RSSGach Iontráil Tagged Leis: "turcaí"

ISLAM, Daonlathas & AN SAM:

Fondúireacht Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


In ainneoin gur díospóireacht ilbhliantúil agus casta araon í, Arches Ráithiúil athscrúdú ar chúiseanna diagachta agus praiticiúla, an díospóireacht thábhachtach faoin gcaidreamh agus comhoiriúnacht idir Ioslam agus an Daonlathas, mar a léirítear i gclár oibre dóchais agus athraithe Barack Obama. Cé go gceiliúrann go leor cinnt Obama san Oifig Oval mar chatharsis náisiúnta do na SA, tá cuid eile fós nach bhfuil chomh dóchasach faoi athrú san idé-eolaíocht agus sa chur chuige sa saol idirnáisiúnta. Cé gur féidir cuid mhór den teannas agus den easpa muiníne idir an domhan Moslamach agus SAM a chur i leith an chur chuige a bhaineann le cur chun cinn an daonlathais., go tipiciúil i bhfabhar deachtóireachtaí agus réimis puipéad a íocann seirbhís liopa do luachanna daonlathacha agus cearta daonna, iarshlua na 9/11 dhaingnigh sé an amhras go fírinneach trí sheasamh Mheiriceá ar Ioslam polaitiúil. Tá balla diúltach cruthaithe aige mar a d’aimsigh worldpublicopinion.org, dá réir a 67% Creideann na hÉigiptigh go bhfuil ról “diúltach den chuid is mó” á imirt ag Meiriceá ar fud an domhain.
Mar sin bhí freagra Mheiriceá oiriúnach. Trí Obama a thoghadh, tá go leor ar fud an domhain ag súil le duine nach bhfuil chomh corraitheach a fhorbairt, ach beartas eachtrach níos cothroime i dtreo an domhain Moslamach. An tástáil le haghaidh Obama, agus muid ag plé, is é an chaoi a gcuireann Meiriceá agus a comhghuaillithe an daonlathas chun cinn. An mbeidh sé ag éascú nó ag impí?
Thairis sin, an bhfuil sé tábhachtach gur bróicéir macánta é i gcriosanna fada coinbhleachta? Ag liostáil saineolas agus léargas prolifi
c scoláirí, acadóirí, iriseoirí agus polaiteoirí le taithí, Tugann Arches Quarterly an gaol idir Ioslam agus Daonlathas agus ról Mheiriceá chun solais – chomh maith leis na hathruithe a tharla de bharr Obama., agus an talamh coitianta á lorg. Anas Altikriti, Soláthraíonn POF The Cordoba Foundation an t-athrú tosaigh don phlé seo, áit a ndéanann sé machnamh ar na dóchais agus na dúshláin atá ar chosán Obama. Tar éis Altikriti, an t-iarchomhairleoir don Uachtarán Nixon, Tairgeann an Dr Robert Crane anailís chríochnúil ar phrionsabal Ioslamach an chirt chun saoirse. Anwar Ibrahim, iar-Leas-Phríomh-Aire na Malaeisia, saibhríonn sé an plé leis na réaltachtaí praiticiúla a bhaineann le daonlathas a chur i bhfeidhm i sochaithe ceannasacha Moslamach, eadhon, san Indinéis agus sa Mhalaeisia.
Tá an Dr Shireen Hunter againn freisin, de chuid Ollscoil Georgetown, SAM, a dhéanann iniúchadh ar thíortha Moslamacha atá tite chun deiridh sa daonlathú agus sa nuachóiriú. Comhlánaíonn scríbhneoir sceimhlitheoireachta Th é, Míniú an Dr Nafeez Ahmed ar ghéarchéim na hiar-nua-aoiseachais agus an
meath an daonlathais. An Dr Daud Abdullah (Stiúrthóir Monatóir Meán an Mheánoirthir), Alan Hart (iar-chomhfhreagraí ITN agus BBC Panorama; údar Zionism: Fíor-namhaid na nGiúdach) agus Asem Sondos (Eagarthóir Sawt Al Omma na hÉigipte go seachtainiúil) díriú ar Obama agus a ról vis-à-vis an daonlathas-chur chun cinn sa domhan Moslamach, chomh maith le caidreamh SAM le hIosrael agus leis an mBráithreachas Moslamach.
Aire Gnóthaí Eachtracha Aff airs, Oileáin Mhaildíve, Déanann Ahmed Shaheed tuairimíocht ar thodhchaí an Ioslaim agus an Daonlathais; An Clr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– ball de Shinn Féin a d’fhulaing ceithre bliana sa phríosún as gníomhaíochtaí Poblachtánacha na hÉireann agus feachtasóir ar son Guildford 4 agus Birmingham 6, léiríonn sé ar an turas a thug sé go Gaza le déanaí áit ar chonaic sé tionchar na brúidiúlachta agus na héagóra a cuireadh le chéile i gcoinne na bPalaistíneach; An Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Pléann Stiúrthóir an Ionaid um Staidéar ar Radacú agus ar Fhoréigean Polaitiúil Comhaimseartha na dúshláin a bhaineann le taighde criticiúil a dhéanamh ar sceimhle polaitíochta; An Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, scríbhneoir agus drámadóir, pléann sé ionchais na síochána i Darfur; agus faoi dheireadh breathnaíonn an t-iriseoir agus gníomhaí cearta daonna Ashur Shamis go criticiúil ar dhaonlathú agus ar pholaitíocht na Moslamaigh inniu.
Tá súil againn go dtabharfaidh sé seo go léir léamh cuimsitheach agus foinse machnaimh ar cheisteanna a théann i gcion orainn go léir le linn nua dóchais..
Go raibh maith agat

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. At the same time, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

Islamic Political Culture, Daonlathas, and Human Rights

Daniele. Praghas

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, ach, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Teoiric pholaitiúil Ioslamach, agus staidéir ad hoc ar thíortha aonair, nach measann fachtóirí eile. Is é mo áiteamh go bhfuil na téacsanna agus traidisiúin an Ioslam, cosúil leis na reiligiúin eile, is féidir iad a úsáid chun tacú le córais agus beartais pholaitiúla éagsúla. Ní chuidíonn staidéir a bhaineann go sonrach le tír ar leith linn patrúin a aimsiú a chuideoidh linn na caidrimh éagsúla idir Ioslam agus an pholaitíocht ar fud thíortha an domhain Mhoslamaigh a mhíniú.. Uaidh sin, cur chuige nua maidir le staidéar a dhéanamh ar an
éilítear nasc idir Ioslam agus an pholaitíocht.
Molaim, trí mheastóireacht dhian ar an ngaol idir Ioslam, daonlathas, agus cearta an duine ar an leibhéal trasnáisiúnta, go bhfuil an iomarca béime á cur ar chumhacht an Ioslaim mar fhórsa polaitiúil. Úsáidim cás-staidéir chomparáideacha ar dtús, a dhíríonn ar fhachtóirí a bhaineann leis an idirghníomhú idir grúpaí agus réimis Ioslamacha, tionchair eacnamaíocha, scoilteanna eitneacha, agus forbairt na sochaí, míniú a thabhairt ar an éagsúlacht i dtionchar an Ioslaim ar an bpolaitíocht thar ocht náisiún. Áitím go bhfuil cuid mhór den chumhacht
atá curtha i leith Ioslam mar an fórsa tiomána taobh thiar de bheartais agus córais pholaitiúla i náisiúin Mhoslamacha a mhíniú níos fearr ag na fachtóirí a luadh cheana. Faighim freisin, contrártha le creideamh coiteann, gur minic a bhaineann neart méadaithe na ngrúpaí polaitiúla Ioslamacha le hiolrúchán measartha ar chórais pholaitiúla.
Tá innéacs de chultúr polaitiúil Ioslamach tógtha agam, bunaithe ar a mhéid a úsáidtear an dlí Ioslamach agus an bhfuil agus, más amhlaidh, conas,Smaointe an Iarthair, institiúidí, agus cuirtear teicneolaíochtaí i bhfeidhm, chun nádúr an chaidrimh idir Ioslam agus an daonlathas agus Ioslam agus cearta daonna a thástáil. Úsáidtear an táscaire seo in anailís staitistiúil, lena n-áirítear sampla de thrí thír is fiche ar Mhoslamacha den chuid is mó agus grúpa rialaithe de thrí cinn is fiche de náisiún forbraíochta neamh-Mhuslamach. Chomh maith le comparáid a dhéanamh
náisiúin Ioslamacha chuig náisiúin i mbéal forbartha neamh-Ioslamach, ligeann anailís staitistiúil dom tionchar na n-athróg eile a fuarthas a chuireann isteach ar leibhéil daonlathais agus ar chosaint chearta an duine aonair a rialú.. Ba cheart go mbeadh pictiúr níos réadúla agus níos cruinne ar an tionchar atá ag Ioslam ar pholaitíocht agus ar bheartais mar thoradh air.

Islam and Democracy: Text, Tradition, and History

Ahrar Ahmad

Popular stereotypes in the West tend to posit a progressive, rational, and free West against a backward, oppressive, and threatening Islam. Public opinion polls conducted in the United States during the 1990s revealed a consistent pattern of Americans labeling Muslims as “religious fanatics” and considering Islam’s ethos as fundamentally “anti-democratic.”1 These characterizations
and misgivings have, for obvious reasons, significantly worsened since the tragedy of 9/11. ach, these perceptions are not reflected merely in the popular consciousness or crude media representations. Respected scholars also have contributed to this climate of opinion by writing about the supposedly irreconcilable differences between Islam and the West, the famous “clash of civilizations” that is supposed to be imminent and inevitable, and about the seeming incompatibility between Islam and democracy. For example, Professor Peter Rodman worries that “we are challenged from the outside by a militant atavistic force driven by hatred of all Western political thought harking back to age-old grievances against Christendom.” Dr. Daniel Pipes proclaims that the Muslims challenge the West more profoundly than the communists ever did, for “while the Communists disagree with our policies, the fundamentalist Muslims despise our whole way of life.” Professor Bernard Lewis warns darkly about “the historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo–Christian heritage, our secular present, and the expansion of both.” Professor Amos Perlmutter asks: “Is Islam, fundamentalist or otherwise, compatible with human-rights oriented Western style representative democracy? The answer is an emphatic NO.” And Professor Samuel Huntington suggests with a flourish that “the problem is not Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam itself.” It would be intellectually lazy and simple-minded to dismiss their positions as based merely on spite or prejudice. In fact, if one ignores some rhetorical overkill, some of their charges, though awkward for Muslims, are relevant to a discussion of the relationship between Islam and democracy in the modern world. For example, the position of women or sometimes non-Muslims in some Muslim countries is problematic in terms of the supposed legal equality of all people in a democracy. Similarly, the intolerance directed by some Muslims against writers (e.g., Salman Rushdie in the UK, Taslima Nasrin in Bangladesh, and Professor Nasr Abu Zaid in Egypt) ostensibly jeopardizes the principle of free speech, which is essential to a democracy.
It is also true that less than 10 of the more than 50 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have institutionalized democratic principles or processes as understood in the West, and that too, only tentatively. Ar deireadh, the kind of internal stability and external peace that is almost a prerequisite for a democracy to function is vitiated by the turbulence of internal implosion or external aggression evident in many Muslim countries today (e.g., An tSomáil, An tSúdáin, An Indinéis, An Phacastáin, An Iaráic, Afganastáin, An Ailgéir, and Bosnia).

GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM: THE SOCIAL BASES OF TURKEY’S WELFARE PARTY

Haldun Gulalp

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, then, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. This paper will, therefore, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, with 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Nevertheless, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

Islamic Political Culture, Daonlathas, and Human Rights

Daniele. Praghas

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contrártha leis an

luachanna sochaithe an Iarthair, agus bíonn tionchar suntasach aige ar thorthaí tábhachtacha polaitiúla
i náisiúin Mhoslamacha. Consequently, scholars, commentators, agus rialtas
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, ach, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Teoiric pholaitiúil Ioslamach, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, nach measann fachtóirí eile. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, cosúil leis na reiligiúin eile,
is féidir iad a úsáid chun tacú le córais agus beartais pholaitiúla éagsúla. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Uaidh sin, cur chuige nua maidir le staidéar a dhéanamh ar an
éilítear nasc idir Ioslam agus an pholaitíocht.
Molaim, trí mheastóireacht dhian ar an ngaol idir Ioslam,
daonlathas, agus cearta an duine ar an leibhéal trasnáisiúnta, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, tionchair eacnamaíocha, scoilteanna eitneacha,

agus forbairt na sochaí, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamist Parties : participation without power

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party

Ramin Ahmadov

The election results on November 3, 2002, which brought the Justice and Development Party into power, shocked many, but for varying reasons. Afterwards, some became more hopeful about future of their country, while others became even more doubtful and anxious, since for them the “republican regime” came under threat. These opposing responses, along with the perceptions that fueled them, neatly describe the two very different worlds that currently exist within Turkish society, and so it is important to think through many of the contested issues that have arisen as a result of these shifting political winds.
The winning Justice and Development Party (JDP) was established in 2001 by a group of politicians under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, many of whom split from the religio-political movement of Necmetiin Erbakan, the National Outlook Movement, and the Welfare Party. Interestingly, in less than two years after its establishment, and at the first general election it participated in, the JDP received 34.29 % of the vote when all other established parties fell under the 10 % threshold. The only exception to this was the Republican People’s Party (19.38 %). The JDP captured 365 out of 550 seats in the parliament and therefore was given the opportunity of establishing the government alone, which is exactly what happened. Two years later, in the 2004 local elections, the JDP increased its votes to 41.46 %, while the RPP slightly decreased to 18.27 %, and the Nationalist Action Party increased to 10.10 % (from 8.35 % isteach 2002). Ar deireadh, in the most recent general elections in Turkey in 2007, which was marked by intense debate over presidential elections and an online military note, the JDP won nearly half of all votes, 46.58 %, and began its second term in power.

Turkey and the EU: A Survey on Turkish MPs’ EU Vision

Kudret Bulbul

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (EU) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

Islam and the West

Preface

Eoin J.. DeGioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politics, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. In fact, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

zealous democrats : ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT, INDONESIA AND TURKEY

Anthony Bubalo
Greg Fealy
Whit Mason

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. At the same time, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Cínte, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts, and Social Movements

Pól M.. Lubeck
Bryana Britts
Cities are processes, not products. The three Islamic elements that set in motion the processes that give rise to Islamic cities were: a distinction between the members of the Umma and the outsiders, which led to juridical and spatial distinction by neighborhoods; the segregation of the sexes which gave rise to a particular solution to the question of spatial organization; and a legal system which, rather than imposing general regulations over land uses of various types in various places, left to the litigation of the neighbors the detailed adjudication of mutual rights over space and use. (Janet Abu Lughod 1987: 173)
Framing: Muslim Movements in Urban Situations We live in an intellectual moment when the complexity of the global Islamic
revival renders it difficult to generalize about Muslim institutions, social movements, and discursive practices. While diversity and locality remain paramount features of Muslim cities, globalization has inadvertently nurtured transnational Muslim networks from the homeland of Islam and extended them into the web of interconnected world cities. Quite opportunistically, urban-based
Muslim networks and insurrectionist movements now thrive in the interstitial spaces created by the new global communication and transportation infrastructures. What, then, are the long-term patterns for Muslims in cities? Since the last millennium, as Janet Abu-Lughod reminds us, “the Islamic cityhas been the primary site for: defining power relations between ruler and subject, specifying the rights and identities of spatial communities, and regulating urban social relations between genders. Today’s Muslim city remains the epicenter of a burgeoning public sphere in which informed publics debate highly contested Islamic discourses regarding social justice,

Success of Turkey’s AK Party must not dilute worries over Arab Islamists

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on howIslamistscan pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Ioslamach” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamistsin the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenderswere always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamistalleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. In fact, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhoodaside from the common faith of its membersthat it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, an “Thiar”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Islam and Democracy

Dalia Mogahed

Islam in politics has been asserted in many countries in the Muslim world through democratic elections. Islamist parties have gained varying degreesof political power in Turkey, An Éigipt, Liobáin, and the occupied Palestinian territories, and have widespread influence in Morocco and Jordan. Now, more than ever, Western governments, alarmed by this outcome, have raised the perennial question: Is Islam compatible with democracy?A recent in-depth Gallup survey in 10 predominantly Muslim countries,representing more than 80% of the global Muslim population, shows that whenasked what they admire most about the West, Muslims frequently mention political freedom, liberty, fair judicial systems, and freedom of speech. When asked to critique their own societies, extremism and inadequate adherence to Islamic teachings were their top grievances.However, while Muslims say they admire freedom and an open political system,Gallup surveys suggest that they do not believe they must choose between Islam and democracy, but rather, that the two can co-exist inside one functional government.

To Be A Muslim

Fathi Yakan

All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.