中的所有条目 "摩洛哥" 类别
阿拉伯明天
大卫·B. OTTAWAY
十月 6, 1981, 本来是在埃及庆祝的一天. 它标志着埃及在三项阿以冲突中取得最伟大胜利的周年纪念日, 在开国之日,该国的失败者军队冲过苏伊士运河 1973 赎罪日战争,使以色列军队退缩. 酷, 万里无云的早晨, 开罗体育馆里挤满了埃及家庭,他们前来参观是为了看准军事力量。, 总统安瓦尔·萨达特,战争的建筑师, 人和机器在他面前游行时满意地看着. 我在附近, 刚到的外国记者, 六架幻影喷气式飞机在杂技表演中高高呼啸,其中一辆军车直接停在了检阅台前, 用长长的红色画天空, 黄色, 紫色,和绿色的烟雾. 萨达特站了起来, 显然准备与另一支埃及军队交换礼炮. 他使自己成为四名从卡车上跳下来的伊斯兰刺客的理想目标。, 冲上领奖台, 随着子弹的杀手不断地向他们的致命之火喷洒架子, 我考虑了一下是跌倒在地,冒着被惊恐的观众踩死的危险,还是保持脚步并冒着流弹的风险. 本能告诉我要站稳脚跟, 我的新闻责任感促使我去寻找萨达特是活着还是死了.
伊斯兰教, 政治伊斯兰教与美国
阿拉伯洞察力
与美国的“兄弟情谊”是否可能?
哈利勒阿纳尼
伊斯兰教, 民主 & 美国:
科尔多瓦基金会
阿卜杜拉·法利克 |
介绍 ,
再谈伊斯兰教
马哈·阿扎姆(MAHA AZZAM)
挑战威权主义, 殖民主义, 和不团结: 阿富汗和里达的伊斯兰政治改革运动
艾哈迈德·阿里·塞勒姆
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). 然而, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. 的确,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, 这
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. 然而, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
伊斯兰反对党和欧盟参与的潜力
托比·阿切尔
海蒂·休塔宁(Heidi Huuhtanen)
参与政治伊斯兰的策略
沙迪哈米德
阿曼达·卡德莱克(AMANDA KADLEC)
伊斯兰运动和阿拉伯世界的民主进程: 探索灰色地带
内森J. 棕色, 阿姆·哈姆扎维(Amr Hamzawy),
玛丽娜·奥特韦(Marina Ottaway)
伊斯兰激进化
与政治伊斯兰教有关的问题继续对欧洲在中东和北非的外交政策构成挑战 (中东和北非). 在过去十年左右的时间里,随着欧盟政策试图应对这些挑战,政治伊斯兰教本身已经演变. 专家指出政治伊斯兰教中日益复杂和多样化的趋势. 一些伊斯兰组织加强了对民主规范的承诺,并充分参与了和平, 主流国家政治. 其他人仍然执着于暴力手段. 还有一些人转向了一种更加安静的伊斯兰教形式, 脱离政治活动. 中东和北非地区的政治伊斯兰教对欧洲政策制定者没有统一的趋势. 围绕“激进化”的概念展开了分析辩论. 这反过来又催生了对推动“去激进化”的因素的研究, 反之亦然, “再激进化”. 大部分复杂性源于普遍持有的观点,即所有这三种现象同时发生. 甚至条款本身也有争议. 人们经常指出,温和激进的二分法未能完全捕捉到政治伊斯兰内部趋势的细微差别. 一些分析家还抱怨说,“激进主义”的谈论带有意识形态色彩. 在术语层面, 我们理解激进化与极端主义有关, 但在其宗教原教旨主义与政治内容的中心地位上存在不同的看法, 以及是否暗示了诉诸暴力的意愿.
这种差异反映在伊斯兰主义者自己的观点上, 以及在外人的认知中.
政治伊斯兰教和欧洲外交政策
政治伊斯兰教和欧洲邻国政策
迈克尔·爱默生
理查德·杨斯
自从 2001 以及随之而来的西方与政治伊斯兰之间关系性质的国际事件已成为外交政策的决定性问题. 近年来,对政治伊斯兰问题进行了大量的研究和分析。. 这有助于纠正西方以前对伊斯兰价值观和意图的性质的一些简单化和危言耸听的假设. 与此平行, 欧盟 (欧盟) 制定了许多政策举措,主要是欧洲邻里政策(ENP) 原则上致力于对话和更深入的参与(非暴力) 阿拉伯国家内的政治行为者和民间社会组织. 然而,许多分析家和政策制定者现在抱怨在概念辩论和政策制定中的某个奖杯. 已经确定,政治伊斯兰教是一个不断变化的景观, 深受各种情况的影响, 但辩论似乎常常停留在“伊斯兰主义者是否民主”这样简单的问题上?’ 许多独立分析家仍然主张与伊斯兰主义者接触, 但西方政府与伊斯兰组织之间的实际和解仍然有限 .
伊斯兰运动: 政治自由 & 民主
优素福·卡拉达维博士
这是人的职责 (伊斯兰) 下一阶段的运动坚决反对极权独裁统治, 政治专制和篡夺民权. 运动应始终支持政治自由, 如真,不假, 民主. 它应该断然宣布它拒绝暴君并避开所有独裁者, 即使某些暴君似乎对它有良好的意图,以获取一些利益,而且时间通常很短, 正如经验所表明的那样。先知 (锯) 说, “当你看到我的国家成为恐惧的牺牲品,而不是对做错事的人说, “你错了”, 那么你可能会对他们失去希望。”那么,一个强迫人们对自负的不法者说话的政权怎么样?, “怎么刚刚, 你有多棒. 哦,我们的英雄, 我们的救世主和我们的解放者!”《古兰经》谴责像努姆鲁德这样的暴君, 法老, 哈曼等, 但它也鄙视那些追随暴君并服从他们命令的人. 这就是为什么安拉蔑视诺亚比的人说, “但他们跟随 (米) 他们的财富和孩子不会给他们增加,只会给他们带来损失。” [诺亚的信; 21]安拉也提到了广告, 胡德人, “并且听从了每一个强者的命令, 顽固的违法者”. [胡德的信:59]也看看古兰经是怎么说法老的人民的, “但他们听从了法老的命令, 法老的命令没有得到正确的引导。[胡德的信: 97] “因此他愚弄了他的人民, 他们服从了他: 他们确实是一个叛逆的民族 (反对真主).” [苏拉特·祖赫鲁夫: 54]仔细研究穆斯林民族的历史和现代伊斯兰运动应该清楚地表明,伊斯兰思想, 除非在民主和自由的气氛中,否则伊斯兰运动和伊斯兰觉醒从未繁荣或结出果实, 只有在压迫和暴政践踏了坚持伊斯兰教的人民的意志时,它们才会枯萎和贫瘠. 这种压迫政权强加了他们的世俗主义, 通过武力和胁迫对其人民实行社会主义或共产主义, 使用秘密酷刑和公开处决, 并使用那些撕裂肉体的恶魔工具,流血, 粉碎骨头并摧毁灵魂。我们在许多穆斯林国家看到了这些做法, 包括土耳其, 埃及, 叙利亚, 伊拉克, (前者) 南也门, 不同时期的索马里和北非国家, 取决于每个国家独裁者的年龄或统治时期。另一方面, 我们看到伊斯兰运动和伊斯兰觉醒在自由和民主时代结出硕果并蓬勃发展, 在以恐惧和压迫统治人民的帝国政权崩溃之后。因此, 我无法想象伊斯兰运动会支持政治自由和民主以外的任何东西。暴君允许每个人发出声音, 除了伊斯兰教的声音, 让每一种趋势都以政党或某种团体的形式表现出来, 除了伊斯兰潮流,它是唯一真正代表这个国家并表达它的趋势, 价值观, 本质和存在.
马格里布的激进伊斯兰教
Carlos Echeverría Jesús
The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, 黎巴嫩, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. 在 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.
这 500 最有影响力的穆斯林
约翰·埃斯波西托
易卜拉欣·卡林
您手中的出版物是我们希望成为年度系列的第一本,它为了解穆斯林世界的推动者和震动者提供了一个窗口. 我们努力突出穆斯林有影响力的人, 那是, 影响来自他们的伊斯兰教实践或来自他们是穆斯林这一事实的人. 我们认为这为穆斯林影响世界的不同方式提供了宝贵的见解, 并且还展示了当今穆斯林生活的多样性。影响是一个棘手的概念. 它的意思来源于拉丁词influensmeaning to flow-in, 指向一个古老的占星学观念,即看不见的力量 (喜欢月亮) 影响人类. 这份名单上的人物也有影响人类的能力. 这份名单上的每个人都以各种不同的方式影响着地球上许多人的生活. 这 50 最具影响力的人物简介. 他们的影响来自多种来源; 然而,它们是统一的,因为它们每个都影响着大量的人类。然后我们打破了 500 领导进入 15 类别——学术, 政治的,行政的, 血统, 传教士, 女装, 青年, 慈善事业, 发展,科学和技术, 艺术与文化, 媒体, 激进分子, 国际伊斯兰网络, 和今日问题——帮助您了解伊斯兰教和穆斯林影响当今世界的不同方式。两个综合列表显示了影响如何以不同方式发挥作用: 国际伊斯兰网络展示了穆斯林重要跨国网络的领导者, 和“今日问题”突出了由于当前影响人类的问题而具有重要意义的个人.
在欧洲的穆斯林邻国中旅行
乔斯特·拉根迪克
“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, 罗曼诺·普罗迪, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, 然而. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. 自从 11 九月 2001, 尤其是, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.
未来阶段伊斯兰运动的优先事项
优素福·卡德哈维(Yusuf Al-Qardhawi)
What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?
经过 “伊斯兰运动”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heart – the latter being theweakest of beliefs – so that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.
建造桥梁而不是墙壁
Alex Glennie
Since the terror attacks of 11 九月 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (中东和北非) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (印度空军) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. 然而, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.