RSSSvi unosi označeni: "terorizam"

PRECIZNOST U GLOBALNOM RATU PROTIV TERORA:

Šerifa zuhur

Sedam godina nakon rujna 11, 2001 (9/11) napadi, mnogi stručnjaci vjeruju da je al-Qa'ida ponovno ojačala i da su njezini imitatori ili podružnice smrtonosniji nego prije. Nacionalna obavještajna procjena 2007 ustvrdio da je al-Qa'ida sada opasnija nego prije 9/11.1 Al-Qa'idini emulatori nastavljaju prijetiti Zapadu, Srednji istok, i europskih naroda, kao u zavjeri osujećenoj u rujnu 2007 u Njemačkoj. Bruce Riedel navodi: Uvelike zahvaljujući spremnosti Washingtona da ode u Irak umjesto da lovi vođe Al Qaide, organizacija sada ima solidnu bazu operacija u pustoši Pakistana i učinkovitu franšizu u zapadnom Iraku. Njegov doseg se proširio po muslimanskom svijetu i Europi . . . Osama bin Laden je pokrenuo uspješnu propagandnu kampanju. . . . Njegove ideje sada privlače više sljedbenika nego ikada.
Istina je da se razne selefijsko-džihadističke organizacije još uvijek pojavljuju diljem islamskog svijeta. Zašto se odgovori na islamistički terorizam koji zovemo globalni džihad nisu pokazali iznimno učinkovitima?
Prelazak na alate „meke moći,” što je s učinkovitošću zapadnih nastojanja da podupre muslimane u Globalnom ratu protiv terorizma (GWOT)? Zašto su Sjedinjene Države osvojile tako malo “srca i umova” u širem islamskom svijetu? Zašto američke strateške poruke o ovom pitanju tako loše igraju u regiji? Zašto, usprkos širokom muslimanskom neodobravanju ekstremizma kao što je prikazano u anketama i službenim izjavama ključnih muslimanskih vođa, je zapravo porasla podrška bin Ladinu u Jordanu i Pakistanu?
Ova monografija neće se ponovno baviti podrijetlom islamističkog nasilja. Umjesto toga, bavi se vrstom konceptualnog neuspjeha koji krivo konstruira GWOT i koji obeshrabruje muslimane da ga podrže. Ne mogu se identificirati s predloženim transformativnim protumjerama jer prepoznaju neka od svojih temeljnih uvjerenja i institucija kao mete u
ovaj pothvat.
Nekoliko duboko problematičnih trendova zbunjuje američke konceptualizacije GWOT-a i strateških poruka osmišljenih za vođenje tog rata. Ovi se razvijaju iz (1) postkolonijalni politički pristupi muslimanima i muslimanskim većinskim narodima koji se uvelike razlikuju i stoga proizvode proturječne i zbunjujuće dojmove i učinke; i (2) zaostalo generalizirano neznanje i predrasude prema islamu i subregionalnim kulturama. Dodajte ovome američki bijes, strah, i tjeskoba zbog smrtonosnih događaja 9/11, a pojedini elementi koji, unatoč nagovaranjima hladnijih glava, smatrati muslimane i njihovu vjeru odgovornima za nedjela njihovih istovjeraca, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

| rujna 06, 2010 | komentari 0
Čitaj više

Islam i demokracija

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

| rujna 04, 2010 | komentari 0
Čitaj više

The Muslim Brotherhood’s U.S. Network

Zeyno Baran


Washington D.C. has suddenly become very interested in the Muslim Brotherhood. American policymakers are debating whether to engage non-violent elements of the Muslim Brotherhood network, both inside and outside the United States, in the hope that such engagement will empower these “moderates” against violent Wahhabi and Salafi groups such as al-Qaeda. Unfortunately, this strategy is based on a false assumption: that “moderate” Islamist groups will confront and weaken their violent co-religionists, robbing them of their support base.
This lesser-of-two-evils strategy is reminiscent of the rationale behind the Cold War-era decision to support the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet army. In the short term, sad. alliance with the mujahideen did indeed aid America in its struggle against the Soviet Union. In the long term, međutim, NAS. support led to the empowerment of a dangerous and potent adversary. In choosing its allies, sad. cannot afford to elevate short-term tactical considerations above longer-term strategic ones. Most importantly, sad. must consider the ideology of any potential partners.
Although various Islamist groups do quarrel over tactics and often bear considerable animosity towards one another, they all agree on the endgame: a world dictated by political Islam. A “divide and conquer” strategy by the United States will only push them closer together.
| Veljače 13, 2010 | komentari 0
Čitaj više

Commentary: Hollow ring for democracy

ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE

WASHINGTON, June 24 (UPI) — The White House’s crusade for democracy, as President Bush sees it, has produced “a critical mass of events taking that (Srednji istok) region in a hopeful new direction.” And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just toured the area, making clear at every stop whenever the United States has a choice between stability and democracy, the new ideological remedy would sacrifice stability.

Veteran Mideast hands who have dealt with five regional wars and two intifadas over the past half century shuddered. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first among them.

“For the U.S. to crusade in every part of the world to spread democracy may be beyond our capacity,” he says. Sad. system, he explains, “is the product of unique historical experiences, difficult to duplicate or to transplant into Muslim societies where secular democracy has seldom thrived.” If ever.

If stability had been sacrificed for democracy, the former national security adviser and secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and Ford could not have negotiated major Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements: Sinai I, Golan and Sinai II. Without the undemocratic, benign dictatorial figure of Anwar Sadat at the helm in Egypt, or without the late Syrian dictator and master terror-broker Hafez Assad, yet another page of war history would have been written.

With a democratic parliament in Egypt in 1974, presumably dominated by the popular Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat could not have made his spectacular, death-defying trip to Jerusalem — and suddenly become the most popular leader in Israel. A peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and between Jordan and Israel were possible only because absolute rulers — Sadat and the late King Hussein, led both Arab countries.

Sadat knew his courageous act of statesmanship was tantamount to signing his own death warrant. It was carried out in 1981 — by Islamist extremists — on worldwide television.

Rice proudly proclaims it is no longer a war against terrorism but a struggle for democracy. She is proud the Bush administration no longer pursues stability at the expense of democracy. But already the democracy crusade is not only encountering speed bumps, but also roadblocks on a road to nowhere.

The much-vaunted Palestinian elections scheduled for July have been postponed indefinitely.

In Lebanon, the ballot box has already been nullified by political machinations. Gen. Michael Aoun, a bright but aging prospect who came back from French exile to take on Syria’s underground machine, has already joined forces with Damascus. While denying any deal with Syria, the general’s henchmen concede he was compensated munificently for his retirement years in Paris from his post as army chief of staff and his time as premier. Aoun collected $22 million, which included compound interest.

U Egiptu, Rice, presumably attempting to confer respectability on President Hosni Mubarak’s challengers, took time out to receive a known political charlatan who has over the years been exposed as someone who forged election results as he climbed the ladder of a number of political parties under a variety of labels.

Even Mubarak’s enemies concede Ayman Nour fabricated and forged the signatures of as many as 1,187 citizens to conform to regulations to legalize his Ghad (Tomorrow) party. His career is dotted with phony academic credentials, plagiarism, a staged assassination attempt on himself, charges of embezzlement by his Saudi media employer, and scads of document forgeries.

Rice had canceled a previous trip to Egypt to protest the indictment and jailing of Nour pending trial. And before Rice’s most recent accolade, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had also gone out of her way to praise Egypt’s master political con man. Makes you wonder what kind of political reporting is coming out of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.

With this double-headed endorsement by the United States, Nour is losing what little favor he still has in Egypt. He is now seen as a U.S. stooge, to add to a long list of failings.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which is outlawed but tolerated since it renounced terrorism, is more representative of Egyptian opinion than Nour. There is also the Kifaya (Enough) movement that groups Egypt’s leading intellectuals. But they declined to meet with Rice.

The United States is seen throughout the Arab world as synonymous with Israel. This automatically limits the Bush administration’s ability to win friends and influence people. Those making the most out of U.S. pressure to democratize are organizations listed by the United States as “terrorist.” Both Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon are now mining opportunities both above and underground. Islamic legislators in Jordan petitioned King Abdullah to allow Jordanian Hamas leaders, evicted six years ago, to come home. The king listened impassively.

It took Europe 500 years to reach the degree of political maturity witnessed by the recent collapse of the European Union’s plans for a common constitution. Winston Churchill said democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried. But Churchill also said, “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.” This still applies in the souks of the Arab world, from Marrakech to Muscat.

| Veljače 12, 2010 | komentari 0
Čitaj više

TERORRIST DIASPORAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Shannon Peterson

David Goetze


Ever since the Bush administration’s declaration of a global war on terror after 9/11,academics and policymakers have sought ways to counter the global terrorist threat. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. Štoviše, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 6). Slijedom toga, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: the MuslimBrotherhood, Hamas, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. Međutim, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.

| Veljače 11, 2010 | komentari 0
Čitaj više

Procjena islamističke glavne struje u Egiptu i Maleziji

Izvan 'terorizma' i 'državne hegemonije': procjenjujući islamističku glavnu struju u Egiptu i Maleziji

JAN STARKMalaysia-Islamists

Međunarodne mreže islamskog 'terorizma' poslužile su kao najpopularnije objašnjenje za opisivanje fenomena političkog islama od 11 rujanski napadi.

Ovaj rad tvrdi da i samoproglašeni doktrinarni islam militanata i zapadne percepcije homogene islamističke prijetnje moraju biti dekonstruirani kako bi se otkrile često dvosmislene manifestacije 'službenog' i 'oporbenog' islama, modernosti i konzervativizma.

Kao usporedbu dviju islamskih zemalja, Egipta i Malezije,koje obje tvrde da imaju vodeću ulogu u svojim regijama, pokazuje, umjerene islamske skupine imale su značajan utjecaj na procese demokratizacije i pojavu civilnog društva tijekom četvrt stoljeća od 'islamskog ponovnog uspona'.

Zajednička iskustva poput izgradnje koalicija i aktivnog sudjelovanja u političkom sustavu pokazuju utjecaj i važnost skupina kao što je Egipatsko Muslimansko bratstvo, Islamski omladinski pokret Malezije (ABIM) ili Islamska stranka Malezije (NE).

Te su skupine oblikovale politički krajolik u mnogo većoj mjeri nego što sugerira trenutačna preokupacija 'terorističkom prijetnjom'. Postupni razvoj 'kulture dijaloga' otkrio je nove pristupe političkom sudjelovanju i demokraciji na lokalnoj razini.

| pro 18, 2009 | komentari 1
Čitaj više