中的所有条目 "约旦" 类别
阿拉伯明天
大卫·B. OTTAWAY
十月 6, 1981, 本来是在埃及庆祝的一天. 它标志着埃及在三项阿以冲突中取得最伟大胜利的周年纪念日, 在开国之日，该国的失败者军队冲过苏伊士运河 1973 赎罪日战争，使以色列军队退缩. 酷, 万里无云的早晨, 开罗体育馆里挤满了埃及家庭，他们前来参观是为了看准军事力量。, 总统安瓦尔·萨达特,战争的建筑师, 人和机器在他面前游行时满意地看着. 我在附近, 刚到的外国记者, 六架幻影喷气式飞机在杂技表演中高高呼啸，其中一辆军车直接停在了检阅台前, 用长长的红色画天空, 黄色, 紫色,和绿色的烟雾. 萨达特站了起来, 显然准备与另一支埃及军队交换礼炮. 他使自己成为四名从卡车上跳下来的伊斯兰刺客的理想目标。, 冲上领奖台, 随着子弹的杀手不断地向他们的致命之火喷洒架子, 我考虑了一下是跌倒在地，冒着被惊恐的观众踩死的危险，还是保持脚步并冒着流弹的风险. 本能告诉我要站稳脚跟, 我的新闻责任感促使我去寻找萨达特是活着还是死了.
伊斯兰教, 政治伊斯兰教与美国
阿拉伯洞察力
与美国的“兄弟情谊”是否可能?
哈利勒阿纳尼
“没有机会与任何美国沟通. 只要美国坚持其长期以来将伊斯兰教视为真正危险的观点, 一种将美国与犹太复国主义敌人置于同一条船上的观点. 我们对美国人民或美国没有先入为主的观念. 社会及其民间组织和智囊团. 我们与美国人民的沟通没有问题，但没有做出足够的努力来拉近我们的距离,”博士说. 伊萨姆·伊里安, 穆斯林兄弟会政治部负责人接受电话采访.
Al-Iryan的话总结了穆斯林兄弟会对美国人民和美国的看法. 政府. 穆斯林兄弟会的其他成员会同意, 已故的哈桑·班纳也是如此, 谁在 1928. 铝- 版纳主要将西方视为道德败坏的象征. 其他萨拉菲派——一个以祖先为楷模的伊斯兰学派——对美国也持同样的看法, 但缺乏穆斯林兄弟会拥护的意识形态灵活性. 虽然穆斯林兄弟会相信让美国人参与民间对话, 其他极端组织认为对话没有意义，并认为武力是与美国打交道的唯一方式.
再谈伊斯兰教
马哈·阿扎姆（MAHA AZZAM）
围绕所谓的伊斯兰教存在着政治和安全危机, 一场先例已久的危机 9/11. 在过去的 25 年份, 关于如何解释和打击伊斯兰教有不同的侧重点. 分析师和决策者
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
由于恐怖袭击反过来影响了对移民的态度，西方对伊斯兰教的敌意和恐惧日益加剧，今天的情况变得更加复杂, 宗教和文化. umma 或信徒社区的边界已从穆斯林国家延伸到欧洲城市. 只要有穆斯林社区，乌玛就可能存在. 在融入周围社区的感觉不明确且歧视可能很明显的环境中，共同信仰的归属感会增加. 对社会价值观的排斥越大,
无论是在西方还是在穆斯林国家, 伊斯兰教作为一种文化认同和价值体系的道德力量得到更大的巩固.
在伦敦发生爆炸事件之后 7 七月 2005 越来越明显的是，一些年轻人将宗教承诺作为表达种族的一种方式. 全球穆斯林之间的联系以及他们认为穆斯林易受伤害的看法，导致世界不同地区的许多人将当地的困境融入到更广泛的穆斯林困境中, 有文化认同, 主要或部分, 具有广泛定义的伊斯兰教.
伊斯兰教与法治
比吉特·克拉维茨
赫尔穆特·赖菲尔德
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. 同时, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权
丹尼尔（Daniele）. 价钱
有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 与西方社会的价值观相矛盾, 并显着影响穆斯林国家的重要政治成果. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 政府官员经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是对自由民主国家的下一个意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要基于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和个别国家的特别研究, 不考虑其他因素. 我的论点是伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样, 可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 特定国家和描述性研究无法帮助我们找到有助于我们解释穆斯林世界各国伊斯兰教与政治之间不同关系的模式. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系, 民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 过分强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我首先使用比较案例研究, 重点关注与伊斯兰团体和政权之间的相互作用有关的因素, 经济影响, 种族分裂, 和社会发展, 解释伊斯兰教对八个国家政治影响的差异. 我认为大部分的权力
归因于伊斯兰教作为穆斯林国家政策和政治制度背后的驱动力，可以通过前面提到的因素更好地解释. 我也发现, 与普遍看法相反, 伊斯兰政治团体的日益强大往往与政治体系的适度多元化有关.
我构建了一个伊斯兰政治文化指数, 基于伊斯兰法律的使用程度以及是否和, 如果是这样, 如何,西方观念, 机构, 和技术被实施, 检验伊斯兰教与民主以及伊斯兰教与人权之间关系的性质. 该指标用于统计分析, 其中包括 23 个以穆斯林为主的国家的样本和 23 个非穆斯林发展中国家的对照组. 除了比较
伊斯兰国家到非伊斯兰发展中国家, 统计分析使我能够控制已发现影响民主水平和保护个人权利的其他变量的影响. 结果应该是对伊斯兰教对政治和政策的影响的更现实和准确的描述.
伊斯兰教与民主
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
挑战威权主义, 殖民主义, 和不团结: 阿富汗和里达的伊斯兰政治改革运动
艾哈迈德·阿里·塞勒姆
The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most
Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet
some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
所以, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). 然而, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. 的确,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, 这
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. 然而, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
埃及处于临界点 ?
大卫·B. 奥特韦
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, 霍斯尼·穆巴拉克（Hosni Mubarak）, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 至 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.
埃及穆斯林兄弟会的组织连续性
苔丝·李·艾森哈特
As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of
Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (兄弟会) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, 然而, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores
the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.
一个穆斯林群岛
最大L. 毛
This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.
伊斯兰政治思想中的民主
Azzam S. 塔米米
Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, 在 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, 在 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.
伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权
丹尼尔（Daniele）. 价钱
有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 矛盾的
西方社会的价值观, 并显着影响重要的政治结果
在穆斯林国家. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 和政府
官员们经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是下一个
对自由民主国家的意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要是基于
关于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和特别研究
个别国家, 不考虑其他因素. 这是我的争论
伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样,
可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 国家
具体的和描述性的研究并不能帮助我们找到有帮助的模式
我们解释伊斯兰教与政治之间的不同关系
穆斯林世界的国家. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系,
民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 太多了
强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我先来
使用比较案例研究, 关注与相互作用相关的因素
伊斯兰团体和政权之间, 经济影响, 种族分裂,
和社会发展, 解释影响的差异
八个国家的伊斯兰教政治.
伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权
丹尼尔（Daniele）. 价钱
有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 矛盾的
西方社会的价值观, 并显着影响重要的政治结果
在穆斯林国家. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 和政府
官员们经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是下一个
对自由民主国家的意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要是基于
关于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和特别研究
个别国家, 不考虑其他因素. 这是我的争论
伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样,
可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 国家
具体的和描述性的研究并不能帮助我们找到有帮助的模式
我们解释伊斯兰教与政治之间的不同关系
穆斯林世界的国家. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系,
民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 太多了
强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我先来
使用比较案例研究, 关注与相互作用相关的因素
伊斯兰团体和政权之间, 经济影响, 种族分裂,
和社会发展, 解释影响的差异
八个国家的伊斯兰教政治.
伊斯兰反对党和欧盟参与的潜力
托比·阿切尔
海蒂·休塔宁（Heidi Huuhtanen）
鉴于伊斯兰运动在穆斯林世界和
自世纪之交以来，激进化对全球事件的影响方式, 它
对于欧盟来说，在可以松散的范围内评估其对参与者的政策很重要
被称为“伊斯兰世界”. 询问是否以及如何参与尤为重要
与各种伊斯兰团体.
即使在欧盟内部，这仍然存在争议. 有些人认为伊斯兰价值观
落后于伊斯兰政党与西方的民主理想和
人权, 而其他人则将参与视为现实的必要性，因为日益增长的
伊斯兰政党在国内的重要性及其日益参与国际事务
事务. 另一种观点是，穆斯林世界的民主化将会增加
欧洲安全. 这些和其他关于是否以及如何
欧盟是否应该参与只能通过研究不同的伊斯兰运动和
他们的政治环境, 逐个国家.
民主化是欧盟共同外交政策行动的中心主题, 铺设
在文章中 11 欧盟条约. 在此考虑的许多州
举报不民主, 或不完全民主. 在这些国家中的大多数, 伊斯兰主义者
政党和运动构成了对现行政权的重大反对, 和
在一些地区，他们形成了最大的反对派集团. 欧洲民主国家长期以来不得不
处理专制的统治政权, 但这是一个新现象
在最有可能受益者可能拥有的国家进行民主改革, 来自
欧盟的观点, 不同的，有时是有问题的民主方法及其
相关值, 例如少数民族和妇女权利和法治. 这些费用是
经常反对伊斯兰运动, 因此，对于欧洲政策制定者来说，重要的是
准确了解潜在合作伙伴的政策和理念.
来自不同国家的经验往往表明，更自由的伊斯兰主义者
允许聚会, 他们的行动和想法越温和. 在许多
伊斯兰政党和团体早已偏离了最初的目标
建立一个受伊斯兰法律管辖的伊斯兰国家, 并开始接受基本的
选举权力的民主原则, 其他政治的存在
竞争对手, 和政治多元化.
中东的政治伊斯兰教
是努森
This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly
referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, 在
particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may
be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report
回顾一些用来解释中东伊斯兰复兴的主要理论
(数字 1). 简单来说, 报告表明，伊斯兰教不必与民主和
有一种趋势是忽视许多中东国家已经
参与了对伊斯兰运动的残酷镇压, 导致他们, 有人争辩, 占用
反对国家的武器, 更罕见的是, 外国. 使用政治暴力是
广泛分布于中东, 但既不不合逻辑也不非理性. 在很多情况下甚至
以使用暴力而闻名的伊斯兰团体已转变为和平的政治组织
政党成功参加市政和全国选举. 尽管如此, 伊斯兰主义者
尽管有许多理论试图
说明它的增长和受欢迎的吸引力. 一般来说, 大多数理论认为伊斯兰主义是
对相对剥夺的反应, 尤其是社会不平等和政治压迫. 选择
理论在宗教本身和宗教的范围内寻求伊斯兰复兴的答案
强大的, 宗教象征的唤起潜力.
结论主张超越“悲观与厄运”的方法，即
将伊斯兰主义描绘成一种非法的政治表达和对西方的潜在威胁 (“老的
伊斯兰主义”), 以及对当前伊斯兰主义民主化的更细致入微的理解
现在正在整个中东发生的运动 (“新伊斯兰主义”). 这个
importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded
along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their
adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on
understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only
社会中较贫穷的阶层，但也属于中产阶级.参与政治伊斯兰的策略
沙迪哈米德
阿曼达·卡德莱克（AMANDA KADLEC）
政治伊斯兰教是当今中东地区最活跃的政治力量. 它的未来与该地区的未来密切相关. 如果美国和欧盟致力于支持该地区的政治改革, 他们需要设计具体的, 参与伊斯兰团体的连贯战略. 然而, 美国. 普遍不愿意与这些运动展开对话. 相似地, 欧盟与伊斯兰主义者的接触是个例外, 不是规则. 存在低级联系人的地方, 它们主要用于信息收集目的, 不是战略目标. 美国. 和欧盟有许多解决该地区经济和政治发展的计划——其中包括中东伙伴关系倡议 (美皮), 千年挑战公司 (中冶), 地中海联盟, 和欧洲睦邻政策 (ENP) - 然而，他们对伊斯兰政治反对派的挑战如何适应更广泛的区域目标几乎没有什么可说的. 我们. 和欧盟的民主援助和规划几乎完全针对威权政府本身或世俗的民间社会团体，在他们自己的社会中得到的支持很少.
重新评估现行政策的时机已经成熟. 自九月恐怖袭击以来 11, 2001, 支持中东民主对西方政策制定者来说具有更大的重要性, 谁看到了缺乏民主和政治暴力之间的联系. 人们更加关注理解政治伊斯兰内部的变化. 美国新政府更愿意扩大与穆斯林世界的交流. 同时, 绝大多数主流伊斯兰组织——包括埃及的穆斯林兄弟会, 约旦的伊斯兰行动阵线 (印度空军), 摩洛哥正义与发展党 (PJD), 科威特伊斯兰立宪运动, 和也门伊斯兰党——越来越多地将支持政治改革和民主作为其政治纲领的核心组成部分. 此外, 许多人表示有兴趣与美国展开对话. 和欧盟政府.
西方国家与中东关系的未来可能在很大程度上取决于前者与非暴力伊斯兰政党就共同利益和目标进行广泛对话的程度. 最近有大量关于与伊斯兰主义者接触的研究, 但很少有人清楚地说明它在实践中可能需要什么. 佐伊·诺特, 德国外交关系委员会访问学者, 把它, “欧盟正在考虑参与，但并不真正知道如何参与。”1 希望澄清讨论, 我们区分了三个级别的“参与度”,”每个都有不同的手段和目的: 低级接触, 战略对话, 和伙伴关系.
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