Archive for September, 2010
误解的根源
易卜拉欣·卡林
九月过后 11, 伊斯兰教与西方之间长期曲折的关系进入了一个新阶段. 这些袭击被解释为实现了一个长期存在于西方意识中的预言, IE。, 伊斯兰教作为一个威胁性力量的到来，其明确意图是摧毁西方文明. 伊斯兰教作为暴力的表征, 好战的, 压迫性的宗教意识形态从电视节目和国家机关延伸到学校和互联网. 甚至有人建议马卡, 伊斯兰教最神圣的城市, 被“核弹”给所有穆斯林一个持久的教训. 尽管人们可以看到普遍的愤怒感, 敌意, 和报复作为对无辜生命的可恶损失的正常人类反应, 对穆斯林的妖魔化是更深层次的哲学和历史问题的结果.
以许多微妙的方式, 伊斯兰教和西方的悠久历史, 从八九世纪巴格达的神学辩论到十二、十三世纪安达卢西亚的集会经验, 告知每个文明相对于其他文明当前的看法和疑虑. 本文将考察这段历史的一些显着特征，并认为伊斯兰教的整体表现, 由一组高度复杂的图像制作者创建和维持, 智囊团, 学者, 说客, 政策制定者, 和媒体, 主宰当今西方良心, 起源于西方与伊斯兰世界的悠久历史. 还有人认为，对伊斯兰教和穆斯林的根深蒂固的疑虑已导致并将继续导致根本上存在缺陷和错误的政策决定，这些决定直接影响伊斯兰教与西方的当前关系. 9 月之后，许多美国人的头脑中几乎毫不含糊地将伊斯兰教与恐怖主义和极端主义等同起来 11 是两种历史误解所产生的结果, 下面会详细分析, 以及某些将对抗视为与伊斯兰世界打交道的唯一途径的利益集团的政治议程. 希望以下分析能够提供一个历史背景，让我们能够理解这些趋势及其对两个世界的影响.
西方的伊斯兰教
乔斯琳·塞萨里
穆斯林移民欧洲, 北美, 澳大利亚和随后发展起来的复杂的社会宗教动态使西方的伊斯兰教成为一个引人注目的新研究领域. 萨尔曼·拉什迪事件, 头巾争议, 对世贸中心的袭击, 以及对丹麦漫画的愤怒都是国际危机的例子，这些危机揭示了西方穆斯林与全球穆斯林世界之间的联系. 这些新情况对当代伊斯兰教的研究带来了理论和方法上的挑战, 我们避免将伊斯兰教或穆斯林本质化并抵制专注于安全和恐怖主义的话语的修辞结构已变得至关重要.
在本文中, 我认为伊斯兰教作为一种宗教传统是一个未知领域. 造成这种情况的一个初步原因是宗教作为研究对象没有达成共识. 宗教, 作为一门学科, 已成为历史之间的撕裂, 社会学, 和诠释学方法. 与伊斯兰教, 情况更加复杂. 在西方, 伊斯兰教研究始于东方学的一个分支，因此走上了一条与宗教研究不同的独特道路. 尽管对东方主义的批判对于伊斯兰研究在社会科学领域的出现起到了核心作用, 伊斯兰主义者与人类学家和社会学家之间的紧张关系仍然很强烈. 伊斯兰教和西方穆斯林的话题嵌入在这场斗争中. 这种方法论紧张的一个含义是，开始他们在法国学习伊斯兰教的学术生涯的伊斯兰教学生, 德国, 或者美国认为建立伊斯兰学者的信誉具有挑战性, 尤其是在北美学术界
语境.
职业, 殖民主义, 种族隔离?
人类科学研究委员会
南非人文科学研究委员会委托进行这项研究，以检验 John Dugard 教授在 1 月份提交给联合国人权理事会的报告中提出的假设 2007, 以联合国以色列占领的巴勒斯坦领土人权状况特别报告员的身份 (即, 西岸, 包括东耶路撒冷, 和
加沙, 以后选择). Dugard教授提出了这个问题: 以色列显然是对被占领土的军事占领. 同时, 占领的因素构成殖民主义和种族隔离的形式, 违反国际法的. 具有殖民主义和种族隔离特征的长期占领政权对被占领人民的法律后果是什么, 占领国和第三国?
为了考虑这些后果, 这项研究旨在合法地检查杜加德教授问题的前提: 以色列是 OPT 的占领者吗, 和, 如果是这样, 它对这些领土的占领是否构成殖民主义或种族隔离? 鉴于其痛苦的种族隔离历史，南非对这些问题有着明显的兴趣, 这意味着否认自决
对其大多数人口和, 在占领纳米比亚期间, 将种族隔离扩大到南非有效地寻求殖民的领土. 这些非法做法绝不能在其他地方复制: 其他民族绝不能像南非和纳米比亚人民那样遭受苦难.
探索这些问题, 组建了一个国际学者团队. 该项目的目的是从国际法的无党派角度审视局势, 而不是参与政治话语和修辞. 这项研究是为期 15 个月的深入研究协作过程的结果, 咨询, 写作和审查. 它总结和, 这是值得期待的, 有说服力地论证并清楚地表明，以色列, 自从 1967, 一直是 OPT 的交战占领国, 并且它对这些领土的占领已成为实施种族隔离制度的殖民企业. 交战占领本身并不是非法情况: 它被认为是武装冲突的可能后果. 同时, 根据武装冲突法 (也称为国际人道法), 占领只是一种暂时的状态. 国际法禁止以武力威胁或使用武力的方式单方面吞并或永久获取领土: 如果发生这种情况, 任何国家不得承认或支持由此产生的非法情况. 相对于职业, 殖民主义和种族隔离总是非法的，并且确实被认为是特别严重的违反国际法的行为，因为它们从根本上违背了国际法律秩序的核心价值观. 殖民主义违反自决原则,
其中国际法院 (国际法院) 被确认为“当代国际法的基本原则之一”. 所有国家都有义务尊重和促进自决. 种族隔离是种族歧视的严重案例, 根据《禁止并惩治种族隔离罪行国际公约》构成 (1973,
此后的“种族隔离公约”) “为了建立和维持一个种族群体对任何其他种族群体的统治并有系统地压迫他们而实施的不人道行为”. 种族隔离的做法, 而且, 是国际犯罪.
Dugard 教授在其向联合国人权理事会提交的报告中 2007 建议应就以色列行为的法律后果征求国际法院的咨询意见. 这一咨询意见无疑将补充国际法院在 2004 关于在被占巴勒斯坦领土修建隔离墙的法律后果 (此后的“墙咨询意见”). 这一法律行动过程并未穷尽国际社会可以选择的选项, 第三国和国际组织在被评估为另一国从事殖民主义或种族隔离做法时的义务.
伊斯兰教, 民主 & 美国:
科尔多瓦基金会
阿卜杜拉·法利克 |
介绍 ,
尽管这是一场长期而复杂的辩论, Arches Quarterly 从神学和实践的角度重新审视, 关于伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系和兼容性的重要辩论, 正如巴拉克奥巴马的希望和变革议程所呼应的那样. 虽然许多人庆祝奥巴马登上椭圆形办公室作为美国的全国宣泄者, 其他人对国际舞台上意识形态和方法的转变仍然不乐观. 虽然穆斯林世界和美国之间的许多紧张局势和不信任可归因于促进民主的方法, 通常偏爱专制政权和伪造政权，这些政权为民主价值观和人权提供口红, 余震 9/11 通过美国在政治伊斯兰上的立场，确实进一步加剧了担忧. 它创造了由worldpublicopinion.org发现的负面墙, 根据该 67% 的埃及人认为，全球范围内，美国正在扮演“主要消极”角色.
因此，美国的反应很贴切. 通过选举奥巴马, 世界各地的许多人都寄希望于发展一个不太好战的人, 但对穆斯林世界更公平的外交政策. 奥巴马的考验, 当我们讨论, 是美国及其盟友促进民主的方式. 它会促进还是强加?
而且, 它能否成为长期冲突地区的诚实经纪人？? 吸收 prolifi 的专业知识和洞察力
c学者, 学者, 经验丰富的记者和政治家, Arches Quarterly 揭示了伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系以及美国的角色——以及奥巴马带来的变化, 在寻求共同点. 阿纳斯·阿尔蒂克里蒂, The e Cordoba Foundation 的首席执行官为这次讨论提供了开场白, 他反思了奥巴马道路上的希望和挑战. 跟随 Altikriti, 尼克松总统的前顾问, 罗伯特·克莱恩（Robert Craneoff）博士对伊斯兰自由权原则进行了透彻的分析. 安瓦尔·易卜拉欣, 马来西亚前副总理, 通过在穆斯林占主导地位的社会中实施民主的实际现实来丰富讨论, 即, 在印度尼西亚和马来西亚.
我们也有Shireen Hunter博士, 乔治敦大学, 美国, 探索落后于民主化和现代化的穆斯林国家. 恐怖主义作家对此予以补充, 纳菲兹·艾哈迈德（Nafeez Ahmed）博士对后现代危机和
民主的灭亡. Daud Abdullah博士 (中东媒体监控总监), 艾伦·哈特 (前ITN和BBC Panorama通讯员; 犹太复国主义的作者: 犹太人的真正敌人) 和Asem Sondos (埃及《 Sawt Al Omma》杂志编辑) 专注于奥巴马及其在穆斯林世界促进民主方面的作用, 以及美国与以色列和穆斯林兄弟会的关系.
外交部长, 马尔代夫, 艾哈迈德·沙希德 (Ahmed Shaheed) 推测伊斯兰教和民主的未来; 克莱尔. 格里·麦克洛克林
– 因爱尔兰共和党活动而入狱四年的新芬党成员和吉尔福德的活动家 4 和伯明翰 6, 反映了他最近去加沙的旅行，在那里他目睹了对巴勒斯坦人的残暴和不公正的影响; 玛丽·布林-史密斯博士, 激进化和当代政治暴力研究中心主任讨论批判性研究政治恐怖的挑战; 哈立德·穆巴拉克博士, 作家和剧作家, 讨论达尔富尔和平的前景; 最后，记者和人权活动家 Ashur Shamis 批判性地审视了当今穆斯林的民主化和政治化.
我们希望所有这些都有助于在新的希望曙光中对影响我们所有人的问题进行全面的阅读和反思.
谢谢
美国哈马斯政策阻碍中东和平
亨利·西格曼
过去的双边会谈失败 16 多年的经验表明，中东和平协议永远不可能靠各方自己达成. 以色列政府相信他们可以无视国际社会对其在约旦河西岸的非法殖民项目的谴责，因为他们可以指望美国反对国际制裁. 不受美国制定的参数框架的双边会谈 (根据安全理事会决议, 奥斯陆协定, 阿拉伯和平倡议, “路线图”和其他以前的巴以协议) 不能成功. 以色列政府认为，美国国会不会允许美国总统发布此类参数并要求其接受. 9月在华盛顿特区恢复双边会谈有什么希望 2 完全取决于奥巴马总统证明这种信念是错误的, 以及他承诺的“过渡建议”是否, 如果谈判陷入僵局, 是提交美式参数的委婉说法. 这样的美国倡议必须为以色列在其 1967 年前边界内的安全提供铁定的保证, 但同时必须明确指出，如果以色列坚持不让巴勒斯坦人在约旦河西岸和加沙建立一个可行的主权国家，这些保证是不可用的. 本文重点讨论永久地位协议的另一个主要障碍: 缺乏有效的巴勒斯坦对话者. 解决哈马斯的正当不满——正如中央司令部最近的一份报告所指出的那样, 哈马斯有正当的不满——可能导致其重返巴勒斯坦联合政府，为以色列提供可靠的和平伙伴. 如果由于哈马斯的拒绝主义而导致外展失败, 该组织阻止其他巴勒斯坦政党谈判达成的合理协议的能力将受到严重阻碍. 如果奥巴马政府不领导一项国际倡议，以定义巴以协议的内容，并积极促进巴勒斯坦政治和解, 欧洲必须这样做, 希望美国能效法. 不幸, 没有银弹可以保证“两国在和平与安全中并存”的目标。
但是，奥巴马总统目前的做法绝对不能.
再谈伊斯兰教
马哈·阿扎姆（MAHA AZZAM）
围绕所谓的伊斯兰教存在着政治和安全危机, 一场先例已久的危机 9/11. 在过去的 25 年份, 关于如何解释和打击伊斯兰教有不同的侧重点. 分析师和决策者
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
由于恐怖袭击反过来影响了对移民的态度，西方对伊斯兰教的敌意和恐惧日益加剧，今天的情况变得更加复杂, 宗教和文化. umma 或信徒社区的边界已从穆斯林国家延伸到欧洲城市. 只要有穆斯林社区，乌玛就可能存在. 在融入周围社区的感觉不明确且歧视可能很明显的环境中，共同信仰的归属感会增加. 对社会价值观的排斥越大,
无论是在西方还是在穆斯林国家, 伊斯兰教作为一种文化认同和价值体系的道德力量得到更大的巩固.
在伦敦发生爆炸事件之后 7 七月 2005 越来越明显的是，一些年轻人将宗教承诺作为表达种族的一种方式. 全球穆斯林之间的联系以及他们认为穆斯林易受伤害的看法，导致世界不同地区的许多人将当地的困境融入到更广泛的穆斯林困境中, 有文化认同, 主要或部分, 具有广泛定义的伊斯兰教.
伊斯兰教与法治
比吉特·克拉维茨
赫尔穆特·赖菲尔德
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. 同时, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权
丹尼尔（Daniele）. 价钱
有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 与西方社会的价值观相矛盾, 并显着影响穆斯林国家的重要政治成果. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 政府官员经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是对自由民主国家的下一个意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要基于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和个别国家的特别研究, 不考虑其他因素. 我的论点是伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样, 可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 特定国家和描述性研究无法帮助我们找到有助于我们解释穆斯林世界各国伊斯兰教与政治之间不同关系的模式. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系, 民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 过分强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我首先使用比较案例研究, 重点关注与伊斯兰团体和政权之间的相互作用有关的因素, 经济影响, 种族分裂, 和社会发展, 解释伊斯兰教对八个国家政治影响的差异. 我认为大部分的权力
归因于伊斯兰教作为穆斯林国家政策和政治制度背后的驱动力，可以通过前面提到的因素更好地解释. 我也发现, 与普遍看法相反, 伊斯兰政治团体的日益强大往往与政治体系的适度多元化有关.
我构建了一个伊斯兰政治文化指数, 基于伊斯兰法律的使用程度以及是否和, 如果是这样, 如何,西方观念, 机构, 和技术被实施, 检验伊斯兰教与民主以及伊斯兰教与人权之间关系的性质. 该指标用于统计分析, 其中包括 23 个以穆斯林为主的国家的样本和 23 个非穆斯林发展中国家的对照组. 除了比较
伊斯兰国家到非伊斯兰发展中国家, 统计分析使我能够控制已发现影响民主水平和保护个人权利的其他变量的影响. 结果应该是对伊斯兰教对政治和政策的影响的更现实和准确的描述.
全球反恐战争中的精准:
Sherifa Zuhur
九月之后的七年 11, 2001 (9/11) 攻击, 许多专家认为，基地组织已经恢复了力量，其模仿者或分支机构比以前更具杀伤力. 国家情报估计 2007 断言基地组织现在比以前更危险 9/11.1 基地组织的模仿者继续威胁西方, 中东, 和欧洲国家, 就像在九月被挫败的情节一样 2007 在德国. 布鲁斯·里德尔说: 很大程度上要归功于华盛顿急于进入伊拉克而不是追捕基地组织的领导人, 该组织现在在巴基斯坦的荒地拥有坚实的业务基础，并在伊拉克西部拥有有效的特许经营权. 它的影响力遍及整个穆斯林世界和欧洲 . . . 奥萨马·本·拉登开展了一场成功的宣传活动. . . . 他的想法现在吸引了比以往更多的追随者.
确实，各种萨拉菲圣战组织仍在整个伊斯兰世界中出现. 为什么对我们称之为全球圣战的伊斯兰恐怖主义的大量资源反应没有证明非常有效?
转向“软实力”工具,” 西方在全球反恐战争中支持穆斯林的努力效果如何？ (长城汽车)? 为什么美国在更广泛的伊斯兰世界中赢得如此少的“民心”? 为什么美国在这个问题上的战略信息在该地区发挥如此糟糕? 为什么, 尽管穆斯林普遍反对极端主义，正如主要穆斯林领导人的调查和官方言论所示, 约旦和巴基斯坦对本拉登的支持实际上有所增加?
本专着不会重新审视伊斯兰暴力的起源. 相反，它关注的是一种错误地构建 GWOT 并阻止穆斯林支持它的概念上的失败. 他们无法认同提议的变革性对策，因为他们将自己的一些核心信念和制度视为目标
这种努力.
几个严重成问题的趋势混淆了美国对 GWOT 的概念化以及为打这场战争而制定的战略信息. 这些演变自 (1) 对穆斯林和穆斯林占多数的国家的后殖民政治方法差异很大，因此产生了相互矛盾和令人困惑的印象和效果; 和 (2) 对伊斯兰教和次区域文化的普遍无知和偏见. 增加美国人的愤怒, 恐惧, 和对致命事件的焦虑 9/11, 和某些元素, 尽管有冷静的头脑的敦促, 让穆斯林和他们的宗教为他们的同教者的罪行负责, 或出于政治原因认为这样做有用的人.
辩论阿拉伯世界的民主
易卜生·易卜拉欣|
什么是民主?
西方学者将民主定义为保护个人公民权利和政治权利的方法. 它提供言论自由, 按, 信仰, 观点, 所有权, 和组装, 以及投票权, 提名和寻求公职. 亨廷顿 (1984) 认为一个政治制度是民主的，因为它最强大的集体决策者是通过以下方式选出的
定期选举，候选人自由竞争选票，几乎所有成年人都有投票权. 罗斯坦 (1995) 指出民主是一种政府形式和一种治理过程，可以根据情况改变和适应. 他还补充说，西方对民主的定义 — 除了问责, 竞赛, 一定程度的参与 — 包含对重要公民权利和政治权利的保障. 安德森 (1995) 认为民主一词是指通过定期选举选出最有权势的集体决策者的制度，在该制度中，候选人可以自由竞争选票，并且几乎所有成年人都有资格投票. 萨德·埃丁·易卜拉欣 (1995), 埃及学者, 将可能适用于阿拉伯世界的民主视为一套旨在通过和平方式进行治理的规则和制度
管理竞争团体和/或利益冲突. 然而, 萨米尔·阿明 (1991) 将他的民主定义建立在社会马克思主义的观点之上. 他把民主分为两类: 以个人权利和个人自由为基础的资产阶级民主, 但没有社会平等; 和政治民主，赋予社会上所有人投票和选举其政府和机构代表的权利，这将有助于获得他们平等的社会权利.
结束本节, 我想说，没有一个单一的民主定义可以准确地表明它是什么或不是什么. 然而, 正如我们注意到的, 上面提到的大多数定义都有基本的相似元素 – 问责制, 竞赛, 和一定程度的参与 – 已在西方世界和国际上占据主导地位.
民主, 选举和埃及穆斯林兄弟会
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (兆字节), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
埃及的穆斯林兄弟: 对抗或整合?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 选举. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. 同时, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
伊斯兰教与民主: 文本, 传统, 和历史
阿勒·艾哈迈德（Ahrar Ahmad）
Popular stereotypes in the West tend to posit a progressive, rational, and free West against a backward, oppressive, and threatening Islam. Public opinion polls conducted in the United States during the 1990s revealed a consistent pattern of Americans labeling Muslims as “religious fanatics” and considering Islam’s ethos as fundamentally “anti-democratic.”1 These characterizations
and misgivings have, for obvious reasons, significantly worsened since the tragedy of 9/11. 然而, these perceptions are not reflected merely in the popular consciousness or crude media representations. Respected scholars also have contributed to this climate of opinion by writing about the supposedly irreconcilable differences between Islam and the West, the famous “clash of civilizations” that is supposed to be imminent and inevitable, and about the seeming incompatibility between Islam and democracy. 例如, Professor Peter Rodman worries that “we are challenged from the outside by a militant atavistic force driven by hatred of all Western political thought harking back to age-old grievances against Christendom.” Dr. Daniel Pipes proclaims that the Muslims challenge the West more profoundly than the communists ever did, for “while the Communists disagree with our policies, the fundamentalist Muslims despise our whole way of life.” Professor Bernard Lewis warns darkly about “the historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo–Christian heritage, our secular present, and the expansion of both.” Professor Amos Perlmutter asks: “Is Islam, fundamentalist or otherwise, compatible with human-rights oriented Western style representative democracy? The answer is an emphatic NO.” And Professor Samuel Huntington suggests with a flourish that “the problem is not Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam itself.” It would be intellectually lazy and simple-minded to dismiss their positions as based merely on spite or prejudice. 实际上, if one ignores some rhetorical overkill, some of their charges, though awkward for Muslims, are relevant to a discussion of the relationship between Islam and democracy in the modern world. 例如, the position of women or sometimes non-Muslims in some Muslim countries is problematic in terms of the supposed legal equality of all people in a democracy. 相似地, the intolerance directed by some Muslims against writers (e.g., Salman Rushdie in the UK, Taslima Nasrin in Bangladesh, and Professor Nasr Abu Zaid in Egypt) ostensibly jeopardizes the principle of free speech, which is essential to a democracy.
It is also true that less than 10 of the more than 50 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have institutionalized democratic principles or processes as understood in the West, and that too, only tentatively. 最后, the kind of internal stability and external peace that is almost a prerequisite for a democracy to function is vitiated by the turbulence of internal implosion or external aggression evident in many Muslim countries today (e.g., 索马里, 苏丹, 印度尼西亚, 巴基斯坦, 伊拉克, 阿富汗, 阿尔及利亚, and Bosnia).
伊拉克与政治伊斯兰的未来
詹姆斯·皮斯卡托里
Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(A) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(乙) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.
伊斯兰教与民主
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
寻找伊斯兰宪政
纳迪西亚·霍根
While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. 例如, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. 然而, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
First, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts
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