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The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. ÚTTAKA

október 6, 1981, átti að vera hátíðardagur í Egyptalandi. Það markaði afmæli stórkostlegustu sigurstundar Egyptalands í þremur átökum araba og Ísraela., þegar fátækur her landsins lagðist yfir Súez-skurðinn á opnunardögum landsins 1973 Yom Kippur-stríðið og sendi ísraelska hermenn að hörfa. Á svala, skýlaus morgun, Kaíró leikvangurinn var troðfullur af egypskum fjölskyldum sem höfðu komið til að sjá herinn stinga vélbúnaði sínum., Anwar el-Sadat forseti,arkitekt stríðsins, horfði með ánægju þegar menn og vélar gengu fram fyrir hann. Ég var nálægt, nýkominn erlendur fréttaritari.Skyndilega, einn af herflutningabílunum stöðvaði beint fyrir framan yfirlitssýninguna rétt þegar sex Mirage þotur öskruðu yfir höfuð í loftfimleikum, að mála himininn með löngum rauðum slóðum, gulur, fjólublár,og grænan reyk. Sadat stóð upp, að því er virðist að búa sig undir að skiptast á kveðjum við enn einn lið egypskra hermanna. Hann gerði sig að fullkomnu skotmarki fyrir fjóra íslamista morðingja sem stukku úr vörubílnum, ruddist inn á pallinn, og þeytti líkama hans með byssukúlum. Þegar morðingjarnir héldu áfram í það sem virtist heila eilífð að úða stallinum með banvænum eldi sínum, Ég velti því fyrir mér í augnabliki hvort ég ætti að lenda í jörðu og eiga á hættu að verða troðinn til bana af skelfingu lostnum áhorfendum eða halda áfram og eiga á hættu að taka villandi byssukúlu. Eðlishvöt sagði mér að halda mér á fætur, og blaðamannaskylda mín varð til þess að ég fór að komast að því hvort Sadat væri á lífi eða dáinn.

Íslam, Stjórnmála Íslam og Ameríku

Arab Insight

Er „Bræðralag“ með Ameríku mögulegt?

khalil al-anani

„Það er enginn möguleiki á að eiga samskipti við nein Bandaríkin. stjórnsýslu svo framarlega sem Bandaríkin halda við langvarandi skoðun sinni á íslam sem raunverulegri hættu, skoðun sem setur Bandaríkin í sama bát og óvinur zíonista. Við höfum engar fyrirfram gefnar hugmyndir varðandi bandarísku þjóðina eða Bandaríkin. samfélaginu og borgaralegum samtökum þess og hugveitum. Við eigum ekki í neinum vandræðum með að eiga samskipti við bandarísku þjóðina en ekki er reynt að færa okkur nær,“ sagði Dr. Issam al-Iryan, yfirmaður stjórnmáladeildar Bræðralags múslima í símaviðtali.
Orð Al-Iryan draga saman skoðanir Bræðralags múslima á bandarísku þjóðinni og Bandaríkjunum. ríkisstjórn. Aðrir meðlimir Bræðralags múslima myndu taka undir það, eins og hinn látni Hassan al-Banna, sem stofnaði hópinn í 1928. Al- Banna leit á Vesturlönd að mestu leyti sem tákn um siðferðisbrot. Aðrir salafistar – íslamskur hugsunarskóli sem treystir á forfeður sem fyrirmyndir – hafa tekið sömu skoðun á Bandaríkjunum, en skortir þann hugmyndafræðilega sveigjanleika sem Bræðralag múslima aðhyllist. Þó að Bræðralag múslima trúi því að Bandaríkjamenn taki þátt í borgaralegum viðræðum, aðrir öfgahópar sjá engan tilgang í viðræðum og halda því fram að hervald sé eina leiðin til að eiga við Bandaríkin.

Hamas-stefna Bandaríkjanna hindrar frið í Miðausturlöndum

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Því miður, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Egyptaland á Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat af íslömskum ofstækismönnum í október 1981.
Seinni þjóðarleikritið, sem ég varð vitni að persónulega, hafði reynst gríðarlegur áfangi. Það neyddi arftaka Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, að snúa inn á við til að takast á við íslamista áskorun af óþekktum hlutföllum og binda í raun enda á leiðtogahlutverk Egypta í arabaheiminum.
Mubarak sýndi sig strax vera mjög varkár, hugmyndalaus leiðtogi, brjálæðislega viðbragðsfús frekar en forvirk í að takast á við félagsleg og efnahagsleg vandamál sem eru yfirþyrmandi þjóð hans eins og sprengiefni fólksfjölgun hennar (1.2 milljón fleiri Egypta á ári) og efnahagslægð.
Í fjögurra hluta Washington Post seríu sem skrifuð var þegar ég var að fara snemma 1985, Ég tók eftir því að nýi egypski leiðtoginn væri enn nokkurn veginn
algjör ráðgáta fyrir sitt eigið fólk, bjóða enga sýn og stjórna því sem virtist vera stýrislaust ríkisskip. Sósíalískt hagkerfi
erfður frá tímum Gamal Abdel Nasser forseta (1952 til 1970) var rugl. Gjaldmiðill landsins, pundið, var starfræktur
á átta mismunandi gengi; ríkisreknar verksmiðjur þess voru óframleiðandi, ósamkeppnishæf og djúpt í skuldum; og ríkisstjórnin var á leið í gjaldþrot að hluta til vegna niðurgreiðslna á matvælum, rafmagn og bensín eyddu þriðjungi ($7 milljarða) af fjárhagsáætlun sinni. Kaíró hafði sokkið niður í vonlausa grýttu umferðar og iðandi mannkyns — 12 milljónir manna þrengdust inn í þröngt landsvæði sem liggur að ánni Níl., mest lifandi kinn við kjálka í hrikalegum leiguíbúðum í sífellt stækkandi fátækrahverfum borgarinnar.

Íslamsk stjórnmálamenning, Lýðræði, og mannréttindi

Daniel E. Verð

Því hefur verið haldið fram að íslam auðveldi forræðishyggju, stangast á við

gildi vestrænna samfélaga, og hefur veruleg áhrif á mikilvægar pólitískar niðurstöður
í múslimskum þjóðum. Þar af leiðandi, fræðimenn, álitsgjafar, og ríkisstjórn
embættismenn benda oft á „íslamska bókstafstrú“ sem næsta
hugmyndafræðileg ógn við frjálslynd lýðræðisríki. Þetta útsýni, þó, byggist fyrst og fremst á
um greiningu texta, Íslamsk stjórnmálakenning, og sértækar rannsóknir
einstakra landa, sem taka ekki tillit til annarra þátta. Það er mín röksemdafærsla
að textar og hefðir íslams, eins og annarra trúarbragða,
hægt að nota til að styðja við margvísleg stjórnmálakerfi og stefnur. Land
sérstakar og lýsandi rannsóknir hjálpa okkur ekki að finna mynstur sem munu hjálpa
við útskýrið mismunandi tengsl á milli íslams og stjórnmála um allt land
löndum múslimaheimsins. Þess vegna, ný nálgun við rannsókn á
tengsl milli íslams og stjórnmála eru kallaðar.
ég legg til, með ströngu mati á tengslum íslams,
lýðræði, og mannréttindi á þverþjóðlegum vettvangi, það of mikið
áhersla er lögð á mátt íslams sem stjórnmálaafls. Ég fyrst
nota samanburðarrannsóknir, sem einblína á þætti sem tengjast samspilinu
milli íslamskra hópa og stjórnvalda, efnahagsleg áhrif, þjóðernisbrot,

og samfélagsþróun, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Pólitískt íslam í Miðausturlöndum

Eru Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, í

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Mynd 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, að taka upp

vopn gegn ríkinu, og sjaldnar, framandi löndum. Notkun pólitísks ofbeldis er

útbreidd í Miðausturlöndum, en er hvorki órökrétt né rökleysa. Í mörgum tilfellum jafnvel

Íslamistahópar sem þekktir eru fyrir að beita ofbeldi hafa verið breyttir í friðsamleg pólitísk

flokkar sem taka þátt í sveitarstjórnar- og landskosningum með góðum árangri. Engu að síður, íslamistinn

vakning í Miðausturlöndum er enn að hluta til óútskýrð þrátt fyrir fjölda kenninga sem leitast við

gera grein fyrir vexti þess og vinsælli aðdráttarafl. Almennt, flestar kenningar halda að íslamismi sé a

viðbrögð við tiltölulega skorti, sérstaklega félagslegur ójöfnuður og pólitísk kúgun. Valkostur

kenningar leita svara við endurvakningu íslamista innan ramma trúarbragðanna sjálfra og þeirra

öflugur, hvetjandi möguleika trúarlegrar táknmyndar.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

af fátækari hluta samfélagsins en einnig millistéttarinnar.

STEFNI TIL AÐ TAKA PÓLITÍSKA ÍSLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Pólitískt íslam er eina virkasta stjórnmálaaflið í Miðausturlöndum í dag. Framtíð þess er nátengd framtíð svæðisins. Ef Bandaríkin og Evrópusambandið eru staðráðin í að styðja pólitískar umbætur á svæðinu, þeir þurfa að búa til steinsteypu, samræmdar aðferðir til að taka þátt í íslömskum hópum. Samt, Bandaríkin. hefur almennt ekki viljað hefja viðræður við þessar hreyfingar. Á sama hátt, Samskipti ESB við íslamista hafa verið undantekningin, ekki reglan. Þar sem lágstig tengiliðir eru fyrir hendi, þær þjóna aðallega upplýsingaöflunartilgangi, ekki stefnumótandi markmið. The US. og ESB eru með fjölda áætlana sem fjalla um efnahagslega og pólitíska þróun á svæðinu - þar á meðal Miðausturlönd samstarfsverkefnið (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Miðjarðarhafsbandalagið, og nágrannastefnu Evrópu (ENP) – samt hafa þeir lítið að segja um hvernig áskorun pólitískrar andstöðu íslamista passar við víðtækari svæðisbundin markmið. US. og lýðræðisaðstoð og áætlanagerð ESB beinist nær eingöngu að annað hvort valdsstjórnum sjálfum eða veraldlegum borgaralegum hópum með lágmarksstuðning í eigin samfélögum.
Það er kominn tími til að endurmeta núverandi stefnu. Frá hryðjuverkaárásunum í september 11, 2001, stuðningur við lýðræði í Mið-Austurlöndum hefur verið mikilvægara fyrir vestræna stefnumótendur, sem sjá tengsl milli skorts á lýðræði og pólitísks ofbeldis. Meiri athygli hefur verið lögð á að skilja afbrigðin innan pólitísks íslams. Nýja bandaríska stjórnin er opnari fyrir því að auka samskipti við múslimska heiminn. Á meðan, mikill meirihluti almennra íslamistasamtaka – þar á meðal Bræðralag múslima í Egyptalandi, Islamic Action Front Jórdaníu (IAF), Réttlætis- og þróunarflokkur Marokkó (PJD), Íslamska stjórnarskrárhreyfingin í Kúveit, og Yemeni Islah flokkurinn - hafa í auknum mæli gert stuðning við pólitískar umbætur og lýðræði að meginþáttum í pólitískum vettvangi þeirra. Auk, margir hafa gefið til kynna mikinn áhuga á að hefja viðræður við Bandaríkin. og ríkisstjórnir ESB.
Framtíð samskipta milli vestrænna ríkja og Miðausturlanda kann að miklu leyti að ráðast af því hversu miklu þeir fyrrnefndu taka þátt í víðtækri umræðu um sameiginlega hagsmuni og markmið, sem ekki eru ofbeldisfullir íslamista.. Nýlega hefur verið fjölgað rannsóknum á tengslum við íslamista, en fáir fjalla greinilega um hvað það gæti falið í sér í reynd. Ace Zoé Nautré, gestgjafi hjá þýska ráðinu um utanríkistengsl, setur það, „ESB er að hugsa um þátttöku en veit í raun ekki hvernig.“1 Í von um að skýra umræðuna, við greinum á milli þriggja stiga „þátttöku,“ hver með mismunandi hætti og markmiðum: lágstig tengiliðir, stefnumótandi samtal, og samstarf.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. Brúnn, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, sérstaklega, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, þó, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jórdanía, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politics, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Síðan 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood

Robert S. þáttur

Steven Brooke

The Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault forcedeeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for electionsinstead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks.
But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. utanríkisstefnu, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, Frakkland, Jórdanía, Spánn, Sýrland,Túnis, and the United Kingdom.

Energizing US-Syria Relations: Leveraging Ancillary Diplomatic Vehicles

Benjamin E. Power,

Andrew Akhlaghi,

Steven Rotchtin

The prospect for greater stability in the Middle East largely hinges on the ability to bring Syria into diplomatic and security discussions as a productive stakeholder, necessitating a thaw in the less than normal state of U.S. – Syrian relations. While Syria’s
importance as a keystone state to a Middle East peace process was acknowledged in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report,1 which called for a shift from disincentives to incentives in seeking constructive results, only in the past few months has there been a demonstrable shift in Washington’s disposition. Recent meetings between high-ranking U.S. officials and their counterparts in Damascus, and even the announcement of reinstating a U.S. ambassador to Syria, have led to widespread speculation in policy circles that a diplomatic thaw is afoot.
This report analyzes key trends in Syria’s domestic and regional socio-political situation that currently function to make Syria a natural ally of the United States.

Lýðræði, Hryðjuverk og stefna Bandaríkjanna í arabaheiminum

F. Gregory Gause

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Þess vegna, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? Með öðrum orðum, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; og 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Tilkall til Miðstöðvarinnar: Pólitískt íslam í umskiptum

John L. Edwards

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Íran, Sudan, Afganistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Tyrkland, Íran, Líbanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Jórdanía, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malasía, Indónesía, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

The Syrian Opposition

Joshua Landis

Joe Pace


Áratugi, US. stefna í átt Sýrland hefur verið einn-mindedly áherslu á forseti Sýrland's, Hafiz al-Asad, frá 1970 til 2000, eftir sonur hans Bashar. Because they perceived the Syrian opposition to be too weak and anti-American, US. officials preferred to work with the Asad regime. Washington thus had no relations with the Syrian opposition until its invasion of Iraq in 2003. Even then, the Bush administration reached out only to Washington-based opponents of the Syrian regime. They were looking for a Syrian counterpart to Ahmad Chalabi, the pro-U.S. Iraqi opposition leader who helped build the case for invading Iraq.
Washington was not interested in engaging Islamists, whom it considered the only opposition with a demonstrated popular base in Syria. As for the secular opposition in Syria, US. embassy officials in Damascus considered them to “have a weak back bench,” without a popular constituency or connection to Syrian youth.2 Moreover, contact between opposition members and embassy officials could be dangerous for opponents of the regime and leave them open to accusations of treason. For these reasons, the difficult terrain of opposition figures within Syria remained terra incognita.

Róttæka íslam í Maghreb

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Líbanon, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. Í 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.