Alle oppføringer merket med: "Tyrkia"
ISLAM, DEMOKRATI & DE FORENTE STATER:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq |
Introduksjon ,
ISLAM OG REGLEN
I vårt moderne vestlige samfunn, statsorganiserte rettssystemer trekker normalt en særegen linje som skiller religion og lov. Omvendt, det er en rekke islamske regionalsamfunn der religion og lovene er like nært bundet og sammenflettet i dag som de var før begynnelsen av den moderne tid. Samtidig, andelen religiøs lov (shariah på arabisk) og offentlig rett (loven) blandes varierer fra land til land. Hva er mer, status for islam og følgelig status for islamsk lov er også forskjellig. I henhold til informasjon gitt av Organisasjonen for den islamske konferansen (OIC), det er for øyeblikket 57 Islamske stater over hele verden, definert som land der islam er religion (1) staten, (2) flertallet av befolkningen, eller (3) et stort mindretall. Alt dette påvirker utviklingen og formen av islamsk lov.
Islamsk politisk kultur, Demokrati, og menneskerettigheter
Daniele. Pris
Islam and Democracy: Text, Tradition, and History
Ahrar Ahmad
GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM: THE SOCIAL BASES OF TURKEY’S WELFARE PARTY
Haldun Gulalp
Islamsk politisk kultur, Demokrati, og menneskerettigheter
Daniele. Pris
Islamist Parties : participation without power
Malika Zeghal
ISLAMISTISK RADIKALISERING
Spørsmål knyttet til politisk islam utgjør fortsatt utfordringer for europeisk utenrikspolitikk i Midtøsten og Nord-Afrika (MENA). Etter hvert som EUs politikk har forsøkt å komme overens med slike utfordringer i løpet av det siste tiåret eller så har politisk islam utviklet seg. Eksperter peker på den økende kompleksiteten og variasjonen av trender innen politisk islam. Noen islamistiske organisasjoner har styrket sitt engasjement for demokratiske normer og engasjert seg fullt ut i fredelig, mainstream nasjonal politikk. Andre forblir giftet med voldelige midler. Og atter andre har drevet mot en mer stillferdig form for islam, løsrevet fra politisk aktivitet. Politisk islam i MENA-regionen presenterer ingen enhetlig trend for europeiske beslutningstakere. Analytisk debatt har vokst rundt konseptet "radikalisering". Dette har igjen skapt forskning på faktorene som driver «avradikalisering», og omvendt, «re-radikalisering». Mye av kompleksiteten stammer fra den utbredte oppfatningen om at alle tre av disse fenomenene skjer samtidig. Selv vilkårene er omstridt. Det har ofte blitt påpekt at den moderat-radikale todelingen ikke fullt ut klarer å fange nyansene av trender innen politisk islam. Noen analytikere klager også over at snakk om "radikalisme" er ideologisk ladet. På terminologinivå, vi forstår radikalisering å være forbundet med ekstremisme, men synspunktene er forskjellige når det gjelder sentraliteten til dets religiøst-fundamentalistiske versus politiske innhold, og over hvorvidt viljen til å ty til vold er underforstått eller ikke.
Slike forskjeller gjenspeiles i holdningene til islamistene selv, så vel som i utenforståendes oppfatninger.
Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party
Ramin Ahmadov
Turkey and the EU: A Survey on Turkish MPs’ EU Vision
Kudret Bulbul
Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (EU) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.
Islam og Vesten
Forord
John J. DeGioia
Den bemerkelsesverdige følelsen av nærhet mellom mennesker og nasjoner er den umiskjennelige virkeligheten i vår globaliserte verden. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politics, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. stilte ikke engang med en kandidat. Mubareks avgjørende seier ser ut til å være betryggende for de fleste – spesielt sekulære amerikanere – som er bekymret for fremtiden til de få vestlige vennlige, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.
zealous democrats : ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT, INDONESIA AND TURKEY
The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.
They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. Samtidig, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Faktisk, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.
Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.
The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.
Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts, and Social Movements
Suksessen til Tyrkias AK-parti må ikke utvanne bekymringer over arabiske islamister
Mona Eltahawy
Det har ikke vært overraskende siden Abdullah Gul ble president i Tyrkia 27 august at mye feilsøkte analyser har vært bortkastet på hvordan “islamister” kan bestå demokratiprøven. Seieren hans var nødt til å bli beskrevet som “islamist” ruting av tyrkisk politikk. Og arabiske islamister – i form av Det muslimske brorskap, deres støttespillere og forsvarere – skulle alltid peke på Tyrkia og fortelle oss at vi hele tiden har tatt feil for å bekymre oss for den arabiske islamisten’ påstått flørt med demokratiet. “Det fungerte i Tyrkia, det kan fungere i den arabiske verden,” de ville prøve å forsikre oss. Feil. Feil. Og feil. For det første, Gul er ikke islamist. Hans kones hodeskjerf kan være den røde kluten til oksen til de sekulære nasjonalistene i Tyrkia, men verken Gul eller AK-partiet som feide parlamentsvalget i Tyrkia i juni, kan kalles islamister. stilte ikke engang med en kandidat. Mubareks avgjørende seier ser ut til å være betryggende for de fleste – spesielt sekulære amerikanere – som er bekymret for fremtiden til de få vestlige vennlige, så lite deler AK-partiet med Det muslimske brorskap – bortsett fra medlemmenes felles tro – at det er absurd å bruke suksessen i tyrkisk politikk som en grunn til å redusere frykten for det muslimske brorskapets rolle i arabisk politikk. Islamismens tre lakmusprøver vil bevise poenget mitt: kvinner og sex, de “Vest”, og Israel. Som en sekulær muslim som har sverget å aldri bo i Egypt dersom islamister noen gang skulle ta makten, Jeg tar aldri lett på ethvert forsøk på å blande religion med politikk. Så det har vært med et mer enn skeptisk blikk at jeg har fulgt tyrkisk politikk de siste årene.
Islam and Democracy
Dalia Mogahed
Islam in politics has been asserted in many countries in the Muslim world through democratic elections. Islamist parties have gained varying degreesof political power in Turkey, Egypt, Libanon, and the occupied Palestinian territories, and have widespread influence in Morocco and Jordan. Now, more than ever, Vestlige regjeringer, alarmed by this outcome, have raised the perennial question: Is Islam compatible with democracy?A recent in-depth Gallup survey in 10 predominantly Muslim countries,representing more than 80% of the global Muslim population, shows that whenasked what they admire most about the West, Muslims frequently mention political freedom, liberty, fair judicial systems, and freedom of speech. When asked to critique their own societies, extremism and inadequate adherence to Islamic teachings were their top grievances.However, while Muslims say they admire freedom and an open political system,Gallup surveys suggest that they do not believe they must choose between Islam and democracy, but rather, that the two can co-exist inside one functional government.
To Be A Muslim
Fathi Yakan
All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.