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PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Artimųjų Rytų, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; ir (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

| Rugsėjo mėn 06, 2010 | Komentarai 0
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Islam and Democracy

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

| Rugsėjo mėn 04, 2010 | Komentarai 0
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The Muslim Brotherhood’s U.S. Network

Zeyno Baranas


Washington D.C. has suddenly become very interested in the Muslim Brotherhood. American policymakers are debating whether to engage non-violent elements of the Muslim Brotherhood network, both inside and outside the United States, in the hope that such engagement will empower these “moderates” against violent Wahhabi and Salafi groups such as al-Qaeda. Unfortunately, this strategy is based on a false assumption: that “moderate” Islamist groups will confront and weaken their violent co-religionists, robbing them of their support base.
This lesser-of-two-evils strategy is reminiscent of the rationale behind the Cold War-era decision to support the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet army. In the short term, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos. alliance with the mujahideen did indeed aid America in its struggle against the Soviet Union. In the long term, tačiau, JAV. support led to the empowerment of a dangerous and potent adversary. In choosing its allies, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos. cannot afford to elevate short-term tactical considerations above longer-term strategic ones. Most importantly, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos. must consider the ideology of any potential partners.
Although various Islamist groups do quarrel over tactics and often bear considerable animosity towards one another, they all agree on the endgame: a world dictated by political Islam. A “divide and conquer” strategy by the United States will only push them closer together.
| Vasario mėn 13, 2010 | Komentarai 0
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Komentaras: Tuščiaviduris žiedas demokratijai

ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE

VAŠINGTONAS, birželio mėn 24 (UPI) — Baltųjų rūmų kryžiaus žygis už demokratiją, kaip mato prezidentas Bushas, pagamino “kritinė įvykių masė, imanti tai (Artimųjų Rytų) regioną viltinga nauja kryptimi.” And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just toured the area, making clear at every stop whenever the United States has a choice between stability and democracy, the new ideological remedy would sacrifice stability.

Veteran Mideast hands who have dealt with five regional wars and two intifadas over the past half century shuddered. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first among them.

“For the U.S. to crusade in every part of the world to spread democracy may be beyond our capacity,” he says. Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos. system, he explains, “is the product of unique historical experiences, difficult to duplicate or to transplant into Muslim societies where secular democracy has seldom thrived.” If ever.

If stability had been sacrificed for democracy, buvęs prezidentų Niksono ir Fordo patarėjas nacionalinio saugumo klausimais ir valstybės sekretorius negalėjo derėtis dėl didelių arabų ir Izraelio pasitraukimo susitarimų: Sinajaus I, Golanas ir Sinajaus II. Be nedemokratiškų, gerybinė diktatoriška Anwaro Sadato figūra prie vairo Egipte, arba be velionio Sirijos diktatoriaus ir pagrindinio teroro tarpininko Hafezo Assado, būtų parašytas dar vienas karo istorijos puslapis.

Su demokratiniu parlamentu Egipte 1974, manoma, kad dominuoja populiarioji Musulmonų brolija, Sadatas negalėjo padaryti savo įspūdingo, mirties nepakeliama kelionė į Jeruzalę — ir staiga tapo populiariausiu Izraelio lyderiu. Taikos sutartis tarp Egipto ir Izraelio bei tarp Jordanijos ir Izraelio buvo įmanoma tik dėl absoliučių valdovų — Sadatas ir velionis karalius Husseinas, vadovavo abiem arabų šalims.

Sadatas žinojo, kad jo drąsus valstybinis poelgis prilygsta jo paties mirties nuosprendžio pasirašymui. Jis buvo atliktas m 1981 — islamistų ekstremistų — pasaulinėje televizijoje.

Rice'as išdidžiai skelbia, kad tai nebėra karas su terorizmu, o kova už demokratiją. Ji didžiuojasi, kad Busho administracija nebesiekia stabilumo demokratijos sąskaita. Tačiau jau demokratijos kryžiaus žygyje susiduriama ne tik su greičio mažinimo kalneliais, bet ir užtvaros kelyje į niekur.

Daug išliaupsinti Palestinos rinkimai, numatyti liepos mėnesį, buvo atidėti neribotam laikui.

Libane, balsadėžė jau buvo panaikinta politinėmis machinacijomis. Gen. Michaelas Aounas, šviesi, bet senstanti perspektyva, grįžusi iš Prancūzijos tremties imtis Sirijos požeminės mašinos, jau suvienijo jėgas su Damasku. Neigdamas bet kokį susitarimą su Sirija, Generolo pakalikai pripažįsta, kad už išėjimo į pensiją Paryžiuje metus jam buvo atlyginta didžiulė kompensacija iš kariuomenės štabo vado pareigų ir premjero pareigų.. Aoun surinko $22 milijonas, į kurias buvo įtrauktos sudėtinės palūkanos.

Egipte, Ryžiai, tikriausiai bando suteikti pagarbą prezidento Hosni Mubarako varžovams, prireikė laiko, kad priimtų žinomą politinį šarlataną, kuris daugelį metų buvo demaskuotas kaip asmuo, klastojęs rinkimų rezultatus, kai lipo daugelio politinių partijų laiptais su įvairiomis etiketėmis..

Net Mubarako priešai pripažįsta, kad Aymanas Nouras išgalvojo ir suklastojo daugelio žmonių parašus. 1,187 piliečių laikytis taisyklių, leidžiančių legalizuoti savo Ghadą (Rytoj) vakarėlis. Jo karjera nusėta netikrais akademiniais įgaliojimais, plagiatas, inscenizuotas pasikėsinimas į save patį, jo Saudo Arabijos žiniasklaidos darbdaviui pateikti kaltinimai iššvaistymu, ir daugybė dokumentų klastojimo.

Rice'as atšaukė ankstesnę kelionę į Egiptą, protestuodamas prieš Nouro kaltinimą ir įkalinimą iki teismo.. Ir prieš naujausią Rice'o apdovanojimą, Buvusi valstybės sekretorė Madeleine Albright taip pat stengėsi pagirti pagrindinį Egipto politinį sukčius. Priverčia susimąstyti, kokie politiniai reportažai ateina iš JAV. Ambasada Kaire.

Su šiuo dviprasmišku JAV pritarimu, Nouras praranda tą mažą malonę, kurią vis dar turi Egipte. Dabar jis laikomas JAV. stulpai, papildyti ilgą trūkumų sąrašą.

Musulmonų brolija, kuris yra uždraustas, bet toleruojamas, nes atsisakė terorizmo, labiau reprezentuoja egiptiečių nuomonę nei Nouras. Taip pat yra Kifaya (Užteks) judėjimas, vienijantis garsiausius Egipto intelektualus. Tačiau jie atsisakė susitikti su Rice.

Jungtinės Valstijos visame arabų pasaulyje laikomos Izraelio sinonimu. Tai automatiškai apriboja Busho administracijos galimybes įgyti draugų ir daryti įtaką žmonėms. Tie, kurie išnaudoja visas JAV galimybes. spaudimą demokratizuoti yra organizacijos, išvardytos JAV kaip “teroristas.” „Hamas“ palestiniečių teritorijose ir „Hezbollah“ Libane dabar turi galimybių kasti tiek virš žemės, tiek po žeme.. Islamo įstatymų leidėjai Jordanijoje kreipėsi į karalių Abdullah, kad leistų Jordanijos „Hamas“ lyderiams, iškeldintas prieš šešerius metus, grįžti namo. Karalius abejingai klausėsi.

Prireikė Europos 500 metų, kad pasiektų politinės brandos laipsnį, kurį liudija neseniai žlugus Europos Sąjungos planai dėl bendros konstitucijos. Winstonas Churchillis sakė, kad demokratija yra pati blogiausia valdymo forma, išskyrus visas kitas, kurios buvo išbandytos. Tačiau Churchillis taip pat sakė, “Geriausias argumentas prieš demokratiją – penkių minučių pokalbis su vidutiniu rinkėju.” Tai vis dar galioja arabų pasaulio turguose, nuo Marakešo iki Maskato.

| Vasario mėn 12, 2010 | Komentarai 0
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TERORRIST DIASPORAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Šenonas Petersonas

Deividas Goetze


Ever since the Bush administration’s declaration of a global war on terror after 9/11,academics and policymakers have sought ways to counter the global terrorist threat. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. Moreover, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 6). Consequently, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: the MuslimBrotherhood, „Hamas“, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. However, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.

| Vasario mėn 11, 2010 | Komentarai 0
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Assessing the Islamist mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘StateHegemony’: assessing the Islamistmainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

JAN STARKMalaysia-Islamists

International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.

This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.

As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.

Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).

These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.

| gruod 18, 2009 | Komentarai 1
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