Όλες οι εγγραφές με ετικέτα με: "Τουρκία"

ΙΣΛΑΜ, ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ & Η ΗΠΑ:

Ίδρυμα Κόρδοβα

Αμπντουλάχ Faliq

Εισαγωγή ,

ΙΣΛΑΜ ΚΑΙ ΚΡΑΤΟΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ

Στη σύγχρονη δυτική κοινωνία μας, Τα νομικά συστήματα που οργανώνονται από το κράτος συνήθως χαράσσουν μια διακριτική γραμμή που διαχωρίζει τη θρησκεία από το νόμο. Αντίστροφως, υπάρχουν πολλές ισλαμικές περιφερειακές κοινωνίες όπου η θρησκεία και οι νόμοι είναι τόσο στενά συνδεδεμένοι και αλληλένδετοι σήμερα όσο πριν από την έναρξη της σύγχρονης εποχής. Την ίδια στιγμή, η αναλογία στην οποία ο θρησκευτικός νόμος (σαρία στα αραβικά) και δημοσίου δικαίου (ο νόμος) αναμειγνύονται ποικίλλει από τη μια χώρα στην άλλη. Τι περισσότερο, Το καθεστώς του Ισλάμ και κατά συνέπεια του Ισλαμικού νόμου διαφέρει επίσης. Σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες που έδωσε ο Οργανισμός Ισλαμικής Διάσκεψης (OIC), υπάρχουν αυτή τη στιγμή 57 Ισλαμικά κράτη σε όλο τον κόσμο, ορίζονται ως χώρες στις οποίες το Ισλάμ είναι θρησκεία (1) το κράτος, (2) η πλειοψηφία του πληθυσμού, ή (3) μια μεγάλη μειοψηφία. Όλα αυτά επηρεάζουν την ανάπτυξη και τη μορφή του ισλαμικού νόμου.

Ισλαμικός Πολιτικός Πολιτισμός, Δημοκρατία, και Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων

Daniel E. Τιμή

Ισλάμ και Δημοκρατία: Text, Tradition, and History

Ahrar Ahmad

GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM: THE SOCIAL BASES OF TURKEY’S WELFARE PARTY

Haldun Gulalp

Ισλαμικός Πολιτικός Πολιτισμός, Δημοκρατία, και Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων

Daniel E. Τιμή

Islamist Parties : participation without power

Malika Zeghal

ΙΣΛΑΜΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΡΙΖΟΣΠΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party

Ramin Ahmadov

Turkey and the EU: A Survey on Turkish MPs’ EU Vision

Κουντρέτ Bulbul

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (EU) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

Islam and the West

Preface

John J. DeGioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politics, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. In fact, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

ζηλωτές δημοκράτες : ΙΣΛΑΜΙΣΜΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟ, ΙΝΔΟΝΗΣΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. Την ίδια στιγμή, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Πράγματι, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

Μουσουλμανική Κοινωνία Πολιτών σε Αστικούς Δημόσιους Χώρους: Παγκοσμιοποίηση, Λογικές μετατοπίσεις, και Κοινωνικών Κινημάτων

Success of Turkey’s AK Party must not dilute worries over Arab Islamists

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Ισλαμιστής” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. In fact, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, ο “δυτικά”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Ισλάμ και Δημοκρατία

Dalia Mogahed

Το Ισλάμ στην πολιτική έχει επιβεβαιωθεί σε πολλές χώρες του μουσουλμανικού κόσμου μέσω δημοκρατικών εκλογών. Τα ισλαμιστικά κόμματα έχουν αποκτήσει διαφορετικούς βαθμούς πολιτικής ισχύος στην Τουρκία, Αίγυπτος, Λίβανος, και τα κατεχόμενα παλαιστινιακά εδάφη, και έχουν ευρεία επιρροή στο Μαρόκο και την Ιορδανία. Τώρα, περισσότερο από ποτέ, Δυτικές κυβερνήσεις, ανησυχούν από αυτό το αποτέλεσμα, έθεσαν το διαχρονικό ερώτημα: Είναι το Ισλάμ συμβατό με τη δημοκρατία?Μια πρόσφατη εις βάθος έρευνα του Gallup στο 10 κυρίως μουσουλμανικές χώρες,που αντιπροσωπεύουν περισσότερα από 80% του παγκόσμιου μουσουλμανικού πληθυσμού, δείχνει ότι όταν ρωτήθηκαν τι θαυμάζουν περισσότερο στη Δύση, Οι μουσουλμάνοι αναφέρουν συχνά την πολιτική ελευθερία, ελευθερία, δίκαια δικαστικά συστήματα, και ελευθερία του λόγου. Όταν τους ζητήθηκε να ασκήσουν κριτική στις δικές τους κοινωνίες, Ο εξτρεμισμός και η ανεπαρκής προσήλωση στις ισλαμικές διδασκαλίες ήταν τα κύρια παράπονά τους.Ωστόσο, ενώ οι μουσουλμάνοι λένε ότι θαυμάζουν την ελευθερία και ένα ανοιχτό πολιτικό σύστημα,Οι έρευνες της Gallup δείχνουν ότι δεν πιστεύουν ότι πρέπει να επιλέξουν μεταξύ Ισλάμ και δημοκρατίας, αλλά μάλλον, ότι τα δύο μπορούν να συνυπάρξουν μέσα σε μια λειτουργική κυβέρνηση.

To Be A Muslim

Fath Yakan

All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.