Tess Eisenhart Lee

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Hermanos Musulmanes, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular

regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social

welfare services. Desde su fundación en 1928, the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) has thrived in a

parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with

ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, sin embargo,, the Brotherhood has

dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in

the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest

oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly

1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder

for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian

regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the

Arab world?

This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past

decade.

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| Sep 01, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Laicismo, Hermenéutica, e imperio: La política de la reforma islámica

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent

calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot

be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, particular

those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism

and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike

to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling

is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State

Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform

“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception

of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be

reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to

the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is

being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category

with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of

secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the

mundo musulman. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular

understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on

islam, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy

concerns in the Muslim world.

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| ago 27, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Manifiesto político de Hizbollah 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.

The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,

national, economic as well as social theft .

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| ago 27, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Cultura política islámica, Democracia, y Derechos Humanos

Daniel E. Precio

Se ha argumentado que el Islam facilita el autoritarismo., contradice el

valores de las sociedades occidentales, y afecta significativamente importantes resultados políticos

en las naciones musulmanas. Como consecuencia, eruditos, comentaristas, y gobierno

Los funcionarios apuntan con frecuencia al "fundamentalismo islámico" como el próximo

amenaza ideológica para las democracias liberales. Esta vista, sin embargo,, se basa principalmente

sobre el análisis de textos, teoría política islámica, y estudios ad hoc

de países individuales, que no consideran otros factores. es mi argumento

que los textos y tradiciones del Islam, como los de otras religiones,

se puede utilizar para apoyar una variedad de sistemas políticos y políticas. País

estudios específicos y descriptivos no nos ayudan a encontrar patrones que ayuden

Expliquemos las distintas relaciones entre el islam y la política en todo el mundo.

paises del mundo musulman. Por eso, un nuevo enfoque para el estudio de la

Se requiere una conexión entre el Islam y la política..

yo sugiero, a través de una evaluación rigurosa de la relación entre el Islam,

la democracia, y derechos humanos a nivel transnacional, que demasiado

se está poniendo énfasis en el poder del Islam como fuerza política. yo primero

utilizar estudios de casos comparativos, que se centran en factores relacionados con la interacción

entre grupos y regímenes islámicos, influencias economicas, divisiones étnicas,

y desarrollo social, para explicar la variación en la influencia de

Islam en la política a través de ocho naciones.

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| ago 24, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Cultura política islámica, Democracia, y Derechos Humanos

Daniel E. Precio

Se ha argumentado que el Islam facilita el autoritarismo., contradice el

valores de las sociedades occidentales, y afecta significativamente importantes resultados políticos

en las naciones musulmanas. Como consecuencia, eruditos, comentaristas, y gobierno

Los funcionarios apuntan con frecuencia al "fundamentalismo islámico" como el próximo

amenaza ideológica para las democracias liberales. Esta vista, sin embargo,, se basa principalmente

sobre el análisis de textos, teoría política islámica, y estudios ad hoc

de países individuales, que no consideran otros factores. es mi argumento

que los textos y tradiciones del Islam, como los de otras religiones,

se puede utilizar para apoyar una variedad de sistemas políticos y políticas. País

estudios específicos y descriptivos no nos ayudan a encontrar patrones que ayuden

Expliquemos las distintas relaciones entre el islam y la política en todo el mundo.

paises del mundo musulman. Por eso, un nuevo enfoque para el estudio de la

Se requiere una conexión entre el Islam y la política..

yo sugiero, a través de una evaluación rigurosa de la relación entre el Islam,

la democracia, y derechos humanos a nivel transnacional, que demasiado

se está poniendo énfasis en el poder del Islam como fuerza política. yo primero

utilizar estudios de casos comparativos, que se centran en factores relacionados con la interacción

entre grupos y regímenes islámicos, influencias economicas, divisiones étnicas,

y desarrollo social, para explicar la variación en la influencia de

Islam en la política a través de ocho naciones.

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| ago 22, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Los partidos de oposición islamistas y el potencial para el compromiso de la UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

A la luz de la creciente importancia de los movimientos islamistas en el mundo musulmán y

la forma en que la radicalización ha influido en los acontecimientos mundiales desde el cambio de siglo, eso

Es importante que la UE evalúe sus políticas hacia los actores dentro de lo que puede

llamado el "mundo islámico". Es particularmente importante preguntarse si y cómo involucrar

con los diversos grupos islamistas.

Esto sigue siendo controvertido incluso dentro de la UE.. Algunos sienten que los valores islámicos que

se encuentran detrás de los partidos islamistas son simplemente incompatibles con los ideales occidentales de democracia y

derechos humanos, mientras que otros ven el compromiso como una necesidad realista debido a la creciente

importancia doméstica de los partidos islamistas y su creciente participación en

asuntos. Otra perspectiva es que la democratización en el mundo musulmán aumentaría

seguridad europea. La validez de estos y otros argumentos sobre si y cómo el

La UE debe comprometerse solo puede probarse estudiando los diferentes movimientos islamistas y

sus circunstancias politicas, país por país.

La democratización es un tema central de las acciones de política exterior común de la UE, como se puso

en el artículo 11 del Tratado de la Unión Europea. Muchos de los estados considerados en este

informe no son democráticos, o no totalmente democrático. En la mayoría de estos países, islamista

partidos y movimientos constituyen una oposición significativa a los regímenes imperantes, y

en algunos forman el mayor bloque de oposición. Las democracias europeas han tenido que

hacer frente a los regímenes de gobierno que son autoritarios, pero es un fenómeno nuevo para presionar

para la reforma democrática en estados donde los beneficiarios más probables podrían haber, desde el

El punto de vista de la UE, enfoques diferentes y a veces problemáticos de la democracia y su

valores relacionados, como los derechos de las minorías y de las mujeres y el estado de derecho. Estos cargos son

a menudo contra los movimientos islamistas, por lo que es importante que los responsables políticos europeos

tener una imagen precisa de las políticas y filosofías de los socios potenciales.

Las experiencias de diferentes países tienden a sugerir que cuanto más libertad islamista

se permiten fiestas, cuanto más moderados son en sus acciones e ideas. En muchos

casos Hace tiempo que los partidos y grupos islamistas se han alejado de su objetivo original

de establecer un estado islámico regido por la ley islámica, y han llegado a aceptar lo básico

principios democráticos de la competencia electoral por el poder, la existencia de otras políticas

competidores, y pluralismo político.

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| ago 21, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Islam político en el Medio Oriente

Si Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, en

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(nombra y destituye a los gobernadores 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

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| ago 20, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Partes islamistas : ¿Por qué no pueden ser democráticos?

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, la democracia, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

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| ago 20, 2010 | Comentarios 0

ESTRATEGIAS PARA PARTICIPAR EN EL ISLAM POLÍTICO

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarmente, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. EE.UU.. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.

The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Mientras tanto, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.

The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

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| ago 19, 2010 | Comentarios 0

LOS MOVIMIENTOS ISLAMISTAS Y EL PROCESO DEMOCRÁTICO EN EL MUNDO ÁRABE: Explorando las zonas grises

Nathan J. Marrón, , Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Los movimientos islamistas, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,

by and large, have failed on all accounts.

Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate

threat, sin embargo,, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.

It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordania, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Política, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

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| ago 18, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Islam político y política exterior europea

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

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| ago 17, 2010 | Comentarios 0

NORMAS ISLÁMICAS SOBRE LA GUERRA

H Youssef. Aboul-Enein

Sherifa Zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

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| ago 13, 2010 | Comentarios 0

De movimiento rebelde a partido político

Alastair Crooke

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. In addition, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

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| ago 02, 2010 | Comentarios 0

Boletín de reforma árabe

group of researchers

Egipto: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy

The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final

approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.

The platform’s detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure

from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005

electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most

important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.

The document raises troubling questions, sin embargo,, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the

context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant

ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.

Primero, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. En

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,

especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in

Marruecos, Jordania, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and

the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious

activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, la

platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their

religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.

Segundo, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution

(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the

pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis

was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions

fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious

affiliation.

IPaper ZD Scribd

| ago 01, 2010 | Comentarios 0