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保守主义和伊斯兰主义之间的女权主义: 巴勒斯坦的情况

博士, Islah Jad |

在西岸和加沙地带举行了立法选举。 2006 掌权的伊斯兰运动哈马斯, 后来组成了巴勒斯坦立法委员会的多数席位,也是哈马斯的第一多数席位政府. 这些选举导致任命了第一位哈马斯女部长, 成为妇女事务部长. 三月之间 2006 和六月 2007, 两名不同的哈马斯女部长上任, 但两人都发现很难管理该部,因为该部的大多数雇员不是哈马斯成员,而是属于其他政党, 大多数是法塔赫的成员, 控制大多数巴勒斯坦权力机构机构的主导运动. 在哈马斯在加沙地带掌权并导致其政府在西岸倒台后,妇女事务部哈马斯妇女与法塔赫女性成员之间的紧张斗争期结束——一场斗争有时会发生剧烈的转变. 后来引用来解释这场斗争的一个原因是世俗女权主义话语和伊斯兰主义关于妇女问题的话语之间的区别. 在巴勒斯坦的背景下,这种分歧具有危险性,因为它被用来证明使血腥的政治斗争永存。, 将哈马斯妇女从其职务或职位上撤职, 以及当时在西岸和被占领的加沙地带普遍存在的政治和地理鸿沟.
这场斗争提出了一些重要的问题: 我们应该惩罚已经掌权的伊斯兰运动吗, 还是我们应该考虑导致法塔赫在政治舞台上失败的原因? 女权主义可以为女性提供一个全面的框架吗, 不论他们的社会和意识形态有何关系? 对女性具有共同点的论述可以帮助她们实现并达成共同目标? 家长制仅存在于伊斯兰意识形态中吗, 而不是民族主义和爱国主义? 我们所说的女权主义是什么意思? 是否只有一种女权主义, 或几种女权主义? 我们所说的伊斯兰教是什么意思 – 是这个名字或宗教所知道的运动吗, 哲学, 或法律制度? 我们需要深入了解这些问题并仔细考虑, 我们必须同意它们,以便我们以后可以决定, 作为女权主义者, 如果我们对家长作风的批评应该针对宗教 (信仰), 应该局限在信徒的心里,不能控制整个世界, 或法理, 它涉及不同的信仰流派,这些流派解释了《古兰经》中包含的法律制度和先知的言论 – 圣训.

伊斯兰妇女在被占巴勒斯坦的行动

Khaled Amayreh的采访

Sameera Al-Halayka 访谈

Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. 她

出生在希伯伦附近的肖尤赫村 1964. 她拥有伊斯兰教法学士学位 (伊斯兰

法理) 来自希伯伦大学. 她曾是一名记者 1996 至 2006 什么时候

she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 选举.

她已婚并育有七个孩子.

问: 在一些西方国家,女性接受的普遍印象

伊斯兰抵抗组织内的低劣待遇, 比如哈马斯. 这是真的?

哈马斯如何对待女性活动家?
穆斯林妇女的权利和义务首先来自伊斯兰教法或法律.

它们不是我们从哈马斯或任何人那里收到的自愿或慈善行为或姿态

别的. 因此, 就政治参与和行动而言, 女性一般都有

与男性相同的权利和义务. 毕竟, 女性至少弥补 50 的百分比

社会. 在某种意义上, 他们是整个社会,因为他们生, 并提高,

新一代.

所以, 我可以说,哈马斯内部的妇女地位完全符合她的要求

在伊斯兰教本身的地位. 这意味着她是各个级别的全面合作伙伴. 的确, 这将是

对伊斯兰教徒来说是不公平和不公正的 (或伊斯兰主义者,如果你愿意) 女人成为痛苦的伙伴

而她被排除在决策过程之外. 这就是为什么女人扮演的角色

哈马斯一直在开拓.

问: 您是否觉得哈马斯内部出现女性政治激进主义是

符合古典伊斯兰概念的自然发展

关于妇女的地位和作用, 还是仅仅是对

现代性的压力和政治行动的要求以及持续的

以色列占领?

伊斯兰法学和哈马斯宪章中没有任何文字禁止女性

政治参与. 我相信事实正好相反 — 有许多古兰经经文

和先知穆罕默德的格言敦促妇女积极参与政治和公共事务

影响穆斯林的问题. 但对于女性来说,这也是事实, 就像男人一样, 政治活动

不是强制性的,而是自愿的, 并且很大程度上取决于每个女人的能力,

资格和个人情况. 尽管如此, 关心公众

每个穆斯林男人和女人都必须遵守. 先知

穆罕默德说: “不关心穆斯林事务的人不是穆斯林。”

而且, 巴勒斯坦伊斯兰主义妇女必须将实地的所有客观因素纳入

决定是否加入政治或参与政治活动时的帐户.


伊斯兰教, 政治伊斯兰教与美国

阿拉伯洞察力

与美国的“兄弟情谊”是否可能?

哈利勒阿纳尼

“没有机会与任何美国沟通. 只要美国坚持其长期以来将伊斯兰教视为真正危险的观点, 一种将美国与犹太复国主义敌人置于同一条船上的观点. 我们对美国人民或美国没有先入为主的观念. 社会及其民间组织和智囊团. 我们与美国人民的沟通没有问题,但没有做出足够的努力来拉近我们的距离,”博士说. 伊萨姆·伊里安, 穆斯林兄弟会政治部负责人接受电话采访.
Al-Iryan的话总结了穆斯林兄弟会对美国人民和美国的看法. 政府. 穆斯林兄弟会的其他成员会同意, 已故的哈桑·班纳也是如此, 谁在 1928. 铝- 版纳主要将西方视为道德败坏的象征. 其他萨拉菲派——一个以祖先为楷模的伊斯兰学派——对美国也持同样的看法, 但缺乏穆斯林兄弟会拥护的意识形态灵活性. 虽然穆斯林兄弟会相信让美国人参与民间对话, 其他极端组织认为对话没有意义,并认为武力是与美国打交道的唯一方式.

关于等度遗产和伊斯兰政治思想的注释: 教育的例子

詹姆斯·缪尔

人类历史的一个不幸特征是宗教差异和冲突倾向于用无知和偏见的毒酒滋养自己. 虽然有时可以做很多事情来减少偏见, 在我看来,学者和教育工作者应该主要关注减少无知的更基本和持久的目标. 一个人在减少无知方面的成功——包括自己的——将取决于一个人的动机.
伊斯兰教育哲学的研究可能受到当前实际问题的推动: 英国穆斯林渴望拥有伊斯兰学校, 无论是私人资助还是国家资助, 是一个典型的例子. 从教育哲学的角度, 然而, 这样的动机是极其狭隘的, circumscribed by the concepts and categories of the local political disputes of the moment. For those motivated by a desire for knowledge and understanding of a tradition outside their own, it is most doubtful that any study of Islamic philosophy restricted by current practical concerns can be at all productive. There is no simple correspondence between knowledge and “relevance.”
There must, 然而, be some connection between two traditions of thought and practice if there is to be a point of departure, and a point of entry, which allows the scholar to step from one tradition to another. The legacy of Isocrates may constitute one such point of departure, which will help us to understand the relation between two traditions, the classical Greek and the Islamic. The dominance of the Isocratic legacy in Western education is well established and widely known among historians, classicists
and political philosophers, although awareness of it has only just begun to surface among educationists.2 Similarly, the Isocratic legacy to education (and the rich tradition of Arabic Platonism in philosophy) has in uenced Islamic thought, though in ways that are
still not yet well understood. The intention of this paper is to suggest that a modiŽ ed form of the Isocratic educational tradition is a fundamental component of Islamic political thought, 即, Islamic educational thought. This general wording of the intention of this paper in terms of Islamic political thought may give rise to a misunderstanding. 伊斯兰教, 当然, is regarded by its adherents as a uniŽ ed and universal system of belief and behaviour.

从古兰经和麦地那盟约看美国宪法

Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad

This paper is by no means an exhaustive comparison of the American Constitution with the Qur’an and the Madinah Covenant. Rather, it explores the kinds of insights that a comparison between these two documents may suggest. Accordingly, the constitutional topics selected are those in which the author or the commentators on earlier drafts perceived an assessment within the Islamic sources.4 This paper should be taken as an invitation for future studies with more systematic comparisons. In addition to rational inference from the text of the Qur’an and of the Madinah Covenant, I shall draw on the views of the Prophet’s Companions as recorded in the leading Hadith books. Analogously, the views of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic on constitutional
matters are articulated in The Federalist Papers.We shall begin by reviewing the Madinah Covenant, and then evaluate the Constitution’s goals as expressed in the preamble. After that, we shall explore a variety of topics in the main body of the text that lend themselves to the examination proposed here. In particular, these are the roles of the branches of government according to the separation of powers, the role of elections in determining the next head of state, the penalty for treason, the existence of the slave trade and racism, the republican form of government, the provisions for amending the Constitution, religious tests, and the Bill of Rights. 最后, 我们考虑了麦迪逊关于如何将宪法视为避免 fitnah 的模型的论点.
麦地那盟约 穆斯林对其组织作为一个政治团体给予了极大的重视,这一点可以从他们的日历既不是从先知的出生也不是从先知的死亡开始的事实中看出, 但从 2019 年第一个穆斯林政体在城邦麦地那建立起 622. 麦地那成立之前, 阿拉伯人没有国家可以“建立正义”, 投保国内
安宁, 提供共同防御, 促进大众福利, 并获得自由的祝福 …”当时的风俗是,那些太弱而无法保护自己的人成为保护者的客户 (瓦力). 穆罕默德, 自己是孤儿, was brought up under the protection of his uncle Abu Talib.
After his uncle’s death in 619, Muhammad received an invitation from Yathrib’s feuding Arab tribes to govern there. Once in Yathrib, he entered into a covenant with all of its residents, whether they had accepted Islam or not. Even the Jews living on the city’s outskirts subscribed to it.

伊斯兰教与自由民主

罗宾·赖特
Of all the challenges facing democracy in the 1990s, one of the greatest lies in the Islamic world. Only a handful of the more than four dozen predominantly Muslim countries have made significant strides toward establishing democratic systems. Among this handfulincluding Albania, 孟加拉国, 约旦, Kyrgyzstan, 黎巴嫩, Mali, 巴基斯坦, and Turkeynot one has yet achieved full, stable, or secure democracy. And the largest single regional bloc holding out against the global trend toward political pluralism comprises the Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
Yet the resistance to political change associated with the Islamic bloc is not necessarily a function of the Muslim faith. 的确, the evidence indicates quite the reverse. Rulers in some of the most antidemocratic regimes in the Islamic worldsuch as Brunei, 印度尼西亚, 伊拉克, Oman, Qatar, 叙利亚, and Turkmenistanare secular autocrats who refuse to share power with their brethren.
Overall, the obstacles to political pluralism in Islamic countries are not unlike the problems earlier faced in other parts of the world: secular ideologies such as Ba’athism in Iraq and Syria, Pancasila in Indonesia, or lingering communism in some former Soviet Central Asian states brook no real opposition. Ironically, many of these ideologies were adapted from the West; Ba’athism, for instance, was inspired by the European socialism of the 1930s and 1940s. Rigid government controls over everything from communications in Saudi Arabia and Brunei to foreign visitors in Uzbekistan and Indonesia also isolate their people from democratic ideas and debate on popular empowerment. In the largest and poorest Muslim countries, 而且, problems common to [End Page 64] developing states, from illiteracy and disease to poverty, make simple survival a priority and render democratic politics a seeming luxury. 最后, like their non-Muslim neighbors in Asia and Africa, most Muslim societies have no local history of democracy on which to draw. As democracy has blossomed in Western states over the past three centuries, Muslim societies have usually lived under colonial rulers, kings, or tribal and clan leaders.
换句话说, neither Islam nor its culture is the major obstacle to political modernity, even if undemocratic rulers sometimes use Islam as their excuse. 1 In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the ruling House of Saud relied on Wahhabism, a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam, first to unite the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula and then to justify dynastic rule. Like other monotheistic religions, Islam offers wide-ranging and sometimes contradictory instruction. In Saudi Arabia, Islam’s tenets have been selectively shaped to sustain an authoritarian monarchy.

伊斯兰教结构中的运动原理

博士. 穆罕默德·伊克巴尔

作为一种文化运动,伊斯兰教拒绝旧的静态宇宙观, 并达到动态视图. 作为一个统一的情感系统,它承认个人的价值, 并拒绝将血缘关系作为人类团结的基础. 血缘是地根. 只有认识到所有人类生命的起源都是精神性的,才能寻找人类统一的纯粹心理基础。 1 这种认识是对新的忠诚的创造,而无需任何仪式来维持他们的生命。, 并使人有可能将自己从地球上解放出来. 最初以修道院秩序出现的基督教被君士坦丁尝试作为一种统一体系。 2 它未能作为这样的体系发挥作用,促使朱利安皇帝 3 回到罗马的旧神,他试图对其进行哲学解释. 一位现代文明史家由此描绘了伊斯兰教出现在历史舞台上的文明世界状况: 那个用了四千年才建立起来的伟大文明,似乎在瓦解的边缘, 人类很可能会回到野蛮状态,每个部落和教派都反对下一个, 法律和秩序是未知的 . . . 这
旧的部落制裁失去了效力. 因此,旧的帝国方法将不再适用. 新的制裁措施由
基督教正在分裂和破坏,而不是团结和秩序. 这是一个充满悲剧的时代. 文明, 就像一棵巨树,它的枝叶覆盖了世界,它的枝条结出了艺术、科学和文学的金色果实, 蹒跚而行, 它的树干不再流淌着虔诚和崇敬的汁液, 但腐烂到核心, 被战争风暴撕裂, 只由古老的习俗和法律的绳索维系在一起, 随时可能会突然出现. 有没有可以带入的情感文化, 让人类再次团结起来,拯救文明? 这种文化一定是一种新的类型, 因为旧的制裁和仪式已经死了, 并且建立其他同类将是工作
几个世纪。'然后作者继续告诉我们,世界需要一种新的文化来取代王位的文化, 以及基于血缘关系的统一制度.
太棒了, 他补充说, 这种文化应该在最需要的时候从阿拉伯兴起. 有, 然而, 这种现象没什么了不起的. 世界生活直观地看到自己的需求, 并在关键时刻确定自己的方向. 这是什么, 用宗教语言, 我们称之为预言启示. 很自然,伊斯兰教应该闪过一个不受任何古代文化影响的简单民族的意识, 并占据三大洲交汇的地理位置. 新文化在 Tauhâd 的原则中找到了世界统一的基础。'5 伊斯兰教, 作为一个政体, 只是使这一原则成为人类智力和情感生活中的一个活生生的因素的一种实​​际手段. 它要求对上帝忠诚, 不去宝座. 因为上帝是所有生命的终极精神基础, 对上帝的忠诚实际上等于人对自己理想本性的忠诚. 所有生命的终极精神基础, 正如伊斯兰教所设想的那样, 是永恒的,并在变化和变化中展现自己. 一个基于这种现实概念的社会必须调和, 在它的生活中, 恒常与变化的范畴. 它必须拥有永恒的原则来规范它的集体生活, 因为永恒给了我们在不断变化的世界中的立足点.

再谈伊斯兰教

马哈·阿扎姆(MAHA AZZAM)

围绕所谓的伊斯兰教存在着政治和安全危机, 一场先例已久的危机 9/11. 在过去的 25 年份, 关于如何解释和打击伊斯兰教有不同的侧重点. 分析师和决策者
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
由于恐怖袭击反过来影响了对移民的态度,西方对伊斯兰教的敌意和恐惧日益加剧,今天的情况变得更加复杂, 宗教和文化. umma 或信徒社区的边界已从穆斯林国家延伸到欧洲城市. 只要有穆斯林社区,乌玛就可能存在. 在融入周围社区的感觉不明确且歧视可能很明显的环境中,共同信仰的归属感会增加. 对社会价值观的排斥越大,
无论是在西方还是在穆斯林国家, 伊斯兰教作为一种文化认同和价值体系的道德力量得到更大的巩固.
在伦敦发生爆炸事件之后 7 七月 2005 越来越明显的是,一些年轻人将宗教承诺作为表达种族的一种方式. 全球穆斯林之间的联系以及他们认为穆斯林易受伤害的看法,导致世界不同地区的许多人将当地的困境融入到更广泛的穆斯林困境中, 有文化认同, 主要或部分, 具有广泛定义的伊斯兰教.

辩论阿拉伯世界的民主

易卜生·易卜拉欣|

什么是民主?
西方学者将民主定义为保护个人公民权利和政治权利的方法. 它提供言论自由, 按, 信仰, 观点, 所有权, 和组装, 以及投票权, 提名和寻求公职. 亨廷顿 (1984) 认为一个政治制度是民主的,因为它最强大的集体决策者是通过以下方式选出的
定期选举,候选人自由竞争选票,几乎所有成年人都有投票权. 罗斯坦 (1995) 指出民主是一种政府形式和一种治理过程,可以根据情况改变和适应. 他还补充说,西方对民主的定义 — 除了问责, 竞赛, 一定程度的参与 — 包含对重要公民权利和政治权利的保障. 安德森 (1995) 认为民主一词是指通过定期选举选出最有权势的集体决策者的制度,在该制度中,候选人可以自由竞争选票,并且几乎所有成年人都有资格投票. 萨德·埃丁·易卜拉欣 (1995), 埃及学者, 将可能适用于阿拉伯世界的民主视为一套旨在通过和平方式进行治理的规则和制度
管理竞争团体和/或利益冲突. 然而, 萨米尔·阿明 (1991) 将他的民主定义建立在社会马克思主义的观点之上. 他把民主分为两类: 以个人权利和个人自由为基础的资产阶级民主, 但没有社会平等; 和政治民主,赋予社会上所有人投票和选举其政府和机构代表的权利,这将有助于获得他们平等的社会权利.
结束本节, 我想说,没有一个单一的民主定义可以准确地表明它是什么或不是什么. 然而, 正如我们注意到的, 上面提到的大多数定义都有基本的相似元素 – 问责制, 竞赛, 和一定程度的参与 – 已在西方世界和国际上占据主导地位.

伊斯兰教与民主

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

寻找伊斯兰宪政

纳迪西亚·霍根

While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. 例如, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. 然而, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
First, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts

伊斯兰恐惧症和反穆斯林仇恨犯罪

乔纳森·吉森斯·马泽

罗伯特·兰伯特(MBE)

The perils of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime threaten to undermine basic human rights, fundamental aspects of citizenship and co-existing partnerships for Muslims and non- Muslims alike in contemporary Europe. Routine portrayals of Islam as a religion of hatred, violence and inherent intolerance have become key planks for the emergence of extremist nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe – planks which seek to exploit populist fears and which have the potential to lead to Muslim disempowerment in Europe. Sections of the media have created a situation where the one serves to heighten the unfounded claims and anxieties of the other – such that politicians from Austria to the Britain, and the Netherlands to Spain, feel comfortable in using terms like “Tsunamis of Muslim immigration”, and accuse Islam of being a fundamental threat to a “European way of life”. While in many cases, the traction of this populist approach reflects an ignorance of Islamic faith, practice and belief, there are many think-tanks which are currently engaged in promoting erroneous depictions of Islam and Muslim political beliefs through unsubstantiated and academically baseless studies, and a reliance on techniques such as ‘junk-polling’. Prior to researching Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime in London, we worked with Muslim Londoners to research the contested notion of what is widely termed by academics and policy makers as “violent radicalisation” (Githens-Mazer, 2010, Lambert 2010). To a large extent it was that prior research experience that persuaded us to embark on this new project. That is to say, there is an important link between the two areas
of work which we should explain at the outset. 自从 9/11 Muslim Londoners, no less than Muslims in towns and cities across Europe, have often been unfairly stigmatised as subversive threats to state security and social cohesion, sometimes characterised as a fifth column (Cox and Marks 2006, Gove 2006, Mayer and Frampton 2009). We do not suggest that this stigmatisation did not exist before 9/11, still less do we argue that it revolves solely around the issues of security and social cohesion, but we do claim that the response to 9/11 – ‘the war on terror’ – and much of the rhetoric that has surrounded it has played a significant part in increasing the public perception of European Muslims as potential enemies rather than potential partners and neighbours.

博士致辞,穆罕默德·巴迪

博士,穆罕默德·巴迪

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (兆字节) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; therefore, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

昨天和今天之间

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in 它, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, 和 provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
然后, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. 这 Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

面对伊斯兰银行业的挑战

MUNAWAR IQBAL
美国空军
塔里古拉汗

Islamic banking practice, which started in early 1970s on a modest scale, has shown tremendous progress during the last 25 年份. Serious research work of the past two and a half decades has established that Islamic banking is a viable and efficient way of financial intermediation. A number of Islamic banks have been established during this period under heterogeneous, social and economic milieu. Recently, many conventional banks, including some major multinational Western banks, have also started using Islamic banking techniques. All this is encouraging. 然而, the Islamic banking system, like any other system, has to be seen as an evolving reality. This experience needs to be evaluated objectively and the problems ought to be carefully identified and addressed to.

It is with this objective that the Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI) of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) presents this paper on Challenges Facing Islamic Banking, as decided by the IDB Board of Executive Directors. A team of IRTI researchers consisting of Munawar Iqbal, Ausaf Ahmad and Tariqullah Khan has prepared the paper. Munawar Iqbal, Chief of the Islamic Banking and Finance Division acted as the project leader. Two external scholars have also refereed the study. IRTI is grateful for the contribution of these referees. The final product is being issued as the Second Occasional Paper.

It is hoped that serious consideration will be given to the challenges facing Islamic banking identified in the paper. Theoreticians and practitioners in the field of Islamic banking and finance need to find ways and means to meet those challenges so that Islamic banking can keep on progressing as it enters the 21st Century.

伊斯兰国的前奏

Muhammad Ibn Katebur Rahman

We have been given Islam as guidance and his guidance is divided in to, acts of worship wholly between Allah and His servants and acts of achieving aims to attain the Islamic sovereignty on earth. Acts of worship are Salat, Saum, Zabh, etc which have no rational reasons for its existence. Then there are acts which have reasons for its existence such as spending wealth, 圣战, speaking truth, fighting injustice, preventing zina, drugs, interests, etc which are there for the benefit and well being of societies and nations. Each intelligent worshipper in order to achieve these goals of universal benefits therefore must always seek ways to attain it and one of it is theological and political unity. In order to envision the gateways in the world to implement and realize these universal interests we then must know about the changing world, we must know about the age of information. We must know about its nature, behavior, progression which includes knowing about politics, history, technology, science, 军事, cultures, philosophies, psychology of nations, people of power and values, places of interest and value, resources of earth, international law, 互联网, humanity with its divisions on basis of wealth, power and their place in history and progression. Our Prophet (saas) stated that the knowledge is a lost property of a believer and indeed this knowledge is all those knowledge which by knowing benefits Islam and the Muslims both in world and hereafter. The intelligent among us especially the clerics, therefore study books and organizes people of knowledge on basis of their respective expertise so that they can give efficient and effective solutions for the attainment of those Islamic universal benefits. The Islamic politics is just there to realize these universal benefits, to humanity on whole and Muslims in particular