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اصلاحات در جهان اسلام

عدنان خان

The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi boasted after the events of 9/11:
“…we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed

well being, respect for human rights andin contrast with Islamic countriesrespect

for religious and political rights, a system that has its values understanding of diversity

and tolerance…The West will conquer peoples, like it conquered communism, even if it

means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was

1,400 years ago…”1

And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of

ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”

Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute

The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the

history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical

Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified

their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to

apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the

Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time

understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined

principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of

study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became

smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah

were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Thus for

any Muslim attempting to deduce rules or understand what stance should be taken upon a particular

issue the Qur’an is the basis of this study.

The first attempt at reforming Islam took place at the turn of the 19th century. By the turn of the

century the Ummah had been in a lengthy period of decline where the global balance of power shifted

from the Khilafah to Britain. Mounting problems engulfed the Khilafah whilst Western Europe was in

the midst of the industrial revolution. The Ummah came to lose her pristine understanding of Islam, و

in an attempt to reverse the decline engulfing the Uthmani’s (Ottomans) some Muslims were sent to the

غرب, and as a result became smitten by what they saw. Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi of Egypt (1801-1873),

on his return from Paris, wrote a biographical book called Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The

Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of Paris, 1834), praising their cleanliness, love of work, and above

all social morality. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to

the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,

marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.

The Syrian Opposition

جاشوا لاندیس

جو پیس

For decades, ایالات متحده قرار گرفت. policy toward Syria has been single-mindedly focused on Syria’s president, Hafiz al-Asad, from 1970 to 2000, followed by his son Bashar. Because they perceived the Syrian opposition to be too weak and anti-American, ایالات متحده قرار گرفت. officials preferred to work with the Asad regime. Washington thus had no relations with the Syrian opposition until its invasion of Iraq in 2003. Even then, the Bush administration reached out only to Washington-based opponents of the Syrian regime. They were looking for a Syrian counterpart to Ahmad Chalabi, the pro-U.S. Iraqi opposition leader who helped build the case for invading Iraq.
Washington was not interested in engaging Islamists, whom it considered the only opposition with a demonstrated popular base in Syria. As for the secular opposition in Syria, ایالات متحده قرار گرفت. embassy officials in Damascus considered them to “have a weak back bench,” without a popular constituency or connection to Syrian youth.2 Moreover, contact between opposition members and embassy officials could be dangerous for opponents of the regime and leave them open to accusations of treason. For these reasons, the difficult terrain of opposition figures within Syria remained terra incognita.

The Politics and the Promise of Civilizational Dialogues

M. A. Muqtedar Khan

In response to Harvard Professor SamuelHuntington’s now infamous argument predicting afuture full of clashes between civilizations, the world’sliberals responded with a call for a civilizational dialogue.After 9/11, this call for a dialogue betweenIslam and the West has become even more urgent.The philosophical assumptions behind these dialoguesare not too difficult to discern. Islam and themodern West share a common Abrahamic traditionand their foundational sources; Islamic law and philosophyand Western enlightenment philosophy havecommon roots—Hellenistic reason and Biblical revelation.The two civilizations have a common past anda common future, particularly in the light of strongeconomic relations between the West and the Muslimworld and the growing presence of Islam in nearlyevery Western society.Because the future of the two civilizations is inseparable,any clash will be devastating to both, regardlessof the asymmetry of power. A clash between Islamand the modern West would be like a collisionbetween the present and the future for both. Islam isintegral to the future of the West and Islamic civilization’sreticence toward modernity is untenable.Eventually, the Muslim world will have to modernize,democratize, and recognize that its future, too, isinterdependent. Neither the West nor the Muslimworld can imagine a mutually exclusive future.

Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

دکتر. اسرائیل ELAD آلتمن

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, including the government of the United States, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), twoIslamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to newcircumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has itreacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign? How has itnavigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forceson the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? Towhat extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt toward liberaldemocracy?

Muslim Americans Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream

مرکز تحقیقات پیو

Muslims constitute a growing and increasingly important segment of American society.Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research about the attitudes and opinions of thissegment of the public for two reasons. First, the U.S. Census is forbidden by law from askingquestions about religious belief and affiliation, و, as a result, we know very little about thebasic demographic characteristics of Muslim Americans. Second, Muslim Americans comprisesuch a small percentage of the U.S. population that general population surveys do not interview asufficient number of them to allow for meaningful analysis.This Pew Research Center study is therefore the first ever nationwide survey to attempt tomeasure rigorously the demographics, attitudes and experiences of Muslim Americans. It buildson surveys conducted in 2006 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project of Muslim minority publics inGreat Britain, فرانسه, Germany and Spain. The Muslim American survey also follows on Pew’sglobal surveys conducted over the past five years with more than 30,000 Muslims in 22 nationsaround the world since 2002.The methodological approach employed was the most comprehensive ever used to studyMuslim Americans. Nearly 60,000 respondents were interviewed to find a representative sampleof Muslims. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, Urdu and Farsi, as well as English. Subsamplesof the national poll were large enough to explore how various subgroups of thepopulationincluding recent immigrants, native-born converts, and selected ethnic groupsincluding those of Arab, Pakistani, and African American heritagediffer in their attitudesThe survey also contrasts the views of the Muslim population as a whole with those ofthe U.S. general population, and with the attitudes of Muslims all around the world, includingWestern Europe. Finally, findings from the survey make important contributions to the debateover the total size of the Muslim American population.The survey is a collaborative effort of a number of Pew Research Center projects,including the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, the Pew Forum on Religion &Public Life and the Pew Hispanic Center. The project was overseen by Pew Research CenterPresident Andrew Kohut and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Director Luis Lugo. ThePew Research Center’s Director of Survey Research, Scott Keeter, served as project director forthe study, with the close assistance of Gregory Smith, Research Fellow at the Pew Forum. Manyother Pew researchers participated in the design, execution and analysis of the survey.

مصر: پیشینه و ایالات متحده. روابط

جرمی M. تیز

در سال گذشته, سیاست خارجی مصر, خصوصاً رابطه آن با ایالات متحده, به طور قابل توجهی از هر دو تغییر در ایالات متحده بهره مند شده است. و از حوادث موجود در زمین. دولت اوباما, همانطور که در ژوئن رئیس جمهور مشهود است 2009 سخنرانی در قاهره, اهمیت مصر را برای ایالات متحده افزایش داده است. سیاست خارجی در منطقه, به عنوان ایالات متحده. سیاست گذاران برای احیای روند صلح اعراب و اسرائیل تلاش می کنند. در انتخاب قاهره به عنوان محلی برای سخنرانی رئیس جمهور در جهان اسلام, مصریان احساس می کنند که ایالات متحده نسبت به قد و قامت درک شده خود در جهان عرب احترام کشور خود را نشان داده است. در همان زمان, تنش های مداوم با ایران و حماس موقعیت مصر را به عنوان نیروی تجاوز کننده در منطقه تقویت کرده و سودمندی دیپلماتیک این کشور را به ایالات متحده نشان داده است.. سیاست خارجی. براساس منافع خودش, مصر با مداخله ایران در شام و غزه مخالفت کرده است و اخیراً همکاری نظامی با اسرائیل را گسترش داده است تا عزم خود را در برابر تحریکات بعدی ایران نشان دهد., مانند مسلح کردن حماس یا اجازه دادن به حزب الله برای عملیات خاک مصر. علاوه بر این, عملیات سرب بازیگران اسرائیل (دسامبر 2008 تا ژانویه 2009) رفتار حماس را مورد نیاز تا حد متوسط ​​قرار داد, رسیدن به وحدت فلسطین, و به یک تبادل طولانی مدت اسرائیل ، حماس سوز - آتش / زندانی برسند, اهدافی که مصر برای دستیابی به آنها تلاش کرده است, البته تاکنون با موفقیت محدود. علائم بهبود روابط دو جانبه به وضوح مشهود است. در شش ماه گذشته, انبوه مبادلات دیپلماتیک وجود داشته است, اوج سفر رئیس جمهور اوباما در ژوئن 2009 به مصر و سفر رئیس جمهور مصر حسنی مبارک به واشنگتن در آگوست 2009 ، اولین سفر وی به ایالات متحده در بیش از 5 سال. پس از سفر رئیس جمهور اوباما در ژوئن, دو دولت گفتگوی استراتژیک سالانه خود را برگزار می کردند. چندین ماه زودتر, ایالات متحده متعهد شد تجارت و سرمایه گذاری در مصر را گسترش دهد. علی رغم ظاهر فضای مثبت تر, تنش ها و تناقضات ذاتی در روابط ایالات متحده و مصر همچنان وجود دارد. برای ما. سیاست گذاران و اعضای کنگره, سوال چگونه می توان به طور همزمان روابط استراتژیک ایالات متحده و مصر را که از توافقنامه CampDavid و 1979 پیمان صلح ضمن ترویج حقوق بشر و دموکراسی در مصری ها یک چالش اساسی است و هیچ مسیر مشخصی ندارد. از آنجا که شخصیت های مخالف مصر سال ها درباره موضوعاتی مانند جانشینی رهبری ، بیشتر حرف می زدند, فساد, و نابرابری اقتصادی, و رژیم متعاقباً در پاسخ به درخواستهای بیشتر برای اصلاح سرکوبگرتر شده است,فعالان خواستار فشار آمریكا به مصر برای ایجاد فضای تنفس بیشتر برای مخالفان شده اند. دولت مصر در برابر هرگونه آمریکا مقاومت کرده است. تلاش می کند تا در سیاست داخلی خود دخالت کند و به شدت به ایالات متحده آشکار پاسخ داده است. خواستار اصلاحات سیاسی است. همزمان, همانطور که اوضاع اسرائیلی و فلسطین بیشتر خراب شده است, نقش مصر به عنوان واسطه برای ایالات متحده قابل ارزیابی است. سیاست خارجی در منطقه. مصر توافق نامه های آتش بس و مذاکرات میانجیگری با حماس در مورد آزادی زندانیان را تأمین کرده است, ترتیبات آتش بس, و سایر موارد. از آنجا که حماس یک سازمان تروریستی خارجی تعیین شده توسط ایالات متحده است (دعوت) و خواستار نابودی اسرائیل است, نه اسرائیل و نه دولت ایالات متحده مستقیماً با مقامات رسمی خود مذاکره نمی کنند, به جای استفاده از مصر به عنوان وسط. با همکاری دولت اوباما صلح مهم خاورمیانه را متعهد شد, این نگرانی وجود دارد که ایالات متحده. مقامات ممکن است به قیمت حقوق بشر و اصلاحات دموکراتیک اولویت بیشتری به نقش منطقه ای مصر قایل شوند.

Middle East Democracy Promotion Is Not a One-way Street

مارینا اوتاوای Marina Ottaway

The U.S. administration is under pressure to revive democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East,but momentum toward political reform has stalled in most of the region. Opposition parties are at lowebb, and governments are more firmly in control than ever. While new forms of activism, such as laborprotests and a growing volume of blogging critical of government and opposition parties have becomewidespread, they have yet to prove effective as means of influencing leaders to change long-standingpolicies.The last time a U.S. administration faced such unfavorable circumstances in advancing political reformswas over 30 years ago, when the Helsinki process was launched during the Cold War. That experiencetaught us that the United States needs to give reluctant interlocutors something they want if itexpects them to engage on issues they would rather not address. If Washington wants Arab countriesto discuss the universal democratic principles that should underpin their political systems, it needs to beprepared to discuss the universal principles that should underpin its own Middle East policies.


آنتونی BUBALO


Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : اسلام گرایی, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.