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Islámské reformace

Adnan Khan

Italský premiér, Silvio Berlusconi se po událostech chlubil 9/11:
„...musíme si být vědomi nadřazenosti naší civilizace, systém, který garantuje

pohoda, dodržování lidských práv a – na rozdíl od islámských zemí – úcta

za náboženská a politická práva, systém, který má své hodnoty a chápe rozmanitost

a tolerance...Západ si podmaní národy, jako by dobyl komunismus, i kdyby to

znamená konfrontaci s jinou civilizací, ten islámský, uvízl tam, kde byl

1,400 před lety…“1

A v a 2007 hlásí institut RAND:
„Boj probíhající ve velké části muslimského světa je v podstatě válkou

nápady. Jeho výsledek určí budoucí směřování muslimského světa.“

Budování umírněných muslimských sítí, Institut RAND

Pojem „islah“ (reforma) je pro muslimy neznámý pojem. Po celou dobu to nikdy neexistovalo

historie islámské civilizace; nikdy se o tom nediskutovalo a ani se o tom neuvažovalo. Letmý pohled na klasiku

Islámská literatura nám ukazuje, že když klasičtí učenci položili základy usul, a kodifikované

jejich islámská pravidla (fiqh) hleděli pouze na pochopení islámských pravidel, aby to dokázali

aplikovat je. Podobná situace nastala, když byla stanovena pravidla pro hadísy, tafseer a

arabština. Učenci, myslitelé a intelektuálové v celé islámské historii strávili mnoho času

porozumět Alláhovu zjevení – Koránu a aplikovat ayaat na realitu a vytvořenou

principy a disciplíny s cílem usnadnit porozumění. Korán tedy zůstal základem

studium a všechny disciplíny, které se vyvinuly, byly vždy založeny na Koránu. Ti, kteří se stali

zasaženi řeckou filozofií, jako jsou muslimští filozofové a někteří z řad Mut'azilah

byli považováni za lidi, kteří opustili záhyb islámu, protože Korán přestal být základem jejich studia. Tedy pro

každý muslim, který se pokouší odvodit pravidla nebo pochopit, jaký postoj by měl být zaujat ke konkrétnímu

vydání Koránu je základem této studie.

První pokus o reformu islámu se uskutečnil na přelomu 19. a 19. století. Na přelomu

století byla Ummah v dlouhém období úpadku, kdy se globální rovnováha sil posunula

z Khilafahu do Británie. Narůstající problémy zachvátily Khilafah, když byla západní Evropa uvnitř

uprostřed průmyslové revoluce. Ummah ztratila své původní chápání islámu, a

ve snaze zvrátit úpadek, který pohltil Uthmani (Osmané) někteří muslimové byli posláni do

Západ, a v důsledku toho byli uchváceni tím, co viděli. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi z Egypta (1801-1873),

při návratu z Paříže, napsal životopisnou knihu s názvem Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The

Těžba zlata, nebo Přehled Paříže, 1834), chválit jejich čistotu, láska k práci, a výše

veškerou společenskou morálku. Prohlásil, že musíme napodobit to, co se děje v Paříži, obhajovat změny

islámské společnosti od liberalizace žen k systémům vládnutí. Tato myšlenka, a ostatním se to líbí,

znamenal počátek znovuobjevování trendu v islámu.

The Syrian Opposition

Joshua Landis

Joe Pace


For decades, U.S. policy toward Syria has been single-mindedly focused on Syria’s president, Hafiz al-Asad, from 1970 na 2000, followed by his son Bashar. Because they perceived the Syrian opposition to be too weak and anti-American, U.S. officials preferred to work with the Asad regime. Washington thus had no relations with the Syrian opposition until its invasion of Iraq in 2003. Even then, the Bush administration reached out only to Washington-based opponents of the Syrian regime. They were looking for a Syrian counterpart to Ahmad Chalabi, the pro-U.S. Iraqi opposition leader who helped build the case for invading Iraq.
Washington was not interested in engaging Islamists, whom it considered the only opposition with a demonstrated popular base in Syria. As for the secular opposition in Syria, U.S. embassy officials in Damascus considered them to “have a weak back bench,” without a popular constituency or connection to Syrian youth.2 Moreover, contact between opposition members and embassy officials could be dangerous for opponents of the regime and leave them open to accusations of treason. For these reasons, the difficult terrain of opposition figures within Syria remained terra incognita.

Politika a příslib civilizačních dialogů

M. A. Muqtedar Khan

In response to Harvard Professor SamuelHuntington’s now infamous argument predicting afuture full of clashes between civilizations, the world’sliberals responded with a call for a civilizational dialogue.After 9/11, this call for a dialogue betweenIslam and the West has become even more urgent.The philosophical assumptions behind these dialoguesare not too difficult to discern. Islam and themodern West share a common Abrahamic traditionand their foundational sources; Islamic law and philosophyand Western enlightenment philosophy havecommon roots—Hellenistic reason and Biblical revelation.The two civilizations have a common past anda common future, particularly in the light of strongeconomic relations between the West and the Muslimworld and the growing presence of Islam in nearlyevery Western society.Because the future of the two civilizations is inseparable,any clash will be devastating to both, regardlessof the asymmetry of power. A clash between Islamand the modern West would be like a collisionbetween the present and the future for both. Islam isintegral to the future of the West and Islamic civilization’sreticence toward modernity is untenable.Eventually, the Muslim world will have to modernize,democratize, and recognize that its future, too, isinterdependent. Neither the West nor the Muslimworld can imagine a mutually exclusive future.

Současné trendy v ideologii egyptského Muslimského bratrstva

Dr. Izrael Elad Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. S námi. a evropská podpora, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, prosazovat jejich příčiny a získávat od státu ústupky. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, včetně vlády Spojených států amerických, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, a možná také při vymýcení islamistického terorismu. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) a Indonéská strana prosperující spravedlnosti (PKS), twoIslamist parties that, podle některých analytiků, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,respektive, Evropa a „pohanská“ Asie?Tento článek zkoumá, jak MB reagoval na novou realitu, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to newcircumstances? Jaké jsou její cíle a její vize politického uspořádání? How has itreacted to U.S. předehry a reformní a demokratizační kampaň? How has itnavigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forceson the other, země směřovala ke dvěma dramatickým volbám na podzim 2005? Towhat extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt toward liberaldemocracy?

Muslimští Američané střední třídy a většinou mainstream

Pew Research Center

Muslims constitute a growing and increasingly important segment of American society.Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research about the attitudes and opinions of thissegment of the public for two reasons. za prvé, Spojené státy. Census is forbidden by law from askingquestions about religious belief and affiliation, a, as a result, we know very little about thebasic demographic characteristics of Muslim Americans. Druhý, Muslim Americans comprisesuch a small percentage of the U.S. population that general population surveys do not interview asufficient number of them to allow for meaningful analysis.This Pew Research Center study is therefore the first ever nationwide survey to attempt tomeasure rigorously the demographics, attitudes and experiences of Muslim Americans. It buildson surveys conducted in 2006 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project of Muslim minority publics inGreat Britain, Francie, Germany and Spain. The Muslim American survey also follows on Pew’sglobal surveys conducted over the past five years with more than 30,000 Muslims in 22 nationsaround the world since 2002.The methodological approach employed was the most comprehensive ever used to studyMuslim Americans. Nearly 60,000 respondents were interviewed to find a representative sampleof Muslims. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, Urdu and Farsi, as well as English. Subsamplesof the national poll were large enough to explore how various subgroups of thepopulationincluding recent immigrants, native-born converts, and selected ethnic groupsincluding those of Arab, Pakistani, and African American heritagediffer in their attitudesThe survey also contrasts the views of the Muslim population as a whole with those ofthe U.S. general population, and with the attitudes of Muslims all around the world, includingWestern Europe. Konečně, findings from the survey make important contributions to the debateover the total size of the Muslim American population.The survey is a collaborative effort of a number of Pew Research Center projects,including the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, the Pew Forum on Religion &Public Life and the Pew Hispanic Center. The project was overseen by Pew Research CenterPresident Andrew Kohut and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Director Luis Lugo. ThePew Research Center’s Director of Survey Research, Scott Keeter, served as project director forthe study, with the close assistance of Gregory Smith, Research Fellow at the Pew Forum. Manyother Pew researchers participated in the design, execution and analysis of the survey.

Egypt: Pozadí a USA. Vztahy

Jeremy M. Ostrý

In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, jako U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Dále, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (Prosinec 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Ve stejnou dobu, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

Middle East Democracy Promotion Is Not a One-way Street

Marina Ottaway

The U.S. administration is under pressure to revive democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East,but momentum toward political reform has stalled in most of the region. Opposition parties are at lowebb, and governments are more firmly in control than ever. While new forms of activism, such as laborprotests and a growing volume of blogging critical of government and opposition parties have becomewidespread, they have yet to prove effective as means of influencing leaders to change long-standingpolicies.The last time a U.S. administration faced such unfavorable circumstances in advancing political reformswas over 30 years ago, when the Helsinki process was launched during the Cold War. That experiencetaught us that the United States needs to give reluctant interlocutors something they want if itexpects them to engage on issues they would rather not address. If Washington wants Arab countriesto discuss the universal democratic principles that should underpin their political systems, it needs to beprepared to discuss the universal principles that should underpin its own Middle East policies.

Mezi světovou a MÍSTNÍ

ANTHONY Bubalo

GREG FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. Dnes, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : Islamismus, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.