中的所有条目 "巴勒斯坦" 类别
阿拉伯明天
大卫·B. OTTAWAY
十月 6, 1981, 本来是在埃及庆祝的一天. 它标志着埃及在三项阿以冲突中取得最伟大胜利的周年纪念日, 在开国之日，该国的失败者军队冲过苏伊士运河 1973 赎罪日战争，使以色列军队退缩. 酷, 万里无云的早晨, 开罗体育馆里挤满了埃及家庭，他们前来参观是为了看准军事力量。, 总统安瓦尔·萨达特,战争的建筑师, 人和机器在他面前游行时满意地看着. 我在附近, 刚到的外国记者, 六架幻影喷气式飞机在杂技表演中高高呼啸，其中一辆军车直接停在了检阅台前, 用长长的红色画天空, 黄色, 紫色,和绿色的烟雾. 萨达特站了起来, 显然准备与另一支埃及军队交换礼炮. 他使自己成为四名从卡车上跳下来的伊斯兰刺客的理想目标。, 冲上领奖台, 随着子弹的杀手不断地向他们的致命之火喷洒架子, 我考虑了一下是跌倒在地，冒着被惊恐的观众踩死的危险，还是保持脚步并冒着流弹的风险. 本能告诉我要站稳脚跟, 我的新闻责任感促使我去寻找萨达特是活着还是死了.
保守主义和伊斯兰主义之间的女权主义: 巴勒斯坦的情况
博士, Islah Jad |
在西岸和加沙地带举行了立法选举。 2006 掌权的伊斯兰运动哈马斯, 后来组成了巴勒斯坦立法委员会的多数席位，也是哈马斯的第一多数席位政府. 这些选举导致任命了第一位哈马斯女部长, 成为妇女事务部长. 三月之间 2006 和六月 2007, 两名不同的哈马斯女部长上任, 但两人都发现很难管理该部，因为该部的大多数雇员不是哈马斯成员，而是属于其他政党, 大多数是法塔赫的成员, 控制大多数巴勒斯坦权力机构机构的主导运动. 在哈马斯在加沙地带掌权并导致其政府在西岸倒台后，妇女事务部哈马斯妇女与法塔赫女性成员之间的紧张斗争期结束——一场斗争有时会发生剧烈的转变. 后来引用来解释这场斗争的一个原因是世俗女权主义话语和伊斯兰主义关于妇女问题的话语之间的区别. 在巴勒斯坦的背景下，这种分歧具有危险性，因为它被用来证明使血腥的政治斗争永存。, 将哈马斯妇女从其职务或职位上撤职, 以及当时在西岸和被占领的加沙地带普遍存在的政治和地理鸿沟.
这场斗争提出了一些重要的问题: 我们应该惩罚已经掌权的伊斯兰运动吗, 还是我们应该考虑导致法塔赫在政治舞台上失败的原因? 女权主义可以为女性提供一个全面的框架吗, 不论他们的社会和意识形态有何关系? 对女性具有共同点的论述可以帮助她们实现并达成共同目标? 家长制仅存在于伊斯兰意识形态中吗, 而不是民族主义和爱国主义? 我们所说的女权主义是什么意思? 是否只有一种女权主义, 或几种女权主义? 我们所说的伊斯兰教是什么意思 – 是这个名字或宗教所知道的运动吗, 哲学, 或法律制度? 我们需要深入了解这些问题并仔细考虑, 我们必须同意它们，以便我们以后可以决定, 作为女权主义者, 如果我们对家长作风的批评应该针对宗教 (信仰), 应该局限在信徒的心里，不能控制整个世界, 或法理, 它涉及不同的信仰流派，这些流派解释了《古兰经》中包含的法律制度和先知的言论 – 圣训.
伊斯兰妇女在被占巴勒斯坦的行动
Khaled Amayreh的采访
Sameera Al-Halayka 访谈
Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. 她
出生在希伯伦附近的肖尤赫村 1964. 她拥有伊斯兰教法学士学位 (伊斯兰
法理) 来自希伯伦大学. 她曾是一名记者 1996 至 2006 什么时候
she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 选举.
她已婚并育有七个孩子.
问: 在一些西方国家，女性接受的普遍印象
伊斯兰抵抗组织内的低劣待遇, 比如哈马斯. 这是真的?
哈马斯如何对待女性活动家?
穆斯林妇女的权利和义务首先来自伊斯兰教法或法律.
它们不是我们从哈马斯或任何人那里收到的自愿或慈善行为或姿态
别的. 因此, 就政治参与和行动而言, 女性一般都有
与男性相同的权利和义务. 毕竟, 女性至少弥补 50 的百分比
社会. 在某种意义上, 他们是整个社会，因为他们生, 并提高,
新一代.
所以, 我可以说，哈马斯内部的妇女地位完全符合她的要求
在伊斯兰教本身的地位. 这意味着她是各个级别的全面合作伙伴. 的确, 这将是
对伊斯兰教徒来说是不公平和不公正的 (或伊斯兰主义者，如果你愿意) 女人成为痛苦的伙伴
而她被排除在决策过程之外. 这就是为什么女人扮演的角色
哈马斯一直在开拓.
问: 您是否觉得哈马斯内部出现女性政治激进主义是
符合古典伊斯兰概念的自然发展
关于妇女的地位和作用, 还是仅仅是对
现代性的压力和政治行动的要求以及持续的
以色列占领?
伊斯兰法学和哈马斯宪章中没有任何文字禁止女性
政治参与. 我相信事实正好相反 — 有许多古兰经经文
和先知穆罕默德的格言敦促妇女积极参与政治和公共事务
影响穆斯林的问题. 但对于女性来说，这也是事实, 就像男人一样, 政治活动
不是强制性的，而是自愿的, 并且很大程度上取决于每个女人的能力,
资格和个人情况. 尽管如此, 关心公众
每个穆斯林男人和女人都必须遵守. 先知
穆罕默德说: “不关心穆斯林事务的人不是穆斯林。”
而且, 巴勒斯坦伊斯兰主义妇女必须将实地的所有客观因素纳入
决定是否加入政治或参与政治活动时的帐户.
伊斯兰教, 政治伊斯兰教与美国
阿拉伯洞察力
与美国的“兄弟情谊”是否可能?
哈利勒阿纳尼
“没有机会与任何美国沟通. 只要美国坚持其长期以来将伊斯兰教视为真正危险的观点, 一种将美国与犹太复国主义敌人置于同一条船上的观点. 我们对美国人民或美国没有先入为主的观念. 社会及其民间组织和智囊团. 我们与美国人民的沟通没有问题，但没有做出足够的努力来拉近我们的距离,”博士说. 伊萨姆·伊里安, 穆斯林兄弟会政治部负责人接受电话采访.
Al-Iryan的话总结了穆斯林兄弟会对美国人民和美国的看法. 政府. 穆斯林兄弟会的其他成员会同意, 已故的哈桑·班纳也是如此, 谁在 1928. 铝- 版纳主要将西方视为道德败坏的象征. 其他萨拉菲派——一个以祖先为楷模的伊斯兰学派——对美国也持同样的看法, 但缺乏穆斯林兄弟会拥护的意识形态灵活性. 虽然穆斯林兄弟会相信让美国人参与民间对话, 其他极端组织认为对话没有意义，并认为武力是与美国打交道的唯一方式.
误解的根源
易卜拉欣·卡林
九月过后 11, 伊斯兰教与西方之间长期曲折的关系进入了一个新阶段. 这些袭击被解释为实现了一个长期存在于西方意识中的预言, IE。, 伊斯兰教作为一个威胁性力量的到来，其明确意图是摧毁西方文明. 伊斯兰教作为暴力的表征, 好战的, 压迫性的宗教意识形态从电视节目和国家机关延伸到学校和互联网. 甚至有人建议马卡, 伊斯兰教最神圣的城市, 被“核弹”给所有穆斯林一个持久的教训. 尽管人们可以看到普遍的愤怒感, 敌意, 和报复作为对无辜生命的可恶损失的正常人类反应, 对穆斯林的妖魔化是更深层次的哲学和历史问题的结果.
以许多微妙的方式, 伊斯兰教和西方的悠久历史, 从八九世纪巴格达的神学辩论到十二、十三世纪安达卢西亚的集会经验, 告知每个文明相对于其他文明当前的看法和疑虑. 本文将考察这段历史的一些显着特征，并认为伊斯兰教的整体表现, 由一组高度复杂的图像制作者创建和维持, 智囊团, 学者, 说客, 政策制定者, 和媒体, 主宰当今西方良心, 起源于西方与伊斯兰世界的悠久历史. 还有人认为，对伊斯兰教和穆斯林的根深蒂固的疑虑已导致并将继续导致根本上存在缺陷和错误的政策决定，这些决定直接影响伊斯兰教与西方的当前关系. 9 月之后，许多美国人的头脑中几乎毫不含糊地将伊斯兰教与恐怖主义和极端主义等同起来 11 是两种历史误解所产生的结果, 下面会详细分析, 以及某些将对抗视为与伊斯兰世界打交道的唯一途径的利益集团的政治议程. 希望以下分析能够提供一个历史背景，让我们能够理解这些趋势及其对两个世界的影响.
职业, 殖民主义, 种族隔离?
人类科学研究委员会
南非人文科学研究委员会委托进行这项研究，以检验 John Dugard 教授在 1 月份提交给联合国人权理事会的报告中提出的假设 2007, 以联合国以色列占领的巴勒斯坦领土人权状况特别报告员的身份 (即, 西岸, 包括东耶路撒冷, 和
加沙, 以后选择). Dugard教授提出了这个问题: 以色列显然是对被占领土的军事占领. 同时, 占领的因素构成殖民主义和种族隔离的形式, 违反国际法的. 具有殖民主义和种族隔离特征的长期占领政权对被占领人民的法律后果是什么, 占领国和第三国?
为了考虑这些后果, 这项研究旨在合法地检查杜加德教授问题的前提: 以色列是 OPT 的占领者吗, 和, 如果是这样, 它对这些领土的占领是否构成殖民主义或种族隔离? 鉴于其痛苦的种族隔离历史，南非对这些问题有着明显的兴趣, 这意味着否认自决
对其大多数人口和, 在占领纳米比亚期间, 将种族隔离扩大到南非有效地寻求殖民的领土. 这些非法做法绝不能在其他地方复制: 其他民族绝不能像南非和纳米比亚人民那样遭受苦难.
探索这些问题, 组建了一个国际学者团队. 该项目的目的是从国际法的无党派角度审视局势, 而不是参与政治话语和修辞. 这项研究是为期 15 个月的深入研究协作过程的结果, 咨询, 写作和审查. 它总结和, 这是值得期待的, 有说服力地论证并清楚地表明，以色列, 自从 1967, 一直是 OPT 的交战占领国, 并且它对这些领土的占领已成为实施种族隔离制度的殖民企业. 交战占领本身并不是非法情况: 它被认为是武装冲突的可能后果. 同时, 根据武装冲突法 (也称为国际人道法), 占领只是一种暂时的状态. 国际法禁止以武力威胁或使用武力的方式单方面吞并或永久获取领土: 如果发生这种情况, 任何国家不得承认或支持由此产生的非法情况. 相对于职业, 殖民主义和种族隔离总是非法的，并且确实被认为是特别严重的违反国际法的行为，因为它们从根本上违背了国际法律秩序的核心价值观. 殖民主义违反自决原则,
其中国际法院 (国际法院) 被确认为“当代国际法的基本原则之一”. 所有国家都有义务尊重和促进自决. 种族隔离是种族歧视的严重案例, 根据《禁止并惩治种族隔离罪行国际公约》构成 (1973,
此后的“种族隔离公约”) “为了建立和维持一个种族群体对任何其他种族群体的统治并有系统地压迫他们而实施的不人道行为”. 种族隔离的做法, 而且, 是国际犯罪.
Dugard 教授在其向联合国人权理事会提交的报告中 2007 建议应就以色列行为的法律后果征求国际法院的咨询意见. 这一咨询意见无疑将补充国际法院在 2004 关于在被占巴勒斯坦领土修建隔离墙的法律后果 (此后的“墙咨询意见”). 这一法律行动过程并未穷尽国际社会可以选择的选项, 第三国和国际组织在被评估为另一国从事殖民主义或种族隔离做法时的义务.
伊斯兰教, 民主 & 美国:
科尔多瓦基金会
阿卜杜拉·法利克 |
介绍 ,
尽管这是一场长期而复杂的辩论, Arches Quarterly 从神学和实践的角度重新审视, 关于伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系和兼容性的重要辩论, 正如巴拉克奥巴马的希望和变革议程所呼应的那样. 虽然许多人庆祝奥巴马登上椭圆形办公室作为美国的全国宣泄者, 其他人对国际舞台上意识形态和方法的转变仍然不乐观. 虽然穆斯林世界和美国之间的许多紧张局势和不信任可归因于促进民主的方法, 通常偏爱专制政权和伪造政权，这些政权为民主价值观和人权提供口红, 余震 9/11 通过美国在政治伊斯兰上的立场，确实进一步加剧了担忧. 它创造了由worldpublicopinion.org发现的负面墙, 根据该 67% 的埃及人认为，全球范围内，美国正在扮演“主要消极”角色.
因此，美国的反应很贴切. 通过选举奥巴马, 世界各地的许多人都寄希望于发展一个不太好战的人, 但对穆斯林世界更公平的外交政策. 奥巴马的考验, 当我们讨论, 是美国及其盟友促进民主的方式. 它会促进还是强加?
而且, 它能否成为长期冲突地区的诚实经纪人？? 吸收 prolifi 的专业知识和洞察力
c学者, 学者, 经验丰富的记者和政治家, Arches Quarterly 揭示了伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系以及美国的角色——以及奥巴马带来的变化, 在寻求共同点. 阿纳斯·阿尔蒂克里蒂, The e Cordoba Foundation 的首席执行官为这次讨论提供了开场白, 他反思了奥巴马道路上的希望和挑战. 跟随 Altikriti, 尼克松总统的前顾问, 罗伯特·克莱恩（Robert Craneoff）博士对伊斯兰自由权原则进行了透彻的分析. 安瓦尔·易卜拉欣, 马来西亚前副总理, 通过在穆斯林占主导地位的社会中实施民主的实际现实来丰富讨论, 即, 在印度尼西亚和马来西亚.
我们也有Shireen Hunter博士, 乔治敦大学, 美国, 探索落后于民主化和现代化的穆斯林国家. 恐怖主义作家对此予以补充, 纳菲兹·艾哈迈德（Nafeez Ahmed）博士对后现代危机和
民主的灭亡. Daud Abdullah博士 (中东媒体监控总监), 艾伦·哈特 (前ITN和BBC Panorama通讯员; 犹太复国主义的作者: 犹太人的真正敌人) 和Asem Sondos (埃及《 Sawt Al Omma》杂志编辑) 专注于奥巴马及其在穆斯林世界促进民主方面的作用, 以及美国与以色列和穆斯林兄弟会的关系.
外交部长, 马尔代夫, 艾哈迈德·沙希德 (Ahmed Shaheed) 推测伊斯兰教和民主的未来; 克莱尔. 格里·麦克洛克林
– 因爱尔兰共和党活动而入狱四年的新芬党成员和吉尔福德的活动家 4 和伯明翰 6, 反映了他最近去加沙的旅行，在那里他目睹了对巴勒斯坦人的残暴和不公正的影响; 玛丽·布林-史密斯博士, 激进化和当代政治暴力研究中心主任讨论批判性研究政治恐怖的挑战; 哈立德·穆巴拉克博士, 作家和剧作家, 讨论达尔富尔和平的前景; 最后，记者和人权活动家 Ashur Shamis 批判性地审视了当今穆斯林的民主化和政治化.
我们希望所有这些都有助于在新的希望曙光中对影响我们所有人的问题进行全面的阅读和反思.
谢谢
美国哈马斯政策阻碍中东和平
亨利·西格曼
过去的双边会谈失败 16 多年的经验表明，中东和平协议永远不可能靠各方自己达成. 以色列政府相信他们可以无视国际社会对其在约旦河西岸的非法殖民项目的谴责，因为他们可以指望美国反对国际制裁. 不受美国制定的参数框架的双边会谈 (根据安全理事会决议, 奥斯陆协定, 阿拉伯和平倡议, “路线图”和其他以前的巴以协议) 不能成功. 以色列政府认为，美国国会不会允许美国总统发布此类参数并要求其接受. 9月在华盛顿特区恢复双边会谈有什么希望 2 完全取决于奥巴马总统证明这种信念是错误的, 以及他承诺的“过渡建议”是否, 如果谈判陷入僵局, 是提交美式参数的委婉说法. 这样的美国倡议必须为以色列在其 1967 年前边界内的安全提供铁定的保证, 但同时必须明确指出，如果以色列坚持不让巴勒斯坦人在约旦河西岸和加沙建立一个可行的主权国家，这些保证是不可用的. 本文重点讨论永久地位协议的另一个主要障碍: 缺乏有效的巴勒斯坦对话者. 解决哈马斯的正当不满——正如中央司令部最近的一份报告所指出的那样, 哈马斯有正当的不满——可能导致其重返巴勒斯坦联合政府，为以色列提供可靠的和平伙伴. 如果由于哈马斯的拒绝主义而导致外展失败, 该组织阻止其他巴勒斯坦政党谈判达成的合理协议的能力将受到严重阻碍. 如果奥巴马政府不领导一项国际倡议，以定义巴以协议的内容，并积极促进巴勒斯坦政治和解, 欧洲必须这样做, 希望美国能效法. 不幸, 没有银弹可以保证“两国在和平与安全中并存”的目标。
但是，奥巴马总统目前的做法绝对不能.
再谈伊斯兰教
马哈·阿扎姆（MAHA AZZAM）
围绕所谓的伊斯兰教存在着政治和安全危机, 一场先例已久的危机 9/11. 在过去的 25 年份, 关于如何解释和打击伊斯兰教有不同的侧重点. 分析师和决策者
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
由于恐怖袭击反过来影响了对移民的态度，西方对伊斯兰教的敌意和恐惧日益加剧，今天的情况变得更加复杂, 宗教和文化. umma 或信徒社区的边界已从穆斯林国家延伸到欧洲城市. 只要有穆斯林社区，乌玛就可能存在. 在融入周围社区的感觉不明确且歧视可能很明显的环境中，共同信仰的归属感会增加. 对社会价值观的排斥越大,
无论是在西方还是在穆斯林国家, 伊斯兰教作为一种文化认同和价值体系的道德力量得到更大的巩固.
在伦敦发生爆炸事件之后 7 七月 2005 越来越明显的是，一些年轻人将宗教承诺作为表达种族的一种方式. 全球穆斯林之间的联系以及他们认为穆斯林易受伤害的看法，导致世界不同地区的许多人将当地的困境融入到更广泛的穆斯林困境中, 有文化认同, 主要或部分, 具有广泛定义的伊斯兰教.
全球反恐战争中的精准:
Sherifa Zuhur
九月之后的七年 11, 2001 (9/11) 攻击, 许多专家认为，基地组织已经恢复了力量，其模仿者或分支机构比以前更具杀伤力. 国家情报估计 2007 断言基地组织现在比以前更危险 9/11.1 基地组织的模仿者继续威胁西方, 中东, 和欧洲国家, 就像在九月被挫败的情节一样 2007 在德国. 布鲁斯·里德尔说: 很大程度上要归功于华盛顿急于进入伊拉克而不是追捕基地组织的领导人, 该组织现在在巴基斯坦的荒地拥有坚实的业务基础，并在伊拉克西部拥有有效的特许经营权. 它的影响力遍及整个穆斯林世界和欧洲 . . . 奥萨马·本·拉登开展了一场成功的宣传活动. . . . 他的想法现在吸引了比以往更多的追随者.
确实，各种萨拉菲圣战组织仍在整个伊斯兰世界中出现. 为什么对我们称之为全球圣战的伊斯兰恐怖主义的大量资源反应没有证明非常有效?
转向“软实力”工具,” 西方在全球反恐战争中支持穆斯林的努力效果如何？ (长城汽车)? 为什么美国在更广泛的伊斯兰世界中赢得如此少的“民心”? 为什么美国在这个问题上的战略信息在该地区发挥如此糟糕? 为什么, 尽管穆斯林普遍反对极端主义，正如主要穆斯林领导人的调查和官方言论所示, 约旦和巴基斯坦对本拉登的支持实际上有所增加?
本专着不会重新审视伊斯兰暴力的起源. 相反，它关注的是一种错误地构建 GWOT 并阻止穆斯林支持它的概念上的失败. 他们无法认同提议的变革性对策，因为他们将自己的一些核心信念和制度视为目标
这种努力.
几个严重成问题的趋势混淆了美国对 GWOT 的概念化以及为打这场战争而制定的战略信息. 这些演变自 (1) 对穆斯林和穆斯林占多数的国家的后殖民政治方法差异很大，因此产生了相互矛盾和令人困惑的印象和效果; 和 (2) 对伊斯兰教和次区域文化的普遍无知和偏见. 增加美国人的愤怒, 恐惧, 和对致命事件的焦虑 9/11, 和某些元素, 尽管有冷静的头脑的敦促, 让穆斯林和他们的宗教为他们的同教者的罪行负责, 或出于政治原因认为这样做有用的人.
埃及的穆斯林兄弟: 对抗或整合?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 选举. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. 同时, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
伊拉克与政治伊斯兰的未来
詹姆斯·皮斯卡托里
Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(A) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(乙) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.
伊斯兰教与民主
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
挑战威权主义, 殖民主义, 和不团结: 阿富汗和里达的伊斯兰政治改革运动
艾哈迈德·阿里·塞勒姆
The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most
Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet
some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
所以, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). 然而, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. 的确,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, 这
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. 然而, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
一个穆斯林群岛
最大L. 毛
This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.
伊斯兰政治思想中的民主
Azzam S. 塔米米
Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, 在 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, 在 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.
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