RSS中的所有条目 "突尼斯" 类别

阿拉伯明天

大卫·B. OTTAWAY

十月 6, 1981, 本来是在埃及庆祝的一天. 它标志着埃及在三项阿以冲突中取得最伟大胜利的周年纪念日, 在开国之日,该国的失败者军队冲过苏伊士运河 1973 赎罪日战争,使以色列军队退缩. 酷, 万里无云的早晨, 开罗体育馆里挤满了埃及家庭,他们前来参观是为了看准军事力量。, 总统安瓦尔·萨达特,战争的建筑师, 人和机器在他面前游行时满意地看着. 我在附近, 刚到的外国记者, 六架幻影喷气式飞机在杂技表演中高高呼啸,其中一辆军车直接停在了检阅台前, 用长长的红色画天空, 黄色, 紫色,和绿色的烟雾. 萨达特站了起来, 显然准备与另一支埃及军队交换礼炮. 他使自己成为四名从卡车上跳下来的伊斯兰刺客的理想目标。, 冲上领奖台, 随着子弹的杀手不断地向他们的致命之火喷洒架子, 我考虑了一下是跌倒在地,冒着被惊恐的观众踩死的危险,还是保持脚步并冒着流弹的风险. 本能告诉我要站稳脚跟, 我的新闻责任感促使我去寻找萨达特是活着还是死了.

伊斯兰教, 政治伊斯兰教与美国

阿拉伯洞察力

与美国的“兄弟情谊”是否可能?

哈利勒阿纳尼

“没有机会与任何美国沟通. 只要美国坚持其长期以来将伊斯兰教视为真正危险的观点, 一种将美国与犹太复国主义敌人置于同一条船上的观点. 我们对美国人民或美国没有先入为主的观念. 社会及其民间组织和智囊团. 我们与美国人民的沟通没有问题,但没有做出足够的努力来拉近我们的距离,”博士说. 伊萨姆·伊里安, 穆斯林兄弟会政治部负责人接受电话采访.
Al-Iryan的话总结了穆斯林兄弟会对美国人民和美国的看法. 政府. 穆斯林兄弟会的其他成员会同意, 已故的哈桑·班纳也是如此, 谁在 1928. 铝- 版纳主要将西方视为道德败坏的象征. 其他萨拉菲派——一个以祖先为楷模的伊斯兰学派——对美国也持同样的看法, 但缺乏穆斯林兄弟会拥护的意识形态灵活性. 虽然穆斯林兄弟会相信让美国人参与民间对话, 其他极端组织认为对话没有意义,并认为武力是与美国打交道的唯一方式.

伊斯兰教结构中的运动原理

博士. 穆罕默德·伊克巴尔

作为一种文化运动,伊斯兰教拒绝旧的静态宇宙观, 并达到动态视图. 作为一个统一的情感系统,它承认个人的价值, 并拒绝将血缘关系作为人类团结的基础. 血缘是地根. 只有认识到所有人类生命的起源都是精神性的,才能寻找人类统一的纯粹心理基础。 1 这种认识是对新的忠诚的创造,而无需任何仪式来维持他们的生命。, 并使人有可能将自己从地球上解放出来. 最初以修道院秩序出现的基督教被君士坦丁尝试作为一种统一体系。 2 它未能作为这样的体系发挥作用,促使朱利安皇帝 3 回到罗马的旧神,他试图对其进行哲学解释. 一位现代文明史家由此描绘了伊斯兰教出现在历史舞台上的文明世界状况: 那个用了四千年才建立起来的伟大文明,似乎在瓦解的边缘, 人类很可能会回到野蛮状态,每个部落和教派都反对下一个, 法律和秩序是未知的 . . . 这
旧的部落制裁失去了效力. 因此,旧的帝国方法将不再适用. 新的制裁措施由
基督教正在分裂和破坏,而不是团结和秩序. 这是一个充满悲剧的时代. 文明, 就像一棵巨树,它的枝叶覆盖了世界,它的枝条结出了艺术、科学和文学的金色果实, 蹒跚而行, 它的树干不再流淌着虔诚和崇敬的汁液, 但腐烂到核心, 被战争风暴撕裂, 只由古老的习俗和法律的绳索维系在一起, 随时可能会突然出现. 有没有可以带入的情感文化, 让人类再次团结起来,拯救文明? 这种文化一定是一种新的类型, 因为旧的制裁和仪式已经死了, 并且建立其他同类将是工作
几个世纪。'然后作者继续告诉我们,世界需要一种新的文化来取代王位的文化, 以及基于血缘关系的统一制度.
太棒了, 他补充说, 这种文化应该在最需要的时候从阿拉伯兴起. 有, 然而, 这种现象没什么了不起的. 世界生活直观地看到自己的需求, 并在关键时刻确定自己的方向. 这是什么, 用宗教语言, 我们称之为预言启示. 很自然,伊斯兰教应该闪过一个不受任何古代文化影响的简单民族的意识, 并占据三大洲交汇的地理位置. 新文化在 Tauhâd 的原则中找到了世界统一的基础。'5 伊斯兰教, 作为一个政体, 只是使这一原则成为人类智力和情感生活中的一个活生生的因素的一种实​​际手段. 它要求对上帝忠诚, 不去宝座. 因为上帝是所有生命的终极精神基础, 对上帝的忠诚实际上等于人对自己理想本性的忠诚. 所有生命的终极精神基础, 正如伊斯兰教所设想的那样, 是永恒的,并在变化和变化中展现自己. 一个基于这种现实概念的社会必须调和, 在它的生活中, 恒常与变化的范畴. 它必须拥有永恒的原则来规范它的集体生活, 因为永恒给了我们在不断变化的世界中的立足点.

伊斯兰教, 民主 & 美国:

科尔多瓦基金会

阿卜杜拉·法利克 |

介绍 ,


尽管这是一场长期而复杂的辩论, Arches Quarterly 从神学和实践的角度重新审视, 关于伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系和兼容性的重要辩论, 正如巴拉克奥巴马的希望和变革议程所呼应的那样. 虽然许多人庆祝奥巴马登上椭圆形办公室作为美国的全国宣泄者, 其他人对国际舞台上意识形态和方法的转变仍然不乐观. 虽然穆斯林世界和美国之间的许多紧张局势和不信任可归因于促进民主的方法, 通常偏爱专制政权和伪造政权,这些政权为民主价值观和人权提供口红, 余震 9/11 通过美国在政治伊斯兰上的立场,确实进一步加剧了担忧. 它创造了由worldpublicopinion.org发现的负面墙, 根据该 67% 的埃及人认为,全球范围内,美国正在扮演“主要消极”角色.
因此,美国的反应很贴切. 通过选举奥巴马, 世界各地的许多人都寄希望于发展一个不太好战的人, 但对穆斯林世界更公平的外交政策. 奥巴马的考验, 当我们讨论, 是美国及其盟友促进民主的方式. 它会促进还是强加?
而且, 它能否成为长期冲突地区的诚实经纪人?? 吸收 prolifi 的专业知识和洞察力
c学者, 学者, 经验丰富的记者和政治家, Arches Quarterly 揭示了伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系以及美国的角色——以及奥巴马带来的变化, 在寻求共同点. 阿纳斯·阿尔蒂克里蒂, The e Cordoba Foundation 的首席执行官为这次讨论提供了开场白, 他反思了奥巴马道路上的希望和挑战. 跟随 Altikriti, 尼克松总统的前顾问, 罗伯特·克莱恩(Robert Craneoff)博士对伊斯兰自由权原则进行了透彻的分析. 安瓦尔·易卜拉欣, 马来西亚前副总理, 通过在穆斯林占主导地位的社会中实施民主的实际现实来丰富讨论, 即, 在印度尼西亚和马来西亚.
我们也有Shireen Hunter博士, 乔治敦大学, 美国, 探索落后于民主化和现代化的穆斯林国家. 恐怖主义作家对此予以补充, 纳菲兹·艾哈迈德(Nafeez Ahmed)博士对后现代危机和
民主的灭亡. Daud Abdullah博士 (中东媒体监控总监), 艾伦·哈特 (前ITN和BBC Panorama通讯员; 犹太复国主义的作者: 犹太人的真正敌人) 和Asem Sondos (埃及《 Sawt Al Omma》杂志编辑) 专注于奥巴马及其在穆斯林世界促进民主方面的作用, 以及美国与以色列和穆斯林兄弟会的关系.
外交部长, 马尔代夫, 艾哈迈德·沙希德 (Ahmed Shaheed) 推测伊斯兰教和民主的未来; 克莱尔. 格里·麦克洛克林
– 因爱尔兰共和党活动而入狱四年的新芬党成员和吉尔福德的活动家 4 和伯明翰 6, 反映了他最近去加沙的旅行,在那里他目睹了对巴勒斯坦人的残暴和不公正的影响; 玛丽·布林-史密斯博士, 激进化和当代政治暴力研究中心主任讨论批判性研究政治恐怖的挑战; 哈立德·穆巴拉克博士, 作家和剧作家, 讨论达尔富尔和平的前景; 最后,记者和人权活动家 Ashur Shamis 批判性地审视了当今穆斯林的民主化和政治化.
我们希望所有这些都有助于在新的希望曙光中对影响我们所有人的问题进行全面的阅读和反思.
谢谢

美国哈马斯政策阻碍中东和平

亨利·西格曼


过去的双边会谈失败 16 多年的经验表明,中东和平协议永远不可能靠各方自己达成. 以色列政府相信他们可以无视国际社会对其在约旦河西岸的非法殖民项目的谴责,因为他们可以指望美国反对国际制裁. 不受美国制定的参数框架的双边会谈 (根据安全理事会决议, 奥斯陆协定, 阿拉伯和平倡议, “路线图”和其他以前的巴以协议) 不能成功. 以色列政府认为,美国国会不会允许美国总统发布此类参数并要求其接受. 9月在华盛顿特区恢复双边会谈有什么希望 2 完全取决于奥巴马总统证明这种信念是错误的, 以及他承诺的“过渡建议”是否, 如果谈判陷入僵局, 是提交美式参数的委婉说法. 这样的美国倡议必须为以色列在其 1967 年前边界内的安全提供铁定的保证, 但同时必须明确指出,如果以色列坚持不让巴勒斯坦人在约旦河西岸和加沙建立一个可行的主权国家,这些保证是不可用的. 本文重点讨论永久地位协议的另一个主要障碍: 缺乏有效的巴勒斯坦对话者. 解决哈马斯的正当不满——正如中央司令部最近的一份报告所指出的那样, 哈马斯有正当的不满——可能导致其重返巴勒斯坦联合政府,为以色列提供可靠的和平伙伴. 如果由于哈马斯的拒绝主义而导致外展失败, 该组织阻止其他巴勒斯坦政党谈判达成的合理协议的能力将受到严重阻碍. 如果奥巴马政府不领导一项国际倡议,以定义巴以协议的内容,并积极促进巴勒斯坦政治和解, 欧洲必须这样做, 希望美国能效法. 不幸, 没有银弹可以保证“两国在和平与安全中并存”的目标。
但是,奥巴马总统目前的做法绝对不能.

再谈伊斯兰教

马哈·阿扎姆(MAHA AZZAM)

围绕所谓的伊斯兰教存在着政治和安全危机, 一场先例已久的危机 9/11. 在过去的 25 年份, 关于如何解释和打击伊斯兰教有不同的侧重点. 分析师和决策者
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
由于恐怖袭击反过来影响了对移民的态度,西方对伊斯兰教的敌意和恐惧日益加剧,今天的情况变得更加复杂, 宗教和文化. umma 或信徒社区的边界已从穆斯林国家延伸到欧洲城市. 只要有穆斯林社区,乌玛就可能存在. 在融入周围社区的感觉不明确且歧视可能很明显的环境中,共同信仰的归属感会增加. 对社会价值观的排斥越大,
无论是在西方还是在穆斯林国家, 伊斯兰教作为一种文化认同和价值体系的道德力量得到更大的巩固.
在伦敦发生爆炸事件之后 7 七月 2005 越来越明显的是,一些年轻人将宗教承诺作为表达种族的一种方式. 全球穆斯林之间的联系以及他们认为穆斯林易受伤害的看法,导致世界不同地区的许多人将当地的困境融入到更广泛的穆斯林困境中, 有文化认同, 主要或部分, 具有广泛定义的伊斯兰教.

伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权

丹尼尔(Daniele). 价钱

有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 与西方社会的价值观相矛盾, 并显着影响穆斯林国家的重要政治成果. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 政府官员经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是对自由民主国家的下一个意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要基于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和个别国家的特别研究, 不考虑其他因素. 我的论点是伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样, 可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 特定国家和描述性研究无法帮助我们找到有助于我们解释穆斯林世界各国伊斯兰教与政治之间不同关系的模式. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系, 民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 过分强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我首先使用比较案例研究, 重点关注与伊斯兰团体和政权之间的相互作用有关的因素, 经济影响, 种族分裂, 和社会发展, 解释伊斯兰教对八个国家政治影响的差异. 我认为大部分的权力
归因于伊斯兰教作为穆斯林国家政策和政治制度背后的驱动力,可以通过前面提到的因素更好地解释. 我也发现, 与普遍看法相反, 伊斯兰政治团体的日益强大往往与政治体系的适度多元化有关.
我构建了一个伊斯兰政治文化指数, 基于伊斯兰法律的使用程度以及是否和, 如果是这样, 如何,西方观念, 机构, 和技术被实施, 检验伊斯兰教与民主以及伊斯兰教与人权之间关系的性质. 该指标用于统计分析, 其中包括 23 个以穆斯林为主的国家的样本和 23 个非穆斯林发展中国家的对照组. 除了比较
伊斯兰国家到非伊斯兰发展中国家, 统计分析使我能够控制已发现影响民主水平和保护个人权利的其他变量的影响. 结果应该是对伊斯兰教对政治和政策的影响的更现实和准确的描述.

埃及处于临界点 ?

大卫·B. 奥特韦
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, 霍斯尼·穆巴拉克(Hosni Mubarak), to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 至 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

穆斯林世界民族主义的根源

沙比尔·艾哈迈德(Shabir Ahmed)

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. 的确, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Furthermore, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, 阿拉伯, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. 例如, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Rather, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

伊斯兰政治思想中的民主

Azzam S. 塔米米

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, 在 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, 在 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

世俗主义, 诠释学, 和帝国: 伊斯兰改革的政治

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent
calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot
be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, 特别
those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism
and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike
to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling
is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State
Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform
“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception
of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be
reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to
the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is
being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category
with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of
secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the
穆斯林世界. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular
understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on
伊斯兰教, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy
concerns in the Muslim world.

伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权

丹尼尔(Daniele). 价钱

有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 矛盾的

西方社会的价值观, 并显着影响重要的政治结果

在穆斯林国家. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 和政府

官员们经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是下一个

对自由民主国家的意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要是基于

关于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和特别研究

个别国家, 不考虑其他因素. 这是我的争论

伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样,

可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 国家

具体的和描述性的研究并不能帮助我们找到有帮助的模式

我们解释伊斯兰教与政治之间的不同关系

穆斯林世界的国家. 因此, 一种新的研究方法

伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系,

民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 太多了

强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我先来

使用比较案例研究, 关注与相互作用相关的因素

伊斯兰团体和政权之间, 经济影响, 种族分裂,

和社会发展, 解释影响的差异

八个国家的伊斯兰教政治.

伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权

丹尼尔(Daniele). 价钱

有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 矛盾的

西方社会的价值观, 并显着影响重要的政治结果
在穆斯林国家. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 和政府
官员们经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是下一个
对自由民主国家的意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要是基于
关于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和特别研究
个别国家, 不考虑其他因素. 这是我的争论
伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样,
可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 国家
具体的和描述性的研究并不能帮助我们找到有帮助的模式
我们解释伊斯兰教与政治之间的不同关系
穆斯林世界的国家. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系,
民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 太多了
强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我先来
使用比较案例研究, 关注与相互作用相关的因素
伊斯兰团体和政权之间, 经济影响, 种族分裂,

和社会发展, 解释影响的差异

八个国家的伊斯兰教政治.

参与政治伊斯兰的策略

沙迪哈米德

阿曼达·卡德莱克(AMANDA KADLEC)

政治伊斯兰教是当今中东地区最活跃的政治力量. 它的未来与该地区的未来密切相关. 如果美国和欧盟致力于支持该地区的政治改革, 他们需要设计具体的, 参与伊斯兰团体的连贯战略. 然而, 美国. 普遍不愿意与这些运动展开对话. 相似地, 欧盟与伊斯兰主义者的接触是个例外, 不是规则. 存在低级联系人的地方, 它们主要用于信息收集目的, 不是战略目标. 美国. 和欧盟有许多解决该地区经济和政治发展的计划——其中包括中东伙伴关系倡议 (美皮), 千年挑战公司 (中冶), 地中海联盟, 和欧洲睦邻政策 (ENP) - 然而,他们对伊斯兰政治反对派的挑战如何适应更广泛的区域目标几乎没有什么可说的. 我们. 和欧盟的民主援助和规划几乎完全针对威权政府本身或世俗的民间社会团体,在他们自己的社会中得到的支持很少.
重新评估现行政策的时机已经成熟. 自九月恐怖袭击以来 11, 2001, 支持中东民主对西方政策制定者来说具有更大的重要性, 谁看到了缺乏民主和政治暴力之间的联系. 人们更加关注理解政治伊斯兰内部的变化. 美国新政府更愿意扩大与穆斯林世界的交流. 同时, 绝大多数主流伊斯兰组织——包括埃及的穆斯林兄弟会, 约旦的伊斯兰行动阵线 (印度空军), 摩洛哥正义与发展党 (PJD), 科威特伊斯兰立宪运动, 和也门伊斯兰党——越来越多地将支持政治改革和民主作为其政治纲领的核心组成部分. 此外, 许多人表示有兴趣与美国展开对话. 和欧盟政府.
西方国家与中东关系的未来可能在很大程度上取决于前者与非暴力伊斯兰政党就共同利益和目标进行广泛对话的程度. 最近有大量关于与伊斯兰主义者接触的研究, 但很少有人清楚地说明它在实践中可能需要什么. 佐伊·诺特, 德国外交关系委员会访问学者, 把它, “欧盟正在考虑参与,但并不真正知道如何参与。”1 希望澄清讨论, 我们区分了三个级别的“参与度”,”每个都有不同的手段和目的: 低级接触, 战略对话, 和伙伴关系.

解决美国的伊斯兰困境: 南亚和东南亚的教训

沙迪·哈米德(Shadi Hamid)
我们. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 和 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. 然而, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, 和, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt. The situation in Jordan is similar. The Bush administration and the Democratic congress have hailed the country as a “model” of Arab reform at precisely the same time that it has been devising new ways to manipulate the electoral process to limit Islamist representation, and just as it held elections plagued by widespread allegations of outright fraud
and rigging.1 This is not a coincidence. Egypt and Jordan are the only two Arab countries that have signed peace treaties with Israel. 而且, they are seen as crucial to U.S. efforts to counter Iran, stabilize Iraq, and combat terrorism.

对政治伊斯兰教的误判

马丁·克拉默

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderatesorreformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.