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伊斯兰教与国家权力的形成

赛义德·瓦利·雷扎·纳瑟

在 1979 穆罕默德·齐亚·哈克将军, 巴基斯坦的军事统治者, 宣布巴基斯坦将成为伊斯兰国家. 伊斯兰价值观和规范将成为民族认同的基础, 法律, 经济, 和社会关系, 并将激发所有政策制定. 在 1980 马哈蒂尔·穆罕默德, 马来西亚新首相, 引入了一项类似的基础广泛的计划,以将国家政策制定锚定在伊斯兰价值观中, 并使他的国家的法律和经济实践符合伊斯兰教义. 为什么这些统治者要为自己的国家选择“伊斯兰化”的道路? 曾经的世俗后殖民国家如何成为伊斯兰化的代理人和“真正的”伊斯兰国家的先兆?
自 1970 年代末至 1980 年代初以来,马来西亚和巴基斯坦走上了一条与其他第三世界国家不同的独特发展道路. 在这两个国家,宗教身份被整合到国家意识形态中,以伊斯兰价值观为发展目标和进程提供信息.
这项工作还呈现了一幅非常不同的图景,即伊斯兰教与穆斯林社会中的政治之间的关系. 在马来西亚和巴基斯坦, 是国家机构而不是伊斯兰活动家 (那些主张对伊斯兰教进行政治解读的人; 也被称为复兴主义者或原教旨主义者) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, 更广泛地说,文化和宗教如何服务于国家权力和发展的需要. 这里的分析依赖于理论讨论
在国家行为的社会科学以及文化和宗教在其中的作用. 更重要, 它从正在审查的案例中得出推论,以得出学科感兴趣的更广泛的结论.

伊斯兰教, 民主 & 美国:

科尔多瓦基金会

阿卜杜拉·法利克 |

介绍 ,


尽管这是一场长期而复杂的辩论, Arches Quarterly 从神学和实践的角度重新审视, 关于伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系和兼容性的重要辩论, 正如巴拉克奥巴马的希望和变革议程所呼应的那样. 虽然许多人庆祝奥巴马登上椭圆形办公室作为美国的全国宣泄者, 其他人对国际舞台上意识形态和方法的转变仍然不乐观. 虽然穆斯林世界和美国之间的许多紧张局势和不信任可归因于促进民主的方法, 通常偏爱专制政权和伪造政权,这些政权为民主价值观和人权提供口红, 余震 9/11 通过美国在政治伊斯兰上的立场,确实进一步加剧了担忧. 它创造了由worldpublicopinion.org发现的负面墙, 根据该 67% 的埃及人认为,全球范围内,美国正在扮演“主要消极”角色.
因此,美国的反应很贴切. 通过选举奥巴马, 世界各地的许多人都寄希望于发展一个不太好战的人, 但对穆斯林世界更公平的外交政策. 奥巴马的考验, 当我们讨论, 是美国及其盟友促进民主的方式. 它会促进还是强加?
而且, 它能否成为长期冲突地区的诚实经纪人?? 吸收 prolifi 的专业知识和洞察力
c学者, 学者, 经验丰富的记者和政治家, Arches Quarterly 揭示了伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系以及美国的角色——以及奥巴马带来的变化, 在寻求共同点. 阿纳斯·阿尔蒂克里蒂, The e Cordoba Foundation 的首席执行官为这次讨论提供了开场白, 他反思了奥巴马道路上的希望和挑战. 跟随 Altikriti, 尼克松总统的前顾问, 罗伯特·克莱恩(Robert Craneoff)博士对伊斯兰自由权原则进行了透彻的分析. 安瓦尔·易卜拉欣, 马来西亚前副总理, 通过在穆斯林占主导地位的社会中实施民主的实际现实来丰富讨论, 即, 在印度尼西亚和马来西亚.
我们也有Shireen Hunter博士, 乔治敦大学, 美国, 探索落后于民主化和现代化的穆斯林国家. 恐怖主义作家对此予以补充, 纳菲兹·艾哈迈德(Nafeez Ahmed)博士对后现代危机和
民主的灭亡. Daud Abdullah博士 (中东媒体监控总监), 艾伦·哈特 (前ITN和BBC Panorama通讯员; 犹太复国主义的作者: 犹太人的真正敌人) 和Asem Sondos (埃及《 Sawt Al Omma》杂志编辑) 专注于奥巴马及其在穆斯林世界促进民主方面的作用, 以及美国与以色列和穆斯林兄弟会的关系.
外交部长, 马尔代夫, 艾哈迈德·沙希德 (Ahmed Shaheed) 推测伊斯兰教和民主的未来; 克莱尔. 格里·麦克洛克林
– 因爱尔兰共和党活动而入狱四年的新芬党成员和吉尔福德的活动家 4 和伯明翰 6, 反映了他最近去加沙的旅行,在那里他目睹了对巴勒斯坦人的残暴和不公正的影响; 玛丽·布林-史密斯博士, 激进化和当代政治暴力研究中心主任讨论批判性研究政治恐怖的挑战; 哈立德·穆巴拉克博士, 作家和剧作家, 讨论达尔富尔和平的前景; 最后,记者和人权活动家 Ashur Shamis 批判性地审视了当今穆斯林的民主化和政治化.
我们希望所有这些都有助于在新的希望曙光中对影响我们所有人的问题进行全面的阅读和反思.
谢谢

一个穆斯林群岛

最大L. 毛

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.

伊斯兰反对党和欧盟参与的潜力

托比·阿切尔

海蒂·休塔宁(Heidi Huuhtanen)

鉴于伊斯兰运动在穆斯林世界和

自世纪之交以来,激进化对全球事件的影响方式, 它

对于欧盟来说,在可以松散的范围内评估其对参与者的政策很重要

被称为“伊斯兰世界”. 询问是否以及如何参与尤为重要

与各种伊斯兰团体.

即使在欧盟内部,这仍然存在争议. 有些人认为伊斯兰价值观

落后于伊斯兰政党与西方的民主理想和

人权, 而其他人则将参与视为现实的必要性,因为日益增长的

伊斯兰政党在国内的重要性及其日益参与国际事务

事务. 另一种观点是,穆斯林世界的民主化将会增加

欧洲安全. 这些和其他关于是否以及如何

欧盟是否应该参与只能通过研究不同的伊斯兰运动和

他们的政治环境, 逐个国家.

民主化是欧盟共同外交政策行动的中心主题, 铺设

在文章中 11 欧盟条约. 在此考虑的许多州

举报不民主, 或不完全民主. 在这些国家中的大多数, 伊斯兰主义者

政党和运动构成了对现行政权的重大反对, 和

在一些地区,他们形成了最大的反对派集团. 欧洲民主国家长期以来不得不

处理专制的统治政权, 但这是一个新现象

在最有可能受益者可能拥有的国家进行民主改革, 来自

欧盟的观点, 不同的,有时是有问题的民主方法及其

相关值, 例如少数民族和妇女权利和法治. 这些费用是

经常反对伊斯兰运动, 因此,对于欧洲政策制定者来说,重要的是

准确了解潜在合作伙伴的政策和理念.

来自不同国家的经验往往表明,更自由的伊斯兰主义者

允许聚会, 他们的行动和想法越温和. 在许多

伊斯兰政党和团体早已偏离了最初的目标

建立一个受伊斯兰法律管辖的伊斯兰国家, 并开始接受基本的

选举权力的民主原则, 其他政治的存在

竞争对手, 和政治多元化.

解决美国的伊斯兰困境: 南亚和东南亚的教训

沙迪·哈米德(Shadi Hamid)
我们. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 和 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. 然而, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, 和, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt. The situation in Jordan is similar. The Bush administration and the Democratic congress have hailed the country as a “model” of Arab reform at precisely the same time that it has been devising new ways to manipulate the electoral process to limit Islamist representation, and just as it held elections plagued by widespread allegations of outright fraud
and rigging.1 This is not a coincidence. Egypt and Jordan are the only two Arab countries that have signed peace treaties with Israel. 而且, they are seen as crucial to U.S. efforts to counter Iran, stabilize Iraq, and combat terrorism.

全球与地方之间

安东尼·布巴罗(ANTHONY BUBALO)

格雷格·菲利

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : 伊斯兰主义, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

伊斯兰现代性: FETHULLAH GULEN 和当代伊斯兰教

法赫里·卡奇

The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, 然而, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. 然而, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.

渐进的伊斯兰思想, 公民社会与民族背景下的古伦运动

格雷格·巴顿

费特拉古伦 (出生 1941), 或霍贾芬迪(Hodjaeffendi),他的祖国土耳其和国外成千上万的人都亲切地称呼他, 是二十世纪出现的最重要的伊斯兰思想家和活动家之一. 他的乐观和前瞻性的思想, 强调通过教育实现心灵和思想的自我发展, 积极主动地融入现代世界,并在宗教团体之间开展对话和合作精神, 社会阶层和国家可以被解读为贾拉鲁丁·鲁米学说的当代重新表述, 尤努斯·埃姆雷, 和其他经典的苏菲派老师 (米歇尔, 2005A, 2005乙; 沙里托普拉克, 2003; 2005A; 2005乙; 乌纳尔和威廉姆斯, 2005). 进一步来说, 可以看出居伦正在继续赛义德·努尔西的做法 (1876-1960), 另一位伟大的安纳托利亚伊斯兰知识分子, 离开: 为土耳其及其他地区的穆斯林活动家有效地为现代社会的发展做出贡献指明了道路,避免政党政治活动的陷阱和妥协,并以对宗教在现代世界中的作用的真正包容性和人道主义的理解取代伊斯兰主义思想的狭隘性 (阿布拉比, 1995; 马卡姆和奥兹德米尔, 2005; 瓦希德, 2005, 严酷士, 2005A).

美国和埃及

A Conference Report

The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,and the bilateral relationship with Washington remains the keystone of Egypt’sforeign policy. Strong U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations are also an important anchorfor states throughout the Middle East and for Western policy in the region. Therelationship is valuable for policymakers in both countries; doing without it isunthinkable.To explore this relationship, the CSIS Middle East Program, in cooperation with theAl-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, convened a one-dayconference on June 26, 2003, entitled, “The United States and Egypt: Building thePartnership.” The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm how that partnership mightbe strengthened.Participants agreed that much needs to be done on the diplomatic, political, 军事,and economic levels. Although all did not agree on a single course forward, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.

土耳其会有一位伊斯兰总统吗?

迈克尔·鲁宾


While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, 这

Turkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-year

term ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a new

parliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks will

inaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the future

of Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan

wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known as

AKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned to

erode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—the

Turkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wears

a Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,

which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December

2006, 例如, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predicting

A 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1

While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about military
intervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared to
spark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’s
civilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkish
democracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interference
by U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.

While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, 例如, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.

伊斯兰运动和使用暴力:

埃森·基迪斯(Esen Kirdis)

.


Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? First, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Second, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, IE. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) 穆斯林兄弟会, (3) 伊斯兰祈祷团(Jemaah Islamiyah), 和 (4) Tablighi Jamaat

评估埃及和马来西亚的伊斯兰主流

Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘StateHegemony’: assessing the Islamistmainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

简·斯塔克Malaysia-Islamists

International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.

This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.

As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.

Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).

These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.