Όλες οι εγγραφές με ετικέτα με: "U.S."

Ισλαμική Μεταρρύθμιση

Αντνάν Χαν

Η συριακή αντιπολίτευση

Joshua Landis

Joe Pace

Η πολιτική και η υπόσχεση των πολιτισμικών διαλόγων

Μ. ΕΝΑ. Μουκτεντάρ Χαν

Σε απάντηση στο διαβόητο πλέον επιχείρημα του καθηγητή του Χάρβαρντ SamuelHuntington που προβλέπει μέλλον γεμάτο συγκρούσεις μεταξύ πολιτισμών, οι φιλελεύθεροι του κόσμου απάντησαν με έκκληση για πολιτισμικό διάλογο.Μετά 9/11, αυτή η έκκληση για διάλογο μεταξύ Ισλάμ και Δύσης έχει γίνει ακόμη πιο επείγουσα. Οι φιλοσοφικές υποθέσεις πίσω από αυτούς τους διαλόγους δεν είναι πολύ δύσκολο να διακριθούν. Το Ισλάμ και η σύγχρονη Δύση μοιράζονται μια κοινή αβρααμική παράδοση και τις θεμελιώδεις πηγές τους; Ο ισλαμικός νόμος και η φιλοσοφία και η φιλοσοφία του δυτικού διαφωτισμού έχουν κοινές ρίζες—ελληνιστική λογική και βιβλική αποκάλυψη. Οι δύο πολιτισμοί έχουν κοινό παρελθόν και κοινό μέλλον, particularly in the light of strongeconomic relations between the West and the Muslimworld and the growing presence of Islam in nearlyevery Western society.Because the future of the two civilizations is inseparable,any clash will be devastating to both, regardlessof the asymmetry of power. A clash between Islamand the modern West would be like a collisionbetween the present and the future for both. Islam isintegral to the future of the West and Islamic civilization’sreticence toward modernity is untenable.Eventually, the Muslim world will have to modernize,democratize, and recognize that its future, too, isinterdependent. Neither the West nor the Muslimworld can imagine a mutually exclusive future.

Τρέχουσες τάσεις στην ιδεολογία της Αιγυπτιακής Μουσουλμανικής Αδελφότητας

Ο Δρ. Ισραήλ Elad Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. Μαζί μας. και ευρωπαϊκή υποστήριξη, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, προωθούν τις αιτίες τους και αποσπούν παραχωρήσεις από το κράτος. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της κυβέρνησης των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, και ίσως επίσης στην εξάλειψη της ισλαμιστικής τρομοκρατίας. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) και το Κόμμα της Ευημερούσας Δικαιοσύνης της Ινδονησίας (PKS), twoIslamist parties that, σύμφωνα με ορισμένους αναλυτές, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,αντίστοιχα, Ευρώπη και μια «ειδωλολατρική» Ασία?Αυτό το άρθρο εξετάζει πώς ανταποκρίθηκε το MB στη νέα πραγματικότητα, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. Σε ποιο βαθμό το κίνημα έχει προσαρμόσει την προοπτική του σε νέες συνθήκες? Ποιοι είναι οι στόχοι του και το όραμά του για την πολιτική τάξη? Πώς αντέδρασε στις Η.Π.Α. και στην εκστρατεία μεταρρυθμίσεων και εκδημοκρατισμού? Πώς οδήγησε τις σχέσεις της με το αιγυπτιακό καθεστώς από τη μια πλευρά, και άλλες δυνάμεις της αντιπολίτευσης από την άλλη, καθώς η χώρα κατευθυνόταν προς δύο δραματικές εκλογές το φθινόπωρο 2005? Σε ποιο βαθμό μπορεί το MB να θεωρηθεί δύναμη που θα μπορούσε να οδηγήσει την Αίγυπτο προς τη φιλελεύθερη δημοκρατία?

Μουσουλμάνοι Αμερικανοί Μέσης Τάξης και κυρίως Mainstream

Κέντρο Ερευνών Pew

Muslims constitute a growing and increasingly important segment of American society.Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research about the attitudes and opinions of thissegment of the public for two reasons. Πρώτα, the U.S. Census is forbidden by law from askingquestions about religious belief and affiliation, και, as a result, we know very little about thebasic demographic characteristics of Muslim Americans. Δεύτερος, Muslim Americans comprisesuch a small percentage of the U.S. population that general population surveys do not interview asufficient number of them to allow for meaningful analysis.This Pew Research Center study is therefore the first ever nationwide survey to attempt tomeasure rigorously the demographics, attitudes and experiences of Muslim Americans. It buildson surveys conducted in 2006 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project of Muslim minority publics inGreat Britain, Γαλλία, Germany and Spain. The Muslim American survey also follows on Pew’sglobal surveys conducted over the past five years with more than 30,000 Muslims in 22 nationsaround the world since 2002.The methodological approach employed was the most comprehensive ever used to studyMuslim Americans. Nearly 60,000 respondents were interviewed to find a representative sampleof Muslims. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, Urdu and Farsi, as well as English. Subsamplesof the national poll were large enough to explore how various subgroups of thepopulation — including recent immigrants, native-born converts, and selected ethnic groupsincluding those of Arab, Pakistani, and African American heritage — differ in their attitudesThe survey also contrasts the views of the Muslim population as a whole with those ofthe U.S. general population, and with the attitudes of Muslims all around the world, includingWestern Europe. Τελικά, findings from the survey make important contributions to the debateover the total size of the Muslim American population.The survey is a collaborative effort of a number of Pew Research Center projects,including the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, the Pew Forum on Religion &Public Life and the Pew Hispanic Center. The project was overseen by Pew Research CenterPresident Andrew Kohut and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Director Luis Lugo. ThePew Research Center’s Director of Survey Research, Scott Keeter, served as project director forthe study, with the close assistance of Gregory Smith, Research Fellow at the Pew Forum. Manyother Pew researchers participated in the design, execution and analysis of the survey.

Αίγυπτος: Ιστορικό και Η.Π.Α. Συγγένειες

Jeremy M. Αιχμηρός

In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Επί πλέον, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (Δεκέμβριος 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Την ίδια στιγμή, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

Middle East Democracy Promotion Is Not a One-way Street

Μαρίνα Ottaway

Οι ΗΠΑ. administration is under pressure to revive democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East,but momentum toward political reform has stalled in most of the region. Opposition parties are at lowebb, and governments are more firmly in control than ever. While new forms of activism, such as laborprotests and a growing volume of blogging critical of government and opposition parties have becomewidespread, they have yet to prove effective as means of influencing leaders to change long-standingpolicies.The last time a U.S. administration faced such unfavorable circumstances in advancing political reformswas over 30 years ago, when the Helsinki process was launched during the Cold War. That experiencetaught us that the United States needs to give reluctant interlocutors something they want if itexpects them to engage on issues they would rather not address. If Washington wants Arab countriesto discuss the universal democratic principles that should underpin their political systems, it needs to beprepared to discuss the universal principles that should underpin its own Middle East policies.

BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL

ANTHONY Bubalo

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Today, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : ισλαμισμός, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.