RSS所有条目标记为: "真主党"

阿拉伯明天

大卫·B. OTTAWAY

十月 6, 1981, 本来是在埃及庆祝的一天. 它标志着埃及在三项阿以冲突中取得最伟大胜利的周年纪念日, 在开国之日,该国的失败者军队冲过苏伊士运河 1973 赎罪日战争,使以色列军队退缩. 酷, 万里无云的早晨, 开罗体育馆里挤满了埃及家庭,他们前来参观是为了看准军事力量。, 总统安瓦尔·萨达特,战争的建筑师, 人和机器在他面前游行时满意地看着. 我在附近, 刚到的外国记者, 六架幻影喷气式飞机在杂技表演中高高呼啸,其中一辆军车直接停在了检阅台前, 用长长的红色画天空, 黄色, 紫色,和绿色的烟雾. 萨达特站了起来, 显然准备与另一支埃及军队交换礼炮. 他使自己成为四名从卡车上跳下来的伊斯兰刺客的理想目标。, 冲上领奖台, 随着子弹的杀手不断地向他们的致命之火喷洒架子, 我考虑了一下是跌倒在地,冒着被惊恐的观众踩死的危险,还是保持脚步并冒着流弹的风险. 本能告诉我要站稳脚跟, 我的新闻责任感促使我去寻找萨达特是活着还是死了.

真主党的政治宣言 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

伊斯兰反对党和欧盟参与的潜力

托比·阿切尔

海蒂·休塔宁(Heidi Huuhtanen)

鉴于伊斯兰运动在穆斯林世界和

自世纪之交以来,激进化对全球事件的影响方式, 它

对于欧盟来说,在可以松散的范围内评估其对参与者的政策很重要

被称为“伊斯兰世界”. 询问是否以及如何参与尤为重要

与各种伊斯兰团体.

即使在欧盟内部,这仍然存在争议. 有些人认为伊斯兰价值观

落后于伊斯兰政党与西方的民主理想和

人权, 而其他人则将参与视为现实的必要性,因为日益增长的

伊斯兰政党在国内的重要性及其日益参与国际事务

事务. 另一种观点是,穆斯林世界的民主化将会增加

欧洲安全. 这些和其他关于是否以及如何

欧盟是否应该参与只能通过研究不同的伊斯兰运动和

他们的政治环境, 逐个国家.

民主化是欧盟共同外交政策行动的中心主题, 铺设

在文章中 11 欧盟条约. 在此考虑的许多州

举报不民主, 或不完全民主. 在这些国家中的大多数, 伊斯兰主义者

政党和运动构成了对现行政权的重大反对, 和

在一些地区,他们形成了最大的反对派集团. 欧洲民主国家长期以来不得不

处理专制的统治政权, 但这是一个新现象

在最有可能受益者可能拥有的国家进行民主改革, 来自

欧盟的观点, 不同的,有时是有问题的民主方法及其

相关值, 例如少数民族和妇女权利和法治. 这些费用是

经常反对伊斯兰运动, 因此,对于欧洲政策制定者来说,重要的是

准确了解潜在合作伙伴的政策和理念.

来自不同国家的经验往往表明,更自由的伊斯兰主义者

允许聚会, 他们的行动和想法越温和. 在许多

伊斯兰政党和团体早已偏离了最初的目标

建立一个受伊斯兰法律管辖的伊斯兰国家, 并开始接受基本的

选举权力的民主原则, 其他政治的存在

竞争对手, 和政治多元化.

中东的政治伊斯兰教

是努森

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, 在

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

回顾一些用来解释中东伊斯兰复兴的主要理论

(数字 1). 简单来说, 报告表明,伊斯兰教不必与民主和

有一种趋势是忽视许多中东国家已经

参与了对伊斯兰运动的残酷镇压, 导致他们, 有人争辩, 占用

反对国家的武器, 更罕见的是, 外国. 使用政治暴力是

广泛分布于中东, 但既不不合逻辑也不非理性. 在很多情况下甚至

以使用暴力而闻名的伊斯兰团体已转变为和平的政治组织

政党成功参加市政和全国选举. 尽管如此, 伊斯兰主义者

尽管有许多理论试图

说明它的增长和受欢迎的吸引力. 一般来说, 大多数理论认为伊斯兰主义是

对相对剥夺的反应, 尤其是社会不平等和政治压迫. 选择

理论在宗教本身和宗教的范围内寻求伊斯兰复兴的答案

强大的, 宗教象征的唤起潜力.

结论主张超越“悲观与厄运”的方法,即

将伊斯兰主义描绘成一种非法的政治表达和对西方的潜在威胁 (“老的

伊斯兰主义”), 以及对当前伊斯兰主义民主化的更细致入微的理解

现在正在整个中东发生的运动 (“新伊斯兰主义”). 这个

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

社会中较贫穷的阶层,但也属于中产阶级.

伊斯兰政党 : 为什么他们不能民主

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, 它有

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, 民主, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

从造反运动到政党

阿拉斯泰尔克鲁克

西方许多人认为,从武装抵抗运动到政党的转变应该是线性的, 应该先放弃暴力, 应该由民间社会推动并由温和的政治家斡旋 伊斯兰抵抗运动的情况几乎没有现实意义 (哈马斯). 这并不是说哈马斯没有经历过政治转型: 它有. 但是,尽管西方做出了努力,但这种转变还是实现了,而这些努力并没有促进这种转变. 在保持抵抗运动的同时, 哈马斯已成为巴勒斯坦权力机构的政府并改变了其军事姿态. 但这种转变采取了与传统冲突解决模型中概述的不同的过程. 哈马斯和其他伊斯兰团体继续将自己视为抵抗运动, 但他们越来越多地看到,他们的组织可能会演变成专注于非暴力抵抗的政治潮流。标准的冲突解决模式严重依赖西方解决冲突的经验,并且经常忽略伊斯兰和平缔造历史中方法的差异. 这并不奇怪, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. 此外, 以巴冲突的严酷环境使哈马斯经历了它的特殊性。哈马斯正处于一个重要的转变之中, 但以色列国内的政治潮流, 并且在区域内, 使这种转变的结果不可预测. 很大程度上取决于西方政策的走向 (其“全球反恐战争”) 以及该政策如何影响哈马斯等复兴主义伊斯兰团体, 致力于选举的团体, 改革与善政.

阿拉伯和穆斯林世界民主面临的挑战

阿隆·本·米尔

President Bush’s notions that democratizing Iraq will have a ripple effect on the rest ofthe Arab world, bringing prosperity and peace to the region, and that democracy is the panaceafor Islamic terrorism are unsubstantiated as well as grossly misleading. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. 实际上, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. 此外, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

中东的恐怖主义和极端主义运动

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (解放军) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, 然而, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
解放军, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. 摩洛哥, Libya, 突尼斯, 约旦, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (解放军) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, 然而, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. 摩洛哥, Libya, 突尼斯, 约旦, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.