Svi unosi označeni: "Demokracija"

zealous democrats : ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT, INDONESIA AND TURKEY

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. U isto vrijeme, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Doista, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

Demokracija, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

F. Gregory Gause

Engaging Political Islam to Promote Democracy

Shadi Hamid

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans have struggled toarticulate an overarching, long-term strategy for fighting religious extremism and terror in the Middle East. Most experts on both the left and right agree that promoting democracy will help address the root causes of terrorism in theregion, though they differ on to what degree. The reasoning is simple: If Arabs and Muslims lack legitimate, peaceful outlets with which to express their grievances, they are more likely to resort to violence. In one important 2003study, Princeton University’s Alan Krueger and Czech scholar Jitka Maleckova analyzed extensive data on terrorist attacks and concluded that “the only variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties. Countries with more freedom were less likely to be the birthplace of international terrorists.

Islam i demokracija

Dalia Mogahed

Islam in politics has been asserted in many countries in the Muslim world through democratic elections. Islamist parties have gained varying degreesof political power in Turkey, Egipat, Libanon, and the occupied Palestinian territories, and have widespread influence in Morocco and Jordan. Sada, more than ever, Western governments, alarmed by this outcome, have raised the perennial question: Is Islam compatible with democracy?A recent in-depth Gallup survey in 10 predominantly Muslim countries,representing more than 80% of the global Muslim population, shows that whenasked what they admire most about the West, Muslims frequently mention political freedom, liberty, fair judicial systems, and freedom of speech. When asked to critique their own societies, extremism and inadequate adherence to Islamic teachings were their top grievances.However, while Muslims say they admire freedom and an open political system,Gallup surveys suggest that they do not believe they must choose between Islam and democracy, but rather, that the two can co-exist inside one functional government.

It’s the Policy, Stupid

Ivan L. Esposito

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Grm. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. Međutim, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terorizam, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Thus, na primjer, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

William Thomasson

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Doista, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam

Politička evolucija Muslimanskog bratstva u Egiptu

Stephen Bennett

“Allah je naš cilj. Poslanik je naš vođa. Kur’an je naš zakon. Džihad je naš put. Smrt na Allahovom putu je naša najveća nada.”

Od svojih prvih dana u Egiptu, Muslimansko bratstvo izazvalo je mnogo kontroverzi, jer neki tvrde da organizacija zagovara nasilje u ime islama. Prema Dr. Mamoun Fandy iz James A. Baker III Institut za javnu politiku, “džihadizam i aktiviranje pogleda na svijet kuće islama i kuće rata su ideje proizašle iz spisa i učenja Muslimanskog bratstva” (živahno, 2005). Primarni dokaz za ovaj argument je istaknuti član Bratstva, Sayeed Qutb, koji je zaslužan za razvoj revizionističke i kontroverzne interpretacije džihad koji je pružao vjerska opravdanja za nasilje koje su počinile organizacije ogranci Bratstva poput al-džihad, al-Takfir ve al-Hijra, Hamas, i al-Qaeda.

Ipak, to je još uvijek diskutabilno stajalište, jer unatoč tome što je ideološki roditelj tih nasilnih organizacija, samo Muslimansko bratstvo uvijek je zadržalo službeni stav protiv nasilja i umjesto toga promicalo je islamsko građansko i društveno djelovanje na lokalnoj razini. Unutar prvih dvadeset godina svog postojanja Muslimansko bratstvo je svojim popularnim aktivizmom steklo status najutjecajnije od svih velikih grupa na Bliskom istoku. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.

While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, str. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob također nam kaže da od trenutnih islamističkih oporbenih skupina koje danas postoje "'radikalnije' ili militantnije od tih skupina inzistiraju na revolucionarnoj promjeni koja se treba nametnuti masama i političkom sustavu, dok... novo Muslimansko bratstvo Egipta, poziv na postupnu promjenu koja se treba poduzeti unutar političkog sustava i uz uključivanje muslimanskih masa”

Parting the Veil

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Danas,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Egipat, Jordan, Tunis, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Libanon, Irak, i palestinske teritorije,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Od ranih 1990-ih, NAS. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, Predsjednik George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

Islamski pokret: Political Freedom & Demokracija

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Islamske) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, demokracija. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Egipat, Sirija, Irak, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

Rješavanje američke islamističke dileme

Living with Democracy in Egypt

Daniel Consolatore

Hosni Mubarek was almost elected president of Egypt in September 2005. Not that the seventy-seven-year-old secular autocrat who has ruled that nationfor the past twenty-four years lost the election; by the official count, he took nearly 85 percent of the vote.His nearest competitor, Ayman Nour, the upstart headof the fledgling opposition party al-Ghad (“Tomorrow”),managed less than 8 percent. The only other candidate to take any significant tally was the aged NomanGamaa of the venerable al-Wafd (“Delegation”)party, who managed less than 3 percent. The Ikhwanal-Muslimeen (“Muslim Brotherhood”), feared by somany Westerners for its purist Islamic social and politicalagenda, didn’t even field a candidate.Mubarek’s decisive victory would seem to be reassuringto most people—particularly secular Americans—worried for the future of the few Westernfriendly,moderate Arab regimes, threatened as theyare by the Islamicization of politics in the region. The Bush administration would also seem to have reasonto be pleased, given its recent change of heart aboutArab democracy. The missing chemical weapons in Iraq and subsequent justification of the war thereas precedent for democratization have inspired theWhite House to push for as many elections as possible in the region. Zapravo, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke at the American University inCairo in June, she announced to some surprise that“for sixty years” the United States had been mistakenin “pursu[ing] stability at the expense of democracy”in the Middle East. For generations, NAS. pundits weresure that the “Arab street” couldn’t be trusted with the vote, as they might hand over power to communistsor fundamentalist Islamists. Realpolitik dictated that autocrats and dictators, like Mubarek and Saddam Hussein, had to be coddled in order to maintain “stability”in the region. If they would then stage election sor dispense with them altogether, deny free speech,and let loose secret police to terrorize the population,the White House would likely turn a blind eye. But ifMubarek could now claim a true democratic mandate,that would be the best of all worlds.

Political Transitions in the Arab World

Dina Šehata

The year 2007 marked the end of a brief interval of political liberalization in the Arab world which began shortly after the occupation of Iraq and which resulted primarily from external pressures on Arab regimes to reform and democratize. External pressures during the 2003-2006 period created a political opening which activists across the region used to press for longstanding demands for political and constitutional reform.Faced with a combination of growing external and internal pressures to reform, Arab regimes were forced to make some concessions to their challengers.In Egypt, upon the request of the President, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to allowfor direct competitive presidential elections. In September2005, Egypt witnessed its first competitive presidential election ever and as expected Mubarak was elected for a fifth term with 87%of the vote. Štoviše,during the November 2005 parliamentary elections,which were freer than previous elections, muslimanskog bratstva, the largest opposition movement in Egypt, won 88 seats. This was the largest number of seats won by an opposition group in Egypt since the 1952 revolution.Similarly, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority of the seats.Hamas was thereby able to establish control over the Palestinian Legislative Council which had been dominated by Fatah since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. In Lebanon, in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 14th February2005, a coalition of pro-Hariri political forces was ablet hrough broad-based mass mobilization and external support to force Syrian troops to pull out from Lebanon and the pro-Syrian Government to resign. Elections were held, and the 14th February coalition was able to win a plurality of the votes and to form a new government.In Morocco, King Mohamed VI oversaw the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee which sought to address the grievances of those who had been abused under the reign of his father.The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) also under took some important reforms during the 2003-2006 period. U 2003 Qatar promulgated a written constitution for the first time in its history. In 2005,Saudi Arabia convened municipal elections for the firsttime in five decades. And in 2006, Bahrain held parliamentaryelections in which the Shiite society of AlWefaqwon 40%of the seats. Subsequently, the first Shiitedeputy prime minister in Bahrain was appointed.Theses events, which came to be known as ‘the Arab Spring,’ led some optimists to believe that the Arabworld was on the brink of a democratic transformation similar to those experienced in Latin American and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1980s and1990s. Međutim, u 2007, as political liberalization gave way to heightened polarization and to renewed repression,these hopes were dispelled. The failure ofthe openings of the 2003-2006 period to create a sustained momentum towards democratization can beat tributed to a number of factors. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the failure of the United States to create a stable and democratic regime dampened support for democracy promotion efforts within the American administration and reinforced the views ofthose who held that security and stability must come before democracy. Štoviše, the electoral successes of Islamists in Egypt and in Palestine further dampened Western support for democracy promotion efforts in the region since the principals of thesemovements were perceived to be at odds with the interestsof theWest.

Egypt’s Local Elections Farce Causes and Consequences

Mohammed Herzallah

Amr Hamzawy

Egypt’s local elections of April 8, 2008 were a confirmation of a backwardslide in Egyptian politics. They were plagued by social unrest and politicaldiscord. In the weeks prior to the elections, labor protests escalated,precipitating a harsh crackdown that resulted in at least two fatalities and many injuries.The country’s largest opposition force, muslimanskog bratstva, decided at the last minute to boycott the elections. Voter turn out did not exceed 5 percent and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP),facing virtually no competition, landed a sweeping victory—winning roughly95 percent of the seats at stake.These developments bring to light a broader deterioration in Egyptian politics.Three elements of this process stand out and deserve careful attention:•

Prvi, the burgeoning social crisis caused by out of control inflation, acrippled welfare system, and persistent unemployment;

• Second, a return to the old authoritarian practices of the rulingestablishment; i

• Third, worrying signs that call into question the very existence of aviable opposition capable of advancing reform through the political process.

Angažiranje islamista i promicanje demokracije

Mona Yacoubian

Smatrajući demokratske promjene dugoročnim protuotrovom islamističkom ekstremizmu, Bushova administracija udružila je svoje vojne intervencije u Afganistanu i Iraku s pojačanim naporima za promicanje demokracije u arapskom svijetu, ističući potrebu za slobodnim i poštenim izborima. Do danas, diljem regije održani su parlamentarni izbori različite otvorenosti, od Maroka do Kuvajta. Izbori su otvorili val pobjeda islamista, mnogi nazivaju "islamističkim tsunamijem". 1Uspjesi islamista proizlaze iz njihove učinkovitosti kao vozila narodne opozicije. Dok je liberalan, sekularne oporbene stranke ostaju uglavnom odvojene od velikog dijela stanovništva, Islamisti su razvili goleme i lako mobilizirane lokalne mreže kroz dobrotvorne organizacije i džamije. Vodstvo je često mlađe i dinamičnije, s jakim vezama sa zajednicom, a partijske organizacije vrve energijom i idejama, privlačeći one koji traže promjenu.SAD. Vlada je nekoliko godina tiho angažirala niz umjerenih i legalnih islamističkih stranaka diljem regije, ponekad kroz normalnu diplomatsku aktivnost, ponekad kroz potpore koje financira vlada SAD-u. organizacije. Ovo posebno izvješće ispituje angažman koji financiraju SAD s pravnim, nenasilne islamističke stranke kroz Nacionalni demokratski institut (JE) i Međunarodni republikanski institut (IRI), koje imaju najveće iskustvo u suradnji s islamistima u regiji, a fokusira se na Maroko, Jordan, i Jemena, zbog njihove relativne političke otvorenosti te snage i živosti njihove islamističke političke opozicije.Uspješna strategija. Uspješna strategija angažmana islamista osnažuje pojedince i jača institucije kako bi se postigla veća transparentnost, više odgovornosti, i pomiče se prema umjerenosti. Obuka i osnaživanje pojedinaca kultivira umjerenjake unutar stranaka i povećava njihovu političku sofisticiranost i utjecaj. U međuvremenu, dok se režimi u arapskom svijetu opiru ili manipuliraju političkim reformama, jačanje infrastrukture demokracije jednako je važno kao i podrška pojedincima. Neovisni izborni postupci i nadzor pomažu uspostavi slobodnih i poštenih izbora. Izgradnja institucija osigurava odgovarajuće kontrole izvršne vlasti i jaku vladavinu prava. Jačanje parlamenata posebno je ključno, budući da islamisti prvenstveno sudjeluju u zakonodavnim tijelima. U procjeni jesu li islamističke stranke umjerenije odgovorile na U.S.. angažman, teško je, ako ne i nemoguće, kvantificirati ili izmjeriti pomake koji sami po sebi mogu biti relativni i subjektivni. Izravno povezivanje veće umjerenosti s određenim SAD-om. aktivnosti angažiranja također su vrlo problematične. U najboljem slučaju, ovaj angažman treba smatrati faktorom koji doprinosi. Štoviše, probni rezultati u Maroku, Jordan, i Jemen dovoljno obećavaju da bi trebalo poticati kontinuirani angažman s umjerenim islamistima, iako s većim naglaskom na izgradnju institucija i pogled na širi kontekst ideološke bitke u muslimanskom svijetu između ekstremizma i umjerenosti.

Promicanje demokracije na Bliskom istoku nije jednosmjerna ulica

Marina Ottaway

Sad. administracija je pod pritiskom da oživi napore za promicanje demokracije na Bliskom istoku,ali zamah prema političkim reformama je zastao u većini regije. Oporbene stranke su na niskom nivou, a vlade imaju čvršću kontrolu nego ikad. Dok novi oblici aktivizma, kao što su radnički prosvjedi i sve veći broj blogova koji kritiziraju vladu i oporbene stranke postali su rašireni, tek se moraju dokazati učinkovitima kao sredstvo utjecanja na vođe da promijene dugogodišnju politiku. Posljednji put kada su SAD. Uprava se suočila s takvim nepovoljnim okolnostima u napredovanju političkih reformi 30 prije nekoliko godina, kada je tijekom Hladnog rata pokrenut Helsinški proces. To nas je iskustvo naučilo da Sjedinjene Države trebaju nevoljnim sugovornicima dati nešto što žele ako od njih očekuju da se angažiraju oko pitanja kojima se radije ne bi bavili. Ako Washington želi da arapske zemlje raspravljaju o univerzalnim demokratskim načelima koja bi trebala poduprijeti njihove političke sustave, mora biti spremna za raspravu o univerzalnim načelima koja bi trebala poduprijeti vlastitu bliskoistočnu politiku.

ISLAM, DEMOKRACIJA & SAD

temelj kordobe

In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, važna rasprava o odnosu i kompatibilnosti između islama i demokracije, kao što je odjeknulo u programu nade i promjene Baracka Obame. Dok mnogi slave Obamin uspon u Ovalnom uredu kao nacionalnu katarzu za SAD, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,prema kojoj 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. Test za Obamu, dok raspravljamo,tako Amerika i njezini saveznici promoviraju demokraciju. Hoće li biti olakšavajuće ili impozantno?Štoviše, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?