RSS中的所有条目 "黎巴嫩" 类别

阿拉伯明天

大卫·B. OTTAWAY

十月 6, 1981, 本来是在埃及庆祝的一天. 它标志着埃及在三项阿以冲突中取得最伟大胜利的周年纪念日, 在开国之日，该国的失败者军队冲过苏伊士运河 1973 赎罪日战争，使以色列军队退缩. 酷, 万里无云的早晨, 开罗体育馆里挤满了埃及家庭，他们前来参观是为了看准军事力量。, 总统安瓦尔·萨达特,战争的建筑师, 人和机器在他面前游行时满意地看着. 我在附近, 刚到的外国记者, 六架幻影喷气式飞机在杂技表演中高高呼啸，其中一辆军车直接停在了检阅台前, 用长长的红色画天空, 黄色, 紫色,和绿色的烟雾. 萨达特站了起来, 显然准备与另一支埃及军队交换礼炮. 他使自己成为四名从卡车上跳下来的伊斯兰刺客的理想目标。, 冲上领奖台, 随着子弹的杀手不断地向他们的致命之火喷洒架子, 我考虑了一下是跌倒在地，冒着被惊恐的观众踩死的危险，还是保持脚步并冒着流弹的风险. 本能告诉我要站稳脚跟, 我的新闻责任感促使我去寻找萨达特是活着还是死了.

| 九月 26, 2010 | 评论 0
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挑战威权主义, 殖民主义, 和不团结: 阿富汗和里达的伊斯兰政治改革运动

艾哈迈德·阿里·塞勒姆

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
所以, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). 然而, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. 的确,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, 这

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. 然而, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




| 九月 02, 2010 | 评论 0
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埃及穆斯林兄弟会的组织连续性

苔丝·李·艾森哈特

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (兄弟会) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, 然而, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

| 九月 01, 2010 | 评论 0
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世俗主义, 诠释学, 和帝国: 伊斯兰改革的政治

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent
calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot
be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, 特别
those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism
and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike
to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling
is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State
Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform
“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception
of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be
reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to
the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is
being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category
with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of
secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the
穆斯林世界. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular
understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on
伊斯兰教, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy
concerns in the Muslim world.

| 八月 27, 2010 | 评论 0
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真主党的政治宣言 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .
| 八月 27, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权

丹尼尔（Daniele）. 价钱

有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 矛盾的

西方社会的价值观, 并显着影响重要的政治结果

在穆斯林国家. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 和政府

官员们经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是下一个

对自由民主国家的意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要是基于

关于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和特别研究

个别国家, 不考虑其他因素. 这是我的争论

伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样,

可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 国家

具体的和描述性的研究并不能帮助我们找到有帮助的模式

我们解释伊斯兰教与政治之间的不同关系

穆斯林世界的国家. 因此, 一种新的研究方法

伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系,

民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 太多了

强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我先来

使用比较案例研究, 关注与相互作用相关的因素

伊斯兰团体和政权之间, 经济影响, 种族分裂,

和社会发展, 解释影响的差异

八个国家的伊斯兰教政治.

| 八月 24, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权

丹尼尔（Daniele）. 价钱

有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 矛盾的

西方社会的价值观, 并显着影响重要的政治结果
在穆斯林国家. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 和政府
官员们经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是下一个
对自由民主国家的意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要是基于
关于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和特别研究
个别国家, 不考虑其他因素. 这是我的争论
伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样,
可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 国家
具体的和描述性的研究并不能帮助我们找到有帮助的模式
我们解释伊斯兰教与政治之间的不同关系
穆斯林世界的国家. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系,
民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 太多了
强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我先来
使用比较案例研究, 关注与相互作用相关的因素
伊斯兰团体和政权之间, 经济影响, 种族分裂,

和社会发展, 解释影响的差异

八个国家的伊斯兰教政治.

| 八月 22, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰反对党和欧盟参与的潜力

托比·阿切尔

海蒂·休塔宁（Heidi Huuhtanen）

鉴于伊斯兰运动在穆斯林世界和

自世纪之交以来，激进化对全球事件的影响方式, 它

对于欧盟来说，在可以松散的范围内评估其对参与者的政策很重要

被称为“伊斯兰世界”. 询问是否以及如何参与尤为重要

与各种伊斯兰团体.

即使在欧盟内部，这仍然存在争议. 有些人认为伊斯兰价值观

落后于伊斯兰政党与西方的民主理想和

人权, 而其他人则将参与视为现实的必要性，因为日益增长的

伊斯兰政党在国内的重要性及其日益参与国际事务

事务. 另一种观点是，穆斯林世界的民主化将会增加

欧洲安全. 这些和其他关于是否以及如何

欧盟是否应该参与只能通过研究不同的伊斯兰运动和

他们的政治环境, 逐个国家.

民主化是欧盟共同外交政策行动的中心主题, 铺设

在文章中 11 欧盟条约. 在此考虑的许多州

举报不民主, 或不完全民主. 在这些国家中的大多数, 伊斯兰主义者

政党和运动构成了对现行政权的重大反对, 和

在一些地区，他们形成了最大的反对派集团. 欧洲民主国家长期以来不得不

处理专制的统治政权, 但这是一个新现象

在最有可能受益者可能拥有的国家进行民主改革, 来自

欧盟的观点, 不同的，有时是有问题的民主方法及其

相关值, 例如少数民族和妇女权利和法治. 这些费用是

经常反对伊斯兰运动, 因此，对于欧洲政策制定者来说，重要的是

准确了解潜在合作伙伴的政策和理念.

来自不同国家的经验往往表明，更自由的伊斯兰主义者

允许聚会, 他们的行动和想法越温和. 在许多

伊斯兰政党和团体早已偏离了最初的目标

建立一个受伊斯兰法律管辖的伊斯兰国家, 并开始接受基本的

选举权力的民主原则, 其他政治的存在

竞争对手, 和政治多元化.

| 八月 21, 2010 | 评论 0
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中东的政治伊斯兰教

是努森

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, 在

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

回顾一些用来解释中东伊斯兰复兴的主要理论

(数字 1). 简单来说, 报告表明，伊斯兰教不必与民主和

有一种趋势是忽视许多中东国家已经

参与了对伊斯兰运动的残酷镇压, 导致他们, 有人争辩, 占用

反对国家的武器, 更罕见的是, 外国. 使用政治暴力是

广泛分布于中东, 但既不不合逻辑也不非理性. 在很多情况下甚至

以使用暴力而闻名的伊斯兰团体已转变为和平的政治组织

政党成功参加市政和全国选举. 尽管如此, 伊斯兰主义者

尽管有许多理论试图

说明它的增长和受欢迎的吸引力. 一般来说, 大多数理论认为伊斯兰主义是

对相对剥夺的反应, 尤其是社会不平等和政治压迫. 选择

理论在宗教本身和宗教的范围内寻求伊斯兰复兴的答案

强大的, 宗教象征的唤起潜力.

结论主张超越“悲观与厄运”的方法，即

将伊斯兰主义描绘成一种非法的政治表达和对西方的潜在威胁 (“老的

伊斯兰主义”), 以及对当前伊斯兰主义民主化的更细致入微的理解

现在正在整个中东发生的运动 (“新伊斯兰主义”). 这个

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

社会中较贫穷的阶层，但也属于中产阶级.

| 八月 20, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰政党 : 为什么他们不能民主

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, 它有

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, 民主, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

| 八月 20, 2010 | 评论 0
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参与政治伊斯兰的策略

沙迪哈米德

阿曼达·卡德莱克（AMANDA KADLEC）

政治伊斯兰教是当今中东地区最活跃的政治力量. 它的未来与该地区的未来密切相关. 如果美国和欧盟致力于支持该地区的政治改革, 他们需要设计具体的, 参与伊斯兰团体的连贯战略. 然而, 美国. 普遍不愿意与这些运动展开对话. 相似地, 欧盟与伊斯兰主义者的接触是个例外, 不是规则. 存在低级联系人的地方, 它们主要用于信息收集目的, 不是战略目标. 美国. 和欧盟有许多解决该地区经济和政治发展的计划——其中包括中东伙伴关系倡议 (美皮), 千年挑战公司 (中冶), 地中海联盟, 和欧洲睦邻政策 (ENP) - 然而，他们对伊斯兰政治反对派的挑战如何适应更广泛的区域目标几乎没有什么可说的. 我们. 和欧盟的民主援助和规划几乎完全针对威权政府本身或世俗的民间社会团体，在他们自己的社会中得到的支持很少.
重新评估现行政策的时机已经成熟. 自九月恐怖袭击以来 11, 2001, 支持中东民主对西方政策制定者来说具有更大的重要性, 谁看到了缺乏民主和政治暴力之间的联系. 人们更加关注理解政治伊斯兰内部的变化. 美国新政府更愿意扩大与穆斯林世界的交流. 同时, 绝大多数主流伊斯兰组织——包括埃及的穆斯林兄弟会, 约旦的伊斯兰行动阵线 (印度空军), 摩洛哥正义与发展党 (PJD), 科威特伊斯兰立宪运动, 和也门伊斯兰党——越来越多地将支持政治改革和民主作为其政治纲领的核心组成部分. 此外, 许多人表示有兴趣与美国展开对话. 和欧盟政府.
西方国家与中东关系的未来可能在很大程度上取决于前者与非暴力伊斯兰政党就共同利益和目标进行广泛对话的程度. 最近有大量关于与伊斯兰主义者接触的研究, 但很少有人清楚地说明它在实践中可能需要什么. 佐伊·诺特, 德国外交关系委员会访问学者, 把它, “欧盟正在考虑参与，但并不真正知道如何参与。”1 希望澄清讨论, 我们区分了三个级别的“参与度”,”每个都有不同的手段和目的: 低级接触, 战略对话, 和伙伴关系.

| 八月 19, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰运动和阿拉伯世界的民主进程: 探索灰色地带

内森J. 棕色, 阿姆·哈姆扎维（Amr Hamzawy）,

玛丽娜·奥特韦（Marina Ottaway）

在过去的十年中, 伊斯兰运动已成为中东地区的主要政治参与者. 与政府一起, 伊斯兰运动, 温和的和激进的, 将决定该地区的政治在可预见的未来如何展开. 他们不仅展示了制作具有广泛大众吸引力的信息的能力，而且, 最重要的是, 创建具有真正社会基础的组织并制定连贯的政治战略. 其他方,
总的来说, 所有帐户都失败了.
西方公众和, 尤其是, 美国, 在发生戏剧性事件后才意识到伊斯兰运动的重要性, 例如伊朗革命和埃及总统安瓦尔·萨达特被暗杀. 自 9 月的恐怖袭击以来，注意力更加持久 11, 2001. 因此, 伊斯兰运动被广泛认为是危险和敌对的. 虽然这种描述对于伊斯兰极端组织的组织来说是准确的, 这很危险，因为他们愿意在追求目标时不分青红皂白地使用暴力, 这不是对许多放弃或避免暴力的群体的准确描述. 因为恐怖组织构成了直接
威胁, 然而, 所有国家的政策制定者都对暴力组织给予了不成比例的关注.
它是主流的伊斯兰组织, 不是激进的, 这将对中东未来的政治演变产生最大的影响. 激进分子重建统一整个阿拉伯世界的哈里发的宏伟目标, 甚至将受伊斯兰教原教旨主义解释启发的法律和社会习俗强加于个别阿拉伯国家，这与今天的现实相去甚远，无法实现. 这并不意味着恐怖组织没有危险——即使在追求不可能的目标时，它们也可能造成巨大的生命损失——但它们不太可能改变中东的面貌. 主流伊斯兰组织通常是另一回事. 他们已经对许多国家的社会习俗产生了强大的影响, 制止和扭转世俗主义趋势，改变许多阿拉伯人的着装和行为方式. 以及他们直接的政治目标, 通过参与本国的正常政治而成为强大的力量, 不是不可能的. 它已经在摩洛哥等国家实现, 约旦, 甚至埃及, 仍然禁止所有伊斯兰政治组织，但现在议会中有八十八名穆斯林兄弟. 政治, 不是暴力, 是什么赋予了主流伊斯兰主义者影响力.

| 八月 18, 2010 | 评论 0
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政治伊斯兰教和欧洲外交政策

政治伊斯兰教和欧洲邻国政策

迈克尔·爱默生

理查德·杨斯

自从 2001 以及随之而来的西方与政治伊斯兰之间关系性质的国际事件已成为外交政策的决定性问题. 近年来，对政治伊斯兰问题进行了大量的研究和分析。. 这有助于纠正西方以前对伊斯兰价值观和意图的性质的一些简单化和危言耸听的假设. 与此平行, 欧盟 (欧盟) 制定了许多政策举措，主要是欧洲邻里政策(ENP) 原则上致力于对话和更深入的参与(非暴力) 阿拉伯国家内的政治行为者和民间社会组织. 然而，许多分析家和政策制定者现在抱怨在概念辩论和政策制定中的某个奖杯. 已经确定，政治伊斯兰教是一个不断变化的景观, 深受各种情况的影响, 但辩论似乎常常停留在“伊斯兰主义者是否民主”这样简单的问题上?’ 许多独立分析家仍然主张与伊斯兰主义者接触, 但西方政府与伊斯兰组织之间的实际和解仍然有限 .

| 八月 17, 2010 | 评论 0
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伊斯兰战争规则

优素福H. 艾布尔·埃宁
Sherifa Zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

| 八月 13, 2010 | 评论 0
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从造反运动到政党

阿拉斯泰尔克鲁克

西方许多人认为，从武装抵抗运动到政党的转变应该是线性的, 应该先放弃暴力, 应该由民间社会推动并由温和的政治家斡旋 伊斯兰抵抗运动的情况几乎没有现实意义 (哈马斯). 这并不是说哈马斯没有经历过政治转型: 它有. 但是，尽管西方做出了努力，但这种转变还是实现了，而这些努力并没有促进这种转变. 在保持抵抗运动的同时, 哈马斯已成为巴勒斯坦权力机构的政府并改变了其军事姿态. 但这种转变采取了与传统冲突解决模型中概述的不同的过程. 哈马斯和其他伊斯兰团体继续将自己视为抵抗运动, 但他们越来越多地看到，他们的组织可能会演变成专注于非暴力抵抗的政治潮流。标准的冲突解决模式严重依赖西方解决冲突的经验，并且经常忽略伊斯兰和平缔造历史中方法的差异. 这并不奇怪, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. 此外, 以巴冲突的严酷环境使哈马斯经历了它的特殊性。哈马斯正处于一个重要的转变之中, 但以色列国内的政治潮流, 并且在区域内, 使这种转变的结果不可预测. 很大程度上取决于西方政策的走向 (其“全球反恐战争”) 以及该政策如何影响哈马斯等复兴主义伊斯兰团体, 致力于选举的团体, 改革与善政.

| 八月 02, 2010 | 评论 0
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阿拉伯改革公报

group of researchers


埃及: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy


The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final
approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.
The platform’s detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure
from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005
electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most
important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.
The document raises troubling questions, 然而, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the
context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant
ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.
First, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. 在

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,
especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in
摩洛哥, 约旦, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and
the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious
activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, 这
platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their
religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.
Second, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution
(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the
pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis
was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions
fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious
affiliation.

| 八月 01, 2010 | 评论 0
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