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The Besok Arab

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktober 6, 1981, dimaksudkan untuk menjadi hari perayaan di Mesir. Ini menandai peringatan momen kemenangan terbesar Mesir dalam tiga konflik Arab-Israel, ketika tentara yang diunggulkan negara itu melintasi Terusan Suez pada hari-hari pembukaan 1973 Perang Yom Kippur dan mengirim pasukan Israel mundur. keren, pagi tak berawan, stadion Kairo penuh sesak dengan keluarga Mesir yang datang untuk melihat militer menopang perangkat kerasnya. Di stan peninjauan, Presiden Anwar el-Sadat,arsitek perang, menyaksikan dengan puas saat pria dan mesin berparade di hadapannya. Saya berada di dekatnya, koresponden asing yang baru tiba. Tiba-tiba, salah satu truk tentara berhenti tepat di depan tribun peninjauan tepat ketika enam jet Mirage menderu di atas dalam pertunjukan akrobatik, melukis langit dengan jejak merah panjang, kuning, ungu,dan asap hijau. Sadat berdiri, tampaknya bersiap untuk saling memberi hormat dengan satu lagi kontingen pasukan Mesir. Dia menjadikan dirinya target sempurna bagi empat pembunuh Islam yang melompat dari truk, menyerbu podium, dan membanjiri tubuhnya dengan peluru. Saat para pembunuh melanjutkan untuk apa yang tampak selamanya untuk menyemprot stand dengan api mematikan mereka, Saya mempertimbangkan sejenak apakah akan jatuh ke tanah dan berisiko diinjak-injak sampai mati oleh penonton yang panik atau tetap berjalan dan berisiko terkena peluru nyasar.. Naluri menyuruhku untuk tetap berdiri, dan rasa kewajiban jurnalistik saya mendorong saya untuk mencari tahu apakah Sadat masih hidup atau sudah mati.

Islam, Politik Islam dan Amerika

Arab Insight

Apakah "Persaudaraan" dengan Amerika Mungkin??

khalil al-anani

"Tidak ada kesempatan untuk berkomunikasi dengan AS. administrasi selama Amerika Serikat mempertahankan pandangannya lama Islam sebagai bahaya nyata, pandangan yang menempatkan Amerika Serikat di kapal yang sama dengan musuh Zionis. Kami tidak memiliki gagasan yang terbentuk sebelumnya tentang orang-orang Amerika atau AS. masyarakat dan organisasi sipil serta lembaga pemikirnya. Kami tidak memiliki masalah berkomunikasi dengan orang-orang Amerika tetapi tidak ada upaya yang memadai untuk mendekatkan kami,” kata Dr. Issam al-Iryan, kepala departemen politik Ikhwanul Muslimin dalam sebuah wawancara telepon.
Kata-kata Al-Iryan merangkum pandangan Ikhwanul Muslimin tentang rakyat Amerika dan AS. pemerintah. Anggota Ikhwanul Muslimin lainnya akan setuju, seperti mendiang Hassan al-Banna, yang mendirikan grup di 1928. Al- Banna memandang Barat sebagian besar sebagai simbol kerusakan moral. Salafi lain – sebuah aliran pemikiran Islam yang mengandalkan nenek moyang sebagai model teladan – telah mengambil pandangan yang sama tentang Amerika Serikat., tetapi tidak memiliki fleksibilitas ideologis yang dianut oleh Ikhwanul Muslimin. Sementara Ikhwanul Muslimin percaya untuk melibatkan Amerika dalam dialog sipil, kelompok ekstremis lain tidak melihat gunanya dialog dan mempertahankan bahwa kekuatan adalah satu-satunya cara untuk berurusan dengan Amerika Serikat.

US Hamas kebijakan blok perdamaian Timur Tengah

Henry Siegman


pembicaraan bilateral gagal selama masa lalu ini 16 tahun telah menunjukkan bahwa perdamaian kesepakatan Timur Tengah tidak pernah dapat dicapai oleh para pihak sendiri. Pemerintah Israel percaya bahwa mereka dapat menentang kecaman internasional atas proyek kolonial ilegal mereka di Tepi Barat karena mereka dapat mengandalkan AS untuk menentang sanksi internasional. Pembicaraan bilateral yang tidak dibingkai oleh parameter yang dirumuskan AS (berdasarkan resolusi Dewan Keamanan, kesepakatan Oslo, Inisiatif Perdamaian Arab, “peta jalan” dan perjanjian Israel-Palestina sebelumnya) tidak bisa berhasil. Pemerintah Israel percaya bahwa Kongres AS tidak akan mengizinkan seorang presiden Amerika untuk mengeluarkan parameter seperti itu dan menuntut penerimaan mereka. Apa harapan untuk pembicaraan bilateral yang dilanjutkan di Washington DC pada bulan September? 2 sepenuhnya bergantung pada Presiden Obama yang membuktikan bahwa kepercayaan itu salah, dan apakah "proposal menjembatani" yang dia janjikan, haruskah pembicaraan mencapai jalan buntu, adalah eufemisme untuk penyerahan parameter Amerika. Inisiatif AS semacam itu harus menawarkan jaminan berlapis besi kepada Israel untuk keamanannya di dalam perbatasan pra-1967, tetapi pada saat yang sama harus memperjelas bahwa jaminan ini tidak tersedia jika Israel bersikeras menyangkal Palestina sebagai negara yang layak dan berdaulat di Tepi Barat dan Gaza.. Makalah ini berfokus pada hambatan utama lainnya untuk perjanjian status permanen: tidak adanya lawan bicara Palestina yang efektif. Mengatasi keluhan sah Hamas – dan seperti yang dicatat dalam laporan CENTCOM baru-baru ini, Hamas memiliki keluhan yang sah – dapat mengarah pada pengembaliannya ke pemerintahan koalisi Palestina yang akan memberi Israel mitra perdamaian yang kredibel. Jika penjangkauan itu gagal karena penolakan Hamas, kemampuan organisasi untuk mencegah kesepakatan wajar yang dinegosiasikan oleh partai politik Palestina lainnya akan sangat terhambat. Jika pemerintahan Obama tidak akan memimpin inisiatif internasional untuk menentukan parameter kesepakatan Israel-Palestina dan secara aktif mempromosikan rekonsiliasi politik Palestina, Eropa harus melakukannya, dan berharap Amerika akan mengikuti. Sayangnya, tidak ada peluru perak yang dapat menjamin tujuan “dua negara yang hidup berdampingan dalam damai dan keamanan.”
Tapi jalan Presiden Obama saat ini benar-benar menghalanginya.

Mesir di Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
Pada awal 1980-an, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 untuk 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

Budaya Politik Islam, Demokrasi, dan Hak Asasi Manusia

Daniel E. Harga

Telah berpendapat bahwa Islam memfasilitasi otoriterisme, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Karenanya, sarjana, komentator, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, Namun, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Karenanya, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Politik Islam di Timur Tengah

Apakah Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. Laporan ini memberikan penekanan khusus untuk Timur Tengah, di

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: demokrasi dan kekerasan politik. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Namun, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

STRATEGI UNTUK MELAKUKAN POLITIK ISLAM

Shadi HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politik Islam adalah kekuatan politik yang paling aktif di Timur Tengah hari ini. masa depan adalah terkait erat dengan daerah. Jika Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa berkomitmen untuk mendukung reformasi politik di daerah, mereka akan perlu untuk merancang beton, koheren strategi untuk melibatkan kelompok-kelompok Islam. Belum, Amerika Serikat. secara umum telah bersedia untuk membuka dialog dengan gerakan-gerakan ini. Demikian pula, keterlibatan Uni Eropa dengan Islam telah pengecualian, tidak aturan. Dimana tingkat rendah ada kontak, mereka terutama melayani tujuan pengumpulan-informasi, tidak strategis tujuan. Amerika Serikat. dan Uni Eropa memiliki sejumlah program yang menangani pembangunan ekonomi dan politik di wilayah ini - di antara mereka di Timur Tengah Inisiatif Kemitraan (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation (PKS), Uni untuk Mediterania, dan Kebijakan Lingkungan Eropa (EPP) - Namun mereka memiliki sedikit untuk mengatakan tentang bagaimana tantangan oposisi Islam politik pas dengan tujuan regional yang lebih luas. AS. dan Uni Eropa demokrasi bantuan dan program diarahkan hampir seluruhnya baik pemerintah otoriter sendiri atau kelompok-kelompok masyarakat sipil sekuler dengan dukungan minimal dalam masyarakat mereka sendiri.
Waktu yang matang untuk penilaian ulang kebijakan saat ini. Sejak serangan teroris September 11, 2001, mendukung demokrasi di Timur Tengah telah mengambil kepentingan yang lebih besar bagi para pembuat kebijakan Barat, yang melihat hubungan antara kurangnya demokrasi dan kekerasan politik. Perhatian yang lebih besar telah dikhususkan untuk memahami variasi dalam Islam politik. Pemerintah Amerika baru yang lebih terbuka untuk memperluas komunikasi dengan dunia Muslim. Sementara itu, sebagian besar organisasi Islam mainstream - termasuk Ikhwanul Muslimin di Mesir, Yordania Front Aksi Islam (IAF), Maroko Partai Keadilan dan Pembangunan (PJD), Gerakan Konstitusi Islam Kuwait, dan Yaman Islah Partai - telah semakin membuat dukungan bagi reformasi politik dan demokrasi komponen utama dalam platform politik mereka. Selain, banyak telah mengisyaratkan minat yang kuat dalam membuka dialog dengan AS. dan pemerintah Uni Eropa.
Masa depan hubungan antara negara-negara Barat dan Timur Tengah mungkin sebagian besar ditentukan oleh sejauh mana yang pertama melibatkan partai-partai Islam anti kekerasan dalam dialog yang luas tentang kepentingan bersama dan tujuan. Telah ada proliferasi baru-baru ini studi tentang keterlibatan dengan Islamis, tetapi sedikit alamat jelas apa yang mungkin memerlukan dalam praktek. Sebagai Nautré Zoe, mengunjungi rekan-rekan di Dewan Hubungan Luar Negeri Jerman, dikatakan, "Uni Eropa berpikir tentang keterlibatan tetapi tidak benar-benar tahu bagaimana." 1 Dalam harapan mengklarifikasi diskusi, kita membedakan antara tiga tingkat "keterlibatan,"Masing-masing dengan cara yang bervariasi dan berakhir: tingkat rendah kontak, dialog strategis, dan kemitraan.

Islam GERAKAN DAN PROSES DEMOKRATIS DI DUNIA ARAB: Menjelajahi Zona Gray

Nathan J. Cokelat, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Selama dekade terakhir, gerakan Islam telah menetapkan diri sebagai pemain politik utama di Timur Tengah. Bersama dengan pemerintah, Gerakan Islamis, moderat serta radikal, akan menentukan bagaimana politik daerah terungkap di masa mendatang. Mereka telah menunjukkan kemampuan tidak hanya untuk membuat pesan dengan daya tarik populer yang tersebar luas tetapi juga, dan yang paling penting, untuk menciptakan organisasi dengan basis sosial asli dan mengembangkan strategi politik yang koheren. Pihak lain,
umumnya, gagal di semua akun.
Publik di Barat dan, khususnya, Amerika Serikat, baru menyadari pentingnya gerakan Islam setelah peristiwa dramatis, seperti revolusi di Iran dan pembunuhan Presiden Anwar al-Sadat di Mesir. Perhatian telah jauh lebih dipertahankan sejak serangan teroris September 11, 2001. Hasil dari, Gerakan Islam secara luas dianggap berbahaya dan bermusuhan. Sementara karakterisasi seperti itu akurat mengenai organisasi di ujung radikal spektrum Islam, yang berbahaya karena kesediaan mereka untuk menggunakan kekerasan tanpa pandang bulu dalam mengejar tujuan mereka, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, Namun, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politik, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

Radikalisasi Islam

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Politik Islam dan Kebijakan Luar Negeri Eropa

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, Uni Eropa (SAYA) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(EPP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Ikhwanul Muslim Moderat

Robert S. aspek

Steven Brooke

Persaudaraan Muslim tertua di dunia, terbesar, and most influential Islamist organization. Hal ini juga yang paling kontroversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault forcedeeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for electionsinstead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. Posisi ini tampaknya membuat mereka moderat, the very thing the United States, singkat tentang sekutu di dunia Muslim, mencari.
But the Ikhwan juga assails US. politik luar negeri, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, Perancis, Jordan, Spanyol, Suriah,Tunisia, and the United Kingdom.

Energizing Hubungan AS-Suriah: Memanfaatkan Kendaraan Diplomatik lebih lanjut

Benjamin E. Daya,

Andrew Akhlaghi,

Steven Rotchtin

Prospek untuk stabilitas yang lebih besar di Timur Tengah sebagian besar bergantung pada kemampuan untuk membawa Suriah ke dalam diskusi diplomatik dan keamanan sebagai stakeholder yang produktif, mengharuskan mencair dalam keadaan kurang dari normal US. - Hubungan Suriah. While Syria’s
importance as a keystone state to a Middle East peace process was acknowledged in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report,1 which called for a shift from disincentives to incentives in seeking constructive results, only in the past few months has there been a demonstrable shift in Washington’s disposition. Recent meetings between high-ranking U.S. officials and their counterparts in Damascus, and even the announcement of reinstating a U.S. ambassador to Syria, have led to widespread speculation in policy circles that a diplomatic thaw is afoot.
This report analyzes key trends in Syria’s domestic and regional socio-political situation that currently function to make Syria a natural ally of the United States.

Demokrasi, Terorisme dan Kebijakan Amerika di Dunia Arab

F. Gregory Gause

Amerika Serikat telah memulai apa yang Presiden Bush dan Menteri Luar Negeri Rice disebut “tantangan generasi” untuk mendorong reformasi politik dan demokrasi di dunia Arab. Pemerintahan Bush dan pembela lain dari kampanye demokrasi berpendapat bahwa dorongan untuk demokrasi Arab tidak hanya tentang menyebarkan nilai-nilai Amerika, tetapi juga tentang mengasuransikan keamanan Amerika. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Oleh karena itu, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? Dengan kata lain, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; dan 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Mengklaim Pusat yang: Politik Islam dalam Transisi

John L. Edwards

Pada 1990-an politik Islam, apa yang disebut “fundamentalisme Islam,” tetap kehadiran utama dalam pemerintahan dan politik oposisi dari Afrika Utara ke Asia Tenggara. Islam politik yang berkuasa dan dalam politik telah menimbulkan banyak masalah dan pertanyaan: “Apakah Islam bertentangan dengan modernisasi?,” “Apakah Islam dan demokrasi tidak sejalan?,” “Apa implikasi dari pemerintahan Islam bagi pluralisme, minoritas dan hak-hak perempuan,” “Betapa representatifnya para Islamis,” “Apakah ada moderat Islam?,” “Haruskah Barat takut akan ancaman Islam transnasional atau benturan peradaban?” Revivalisme Islam Kontemporer Pemandangan dunia Muslim saat ini mengungkapkan munculnya republik-republik Islam baru (Iran, Sudan, Afganistan), perkembangan gerakan Islam yang berfungsi sebagai aktor politik dan sosial utama dalam sistem yang ada, dan politik konfrontatif dari ekstremis brutal radikal. Berbeda dengan tahun 1980-an ketika politik Islam hanya disamakan dengan Iran revolusioner atau kelompok klandestin dengan nama-nama seperti Jihad Islam atau Tentara Tuhan, dunia Muslim pada tahun 1990-an adalah dunia di mana kaum Islamis telah berpartisipasi dalam proses pemilihan dan terlihat sebagai perdana menteri., petugas kabinet, pembicara dari majelis nasional, anggota parlemen, dan walikota di negara yang beragam seperti Mesir, Sudan, Turki, Iran, Libanon, Kuwait, Yaman, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, dan Israel / Palestina. Di awal abad kedua puluh satu, politik Islam terus menjadi kekuatan utama untuk ketertiban dan kekacauan dalam politik global, salah satu yang berpartisipasi dalam proses politik tetapi juga dalam tindakan terorisme, tantangan bagi dunia Muslim dan Barat. Memahami sifat politik Islam saat ini, dan khususnya masalah dan pertanyaan yang muncul dari pengalaman di masa lalu, tetap penting bagi pemerintah, pembuat kebijakan, dan mahasiswa politik internasional.

Oposisi Suriah

Joshua Landis

Joe Pace


Selama beberapa dekade, AS. kebijakan terhadap Suriah telah tunggal-pikiran terarah terfokus pada presiden Suriah, Hafiz al-Asad, dari 1970 untuk 2000, diikuti oleh putranya Bashar. Because they perceived the Syrian opposition to be too weak and anti-American, AS. officials preferred to work with the Asad regime. Washington thus had no relations with the Syrian opposition until its invasion of Iraq in 2003. Bahkan kemudian, the Bush administration reached out only to Washington-based opponents of the Syrian regime. They were looking for a Syrian counterpart to Ahmad Chalabi, the pro-U.S. Iraqi opposition leader who helped build the case for invading Iraq.
Washington was not interested in engaging Islamists, whom it considered the only opposition with a demonstrated popular base in Syria. As for the secular opposition in Syria, AS. embassy officials in Damascus considered them to “have a weak back bench,” without a popular constituency or connection to Syrian youth.2 Moreover, contact between opposition members and embassy officials could be dangerous for opponents of the regime and leave them open to accusations of treason. For these reasons, the difficult terrain of opposition figures within Syria remained terra incognita.

Radikal Islam di Maghreb tersebut

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

Pengembangan gerakan Islam radikal telah menjadi featureof kehidupan Aljazair utama politik sejak pertengahan 1970-an, terutama setelah kematian PresidentHouari Boumediène, Republik pertama presiden, pada bulan Desember 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Libanon, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. Di 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,tentara, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. Di bulan September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.