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The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

listopad 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Islam, Political Islam and America

Arapski uvid

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

khalil al-anani

“there is no chance of communicating with any U.S. administration so long as the United States maintains its long-standing view of Islam as a real danger, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Egypt at the Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
Početkom 1980-ih, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 do 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

Islamska politička kultura, Demokracija, i ljudska prava

Daniele. Cijena

Tvrdi se da islam olakšava autoritarizam, proturječi

vrijednostima zapadnih društava, te značajno utječe na važne političke ishode
u muslimanskim narodima. Slijedom toga, učenjaci, komentatori, i vlada
dužnosnici često ističu "islamski fundamentalizam" kao sljedeći
ideološka prijetnja liberalnim demokracijama. Ovaj pogled, međutim, temelji se prvenstveno
o analizi tekstova, Islamska politička teorija, i ad hoc studije
pojedinih zemalja, koji ne uzimaju u obzir druge faktore. To je moja tvrdnja
da tekstovi i tradicija islama, poput onih drugih religija,
može se koristiti za podršku različitim političkim sustavima i politikama. Zemlja
specifične i deskriptivne studije ne pomažu nam pronaći obrasce koji bi pomogli
objašnjavamo različite odnose između islama i politike diljem svijeta
zemalja muslimanskog svijeta. Stoga, novi pristup proučavanju
traži se veza između islama i politike.
predlažem, kroz rigoroznu evaluaciju odnosa između islama,
demokracija, i ljudska prava na međunacionalnoj razini, to previše
naglasak se stavlja na moć islama kao političke snage. ja prvi
koristiti komparativne studije slučaja, koji se usredotočuju na čimbenike koji se odnose na međuigru
između islamskih skupina i režima, ekonomski utjecaji, etnički rascjepi,

i društveni razvoj, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Political Islam in the Middle East

Jesu li Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, u

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

da postoji tendencija zanemarivanja činjenice da su mnoge zemlje Bliskog istoka bile

sudjelovao u brutalnom gušenju islamističkih pokreta, uzrokujući ih, neki tvrde, uzeti

oružjem protiv države, a rjeđe, strane zemlje. Korištenje političkog nasilja je

raširena na Bliskom istoku, ali nije ni nelogičan ni iracionalan. U mnogim slučajevima čak

Islamističke skupine poznate po korištenju nasilja pretvorene su u miroljubive političke

stranaka koje su se uspješno natjecale na općinskim i nacionalnim izborima. Usprkos tome, islamista

oživljavanje na Bliskom istoku ostaje djelomično neobjašnjeno unatoč brojnim teorijama koje nastoje

objasniti njegov rast i popularnost. Općenito, većina teorija drži da je islamizam a

reakcija na relativnu deprivaciju, osobito društvene nejednakosti i političkog ugnjetavanja. Alternativa

teorije traže odgovor na islamistički preporod unutar granica same religije i

snažan, evokativni potencijal religijskog simbolizma.

Zaključak govori u prilog nadilaženja pristupa "mraka i propasti" koji

prikazuje islamizam kao nelegitiman politički izraz i potencijalnu prijetnju Zapadu ("Star

islamizam”), i nijansiranijeg razumijevanja trenutne demokratizacije islamističkog

pokreta koji se sada odvija diljem Bliskog istoka (“Novi islamizam”). Ovaj

u prvi plan se stavlja važnost razumijevanja ideoloških korijena “novog islamizma”.

zajedno s potrebom za temeljitim poznavanjem islamističkih pokreta i njihovih iz prve ruke

pristaše. Kao društveni pokreti, Tvrdi se da treba staviti veći naglasak na

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

STRATEGIJE ZA ANGAŽIRANJE POLITIČKOG ISLAMA

ŠADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politički islam je danas najaktivnija politička snaga na Bliskom istoku. Njegova je budućnost usko povezana s budućnošću regije. Ako su Sjedinjene Države i Europska unija predani podršci političkih reformi u regiji, trebat će osmisliti beton, koherentne strategije za angažiranje islamističkih skupina. Još, sad. općenito nije bio voljan otvoriti dijalog s tim pokretima. Na sličan način, Angažman EU-a s islamistima bio je izuzetak, nije pravilo. Gdje postoje kontakti niske razine, oni uglavnom služe u svrhe prikupljanja informacija, ne strateški ciljevi. Sad. i EU imaju niz programa koji se bave gospodarskim i političkim razvojem u regiji – među njima i Bliskoistočna partnerska inicijativa (MEPI), korporacija Millennium Challenge (MCC), uniji za Mediteran, i Europska politika susjedstva (ENP) – ali imaju malo toga za reći o tome kako se izazov islamističke političke opozicije uklapa u šire regionalne ciljeve. NAS. a pomoć i programiranje demokracije EU-a gotovo su u potpunosti usmjereni ili na same autoritarne vlade ili na sekularne skupine civilnog društva s minimalnom podrškom u vlastitim društvima.
Sazrelo je vrijeme za preispitivanje trenutne politike. Od terorističkih napada u rujnu 11, 2001, podupiranje demokracije na Bliskom istoku postalo je važnije za zapadne kreatore politike, koji vide vezu između nedostatka demokracije i političkog nasilja. Veća pažnja posvećena je razumijevanju varijacija unutar političkog islama. Nova američka administracija otvorenija je za širenje komunikacije s muslimanskim svijetom. U međuvremenu, velika većina glavnih islamističkih organizacija – uključujući Muslimansko bratstvo u Egiptu, Jordanski front islamske akcije (IAF), Marokanska stranka pravde i razvoja (PJD), Islamski ustavni pokret Kuvajta, i Jemenska stranka Islah – potporu političkim reformama i demokraciji sve više čine središnjom komponentom svojih političkih platformi. U Dodatku, mnogi su signalizirali snažan interes za otvaranje dijaloga sa SAD-om. i vlade EU.
Budućnost odnosa između zapadnih nacija i Bliskog istoka može biti uvelike određena stupnjem do kojeg prve angažiraju nenasilne islamističke stranke u širokom dijalogu o zajedničkim interesima i ciljevima. Nedavno je došlo do proliferacije studija o angažmanu s islamistima, ali malo ih se jasno bavi što bi to moglo značiti u praksi. As Zoé Nautré, gostujući suradnik u Njemačkom vijeću za vanjske odnose, stavlja ga, “EU razmišlja o angažmanu, ali zapravo ne zna kako.”1 U nadi da će razjasniti raspravu, razlikujemo tri razine „angažmana,” svaki s različitim sredstvima i ciljevima: kontakti niske razine, strateški dijalog, i partnerstvo.

ISLAMISTIČKI POKRETI I DEMOKRATSKI PROCES U ARAPSKOM SVIJETU: Istraživanje sivih zona

Nathan J. Smeđa, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Tijekom posljednjeg desetljeća, Islamistički pokreti etablirali su se kao glavni politički igrači na Bliskom istoku. Zajedno s vladama, islamistički pokreti, umjereni kao i radikalni, odredit će kako će se odvijati politika u regiji u doglednoj budućnosti. Pokazali su sposobnost ne samo za izradu poruka sa široko rasprostranjenom popularnom privlačnošću, već također, i što je najvažnije, stvoriti organizacije s istinskim društvenim osnovama i razviti koherentne političke strategije. Druge stranke,
uglavnom, nisu uspjeli na svim računima.
Javnost na Zapadu i, posebno, Sjedinjene Države, je tek nakon dramatičnih događaja postao svjestan važnosti islamističkih pokreta, poput revolucije u Iranu i ubojstva predsjednika Anwara al-Sadata u Egiptu. Pozornost je daleko veća od terorističkih napada u rujnu 11, 2001. Kao rezultat, Islamistički pokreti se općenito smatraju opasnima i neprijateljskima. Dok je takva karakterizacija točna u pogledu organizacija na radikalnom kraju islamističkog spektra, koji su opasni zbog svoje spremnosti da pribjegnu neselektivnom nasilju u ostvarivanju svojih ciljeva, to nije točna karakterizacija mnogih skupina koje su se odrekle ili izbjegle nasilje. Budući da terorističke organizacije predstavljaju neposrednu
prijetnja, međutim, kreatori politike u svim zemljama su posvetili nesrazmjernu pozornost nasilnim organizacijama.
To je glavna struja islamističkih organizacija, ne one radikalne, koji će imati najveći utjecaj na buduću političku evoluciju Bliskog istoka. Grandiozni ciljevi radikala o ponovnoj uspostavi kalifata koji bi ujedinio cijeli arapski svijet, ili čak nametanja pojedinim arapskim zemljama zakona i društvenih običaja nadahnutih fundamentalističkom interpretacijom islama jednostavno su predaleko od današnje stvarnosti da bi se ostvarili. To ne znači da terorističke skupine nisu opasne - mogle bi prouzročiti velike gubitke života čak i u potrazi za nemogućim ciljevima - ali da je malo vjerojatno da će promijeniti lice Bliskog istoka. Glavne struje islamističkih organizacija općenito su druga stvar. Oni su već imali snažan utjecaj na društvene običaje u mnogim zemljama, zaustavljanje i preokretanje sekularističkih trendova i mijenjanje načina na koji se mnogi Arapi odijevaju i ponašaju. I njihov neposredni politički cilj, postati moćna sila sudjelovanjem u normalnoj politici svoje zemlje, nije nemoguće. Već se realizira u zemljama poput Maroka, Jordan, pa čak i Egipat, koja još uvijek zabranjuje sve islamističke političke organizacije, ali sada ima osamdeset i osam Muslimanske braće u Parlamentu. Politika, ne nasilje, je ono što glavnim islamistima daje njihov utjecaj.

ISLAMISTIČKA RADIKALIZACIJA

PREDGOVOR
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Pitanja koja se odnose na politički islam nastavljaju predstavljati izazov europskoj vanjskoj politici na Bliskom istoku i Sjevernoj Africi (MENA). Kako se politika EU-a nastojala suočiti s takvim izazovima tijekom posljednjih desetak godina, sam politički islam je evoluirao. Stručnjaci ukazuju na sve veću složenost i raznolikost trendova unutar političkog islama. Neke su islamističke organizacije ojačale svoju predanost demokratskim normama i u potpunosti se angažirale na miroljubivom planu, mainstream nacionalne politike. Drugi ostaju vezani za nasilna sredstva. A neki drugi su skrenuli prema mirnijem obliku islama, isključio iz političkog djelovanja. Politički islam u regiji MENA ne predstavlja jedinstven trend europskim kreatorima politike. Analitička rasprava rasla je oko koncepta 'radikalizacije'. To je zauzvrat pokrenulo istraživanje o čimbenicima koji pokreću "deradikalizaciju", i obrnuto, 'reradikalizacija'. Velik dio složenosti proizlazi iz široko rasprostranjenog mišljenja da se sva tri ova fenomena događaju u isto vrijeme. Čak su i sami uvjeti osporeni. Često se ističe da umjereno-radikalna dihotomija ne uspijeva u potpunosti uhvatiti nijanse trendova unutar političkog islama. Neki analitičari također se žale da je govor o 'radikalizmu' ideološki opterećen. Na razini terminologije, mi razumijemo da je radikalizacija povezana s ekstremizmom, ali gledišta se razlikuju oko središnjeg značaja njegovog religijsko-fundamentalističkog naspram političkog sadržaja, te o tome je li spremnost na pribjegavanje nasilju implicirana ili ne.

Takve razlike ogledaju se u stavovima samih islamista, kao i u percepcijama autsajdera.

Politički islam i europska vanjska politika

POLITIČKI ISLAM I EUROPSKA POLITIKA SUSJEDSTVA

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Od 2001 a međunarodni događaji koji su uslijedili zbog prirode odnosa Zapada i političkog islama postali su odlučujuće pitanje za vanjsku politiku. Posljednjih godina poduzeta je značajna količina istraživanja i analiza po pitanju političkog islama. To je pomoglo ispraviti neke pojednostavljene i alarmantne pretpostavke koje su se prije držale na Zapadu o prirodi islamističkih vrijednosti i namjera. Paralelno s ovim, Europska Unija (MI) razvio je niz političkih inicijativa prvenstveno Europsku politiku susjedstva(ENP) koji se u principu obvežu na dijalog i dublje angažman(nenasilno) politički akteri i organizacije civilnog društva u arapskim zemljama. Ipak, mnogi analitičari i kreatori politike sada se žale na određeni trofej i u konceptualnoj raspravi i u razvoju politike. Utvrđeno je da je politički islam krajolik koji se mijenja, duboko pogođen nizom okolnosti, no čini se da je rasprava često zapela o pojednostavljenom pitanju "jesu li islamisti demokratski?'Mnogi su neovisni analitičari unatoč tome zagovarali angažman s islamistima, ali stvarno zbližavanje zapadnih vlada i islamističkih organizacija i dalje je ograničeno .

Umjereno muslimansko bratstvo

Robert S. Leiken

Steven Brooke

Muslimanska braća su najstarija na svijetu, najveći, i najutjecajnija islamistička organizacija. Ujedno je i najkontroverzniji,
osuđen i konvencionalnim mišljenjem na Zapadu i radikalnim mišljenjem na Bliskom istoku. Američki komentatori nazvali su Muslimansku braću "radikalnim islamistima" i "vitalnom komponentom neprijateljske napadačke snage … duboko neprijateljski raspoloženi prema Sjedinjenim Državama. " Ayman al-Zawahiri iz Al Kaide podsmjehuje im se zbog „lur[ing] tisuće mladića muslimana u redovima za izbore … umjesto u redove džihada. " Džihadisti se gnušaju Muslimanske braće (na arapskom poznat kao al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) za odbacivanje globalnog džihada i prihvaćanje demokracije. Čini se da ih ovi položaji čine umjerenima, upravo ono što Sjedinjene Države, kratka za saveznike u muslimanskom svijetu, traži.
Ali Ikhwan također napada SAD. vanjska politika, posebno podrška Washingtona Izraelu, i pitanja ostaju o njegovoj stvarnoj predanosti demokratskom procesu. Tijekom prošle godine, susreli smo se s desecima vođa i aktivista bratstva iz Egipta, Francuska, Jordan, Španjolska, Sirija,Tunis, i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo.

Energizing US-Syria Relations: Leveraging Ancillary Diplomatic Vehicles

Benjamin E. Vlast,

Andrew Akhlaghi,

Steven Rotchtin

The prospect for greater stability in the Middle East largely hinges on the ability to bring Syria into diplomatic and security discussions as a productive stakeholder, necessitating a thaw in the less than normal state of U.S. – Syrian relations. While Syria’s
importance as a keystone state to a Middle East peace process was acknowledged in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report,1 which called for a shift from disincentives to incentives in seeking constructive results, only in the past few months has there been a demonstrable shift in Washington’s disposition. Recent meetings between high-ranking U.S. officials and their counterparts in Damascus, and even the announcement of reinstating a U.S. ambassador to Syria, have led to widespread speculation in policy circles that a diplomatic thaw is afoot.
This report analyzes key trends in Syria’s domestic and regional socio-political situation that currently function to make Syria a natural ally of the United States.

Demokracija, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

F. Gregory Gause

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Therefore, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? In other words, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; i 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition

Ivan L. Esposito

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afganistana), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, purica, Iran, Libanon, Kuvajt, Jemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malezija, Indonezija, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

The Syrian Opposition

Joshua Landis

Joe Pace


For decades, NAS. policy toward Syria has been single-mindedly focused on Syria’s president, Hafiz al-Asad, iz 1970 do 2000, followed by his son Bashar. Because they perceived the Syrian opposition to be too weak and anti-American, NAS. officials preferred to work with the Asad regime. Washington thus had no relations with the Syrian opposition until its invasion of Iraq in 2003. Even then, the Bush administration reached out only to Washington-based opponents of the Syrian regime. They were looking for a Syrian counterpart to Ahmad Chalabi, the pro-U.S. Iraqi opposition leader who helped build the case for invading Iraq.
Washington was not interested in engaging Islamists, whom it considered the only opposition with a demonstrated popular base in Syria. As for the secular opposition in Syria, NAS. embassy officials in Damascus considered them to “have a weak back bench,” without a popular constituency or connection to Syrian youth.2 Moreover, contact between opposition members and embassy officials could be dangerous for opponents of the regime and leave them open to accusations of treason. For these reasons, the difficult terrain of opposition figures within Syria remained terra incognita.

Radical Islam in the Maghreb

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Libanon, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. U 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,vojnici, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. U rujnu 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.