Svi unosi u "Ikhwanophobia" Kategorija

Moderate and Radical Islam

ANĐEO RABASA

One of the components of this study is relevant to a question that I was asked to address,which is how radical Islam differs from moderate or mainstream Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, zapravo, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.

Challenges to Democracy in the Arab and Muslim World

Alon Ben-Meir

President Bush’s notions that democratizing Iraq will have a ripple effect on the rest ofthe Arab world, bringing prosperity and peace to the region, and that democracy is the panaceafor Islamic terrorism are unsubstantiated as well as grossly misleading. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. Zapravo, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. U Dodatku, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

Ikhwan u Sjevernoj Americi: Kratka povijest

Douglas Farah

Ron Sandee

The current federal court case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) in Dallas, Texas,1 offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its goals and structure. The documents discuss recruitment, organization, ideology and the development of the organization in different phases in the United States. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever, public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.

Muslimansko bratstvo u Belgiji

Steve Merley,
Viši analitičar

Globalno muslimansko bratstvo prisutno je u Europi od 1960 kada je rekao ramazan, unuk Hassana Al-Banne, osnovao džamiju u Münchenu.1 Od tog vremena,Bratstva su osnovana u gotovo svim zemljama EU, kao i zemlje koje nisu članice EU poput Rusije i Turske. Unatoč tome što djeluje pod drugim imenima, neke od organizacija u većim zemljama priznate su kao dio globalnog Muslimanskog bratstva. Na primjer, Savez islamskih organizacija Francuske (UOIF) općenito se smatra dijelom Muslimanskog bratstva u Francuskoj. Mreža također postaje poznata u nekim manjim zemljama poput Nizozemske, gdje je nedavno izvješće Zaklade NEFA detaljno opisalo aktivnosti Muslimanskog bratstva u toj zemlji.2 Susjedna Belgija također je postala važno središte za Muslimansko bratstvo u Europi. A 2002 izvješće Odbora za obavještajne poslove belgijskog parlamenta objasnilo je kako Bratstvo djeluje u Belgiji:“Služba državne sigurnosti od tada prati aktivnosti Međunarodnog muslimanskog bratstva u Belgiji 1982. Međunarodno Muslimansko bratstvo ima tajnu strukturu već skoro 20 godine. Identitet članova je tajan; djeluju u najvećoj diskreciji. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,in this context, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

The Muslim Brotherhood’s U.S. Network

Zeyno Baran

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe

Lorenzo Vidino

Since its founding in 1928, muslimanskog bratstva (Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced the political life of the Middle East. Its motto is telling: “Allah is our objective. Poslanik je naš vođa. The Qur’an is our law. Džihad je naš put. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

While the Brotherhood’s radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of generations of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost some of its power and appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh repression from local regimes and snubbed by the younger generations of Islamists who often prefer more radical organizations.

But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. Since the early 1960s, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic community, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate goal may not be simply “to help Muslims be the best citizens they can be,” but rather to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States.[2]

Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their engagement with Europe’s political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country.

These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they continue to embrace the Brotherhood’s radical views and maintain links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, Dutch, and French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.

But, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German government’s reaction is also instructive if only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric at face value, without looking at the broader scope of its activities.

Qutbizam: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism

DALE C. EIKMEIER

The recently published National Military Strategic Plan for the War onTerrorism (NMSP-WOT) is to be commended for identifying “ideology”as al Qaeda’s center of gravity.1 The identification of an ideology as thecenter of gravity rather than an individual or group is a significant shift froma“capture and kill” philosophy to a strategy focused on defeating the rootcause of Islamic terrorism. Accordingly, the plan’s principal focus is on attackingand countering an ideology that fuels Islamic terrorism. Unfortunately,the NMSP-WOT fails to identify the ideology or suggest ways tocounter it. The plan merely describes the ideology as “extremist.” This descriptioncontributes little to the public’s understanding of the threat or to thecapabilities of the strategist who ultimately must attack and defeat it. The intentof this article is to identify the ideology of the Islamic terrorists and recommendhow to successfully counter it.Sun Tzuwisely said, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundredbattles you will never be in peril.”2 Our success in theWar on Terrorismdepends on knowingwho the enemy is and understanding his ideology.While characterizing and labeling an enemymay serve such a purpose, it is only usefulif the labels are clearly defined and understood. Otherwise, overly broadcharacterizations obscure our ability to truly “know the enemy,” they diffuseefforts, and place potential allies and neutrals in the enemy’s camp. Unfortunately,theWar on Terrorism’s use of labels contributes a great deal to themisunderstandingsassociated with the latter. The fact is, five years after 9/11 theNMSP-WOT provides little specific guidance, other than labeling the enemyas extremist.3 This inability to focus on the specific threat and its supportingphilosophy reflects our own rigid adherence to political correctness and is beingexploited bymilitant Islamists portraying these overly broad descriptionsas a war against Islam.As David F. Forte states “Wemust not fail . . . to distinguishbetween the homicidal revolutionaries like bin Laden and mainstreamMuslim believers.

Teroristički i ekstremistički pokreti na Bliskom istoku

Terorizam i asimetrično ratovanje tek su nova obilježja bliskoistočne vojne ravnoteže, a islamski ekstremizam jedva da je jedini izvor ekstremističkog nasilja. Postoje mnoge ozbiljne etničke i sektaške razlike na Bliskom istoku, a oni su dugo dovodili do sporadičnog nasilja unutar pojedinih država, a ponekad i do velikih građanskih sukoba. Primjeri su građanski ratovi u Jemenu i Dhofar pobuna u Omanu, kao i duga povijest građanskog rata u Libanonu i sirijsko nasilno potiskivanje islamskih političkih skupina koje su se protivile režimu Hafeza al-Asada. Rastuća moć Palestinske oslobodilačke organizacije (PLO) doveli su do građanskog rata u Jordanu u rujnu 1970. Iranska revolucija u 1979 bila je praćena ozbiljnim političkim borbama, i pokušaj izvoza teokratske revolucije koja je pomogla pokrenuti Iransko-irački rat. I Bahrein i Saudijska Arabija imali su građanske sukobe između svojih sunitskih vladajućih elita i neprijateljski raspoloženih šijita, a ti su sukobi doveli do značajnog nasilja u slučaju Saudijske Arabije., međutim, ima dugu povijest nasilnog islamskog ekstremizma u regiji, ponekad potaknuti od strane režima koji su kasnije postali meta samih islamista koje su u početku podržavali. Sadat je pokušao upotrijebiti islamske pokrete kao proturječnost svojoj sekularnoj opoziciji u Egiptu samo da bi ga jedan takav pokret ubio nakon mirovnog sporazuma s Izraelom. Izrael je nakon toga smatrao sigurnim sponzorirati islamske pokrete 1967 kao kontra PLO-u, samo da bismo vidjeli brzu pojavu nasilnih anti-izraelskih skupina. Sjeverni i Južni Jemen bili su poprišta državnih udara i građanskih ratova od ranih 1960-ih, i to je bio građanski rat u Južnom Jemenu koji je na kraju doveo do pada njegovog režima i njegovog spajanja sa Sjevernim Jemenom 1990. Pad šaha doveo je do islamističkog preuzimanja vlasti u Iranu, i otpor sovjetskoj invaziji na Afganistan pokrenuli su islamističku reakciju koja još uvijek utječe na Bliski istok i cijeli islamski svijet. Saudijska Arabija morala se suočiti s pobunom u Velikoj džamiji u Meki godine 1979. Vjerski karakter ovog ustanka dijelio je mnoge elemente pokreta koji su se pojavili nakon sovjetskog povlačenja iz Afganistana i Zaljevskog rata 1991. godine. Alžirski napori da uguši pobjedu islamskih političkih stranaka na demokratskim izborima u 1992 uslijedio je građanski rat koji od tada traje. Egipat je 1990-ih vodio dugu i uglavnom uspješnu bitku s vlastitim islamskim ekstremistima, ali Egipat je uspio samo potisnuti takve pokrete umjesto da ih iskorijeni. U ostatku arapskog svijeta, građanski ratovi na Kosovu iu Bosni pomogli su stvaranju novih islamskih ekstremističkih kadrova. Saudijska Arabija pretrpjela je dva velika teroristička napada prije 2001. Ovi napadi pogodili su centar za obuku Nacionalne garde i vojarnu USAF-a u Al Khobaru, a čini se da je barem jedan bio rezultat islamskih ekstremista. Maroko, Libija, Tunis, Jordan, Bahrein, Katar, Oman, i Jemen su vidjeli kako tvrdokorni islamistički pokreti postaju ozbiljna nacionalna prijetnja. Iako nisu izravno dio regije, Sudan je vodio 15 godina dug građanski rat koji je vjerojatno koštao više od dva milijuna života, a ovaj rat su podržali tvrdokorni islamistički elementi na arapskom sjeveru. Somalija je od tada također poprište građanskog rata 1991 koji je omogućio djelovanje islamističkih ćelija u toj zemlji.

Smrt političkog islama

Jon B. Alterman

Počele su se pisati osmrtnice političkom islamu. Nakon godina naizgled nezaustavljivog rasta, Islamske stranke su počele posrtati. U Maroku, Stranke pravde i razvoja (ili PJD) prošli daleko lošije od očekivanog na izborima u rujnu prošle godine, i jordanska Fronta islamske akcije izgubila je više od polovice svojih mjesta u prošlomjesečnim izborima. Željno iščekivani manifest egipatskog Muslimanskog bratstva, čiji se nacrt pojavio prošlog rujna,nije pokazao ni snagu ni smjelost. Umjesto toga, sugeriralo je da je skupina opsjednuta intelektualnim proturječjima i obuzeta unutarnjim sukobima. Prerano je proglasiti smrt političkog islama, jer je bilo preuranjeno proglasiti rođenje liberalizma u arapskom svijetu u 2003-04, ali njegovi se izgledi čine osjetno slabijima nego prije godinu dana. Nekima, pad iz milosti bio je neizbježan; politički islam se srušio pod vlastitim proturječjima, oni kažu. To tvrde, u objektivnom smislu, politički islam nikada nije bio više od dima i ogledala. Religija se odnosi na vjeru i istinu, a politika je oko kompromisa i prilagodbe. Ovako gledano, politički islam nikada nije bio sveti pothvat, već samo pokušaj da se potaknu politički izgledi jedne strane u političkoj raspravi. Poduprt vjerskim autoritetom i legitimitetom, protivljenje volji islamista prestalo je biti samo političko - postalo je krivovjerje - a islamisti su imali koristi. Ovi skeptici vide politički islam kao koristan način zaštite političkih pokreta,kravlji politički neprijatelji, i podršku skupa. Kao strategija vladanja, međutim, oni tvrde da politički islam nije polučio nikakve uspjehe. U dva područja u kojima je nedavno porastao, palestinske vlasti i Iraka, upravljanje je bilo anemično. U Iranu, gdje su mule bile na vlasti gotovo tri desetljeća, Svećenici se bore za poštovanje, a zemlja izlijeva novac u Dubai i druga prekomorska tržišta s predvidljivijim pravilima i pozitivnijim povratima. Najizrazitije religiozna država na Bliskom istoku, Saudijska Arabija, ima znatno manje intelektualne slobode od mnogih svojih susjeda, a tamošnji čuvari pravovjerja pažljivo ograničavaju religioznu misao. Kao francuski učenjak islama,Olivier Roy, zapamćeno prije više od desetljeća, stapanje vjere i politike nije posvetilo politiku, politiziralo je religiju. Ali dok islam nije pružio koherentnu teoriju upravljanja, a kamoli univerzalno prihvaćen pristup problemima čovječanstva, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, kada su različite mjere praznovjerja i duhovnosti upravljale svakodnevnim životom. Točnije, iako, ono što vidimo je uspon “neotradicionalizma,” u kojoj se upisuju simboli i slogani prošlosti u težnji za bržim ulaskom u budućnost. Islamske financije — što će reći, financije koje se oslanjaju na dionice i povrate, a ne na kamate—cvjetaju, a elegantne bankovne poslovnice imaju odvojene ulaze za muškarce i žene. Uglađeni mladi teleevanđelisti oslanjaju se na tropove posvećivanja svakodnevice i traženja oprosta, privlačeći desetke tisuća na svoje sastanke i milijunsku televizijsku publiku. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Islam, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,ali države nemaju puno veze s kreativnošću koja se javlja na vjerskom polju. Opasnost je da će ova islamizacija javnog života odbaciti ono malo tolerancije što je preostalo na Bliskom istoku, nakon stoljeća asa—u osnovi islamsko—multikulturalno poduzeće. Teško je zamisliti kako islamizirana društva mogu cvjetati ako ne prihvate inovacije i kreativnost, različitosti i različitosti. “Islamski” nije samorazumljiv koncept, kao što je moj prijatelj Mustapha Kamal Pasha jednom primijetio, ali ne može biti izvor snage u modernim društvima ako je vezan za okoštale i parohijalne predodžbe o svojoj prirodi. Suočavanje s razlikama u osnovi je politički zadatak, i tu će se politički islam suočiti sa svojim pravim ispitom. Formalne strukture vlasti na Bliskom istoku pokazale su se izdržljivima, i malo je vjerojatno da će se raspasti pod valom islamskog aktivizma. Da bi politički islam uspio, treba pronaći način da ujedini različite koalicije različitih vjera i stupnjeva vjere, ne samo govoriti svojoj bazi. Još nije pronašao način za to, ali to ne znači da ne može.

TERORRIST DIASPORAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Shannon Peterson

David Goetze

Ever since the Bush administration’s declaration of a global war on terror after 9/11,academics and policymakers have sought ways to counter the global terrorist threat. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. Štoviše, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 6). Slijedom toga, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: the MuslimBrotherhood, Hamas, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. Međutim, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.

Islamski pokreti i uporaba nasilja:

Esen Kirdis

.

Unatoč nedavnom akademskom i popularnom fokusu na nasilne transnacionalne islamske terorističke mreže,postoji mnogostrukost islamskih pokreta. Ova mnogostrukost stavlja učenjake pred dvije zagonetke. Prva zagonetka je razumijevanje zašto su islamski pokreti orijentirani prema zemlji koji su se formirali kao reakcija na uspostavu sekularnih nacionalnih država prebacili svoje aktivnosti i ciljeve na višeslojni transnacionalni prostor. Druga zagonetka je razumijevanje zašto grupe sa sličnim ciljevima i ciljevima usvajaju različite strategije korištenja nasilja ili nenasilja kada "idu transnacionalno". Dva glavna pitanja kojima će se baviti ovaj rad su: Zašto islamski pokreti postaju transnacionalni? I, zašto poprimaju različite oblike kada se transnacionaliziraju? Prvi, Tvrdim da transnacionalna razina predstavlja novo političko mjesto za islamske pokrete koji su ograničeni u svojim zahtjevima na domaćoj razini. Drugi, Tvrdim da transnacionalizacija stvara nesigurnost za skupine o njihovom identitetu i zahtjevima na transnacionalnoj razini. Usvojeni medij, tj. korištenje nasilja naspram nenasilja, ovisi o vrsti transnacionalizacije, akteri susreću na transnacionalnoj razini, i tumačenja vodstva o tome kamo bi pokret trebao ići dalje. Da odgovorim na moja pitanja, Pogledat ću četiri slučaja: (1) Turski islam, (2) muslimanskog bratstva, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, i (4) Džemat Tabligi

The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States

The leadership of the U.S. muslimansko bratstvo (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal

Steven Merley

The leadership of the U.S. muslimansko bratstvo (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within.

The Brotherhood leadership has also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the U.S. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since the early 1960s, the Brotherhood has constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or “front” organizations.

The current U.S. Brotherhood leadership has attempted to deny this history, both claiming that it is not accurate and at the same time that saying that it represents an older form of thought inside the Brotherhood.

An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents, međutim, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.