RSS中的所有条目 "兄弟会 & 西" 类别

伊斯兰改革

阿德南汗

意大利总理, 西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)在事件发生后吹嘘 9/11:
“……我们必须意识到我们文明的优越性, 一个保证了的系统

福祉, 尊重人权和 – 与伊斯兰国家相反 – 尊重

为了宗教和政治权利, 一个有其价值观的系统 对多样性的理解

和宽容……西方将征服人民, 就像它征服了共产主义, 即使它

意味着与另一个文明的对抗, 伊斯兰的, 卡在原来的地方

1,400 几年前……”1

并且在一个 2007 报告兰德研究所宣布:
“穆斯林世界大部分地区正在进行的斗争本质上是一场

想法. 其结果将决定穆斯林世界的未来方向。”

建立温和的穆斯林网络, 兰德研究所

“伊斯拉”的概念 (改革) 是穆斯林不知道的概念. 它从未存在于整个

伊斯兰文明史; 它从未被辩论甚至考虑过. 对古典的粗略一瞥

伊斯兰文学告诉我们,当古典学者奠定了usul的基础时, 并编纂

他们的伊斯兰裁决 (菲格) 他们只是在寻求对伊斯兰规则的理解,以便

应用它们. 当为圣训制定规则时,也发生了类似的情况, 塔夫西尔和

阿拉伯语. 学者, 伊斯兰历史上的思想家和知识分子花了很多时间

理解真主的启示——古兰经,并将 ayaat 应用于现实并创造

校长和学科,以促进理解. 因此,古兰经仍然是

研究和发展的所有学科始终以古兰经为基础. 那些成为

被希腊哲学迷住了,例如穆斯林哲学家和一些来自 Mut'azilah

由于古兰经不再是他们学习的基础,他们被认为已经离开了伊斯兰教的圈子. 因此对于

任何试图推断规则或理解应该对特定的立场采取什么立场的穆斯林

发行古兰经是本研究的基础.

改革伊斯兰教的第一次尝试发生在 19 世纪之交. 轮到

世纪以来,Ummah 经历了一段漫长的衰落期,全球力量平衡发生了变化

从 Khilafah 到英国. 越来越多的问题席卷了希拉法,而西欧则在

工业革命中. 乌玛开始失去她对伊斯兰教的原始理解, 和

试图扭转席卷乌斯马尼人的衰落 (奥斯曼人) 一些穆斯林被送往

西, 结果被他们所看到的迷住了. 埃及的 Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801-1873),

从巴黎回来时, 写了一本名为 Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz 的传记 (这

黄金的提取, 或巴黎概览, 1834), 赞美他们的清洁, 热爱工作, 以上

一切社会道德. 他宣称我们必须模仿巴黎正在做的事情, 提倡改变

伊斯兰社会从女性自由化到统治体系. 这个想法, 和其他人喜欢它,

标志着伊斯兰教重塑趋势的开始.

西方的伊斯兰教

乔斯琳·塞萨里

穆斯林移民欧洲, 北美, 澳大利亚和随后发展起来的复杂的社会宗教动态使西方的伊斯兰教成为一个引人注目的新研究领域. 萨尔曼·拉什迪事件, 头巾争议, 对世贸中心的袭击, 以及对丹麦漫画的愤怒都是国际危机的例子,这些危机揭示了西方穆斯林与全球穆斯林世界之间的联系. 这些新情况对当代伊斯兰教的研究带来了理论和方法上的挑战, 我们避免将伊斯兰教或穆斯林本质化并抵制专注于安全和恐怖主义的话语的修辞结构已变得至关重要.
在本文中, 我认为伊斯兰教作为一种宗教传统是一个未知领域. 造成这种情况的一个初步原因是宗教作为研究对象没有达成共识. 宗教, 作为一门学科, 已成为历史之间的撕裂, 社会学, 和诠释学方法. 与伊斯兰教, 情况更加复杂. 在西方, 伊斯兰教研究始于东方学的一个分支,因此走上了一条与宗教研究不同的独特道路. 尽管对东方主义的批判对于伊斯兰研究在社会科学领域的出现起到了核心作用, 伊斯兰主义者与人类学家和社会学家之间的紧张关系仍然很强烈. 伊斯兰教和西方穆斯林的话题嵌入在这场斗争中. 这种方法论紧张的一个含义是,开始他们在法国学习伊斯兰教的学术生涯的伊斯兰教学生, 德国, 或者美国认为建立伊斯兰学者的信誉具有挑战性, 尤其是在北美学术界
语境.

对伊斯兰政治思想的选举后重读

Roxanne L. Euben

Barack Obama’s post-election rhetoric regarding the “Muslim world” has signaled a critical paradigm shift from his predecessor. The new president’s characterization of the United States in his inaugural address as a “nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers”; his formulation, invoked in several different contexts, that America will offer a hand of friendship to a Muslim world willing to “unclench [its] fist”; the emphasis on his own mixed lineage and experience living in Muslim countries; his pledge to close the Guantánamo Bay prison camp; his interview with Al Arabiya; and the promise to address the Muslim world from a Muslim capital during his first 100 days in office, all suggest a deliberate attempt to shift away from the hardening rhetoric of a new Cold War between the West and Islam and reframe American foreign policy toward Muslim societies.1 Obama’s rhetoric has enormous symbolic importance even if it has yet to issue in dramatic departures from previous U.S. foreign policies regarding, 例如, Hamas or Iran’s nuclear program. At this particular juncture, its significance lies less in the specific policies it may presage or the greater sensitivity to Muslim sensibilities it reveals than in its underlying logic: implicit in these rhetorical gestures is the understanding that, as Obama put it in his interview with Al Arabiya, “the language we use matters,” that words and categories do not simply reflect but also create the world in which we live.

伊斯兰教与西方

Preface

约翰·J. 德乔亚

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, 政治, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. 实际上, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

民主, 恐怖主义与美国在阿拉伯世界的政策

F. 格雷戈里·高斯

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. 所以, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? 换句话说, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; 和 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

声称中心: 转型中的政治伊斯兰

约翰·L. Esposito

1990年代的政治伊斯兰教, 有些人叫什么 “伊斯兰原教旨主义,” 从北非到东南亚,在政府和反对派政治中仍然占有重要地位. 权力和政治中的政治伊斯兰教提出了许多问题和疑问: “伊斯兰教与现代化对立吗?,” “伊斯兰教与民主不相容吗?,” “伊斯兰政府对多元化有何影响, 少数群体和妇女权利,” “伊斯兰主义者的代表性有多大,” “有伊斯兰温和派吗?,” “西方是否应该害怕跨国伊斯兰威胁或文明冲突?” 当代伊斯兰复兴主义 当今穆斯林世界的景观揭示了新的伊斯兰共和国的出现 (伊朗, 苏丹, 阿富汗), 在现有系统中充当主要政治和社会行为者的伊斯兰运动的扩散, 以及激进的暴力极端分子的对抗性政治。_ 与 1980 年代政治伊斯兰被简单地等同于革命的伊朗或具有伊斯兰圣战或上帝之军等名称的秘密团体形成鲜明对比, 1990 年代的穆斯林世界是伊斯兰主义者参与选举过程并以总理身份出现的世界, 内阁官员, 国民议会议长, 议员, 和埃及等不同国家的市长, 苏丹, 火鸡, 伊朗, 黎巴嫩, 科威特, 也门, 约旦, 巴基斯坦, 孟加拉国, 马来西亚, 印度尼西亚, 和以色列/巴勒斯坦. 在二十一世纪初, 政治伊斯兰教仍然是全球政治秩序和混乱的主要力量, 参与政治进程但也参与恐怖主义行为的人, 对穆斯林世界和西方的挑战. 了解当今政治伊斯兰教的本质, 特别是从最近的经验中出现的问题和问题, 对政府仍然至关重要, 决策者, 和国际政治的学生一样.

这是政策, 愚蠢的

约翰·L. Esposito

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. 衬套. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. 然而, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, 恐怖主义, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. 因此, 例如, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?


解决美国的伊斯兰困境

沙迪·哈米德(Shadi Hamid)

我们. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 和 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. 然而, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, 和, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.

穆斯林知识分子关于伊斯兰教的国际磋商 & 政治

斯廷森中心 & 政策研究所

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, 埃及, India,印度尼西亚, Kenya, 马来西亚, 巴基斯坦, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. 最后, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

埃及: 背景和美国. 关系

杰里米·M. 尖锐

In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Furthermore, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (十二月 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. 同时, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

在欧洲的穆斯林邻国中旅行

乔斯特·拉根迪克

简·马林努斯·维尔玛

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union [], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, 罗曼诺·普罗迪, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, 然而. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. 自从 11 九月 2001, 尤其是, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

全球与地方之间

安东尼·布巴罗(ANTHONY BUBALO)

格雷格·菲利

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : 伊斯兰主义, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

穆斯林世界的改革: 伊斯兰主义者和外部势力的作用

Shibley Telhami


在过去的几年里,布什政府对在中东传播民主的关注得到了很多讨论, 不仅在美国和阿拉伯和穆斯林国家,而且在世界各地. 事实上, 无论是关于政治和经济改革必要性的区域性话语,还是美国传播民主的言论都不是新的. 过去二十年, 特别是从冷战结束开始, 中东的知识分子和政府谈论改革. 伊拉克入侵科威特之前的美国政策 1990 还旨在在阿拉伯世界传播民主. 但在那种情况下,第一次海湾战争以及与独裁政权结盟的必要性是民主讨论被拒绝的一个原因. 另一个原因是发现政治改革为伊斯兰政治团体提供了机会,这似乎与美国的目标大相径庭。担心伊斯兰团体仅基于“一个人”的原则支持民主, 一票, 一度,”正如前助理国务卿爱德华·杰雷吉安斯所说, 导致美国后退. 克林顿政府的傍晚, 国务卿沃伦·克里斯托弗最初专注于中东政策中的民主,但随着政府在激进的伊斯兰组织的阴影下推动巴以谈判,他很快就搁置了这个问题,尤其是哈马斯.

政治伊斯兰与西方

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,伊朗, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, 埃及, 印度尼西亚,约旦, 科威特, 黎巴嫩,马来西亚, 巴基斯坦, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

建造桥梁而不是墙壁

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 九月 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (中东和北非) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (印度空军) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. 然而, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

伊斯兰教, 民主 & 美国

科尔多瓦基金会


尽管这是一场长期且复杂的辩论, Arches Quarterly 从神学和实践的角度重新审视, 关于伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系和兼容性的重要辩论, 正如巴拉克奥巴马的希望和变革议程所呼应的那样. 虽然许多人庆祝奥巴马登上椭圆形办公室作为美国的全国宣泄者, 其他人对国际舞台上意识形态和方法的转变不那么乐观。虽然穆斯林世界和美国之间的大部分紧张和不信任可归因于促进民主的方法, 通常偏向于口头上宣扬民主价值观和人权的独裁政权和傀儡政权, 余震 9/11 通过美国在政治伊斯兰问题上的立场,确实进一步加深了疑虑. 它创造了一面由 worldpublicopinion.org 发现的消极情绪墙,根据该 67% 的埃及人认为,在全球范围内,美国正在扮演“主要是负面的”角色。因此,美国的反应是恰当的. 补选奥巴马, 世界各地的许多人寄希望于发展一个不那么好斗的国家,但对穆斯林世界更公平的外交政策. 奥巴马的考验, 当我们讨论,是美国及其盟友促进民主的方式. 它会促进还是强加?而且, 它能否成为长期冲突地区的诚实经纪人??