RSSAlle Einträge Tagged With: "Shi’a"

Syrische Muslimbrüder und die syrisch-iranische Beziehung.

Dr. Yvette Talhamy

Bianony-syr

Die Alawiten Syriens sind Teil des schiitischen Stroms; dies hat zu einem Bündnis mit dem Iran geführt, Zentrum des schiitischen Islam. Dieses Bündnis verschärfte die oppositionelle syrische Muslimbruderschaft (MB), deren Mitglieder seitdem im Exil sind 1982. Nach ihnen, Das Bündnis ist eine Stufe in einem schiitischen Plan zur Übernahme der sunnitischen Länder, einschließlich Syrien. Aber, Im vergangenen Jahr hat die MB ihre Strategie geändert, und wir erleben derzeit eine Annäherung zwischen der Bruderschaft und Damaskus.

Der Zweck dieses Artikels ist es, die Haltung der syrischen Muslimbrüder gegenüber dem „Alawiten-Regime“ als einem sektiererischen schiitischen Regime und als Teil eines schiitisch-iranischen Schemas zu untersuchen, das beabsichtigt, die sunnitische Welt zu übernehmen.

Die Muslimbrüder Syriens, die prominente Opposition gegen das derzeitige Regime, sind eine sunnitisch-islamistische Bewegung, während die ‘Alawiten, die derzeitigen Herrscher Syriens, werden als Schiiten bezeichnet. Dies bringt das alte sunnitisch-schiitische Schisma an die Oberfläche, in dem jeder den anderen beschuldigt, vom wahren Weg des Islam abgewichen zu sein. Die Lage in Syrien, in dem eine schiitische Minderheit durch die säkulare Ba'th-Partei über eine sunnitische Mehrheit herrscht, wird von den sunnitischen Muslimbrüdern als inakzeptabel angesehen, die glauben, dass diese Situation geändert werden sollte – auch unter Anwendung von Gewalt. Die Muslimbrüder glauben, dass Syrien von der sunnitischen Scharia regiert werden sollte (Islamisches Gesetz) und nicht von dem Ketzer Nusayris, wie die schiitischen Alawiten genannt werden. Als Ergebnis des gewalttätigen muslimischen Widerstands gegen das säkulare Ba'th-Regime in den 1960er Jahren und gegen das säkulare, sektiererisches Asad-Regime in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, Viele Brüder wurden getötet und inhaftiert, während die Führung der Bruderschaft Syrien verließ und nie mehr zurückkehren durfte. Heute leben die syrischen Muslimbrüder in London, unter der Führung von ‘Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni.

Die Nusayris von Syrien

Die Alawiten Syriens sind Teil des schiitischen Stroms; dies hat zu einem Bündnis mit dem Iran geführt, Zentrum des schiitischen Islam. Dieses Bündnis verschärfte die oppositionelle syrische Muslimbruderschaft (MB), deren Mitglieder seitdem im Exil sind 1982. Nach ihnen, Das Bündnis ist eine Stufe in einem schiitischen Plan zur Übernahme der sunnitischen Länder, einschließlich Syrien. Aber, Im vergangenen Jahr hat die MB ihre Strategie geändert, und wir erleben derzeit eine Annäherung zwischen der Bruderschaft und Damaskus.
Der Zweck dieses Artikels ist es, die Haltung der syrischen Muslimbrüder gegenüber dem „Alawiten-Regime“ als einem sektiererischen schiitischen Regime und als Teil eines schiitisch-iranischen Schemas zu untersuchen, das beabsichtigt, die sunnitische Welt zu übernehmen.
Die Muslimbrüder Syriens, die prominente Opposition gegen das derzeitige Regime, sind eine sunnitisch-islamistische Bewegung, während die ‘Alawiten, die derzeitigen Herrscher Syriens, werden als Schiiten bezeichnet. Dies bringt das alte sunnitisch-schiitische Schisma an die Oberfläche, in dem jeder den anderen beschuldigt, vom wahren Weg des Islam abgewichen zu sein. Die Lage in Syrien, in dem eine schiitische Minderheit durch die säkulare Ba'th-Partei über eine sunnitische Mehrheit herrscht, wird von den sunnitischen Muslimbrüdern als inakzeptabel angesehen, die glauben, dass diese Situation geändert werden sollte – auch unter Anwendung von Gewalt. Die Muslimbrüder glauben, dass Syrien von der sunnitischen Scharia regiert werden sollte (Islamisches Gesetz) und nicht von dem Ketzer Nusayris, wie die schiitischen Alawiten genannt werden. Als Ergebnis des gewalttätigen muslimischen Widerstands gegen das säkulare Ba'th-Regime in den 1960er Jahren und gegen das säkulare, sektiererisches Asad-Regime in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, Viele Brüder wurden getötet und inhaftiert, während die Führung der Bruderschaft Syrien verließ und nie mehr zurückkehren durfte. Heute leben die syrischen Muslimbrüder in London, unter der Führung von ‘Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni.
Die Nusayris von Syrien
Die ‘Alawiten, die dominierende Elite Syriens, waren bis in die 1920er Jahre als Nusayris bekannt. Der Begriff Nusayris leitet sich vom Namen Muhammad ibn Nusayr ab, der im neunten Jahrhundert lebte. Ibn Nusayr behauptete, dass 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, Cousin und Schwiegersohn des Propheten, war göttlich, und er stellte ihn über den Propheten Muhammad. Die Nusayris glauben auch an das trinitarische Konzept von „A.M.S. („Ali. Muhammad. Salman.).1 Sie glauben an die Seelenwanderung, und sie greifen auf religiöse Verstellung zurück, oder taqiyya. Seit dem 13. Jahrhundert bewohnen sie die nach ihrem Namen bekannte Bergregion, Jabal al-Nusayriya (der Nusayriya-Berg) im Nordwesten Syriens und in der Region Hatay in der Südtürkei.2
Seit Jahrhunderten, die Nusayris, obwohl als extremistische muslimische Sekte angesehen, wurden von den lokalen syrischen Sunniten und von aufeinanderfolgenden sunnitischen Regierungen misshandelt, die sie als Ketzer außerhalb des Islam betrachteten. Die Nusayris lebten isoliert in ihren Bergen, und ihre Begegnungen mit den Einheimischen, sowohl Muslime als auch Christen, waren selten. Sie bewirtschafteten ihr Land nicht und lebten davon, Nachbardörfer zu überfallen und Reisende auszurauben, was ihnen einen negativen Ruf einbrachte.
Zu Beginn der französischen Mandatszeit in Syrien (1920-1946), Die Gruppe änderte ihren Namen in “„Alawiten.” Einige Forscher, wie Daniel Pipes, sagen, dass die Franzosen ihnen diesen Namen gaben, um sie auf ihre Seite zu ziehen.3 Andere argumentieren, dass die Nusayris diejenigen waren, die ihren Namen ändern wollten “„Alawiten,” Gemeint sind die Anhänger von ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, was sie enger mit dem Islam verbunden hat.4 Annahme des Namens ‘Alawiten und Erhalt von Fatawa (Rechtsgutachten) die sie mit dem Schiismus in Verbindung brachten, sollten ihnen helfen, sich in die syrische muslimische Bevölkerung zu integrieren und ihren Ketzerstatus zu beenden. Als Nusayris, Sie galten als ausgestoßene Sekte, sondern als ‘Alawiten, und die Anhänger von ‘Ali, Sie waren Teil des Schiismus und damit Teil der muslimischen Gemeinschaft. Obwohl während des französischen Mandats und des Unabhängigkeitskampfes, Sunnitische Nationalisten hatten die nationale Solidarität über die religiöse Treue gestellt und die Alawiten als arabische Mitbürger anerkannt, es gab immer noch viele, die sie als bezeichneten “Nusayris,” was impliziert, dass sie Ungläubige und Extremisten waren, die weder mit dem sunnitischen noch mit dem schiitischen Islam verwandt sind.5 Allerdings, Anders als die Sunniten, die Schiiten umarmten die Alawiten und gewannen schließlich ihre Unterstützung.
Das sunnitische/schiitische Schisma
Um die Trennungen zwischen Schiiten6 und Sunniten zu verstehen, müssen wir zuerst die historischen Wurzeln und Lehrunterschiede verstehen, die zu dieser Dichotomie geführt haben. Nach dem Tod des Propheten Muhammad im siebten Jahrhundert und den internen Streitigkeiten darüber, wer den Platz des Propheten als Oberhaupt der muslimischen Gemeinschaft erben würde, Es kam zu einer Spaltung zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten. Besonders akut wurden die Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen den beiden bei der Nachfolgeregelung (gegenüber dem Kalifat und dem Imamat) und die Rolle des islamischen Rechts ohne eine klare koranische Aussage zu einer bestimmten Angelegenheit.
Heute sind die Schiiten eine Minderheit in der muslimischen Welt, bestehend aus etwa 10%-15% der Bevölkerung, einschließlich all der verschiedenen Sekten wie Ismailiten, Zaydis, und ‘Alawiten. Obwohl die Alawiten innerhalb der schiitischen Lehre als Sekte gelten, Es gibt nur wenige Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den Schiiten und den Alawiten. Beide verehren 'Ali und die 12 Imame – obwohl sie unterschiedliche Ansichten über sie haben – und beide greifen auf religiöse Verstellung zurück (taqiyya), aber die Ähnlichkeiten enden dort. Beispielsweise, die Nusayris/’Alawiten haben viele Überzeugungen, die von den Schiiten nicht akzeptiert werden, wie der Glaube an die Seelenwanderung, ihre Platzierung von 'Ali über dem Propheten Muhammad, und ihre eigenen religiösen Bücher und Zeremonien.
Ihre theologischen Unterschiede hinderten die beiden von Schiiten regierten Staaten Iran und Syrien jedoch nicht daran, sich zu verbünden. Einige betrachteten das Bündnis als politisch begründet, Sicherheit, und wirtschaftlichen Interessen, aber die syrischen Muslimbrüder sahen das anders. Nach ihnen, Dieses Bündnis ist nur eine Stufe im iranisch-schiitischen Plan, ein iranisch-schiitisches Reich in der gesamten muslimischen Welt zu bilden, mit dem Ziel, die sunnitische Welt zu übernehmen. Bevor wir das Thema weiter vertiefen, müssen wir zunächst die Frage beantworten, wie und wann die Nusayris zu Schiiten wurden.
Schiiten werden
Jahrhundertelang hatten die Alawiten/Nusayris sowohl sozial als auch wirtschaftlich unter aufeinanderfolgenden sunnitischen Herrschern gelitten. Unter den Osmanen, für wen Syrien regierte 400 Jahre, die ‘Alawiten litten sehr. Isoliert in ihren Bergschanzen, in baufälligen Dörfern leben, Sie mussten Hunger und Armut ertragen, während sie von ihren hauptsächlich sunnitischen Grundbesitzern ausgebeutet wurden, die sie verachteten und als Ungläubige betrachteten.7 Nach dem Untergang des Osmanischen Reiches in 1918, Syrien kam unter französisches Mandat 1920. Dies wurde von den Nusayris als Gelegenheit gesehen, in der Region des Nusayriya-Berges, in der sie die Mehrheit bildeten, Autonomie oder Unabhängigkeit zu erlangen.
Mit Beginn des französischen Mandats in Syrien, Die Führer der ‘Alawiten forderten die Franzosen auf, ihnen einen eigenen Staat zu geben. Die Franzosen, die eine Politik des Teilens und Herrschens verfolgten, gewährte den Alawiten einen eigenen Staat, das “Staat der Alawiten” (1920-1936) im Nusayriya-Gebirge entlang der Küste Syriens, Dadurch wird verhindert, dass die inneren Regionen Syriens einen Abfluss zum Mittelmeer haben. Obwohl sie in diesen Jahren Autonomie genossen, die ‘Alawiten wurden untereinander aufgeteilt. Einige Alawiten, hauptsächlich diejenigen, die gebildet wurden, unterstützte einen breiteren Nationalismus und wünschte die Vereinigung von ganz Syrien, während andere den Separatismus unterstützten und ihren unabhängigen Staat behalten wollten. Unter den Separatisten war ‘Ali Sulayman al-Asad, der Vater von Hafiz al-Asad. Während sich die Anhänger des Separatismus auf religiöse Differenzen als Grundlage für ihre Forderung nach einem unabhängigen Staat stützten, Es wurden ernsthafte Maßnahmen ergriffen, hauptsächlich von den nationalistischen Alawiten, um ihre Verbindungen zur schiitischen Lehre zu betonen.8
Die ‘Alawiten, die den Nationalismus unterstützten, sahen, dass der einzige Weg, ihre Existenz zu bewahren, die Integration in ein vereintes Syrien war, anstatt ein eigenes Land zu haben, und sie förderten diese Idee ab den 1920er Jahren. Sie erkannten, dass es für sie wichtig war, zunächst als Schiiten als Teil der muslimischen Gemeinschaft anerkannt zu werden. Als Nusayris wurden sie sowohl von Sunniten als auch von Schiiten als Ungläubige angesehen, aber als ‘Alawiten würden sie Teil des Islam werden und nicht länger als verstoßene Sekte angesehen werden.
In 1926 Die 'Alawiten unternahmen den ersten Schritt, um Teil des muslimischen Glaubens zu werden, als eine Gruppe von 'Alawiten-Scheichs eine Proklamation herausgab, die dies besagte: “Jeder ‘Alawi ist ein Muslim … Jeder Alawit, der seinen islamischen Glauben nicht bekennt oder leugnet, dass der Koran das Wort Gottes ist und dass Muhammad sein Prophet ist, ist kein Alawit … Die Alawiten sind schiitische Muslime … sie sind die Anhänger des Imam Ali.”9 Im April 1933 eine Gruppe von 'Alawiten' Ulama’ hielt ein Treffen ab und gab eine Erklärung heraus, die die Alawiten mit dem Islam verband, und beantragte, unter dem Namen in den Bevölkerungsregistern eingetragen zu werden “Alawische Muslime.”10 Im Juli 1936 Ein weiterer wichtiger Schritt wurde unternommen, um die Integration der Alawiten in den muslimischen Glauben zu unterstützen, als der palästinensische Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni,11 ein Panarabist, der die Idee von Großsyrien unterstützte, eine Fatwa erlassen, die die Alawiten als Muslime anerkennt. Seine Fatwa wurde in der syrischen Zeitung al-Sha’b veröffentlicht [Die Menschen].12 Das Ziel des Hajj Amin war es, alle muslimischen Araber für eine Sache zu vereinen – Arabische Einheit und der Kampf gegen die Besetzung durch die Westmächte. Diese Fatwa war das erste offizielle religiöse Dekret, das die Alawiten als Muslime anerkannte.
In diesem Jahr verloren die Alawiten ihre Unabhängigkeit, autonomer Staat und wurden von Syrien annektiert, das damals noch unter französischem Mandat stand. Während des Mandats (1936-1946), Die Alawiten, die den Separatismus unterstützten, forderten weiterhin, dass die Franzosen ihre Unabhängigkeit wiederherstellen, aber vergeblich. Zur selben Zeit, die nationalistische Strömung unter den Alawiten erstarkte. Auf der einen Seite, die nationalistischen Alawiten betonten weiterhin ihre Verbindung zum Islam, und auf der anderen Seite die muslimische Gemeinschaft, sowohl Sunniten als auch Schiiten, wollte sie für die Sache des syrischen Nationalstaates gewinnen, indem sie mehrere Fatwas und Erklärungen herausgab, die die ‘Alawiten-Sekte als Teil des muslimischen Glaubens legitimierten. Die Franzosen verließen Syrien im April 1946, und die Alawiten, die den Separatismus unterstützten, wussten, dass sie keine andere Alternative hatten als die Integration in den unabhängigen Staat Syrien.
Obwohl während der 26 Jahren des französischen Mandats übernahmen die Alawiten den Schiismus, ihnen zu helfen, sich in die muslimische Welt und in die syrische Nation zu integrieren, sie hatten seine Lehren nie gelernt. In 1947, die führende schiitische Autorität in Nadschaf, Ayatullah Muhsin al-Hakim, beschlossen, den ersten formellen Schritt zu tun, um die Alawiten zu umarmen und sie zu einem Teil der schiitischen Gemeinschaft zu machen. In 1948, die erste Delegation ‘alawiischer Studenten ging nach Nadschaf, um schiitische Theologie zu studieren und Rechtswissenschaften zu studieren.13 Dieser Schritt blieb erfolglos, da die 'alawiischen Studenten mit schiitischen Anfeindungen konfrontiert und als Extremisten angesehen wurden (Warten), Die meisten Schüler brechen ab und kehren nach Hause zurück. Nach diesem Misserfolg, zu Ja'fari (Zwölf) Die Gesellschaft wurde in Latakia gegründet, die Bildungsarbeit und religiöse Führung übernahmen, und eröffnete mehrere Filialen in anderen Städten wie Jabla, in Tartu, und Banias.
Trotz dieser Aktionen, Die ‘Alawiten wurden auch von den Schiiten noch nicht als echte Muslime angesehen, die glaubten, dass sie mehr Führung brauchten.14 Zwischen 1950-1960 Einige ‘alawiische Studenten studierten an der sunnitischen al-Azhar-Universität in Kairo, die ihren Absolventen ein in Syrien anerkanntes Diplom verlieh.15 In jenen Jahren ergriff die Ba’th-Partei unter ‘Alawiten-Führung die Macht in Syrien als Vorstufe zur Übernahme des gesamten Landes. Wie Martin Kramer es ausdrückt: “Diese Situation war reich an Ironie. Die ‘Alawiten, ihnen wurde von den sunnitischen Nationalisten ein eigener Staat verweigert, hatte stattdessen ganz Syrien eingenommen.”16
Das ‘Alawiten-Regime und die syrischen Muslimbrüder
Es gab zwei Hauptkanäle, die den Alawiten halfen, die Macht in Syrien zu erobern: der Sozialist, säkulare Ba'th-Partei, die besonders die ländliche Klasse und nicht-sunnitische Minderheiten anzog, und die Streitkräfte, wo verschiedene religiöse Minderheiten während des französischen Mandats überrepräsentiert waren und dies auch nach ihrer Abreise blieben. Der Staatsstreich vom März 1963 und Februar 1966, in denen die Alawiten eine große Rolle spielten, markiert die ‘Alawiten’ Konsolidierung der Macht. Der letzte syrische Putsch fand im November statt 1970, und wurde als bekannt “Asad-Putsch.”17 In 1971 Hafiz al-Asad wurde der erste alawitische Präsident Syriens. Aber, Einige Zweige der syrischen Nation weigerten sich, diese Tatsache zu akzeptieren. Dies waren hauptsächlich die Muslimbrüder Syriens, die, von 1964 bis heute, sind die wichtigste syrische Opposition gegen die Herrschaft der Ba'th-Partei und gegen die “sektiererisch” Regel, wie sie es nennen, der Familie Asad.18 In 1945-1946, Dr. Mustafa al-Siba’i gründete die syrische Muslimbruderschaft, die gegen die Franzosen für einen islamischen Staat kämpfte.19 In den ersten Jahren nach ihrer Gründung, Die Gesellschaft veröffentlichte Zeitungen und Literatur und spielte eine aktive Rolle in der syrischen Politik. Im selben Zeitraum entwickelte sich das säkulare Ba'th, und im Gegensatz zu den Muslimbrüdern, die gegen die Säkularisierung gekämpft haben, es erhielt Unterstützung aus verschiedenen Sektoren der syrischen Gesellschaft, vor allem unter Minderheiten, Damit wurde sie zur wichtigsten politischen Partei in Syrien.
Die säkulare Doktrin der regierenden Ba'th-Partei verstärkte nur die Ängste der Sunniten, und Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den Säkularen, Das sozialistische Ba’th und die religiösen Muslimbrüder waren unvermeidlich. In 1964, Das Baath-Regime verbot die Muslimbrüder, und sein neuer Anführer, ‘Isam al-’Attar, wurde verbannt. Im selben Jahr eine von den Muslimbrüdern und anderen Oppositionsfraktionen angeführte Revolte, einschließlich Sozialisten, Liberale, und Nasseristen, brach in der Stadt Hama gegen die Säkularen aus, ländlich, und Minderheitencharakter der syrischen herrschenden Elite. Die Revolte wurde nach einem Bombenanschlag auf die Al-Sultan-Moschee der Stadt niedergeschlagen, was viele Verluste verursachte.20
Im April kam es erneut zu Zusammenstößen zwischen den beiden Seiten 1967 als ein junger alawitischer Offizier namens Ibrahim Khallas einen Artikel in der Armeezeitschrift Jaysh al-Sha’b veröffentlichte (Die Volksarmee) unter dem Titel “Der Weg zur Erschaffung eines neuen arabischen Menschen,” worin er diesen Glauben an Gott und Religion verkündete, Feudalismus, Kapitalismus, Imperialismus, und alle Werte, die die Gesellschaft beherrschten, sollten in ein Museum gestellt werden.21 Dieser Artikel verursachte Streiks und Unruhen in verschiedenen Teilen Syriens, die von den ‘Ulama’ geführt wurden, darunter Mitglieder der Muslimbruderschaft und sogar christliche Geistliche. Als Ergebnis, Khallas wurde aus dem Amt entlassen.22 Laut den Muslimbrüdern, sie lehnten die Ba'th ab, weil sie eine säkulare Partei war. Sie glaubten, dass der Islam zur Staatsreligion erklärt werden sollte und dass die Scharia die Grundlage der Gesetzgebung sein sollte.23 Sie lehnten Asad auch nicht wegen seiner „alawiischen“ Herkunft ab, aber weil, aus ihrer Sicht, sein Regime war sektiererisch, tyrannisch, korrupt, bedrückend, und ungerecht.24
Während der 1970er Jahre, Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Asad-Regime und den Muslimbrüdern verschlechterten sich. In 1973, erneute Unruhen brachen aus, als die syrische Verfassung veröffentlicht wurde und den Islam nicht zur Staatsreligion erklärte. Die Muslimbrüder forderten den Islam als Staatsreligion, obwohl es nie als solches bezeichnet wurde. In 1950, die syrische Versammlung verkündete die syrische Verfassung und, auf Antrag des MB, fügte eine Klausel hinzu, dass die Religion des Staatsoberhauptes der Islam sei. Diese Klausel wurde später weggelassen, und nach dem Aufstieg in die Präsidentschaft, Asad hat diese Klausel wieder in die syrische Verfassung eingefügt, aber als die Verfassung für die Volkszählung eingeführt wurde, die Klausel wurde wieder weggelassen. Diese Tat löste eine Welle wütender Demonstrationen aus, die von den Muslimbrüdern organisiert wurden, der Asad als den bezeichnete “Feind Gottes” und rief zum Dschihad gegen ihn und gegen seine auf “atheistisches und korruptes Regime.”25Als Ergebnis, Asad fügte eine Klausel in die Verfassung ein, die besagte “Der Islam ist die Religion des Staatsoberhauptes,” was bedeutet, dass, seit er der Präsident war, er betrachtete sich als Muslim. Außerdem, im selben Jahr, er befahl den Druck eines neuen Korans mit seinem Bild auf der Titelseite, genannt werden “Asad Koran,” wodurch der Zorn der Sunniten und der Muslimbrüder geschürt wird.26
Asad machte viele versöhnliche Gesten, um das Vertrauen der sunnitischen Mehrheit und der Muslimbrüder zu gewinnen. Er betete freitags in Moscheen27 und an den wichtigsten muslimischen Feiertagen wie 'Id al-Fitr und 'Id al-Adha.28 Er hob Beschränkungen für religiöse Einrichtungen auf und erlaubte den Bau neuer Moscheen.29 Im Dezember 1972, er erhielt eine Legitimation von Hasan al-Shirazi, ein irakischer schiitischer Geistlicher im Exil im Libanon, das aussagen “der Glaube der Alawiten entsprach in jeder Hinsicht dem ihrer zwölf schiitischen Brüder.”30 Später, im Juli 1973, Musa al-Sadr, Vorsitzender des Obersten Rates der Schiiten im Libanon und Vertrauter Asads,31 erklärte, die Alawiten seien eine schiitische Sekte,32 und im folgenden Jahr führte Asad die Umrah nach Mekka durch. Auch Asad wurde vom Großmufti von Syrien zum gläubigen Muslim erklärt, Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaru.33 Aber die Muslimbrüder betrachteten ihn immer noch als Nicht-Muslim und führten einen gewalttätigen Kampf gegen das Asad-Regime.34
In den 1970er Jahren litten die Muslimbrüder auch unter internen Problemen, Spaltung in zwei Fraktionen. Eine Fraktion, die in Jordanien war, gegen heftigen Widerstand, während die andere Fraktion, in Aleppo stationiert, forderten den Dschihad gegen das Asad-Regime und seine Ersetzung durch ein sunnitisches Regime.35 Von 1976 zu 1982, Das Asad-Regime sah sich sowohl säkularer als auch islamistischer Opposition gegenüber. Die Intervention im Libanon in 1976 und innenpolitische Probleme wie Inflation, offizielle Korruption, and the domination of the ‘Alawis in every sphere of life in Syria were the driving force for the opposition’s efforts to overthrow Asad’s non-Muslim, tyrannical regime.36 The Asad regime was viewed as a sectarian government in which an infidel religious minority ruled over the majority. According to the Muslim Brothers, this was an unnatural situation that ought to be changed.
In 1979 the Muslim Brothers carried out an armed attack against the Aleppo Artillery School where 83 young recruits, all ‘Alawis, were killed.37 The Minister of the Interior, ‘Adnan Dabbagh, accused the Muslim Brothers of being agents subservient to the United States andthe Zionist influence,”38 and as a result many Islamists were imprisoned and others were executed.39 In April 1980, armed clashes between the Muslim Brothers and the security forces occurred in the city of Aleppo. Using tanks, armored vehicles, and rockets, the government troops, backed by armed party irregulars,40 occupied the city after killing between 1,000 und 2,000 people and arresting some 8,000.41
In June 1980, the Muslim Brothers were accused of a failed attempt to assassinate President Asad, and as a result Rif’at al-Asad, the President’s brother, led a revenge campaign against the Muslim Brothers held in Tadmor (Palymra) prison, massacring hundreds of defenseless Islamist prisoners.42 The Muslim Brothers struck back by attacking ‘Alawi officials and placing car bombs outside government installations and military bases, killing and injuring hundreds. In Beantwortung, the government carried out brutal reprisals against the Islamists. Many were arrested, summary executions were carried out, and thousands went into exile.43 In July 1980, membership or association with the Muslim Brothers was made a crime punishable by death.44
In November 1980, as the next step in their anti-regime struggle, the Muslim Brothers issued a manifesto that contained their detailed program for the future Islamic state of Syria. The manifesto included an attack against the corrupt, sectarian ‘Alawi regime of theAsad brothers,” and emphasized that a minority cannot and should not rule over a majority.45
The Hama Massacre
The city of Hama was one of the main centers of the Muslim Brotherhood opposition to the regime. The first encounter between the Muslim Brothers and the military in the city occurred in April 1981 when the Brothers ambushed a security checkpoint. In revenge, special forces units moved into the city and began a house-to-house search. About 350 people were killed, many fled into exile, others disappeared or were imprisoned, and clashes between the two sides continued.46 When Anwar al-Sadat was killed by Islamists on October 6, 1981, flyers were distributed in Damascus threatening Asad with the same fate, and the confrontation between the rival forces became inevitable.47 In February 1982, bloody clashes between the Syrian army and the Muslim Brothers occurred in the city of Hama, where about 100 government and party representatives were killed by the armed Brothers. Special forces were sent to the city to fight the rebels. The city was strafed by helicopters and bombarded with rocket, artillery, and tank fire. Large parts of the city were destroyed, leaving hundreds of people homeless. Many more deserted the city. Estimates of the number killed vary, but it is clear that thousands were killed or injured.48
In the same period, there were several violent demonstrations against the regime that were unrelated to the Muslim opposition. März 1980, violent demonstrations against the government erupted in the small town of Jisr al-Shughur (between Aleppo and Latakia). The government regained control in the town after using mortars and rockets. Many houses and stores were destroyed and 150-200 people were killed. Demonstrations also erupted in Idlib, Ma’arra (März 1980), and Dayr al-Zur (April 1980).49
After the clashes with the Muslim Brothers, Asad felt that his position was in danger, and he accused Israel, Ägypten, and the United States of using the Muslim Brothers against him.50 In a speech that he gave on the 19th anniversary of the Ba’th revolution, Asad shouted, “Death to the hired Muslim Brothers who tried to play havoc with the homeland! Death to the Muslim Brothers who were hired by US intelligence, reactionaries and Zionists!”51
During the following years Asad decided to change his internal and external policy. Internally, many Muslim Brothers in Syria and abroad were granted amnesty, and many were released from jails. He also allowed the opening of new Qur’anic schools and the building of new mosques, and he lifted the restrictions on Islamic publications and dress.52 Externally, he was alienated since, in addition to his unfriendly relations with the West, his relations with some Arab countries, such as Iraq, Ägypten, und Jordanien, were remarkably bad. He felt that he needed new allies in the region, and therefore began to enhance his relations with different countries and Muslim organizations. Among the countries with which Asad chose to strengthen his alliance was the Islamic Republic of Iran. Among the Muslim organizations that gained Asad’s support and hospitality were the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Sunni) and the Lebanese Hizbullah (Shi’ite).53 After the peace treaties signed by Israel with Egypt and Jordan, and the unofficial relations between Israel and other Arab countries, Syria under the Asads (both father and son) remained the only frontline Arab country carrying the banner of the pan-Arab, anti-Zionist, and anti-Israeli campaign, thus gaining the support of the Arab population.54 However, the recent Syrian-Iranian alliance has aroused suspicion among the Arab population and leadership concerning the motivations for this alliance with the Shi’ite, non-Arab Islamic Republic of Iran.
Syria and Iran Become Allies
The relationship between Syria and Iran began in the 1970s. During those years the Syrian authorities accorded privileges and protection to some major Iranian opposition figures.55 In 1978, President Asad offered to receive the main Iranian opposition leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,56 in Damascus after he was expelled from Iraq in 1978. Khomeini declined Asad’s invitation, and instead settled in Paris until the 1979 revolution, when he returned to Iran as head of state and became the only leader in the Muslim world to combine political and religious authority through the doctrine of velayat-e faqih.57 The Muslim Brothers in general, including those in Syria, supported the Iranian Islamic Revolution and saw it as a revolution of all the Islamic movements of the various schools and sects. Shortly after assuming his position, Khomeini began calling for Islamic revolutions across the entire Muslim world. The Syrian Muslim Brothers saw this as a positive step for change, and hoped that it would lead to a similar revolution in Syria and the overthrow of the oppressiveAsad rule.”58 Although the Brothers had publicly stated their support of the Iranian Revolution, to their disappointment the Islamic Republic of Iran maintained close relations with the Asad regime59 despite the fact that the Ba’th Party proclaimed itself to be a socialist, secular, Arab party whereas Iran was a Muslim, non-Arab theocracy.60
Since the 18th century, the Iranian Shi’ite ‘ulamahave enjoyed wide religious and political power, but during the 20th century the Pahlavi Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza, took official measures to erode the position of the ‘ulama’. Following the revolution and the overthrow of the Shah, Iran became a kind of informal center for the Shi’a of different countries. The Iranians tried to export their revolution to neighboring Arab states, causing turbulence in Arab Gulf states with Shi’ite populations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. In 1981, the Iranians even backed an unsuccessful plot to overthrow the Sunni government of Bahrain, a country with a Shi’ite majority.61 Later, the Gulf region became an arena of terrorism against local and Western targets, and was shaken by suicide attacks. These Iranian terrorist actions in support of other Shi’ites led to a violent response by the Kuwaiti Sunni Muslim Brothers, who bombed Iranian offices in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Brothers even denounced the Shi’a as anathema.62 Today, in retrospect, the Kuwaiti Brothers perceive these terrorist actions as part of a long-term Shi’ite scheme to take over the Sunni world.
It is hard to explain the reasons behind Khomeini’s preference for Asad over the Muslim Brothers, or as Martin Kramer puts it, “when religion is subordinate to politics, miracles again become possible, and Syria’s ‘Alawis may get recognition as Twelver Shi’is.”63
During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Syrien, unlike other Arab countries, supported Iran, and the cooperation and strategic alliance between the two countries grew stronger in the following years.64 In exchange for their support, the Iranians supplied Syria with free petroleum products and oil at concession rates.65 In April 1980, when there were clashes between the Muslim Brothers and security forces in Syria, the Iranians condemned the actions of the Muslim Brothers, accusing them of conspiring with Egypt, Israel, and the United States against Syria.66 For their part, the Syrian Muslim Brothers, as well as the Kuwaiti Muslim Brothers, began to view Iran as a sectarian Shi’ite regime. Parallel with the growing ties between Syria and Iran, the Muslim Brothers of Syria supported and were supported politically and financially by the Iraqi regime under Saddam Husayn.67 In the 1980s, the attacks of the Muslim Brothers against the Islamic Republic of Iran intensified. In a book written by Sa’id Hawwa, the chief ideologist of the Syrian Muslim Brothers in the 1980s, he stressed that the People of the Sunna are the real Muslim community, thus widening the gap between the Muslim Brothers and Iran.68 In April 1982, a coalition of different Syrian opposition groups, including the Syrian MB, set up theNational Alliance for the Liberation of Syria,” which was backed by the Iraqi regime.69 During the 1980s relations between Iran and Syria remained generally close, despite the fact that some Iranian actions had aggravated the Syrians, such as the announcement of a four-stage plan for the establishment of an Islamic Shi’ite regime in Iraq in early 1982. In March of the same year, some Iraniantourists” (who were actually Iranian revolutionary activists) had visited Syria and distributed posters of Khomeini and hung religious slogans on the walls of the Damascus airport and its surroundings.70 Such actions caused a cooling in the relationship between the two countries, but since Iran was alienated from the rest of the region due to the war with Iraq, its relations with the Arab countries were nearly universally poor, making Syria too precious an ally for Iran to lose. The Iranian leadership did whatever was needed to maintain its alliance with Syria, the only Arab state with which it had good relations.
At present, the Shi’ite Hizbullah of Lebanon, currently under the leadership of Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, is another ally of the Asad regime, constituting the third component of the Shi’ite triple alliance. In den frühen 1980er Jahren, while the Syrians were in Lebanon, the Iranians began to cultivate the Shi’ite community of Lebanon. Iran sent Shi’ite clerics to the country to indoctrinate the local Shi’ites with their ideology.71 Iran regarded Lebanon as fertile soil for exporting its revolution, and Hizbullah was the means through which Iran planned toovercomeLebanon in order to attack theZionistenemy, Israel, from the north, and to liberate Palestine. Iran supplied Hizbullah with money, weapons, and military and religious guidance,72 in addition to supporting health, education, and social welfare institutions.73
According to the Syrian Muslim Brothers, the basis of the alliance between the three parties – Syrien, Iran, and Hizbullahis their common Shi’ite doctrine. This allegation was not true in the 1980s, when the relationship between Hizbullah and the Asad regime was marked by tension. During the 1980s, relations between Syria and Hizbullah were indeed more of a rivalry than an alliance, despite Iran’s dissatisfaction with this lack of accord between her two allies.74 In February 1987, the Syrians even perpetrated a massacre against Hizbullah militiamen. After Hizbullah abducted a number of Western citizens, Syrian troops deployed in Beirut’s southern suburbs, where 23 Hizbullah members were subsequently killed. As a result thousands of outraged Lebanese Shi’ite mourners protested against Syria, with some even accusing it of conspiring with Israel.75 For its part, Iran never held Syria responsible for this action but rather attributed it to renegades within the Syrian army. But Iran, knowing this was not true, warned Syria that any action against its allies in Lebanon would be considered an attack against Iran.76
Despite the tension between the two states, Iran was careful not to lose its ally and continued to supply it with free or discounted crude oil. As it became increasingly isolated from the rest of the Arab and Western states, Iran’s relations with Syria became more valuable, especially since there were some diplomatic efforts made on the part of the Arab states to separate the two allies and restore Arab unity.77 During 1987, Iran faced another problem that needed Syrian mediation when Iranian pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca, resulting in bloody clashes with the Saudi security forces. In the incident, 275 Iranians and 85 members of the Saudi security forces were killed, causing a crisis in Saudi/Arab- Iran relations. This incident was regarded by Saudi Arabia as an Iranian plot intended to shake the foundations of Sunni Saudi Arabia. The situation deteriorated to a level where the Iran-Iraq War became regarded as war between the Arabs and the Persians.78
According to the Syrian Muslim Brothers, considering all the aforementioned violent actions committed by Iran in different Arab countries, the Shi’ite Iranians, under the cover of Islam, are more dangerous to the Muslim countries than the Zionists or the Americans. According to the Brothers, the latter’s plan is obvious, but the Shi’ite Iranians manage to obtain Sunni support by waving the flag of war against the Zionists and the Americans, while their genuine aim is to take over these countries and rebuild the Shi’ite Safavid empire.79
In 1987, Sa’id Hawwa, the chief ideologist of the Syrian Muslim Brothers, wrote a book called The Khumayniyya: Deviation in Beliefs and Deviation in Behavior (al- Khumayniyya: shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif), in which he presents the disappointment of the Muslim Brothers in the Islamic Revolution in Iran and exposes thedeviationof Khomeini. In his book, Hawwa quotes from works written by Khomeini himself that, according to Hawwa, reveal the deviation in Khomeini’s thoughts and Shi’ite beliefs. Hawwa goes so far as to regard the Shi’ites and Khomeini as a danger to the existence of the Sunni world, warning young Sunnis against believing the false statements of thisMuslim Revolution.”80 According to Hawwa, the purpose of this revolution is to take over the Sunni world and turn it into a Shi’ite world. To prove his claims, Hawwa points to the Iranian interference in Lebanon and its support for Shi’ite movements such as Hizbullah and Amal, and also presents the odd relationship between Iran and Syria. In his view, the main purpose of the Iran-Iraq War was toconquerIraq and turn it into a Shi’ite state, and then conquer the rest of the Gulf Arab states as a preliminary stage in taking over the whole of the Sunni world.81 Hawwa concludes his book by stating that the Shi’a are different from the Sunnis, their beliefs are different, their prayers are different, and whoever supports them is considered a traitor against God and his Prophet.82
The Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, and Khomeini died the following year. ‘Ali Khameine’i, who had been Iran’s President, became its Supreme Leader,83 and Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani84 was elected President, remaining in office until 1997. Rafsanjani and the Presidents who suceeded him, under the guidance of Khameine’i, pursued Khomeini’s legacy. März 1991, the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Ägypten, and Syria participated in the Damascus meeting,85 and later on in October, the Arab countries, einschließlich Syrien, participated in the Madrid peace talks with Israel. These actions caused tension between Syria and Iran, but after the failure of these talks, the tension between the two allies declined.86 During the 1990s, Syria also played an important role as mediator between Iran and the Arab Gulf states.87 Syria played a mediating role in the dispute between Abu Dhabi and Iran over Iran’s annexation of Abu Musa Island in the Persian Gulf in early 1992, and in the internal Shi’ite disturbances in Bahrain in early 1995.88
Until the 1970s, the ‘Alawis and later President Asad sought religious confirmation as Shi’ite Muslims from prominent Muslim leaders, and especially from Shi’ite leaders. After the Iranian Revolution and the imposition of religious rule, Iran sought an ally in the region, and Syria was that ally. It is fair to say that these two countries built their alliance out of mutual necessity. Over the years their alliance faced numerous obstacles, but managed to survive. Many elements contributed to the survival of this alliance, amongst them the failure of the peace talks in the Middle East, the Palestinian problem, and Western policy that seemed to favor the Israeli side, thus driving Syria to seek a strong ally as a counterweight. Asad’s commitment to the Palestinian cause did not change the attitude of the Muslim Brothers towards him, because they still regarded his regime as an oppressive, sectarian regime and sought to overthrow it, and his alliance with Shi’ite Iran only aggravated them and aroused their suspicions.
The Shi’ite Revolution
The Muslim Brothers of Syria view the ‘Alawi/Shi’ite Asad regime as a part of a Shi’ite/Iranian scheme intended to establish or restore the glory of the old Persian empire and impose Shi’ite doctrine in the various Arab and Muslim states. To support their claims of this purported scheme, they rely on an alleged secret letter that was published in 1998 by the Iranian Sunni League in London, and which they claim was sent from the Iranian Revolution Assembly to different Iranian provinces. This alleged letter included a very detailed five-stage Iranian/Shi’ite plan on how toexportthe Iranian/ Shi’ite revolution to other Muslim countries. The duration of each stage of this plan is ten years, with a total duration of 50 Jahre. The plan’s goal is to unite the Muslims by striking at the Sunni regimes that consider Shi’ite doctrine heretical. According to the plan, controlling these countries would result in control of half the world.
The first step of this plan is: “To improve the relations between Iran and the neighboring Arab states. When the cultural, the economic and the political relations between Iran and those states are good, it will be easy for Iranian agents to enter those countries as immigrants.
The Iranian agents will buy houses, apartments, and lands and help their Shi’ite brothers living in these countries. They will foster good business and personal relations with the powerful figures in these countries, obey the laws of these countries, and obtain permits to celebrate their feasts and to build their own mosquesObtain local nationality through bribes or by using their connections. Encourage the young Shi’ites to incorporate themselves within the local administrations and to enlist in the local armyArouse suspicion and mistrust between the local authorities and the [Sunni] religious authorities by spreading flyers allegedly published by religious leaders criticizing the actions of the local government. This action would lead to friction in the relations between the two sides causing the government to suspect every act of the religious leaders.
The third step is: “After incorporation within the local bureaucracy and army, the task of the Shi’ite religious leaders, contrary to the local Sunni religious leaders, will be to declare publicly their loyalty to the local government, thus gaining their goodwill and trust. Then begins the step of striking at the local economy.
The fourth step is: When mistrust is caused between the religious and political leaders and the collapse of their economy, anarchy will prevail everywhere, and the agents will be the only protectors of the country. After building trust with the ruling elite, the crucial stage will begin by announcing the political leaders as traitors, thus causing their expulsion or their replacement by the Iranian agents. Incorporating Shi’a in the different governmental offices will arouse the anger of the Sunnis who will respond by attacking the government. The agent’s role at this point is to ‘stand bythe head of state and buy the property of those who decide to flee the country.
The fifth step is: “Help to regain peace in those countries by appointing a People’s Assembly, where the Shi’ite candidates will have the majority and will later take over the country, if not through those peaceful measures, then by causing a revolution. After taking over the country, Shi’ism will be imposed.”89
The Syrian Muslim Brothers used this letter to prove90 that the alliance between the ‘Alawi regime and Iran was actually a part of the Shi’ite scheme against the Sunni world. Dr. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, a Syrian author of the Muslim Brothers information bureau, published a series of articles on the Syrian Muslim Brothersofficial website under the titleThe Suspicious Iranian Safavid Persian Scheme in the Arab and Muslim Countries” (al-Mashrual-Irani al-Safawi al-Farisi al-Mashbuh fi Bilad al-‘Arab). The aim of these articles was to reveal the Iranian scheme and the true face of the ‘Alawi regime. In his articles, Dr. Yusuf begins with a description of how the Shi’ite Safavids took over Iran in 1501, and how their influence expanded to Iraq down to the present time. Außerdem, he emphasizes that the Iranianscruel treatment of the Sunni inhabitants under their rule is an illustration of their hate for the Sunnis.91
Actually, Dr. Yusuf’s allegations coincide with Khomeini’s declarations. In his speeches and religious sermons, Khomeini regarded some Sunni governments as illegitimate, claiming that the only truly Islamic state was Iran, and thus believing that Iran has the right to force these states (including by the use of violence), even those that claim to advocate Islamic law, to adopt reforms.92 In his sermons and speeches, Khomeini also attacked the Western powers, especially the United States and their allies (oder “puppetsas he called them) in the region. He fiercely attacked Saudi Arabia, the unofficial leader of the Sunni world, for betraying Islam, as well as Saddam Husayn’s Iraq, which he regarded as an infidel, atheistic government.93 Khomeini’s death did not end the implementation of the Iranian scheme; his successors continued his legacy. The Muslim Brothers believe that the overthrow of Saddam coincided with the goals of Iran, welche, according to the Brothers, is working inside Iraq more than ever to turn it into a Shi’ite state.94
Laut Dr.. Yusuf, what we are seeing now in countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein, Sudan, Jemen, Jordan, Syrien, and Lebanon is the implementation of the Iranian five-stage scheme. In Syria, zum Beispiel, the plan is being implemented under the protection of the Asad regime, and it is the duty of the Muslim Brothers to stop them andsaveSyria.95 On their official website, the Muslim Brothers elaborate and illustrate the Iranianconquestof Syria and their attempts to turn it into a Shi’ite state. “What is conquest?” they ask;
Is it the existence of foreign intelligence in the country that works side by side with local intelligence and controls it? Is it the existence of foreign weapons, troops, and military bases such as the Iranian weapons, troops, and military bases that exist in Damascus? Is not the massive Iranian missionary activity in the villages and the towns of Syria under the protection of the government an attempt to turn them into Shi’a? Is not taking over some regions, by buying them or by using force, and building shrines on them through the help of the government an attempt to turn Syria into a Shi’ite center? They say that they strive for ‘Muslim Unityand wage actions against the West and the Zionists to deceive the Muslim world and build their Empire.96
These allegations of the Muslim Brothers are refuted by the Syrian Grand Mufti, Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassun, who has stated that these allegations are false andridiculous,” rejecting their doubts that ‘Alawis are Muslims, and emphasizing again that the ‘Alawis, Isma’ilis, and the Druze are all true Muslims.97
The Muslim Brothers view the alliance between Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah (or theKhameine’i Party,” wie sie es nennen) as the implementation of the Shi’ite scheme, since the common link between the three is Shi’ism. According to the Muslim Brothers, Hizbullah’s provocative act, in which two Israeli soldiers were abducted in July 2006, precipitating that summer’s Israel-Hizbullah war, only caused the destruction of Lebanon because the war’s goals, such as freeing Lebanese prisoners in Israel and liberating the Sheb’a Farms, the Golan Heights, and Palestine, were never achieved.98 The only achievements of thisDivine Victorywere the death and injury of many innocent people, the crippling of the Lebanese economy, and the destruction of many houses and villages, which left thousands homeless. According to the Muslim Brothers, the Lebanese discovered that thisDivine Victorywas their destruction, rather than the destruction of the Zionist enemy.
The Muslim Brothers regard the war with Israel as a part of the Iranian scheme. The goal of the war was not to fight in Lebanon’s name, but to destroy the country as a preparatory step to taking it over by causing the fall of its legitimate government, and dominating the country in accordance with the Iranian scheme.99 To support his thesis, Dr. Yusuf relies on Iranian statements during the war, in which they declared that if the war extended to Syria, they would stand by the side of the Syrian regime. Außerdem, according to him, it is well known that the Iranians supplied Hizbullah with the weapons used in the war.100 To support their arguments, the Muslim Brothers also quote the words of the Secretary General of Hizbullah, Hasan Nasrallah, who, according to the Brothers, proclaimed that he is merely asmall soldierunder the service of the Imam Khameine’i and that his soldiers fought in the name of Khameine’i and the Imam Husayn (‘Ali ibn Abi Talib’s son), rather than in the name of God. According to the Muslim Brothers these statements are heresy, and Nasrallah’s loyalty is first and foremost to Iran and not to God or the Arab world. His army and military preparations, which were funded by the Iranians, will soon turn against the Arabs, and especially the Syrians, Lebanese, and the Palestinians. The Syrian Brothers believe that it is their duty to warn the Sunni world before it is too late.101
März 2008, they sent a letter to the Arab leaders at the Arab summit held in Damascus complaining of the Syrian regime’s aggression against the Syrian people and the Syrian Muslim Brothers, underlining the alleged Shi’ite scheme that endangered Syrian identity and demography.102 The bloody clashes in Lebanon on May 7, 2008, when armed Hizbullahsoldiersturned their weapons against their fellow Lebanese, both Sunnis and Christians, only served to strengthen the claims of the Syrian Muslim Brothers that an Iranian-armed Hizbullah was planning to take over Lebanon to implement velayat-e faqih in Lebanon.103 However, during the June 7, 2009 elections in Lebanon, Hizbullah did not win, as most polls had anticipated. The election results were viewed by the Muslim Brothers as a victory for democracy.104 Some observers say that Hizbullah lost the elections because they had turned their weapons against the Lebanese, which they had promised they would never do, and because Nasrallah called this act of aggression aglorious day for the resistance,” stating that it would be easy for Hizbullah and its allies to govern Lebanon.105 Some say that this result was due to Western interference, while others say that it was Hizbullah that chose to lose the elections.
During most of 2008, the Muslim Brothers continued their attack against the Syrian-Iranian alliance, accusing Asad of allowing Iran to control Syria’s economy, Politik, and army.106 According to them, there is a contest in the region between two main forcesIran and the United Statesbut Iran has the advantage because it shares the same religion with the people of the region. In their view, neither Israel nor the United States can compete with Iran in this sphere. Since many Muslims regard Iran as a strong Muslim state facing off against the Zionist/American program in the region, there are manycrazy advocatesof Iran, as they call them, who disregard much of Iran’s own program in the region and defend its overall regional policy.107 According to them, the different assassinations that took place in Syria, such as the assassination of Brigadier-General Muhammad Sulayman, Asad’s right hand man and security advisor, are warnings by a fretful Iran and Hizbullah to the Asad regime for making conciliatory gestures towards Israel, Libanon, and the West.108
The Syrian Muslim Brothers continued their attack against Iran’s hidden regional agenda, questioning the real reason for Iran’s eagerness to free Palestine: “Do they want to free Palestine for the Palestinians or for the velayat-e faqih and its interests in the region?”109 Aber, the Syrian Muslim Brothers faced a problem in late 2008 when Israel attacked the Gaza Strip. The prominent supporters of the Hamas government in Gaza were Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah, while Egypt faced heavy criticism for not opening its border with Gaza. Hasan Nasrallah attacked Egypt for its actions and accused it of complicity with Israel. The Egyptian government saw this as an intentional act by Hizbullah, with Iran’s backing, aimed at causing the fall of the Egyptian government. Hizbullah had attempted to undermine Egypt’s role as a leading Arab country, because Egypt had sought to preserve its relations with Israel rather than help the besieged Palestinians. Für ihren Teil, during the Israeli attack against the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Muslim Brothers decided to suspend their actions against the Syrian regime,110 and this action was considered by some opposition figures as an act of rapprochement towards Damascus.111 Yet the Muslim Brothers were in an awkward situation: it was Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah, their enemies, who stood with the Palestinians, and they could not attack them anymore.
During the months that followed the Gaza Strip war, the Muslim Brothersattacks moderated. März 2009 they published an article under the titleIs It Not about Time?” (“Ama ‘an al-‘awan?”), in which they revealed their disappointment at the cold reaction of the regime towards their attempts at rapprochement. They stated that they wanted to be able to return to their country, to work within Syria for what is best for the nation.112 Since 1982 the main leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brothers had been residing outside Syria, and neither they nor their children were allowed to return.
Im April 2009, when a Hizbullah terrorist cell was caught in Egypt, relations between Egypt and Hizbullah deteriorated even further. The cell was intended to help the Palestinians in Gaza against Israel. Egypt accused Hizbullah of using its soil for terrorist actions and also accused it of spreading Shi’ism in Egypt.113 Like the Syrian Muslim Brothers, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak accused thePersians” (Iran) of trying to take over the Arab countries;114 jedoch, the Muslim Brothers did not make any statement regarding this affair.
Though the Syrian Muslim Brothers believe that Syria is endangered by the Shi’ite Asad regime and that it is their duty to awaken the Sunni community and save it from the Iranian-‘Alawi/Shi’ite scheme before it is too late, they have changed their behavior towards the government. Early in April 2009 they withdrew from theNational Salvation Front,” which had been formed in June 2006 under the leadership of ex-Vice President ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, seit, according to them, this alliance only caused damage to their image.115 Khaddam accused them of seeking a rapprochement with Damascus and meeting with agents of the regime.116 Although the Muslim Brothers did not cease their attacks against the Asad regime, Iran, and Hizbullah, they became more moderate. It seems that after over 30 years as an opposition force outside of Syria, they understood that this caused them to be a weak opposition. Heute, they no longer have an ally, such as Saddam Husayn, to support them, and the support they receive from some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, where some of the Muslim Brothers reside, depends upon the relations between these countries and Syria. When these relations are good, the Muslim Brothers are not granted the same privileges and the freedom to attack the Syrian regime as when relations are bad. They know that they cannot change the situation inside Syria while remaining outside it, and therefore they are striving to return to Syria. But so far the regime is not showing any flexibility in response to their conciliatory actions.
In the last few months we are viewing, to the dissatisfaction of the Muslim Brothers, signs of rapprochement between Syria and some Arab countries such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, backed by a new American policy towards Syria which attempts to shatter its Iranian alliance and to isolate Iran in the region. The recent bloody disturbances that occurred in Iran after its presidential elections on June 12, 2009 – when the regime was accused of forging the resultsmight cause Syria to notice that its interests are with the West and the Sunni Arab countries rather than with Iran, where the future of the current regime is in doubt. The Syrian Muslim Brothers supported117 the presidential candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi, who stood for election in opposition to Asad’s ally, Mahmud Ahmadinejad.
Conclusion
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has sought to emphasize the religious dimension of the triple alliance between Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah, since they see Shi’ite doctrine as the link among the three. The MB has claimed for several years that these allies portray themselves as protecting the Muslim world from the Zionists and the West, but they have relied on religious segregation to reach their goal. They carry the flag of protecting the Muslim world as a cover for their real intention, which is to take over the Sunni states. The MB has tried to stir up Sunni fears in Syria, and worldwide, of a possible Shi’ite takeover of Syria and other Sunni states. The fact that Iran, Syrien, and Hizbullah are regarded by many Muslims worldwide as the primary front against the Zionist/American program has minimized their ability to convince the Muslim world generally and Syrian Sunnis specifically of their claims. To their disappointment, the strategy they had adopted until recently has kept them from emerging as a strong opposition and as a possible future alternative to the existing regime.
As an opposition with a leadership residing outside Syria, they face a major problem because they have lost contact with the Syrians still living in the country and neither they nor their children have been allowed to return to Syria. Their attachment to their mother country is therefore becoming weaker as years go by, and they are viewed by many Syrians as outsiders. With the recent rapprochement in which the United States and the Arab states are courting Syria in order to advance the peace process and weaken its alliance with Iran, the MB has understood that they too should change their approach and adopt a new policy which will help them achieve their aims, since their previous strategy did not garner much success. Probably for this reason, during the past year we have witnessed a significant change in the attitude of the MB. For the first time after more than 40 years of attacking the Ba’th regime, and after 27 years in exile, they finally decided to suspend their opposition to the regime and President Bashar al-Asad. They now claim that the Muslim world is in danger and is under attack and that defending it is more important than fighting the regime in Syria; they do not call for an armed resistance of any kind inside or outside Syria. They also have left the SyrianNational Salvation Front,” which they now view as having damaged their image, particularly in their alliance with ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, who was for over 30 years one of the most powerful figures in the Syrian regime. They now emphasize that the suspension of their actions against the regime stems from their perception of a more significant threat to the Muslim world, das “open war against the Arab and Muslim States.They also emphasize, perhaps for the first time, that they do not hold President Asad responsible for the past, but they want changes in Syria for the benefit of the country and its people. Despite their denial that there is a rapprochement with Damascus, all signs show that the MB has moderated their attack against the regime. Despite these conciliatory gestures, some questions remain: Are these gestures genuine, or are they merely a tactical maneuver to allow the MB leadership to return to Syria and regain their hold inside it? Außerdem, will President Asad respond positively to these gestures and allow the MB leadership to return to Syria?
1. For more on the Nusayri religion seeA Catechism of the Nusayri religion,” in Meir Bar-Asher and Aryeh Kofsky, The Nusayri-‘Alawi Religion (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002), pp. 163-199.
2. About the Nusayriya/’Alawi religion see: Bar-Asher and Kofsky, The Nusayri-‘Alawi Religion.
3. Daniel Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of power in Syria,” Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1989), pp. 429-450.
4. Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), p. 44.
5. Martin Kramer, Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 237-238.
6. The largest denomination within the Shi’ite sect is Ithna ‘Ashriyya/Twelver Shi’ism, also known as Ja’fariyya or Imamiyya.
7. For more on the history of the ‘Alawis/Nusayris in the 19th century see Yvette Talhamy, “The Nusayriya Uprisings in Syria in the 19th Century,” PhD thesis, Haifa University, 2006.
8. Kais M. Firro, “The ‘Alawis in Modern Syria: From Nusayriya to Islam via ‘Alawiya,” Der Islam, Bd. 82 (2005), pp. 1-31.
9. ‘Ali ‘Aziz Al-Ibrahim, al-‘Alawiyun wa al-tashayyu’ (Beirut, 1992), pp. 87-88.
10. Gitta Yafee, “Between Separatism and Union: The Autonomy of the Alawi Region in Syria, 1920-1936,” PhD thesis, Tel-Aviv University, 1992, pp. 251-257.
11. For the fatwa see: Paulo Boneschi, “Une fatw? du Grand Mufti de J?rusalem Muhammad ‘Amin al-husayni sur les ‘Alawites,” Revue de l’Histoire des Religions [Review of the History of Religions], Vol. 122 (July-August 1940), pp. 42-54.
12. Husayn Muhammad Al-Mazlum, al-Muslimun al-‘alawiyun: bayna muftarayat al-aqlam wajawr al-hukkam (1999), p. 127
13. Sulayman Ahmad Khadir, al-Irfan, Vol. 37, No. 3 (März 1950), pp. 337-338.
14. Ayatullah Muhsin al-Hakim of Najaf assumed the ‘Alawis to be deficient in their understanding of the true religion and in need of additional guidance. Kramer, Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, p. 244.
15. Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, pp. 244-245.
16. Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution.
17. Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of power in Syria,” p. 440.
18. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 43.
19. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “The Islamic Movement in Syria: Sectarian Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian-Populist Regime,” in Ali Hilal Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 151.
20. Hinnebusch, “The Islamic Movement in Syria,” p. 157.
21. Eyal Zisser, “Hafiz al-Asad Discovers Islam,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 1 (März 1999), p. 49.
22. Adrienne L. Edgar, “The Islamic Opposition in Egypt and Syria: A Comparative Study,” Journal of Arab Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (April 1987), p. 88.
23. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba’athist Syria (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 278.
24. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 43.
25. Moshe Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Eviland ‘Pax Americana’,” in Bruce Cummings et al, eds., Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth about North Korea, Iran and Syria (New York: The New Press, 2004), p. 183.
26. Robert Olson, The Ba’th and Syria, 1947 zu 1982: The Evolution of Ideology, Party and State from the French Mandate to the Era of Hafiz Al Asad (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1982), p. 169.
27. R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 107.
28. Mordechai Kedar, “In Search of Legitimacy: Asad’s Islamic Image in the Syrian Official Press,” in Moshe Maoz et al, eds., Modern Syria from Ottoman Rule to Pivotal Role in the Middle East (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), p. 24.
29. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Eviland ‘Pax Americana’,” p. 182.
30. Martin Kramer, “Syria’s Alawis and Shi’ism,” in Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, p. 249.
31. Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), p. 352.
32. Hanna Batatu, “Syria’s Muslim Brethren,” MERIP REPORTS, Vol.12, No. 110 (November/ December 1982), p. 20. Musa al-Sadr was of Iranian origin, and was one of the opponents of the Shah of Iran.
33. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Eviland ‘Pax Americana’,” p. 182.
34. The Muslim Brothers accused and still accuse Asad of treason. Nach ihnen, during the 1967 war, Asad, who served as Minister of Defense, handed the Golan Heights to Israel without a struggle. http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task=view&id=2003&itemid=84.
35. The factions also split over questions of leadership. Edgar, “The Islamic Opposition in Egypt and Syria: A Comparative Study,” p. 88.
36. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 8.
37. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 10.
38. Thomas Mayer, “The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961-1982,” Orient (1983), p. 589.
39. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 10.
40. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 328.
41. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 15.
42. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 16.
43. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 17.
44. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, p. 109.
45. For the full manifesto translated to English see: Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 201-267.
46. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 17-21.
47. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 331.
48. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 17-21.
49. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 10-13.
50. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 335.
51. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 337.
52. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ und “Pax Americana’,” p. 184.
53. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ und “Pax Americana’,” p. 185.
54. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ und “Pax Americana’,” p. 187.
55. Particularly the opposition to Muhammad Reza Shah’s rule.
56. Khomeini was expelled from Iran in 1964; he spent his exile years in Najaf, Iraq until 1978. When he was exiled from Iraq he moved to Paris, Frankreich.
57. Hussein J. Agha and Ahmad S. Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995), p. 4. Khomeini was the Supreme Leader of Iran. The Supreme Leader is elected by the Assembly of Experts and is considered the ultimate head of the Iranian political and governmental establishment, above Iran’s President, who is elected by a direct public vote.
58. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 184.
59. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 186-187.
60. Yair Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” in Moshe Ma’oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 105.
61. Joseph Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” in Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, p. 180.
62. Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” p. 184.
63. Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, p. 14.
64. Zisser, “Hafiz al-Asad Discovers Islam,” p. 52.
65. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 194.
66. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 183.
67. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power, p. 285.
68. Batatu, “Syria’s Muslim Brethren,” p. 13.
69. Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” p. 115.
70. Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” pp. 113-114.
71. Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (London: Tauris, 2006), p. 88.
72. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 144.
73. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 81.
74. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, pp. 200-206.
75. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 202.
76. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 204.
77. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, pp. 212-217.
78. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 228.
79. http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task=view&id=203&itemid=84.
80. Sa’id Hawwa, al-Khuminyya: Shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-Shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif [The Khumayniyya: Deviation in Beliefs and Deviation in Behavior] (Amman: Dar Amman li al-Nashr wa-al- Tawzi’, 1987).
81. Hawwa, al-Khuminyya: Shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-Shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif, pp. 45-46.
82. Hawwa, al-Khuminyya: Shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-Shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif, pp. 55-56.
83. ‘Ali Khameine’i also served as Iran’s President during 1981-1989.
84. President Rafsanjani was succeeded by Muhammad Khatimi (1997-2005) and later by Mahmud Ahmadinejad (2005 to the present).
85. März 1991, after Operation Desert Storm, the Arab states of the GCC, Ägypten, and Syria participated in the Damascus meeting, issuing theDamascus declarationwherein they declared their intention to establish a deterrent force to protect Kuwait.
86. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 65.
87. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 31.
88. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 87.
89. The letter was published on the following website: http://www.alburhan.com/articles. aspx?id=1568&page_id=0&page_size=5&links=False&gate_id=0.
90. This letter was sent from the opposition Iranian Sunni League in London and first published in al-Bayan magazine and later published in several Sunni and anti-Shi’ite websites, magazines, and newspapers. Those publications presented the letter as authentic and regarded the situations in Arab Sunni countries such as Egypt, Tunesien, Sudan, Jemen, the Gaza Strip, and others as the implementation of this Shi’ite scheme. The letter seems to be genuine, but one always should bear in mind that since it was published in Sunni media, its publishers may have had an ulterior, sectarian motive in publishing it. Sharif Qindil, http://www.alwatan.com.sa/news/newsdetail.asp?id=72921&issueno=2932.
91. http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task=view&id=1967&item id=84.
92. Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg, “Shi’ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: An Ideology of Revolution Violence,” in Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, p. 50.
93. Zonis and Brumberg, “Shi’ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: An Ideology of Revolution Violence,” p. 52.
94. Ma’d Fayad, http://www.asharqalawsat.com/details.asp?section=45&issue=10398&articl e=419648.
95. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content& task=view&id=2223&itemid=84.
96. ‘Abdallah al-Qahtany, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task =view&id=3638&itemid=5.
97. http://www.alaweenonline.com/site/modules/news/article.php?storyid=80.
98. Samir Quntar and four Lebanese prisoners were freed from Israeli prisons on July 16, 2008 in exchange for the bodies of the two abducted Israeli soldiers.
99. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content& task=view&id=2876&itemid=84.
100. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content &task=view&id=2876&itemid=84.
101. Faysal al-Shaykh Muhammad, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_cont ent&task=view&id=3564&itemid=5.
102. “Kitab maftuh ila al-qadah al-‘arab fi mu’tamar al-qimah,”http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7107&Itemid=141.
103. Muhammad Sayf, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=7744&Itemid=141.
104. Zuhir Salim, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k+cOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO+i1s7RTweb+m3DE7T3o5RBQP+8ftHmfmmpxlyq+8xpXUaWxXWcb /9jcWuI24e75yktXIABuVESOmQJmmy+mz/FVxNNqb9vKfB3u7HIZFUEhBMfok=.
105. Therese Sfeir, “Nasrallah hails May 7 ‘glorious dayfor Resistance,” Daily Star, May 16, 2009, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=102027.
106. Muhammad Sayf, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=8771&Itemid=141.
107. ‘Abdallah al-Qahtany, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=8955&Itemid=141.
108. Muhammad Sayf, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=10142&Itemid=141.
109. ‘Abdallah al-Qahtany, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=11031&Itemid=141.
110. Zuhir Salim, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id =11558&Itemid=141.
111.”Ab’ad al-inshiqaq fi jabhat al-khalas al-suriyya al-mu’arida,”http://www.ikhwansyria.com/ ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k+cOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO+i1s7+GaiuXiRmBqRtZgsgsy kAcSnsH3WAi1ZfnptOdZW9bNFwgladkbU8ynWKIGQnf3DCaCvEqPmpHzaNwy+OsX20i80 DFmQSFPDk5/3LB8PZt4=.
112. Hassan Riyad, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& id=12689&Itemid=141.
113. Bahiya Mardiny, http://www.elaph.com/Web/Politics/2009/4/428050.htm.
114. Ian Siperco, “Iran: Shia Tide Rising,” Middle East Policy Council,http://www.mepc.org/ resources/Siperco001.asp.
115. “Hawl al-mawaqif min jabhat al-khalas al-wataniya,”http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index. php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12824&Itemid=141.
116. “Jama’t al-ikhwan al-muslimin tansahib min jabhat al-khalas al-wataniya al-suriyya al-muarida,” http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=513896&issueno=11086.
117. On their site, the MB proclaimed that the Iranians were fed up with 30 years of velayat-e faqih and wanted change. The MB asked the international community to support the Iranian people in achieving this goal. They see Moussavi as a good man who was part of the Iranian Revolution, but who did not join any political party and is very supportive of the poor and stands against Ahmadinejad. For the MB’s support of the Moussavi see: Faysal al-Shaykh Muhammad, http://www.ikhwansyria. com/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k+cOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO+i1s7JD1nshrHNqO0H sQSEugYBxUZbV5VAz3gJta60uHHeRODBb71fi57OOCRZWqfyddaMdPa0oJ3KiVLDZXzBX6R z64g+IgYmt6rZVzphhEtAAE=; Faysal al-Shaykh Muhammad, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k+cOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO+i1s7s8FtXW84zfjioqY8b0a/ 8ULIQMnL/5rTaf970+zKegLai6vZaNUw5Nm5W4zTDKPiS+mxbaRqXbc+RmhnQO KarMvYUPw1FB4I0a/QmbboaOo=.
Dr. Yvette Talhamy is Fellow Teacher in the University of Haifa’s Department of Middle Eastern Studies. Her forthcoming publications will appear in the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, and Chronos History Journal. She spent 2008-9 on a post-doctoral fellowship in Tel Aviv University’s Department of Middle Eastern and African History.
Copyright Middle East Institute Autumn 2009
Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights Reserved
Talhamy, Yvette “Syrische Muslimbrüder und die syrisch-iranische Beziehung, Der”. Middle East Journal, Der. FindArticles.com. 15 Dezember, 2009. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7664/is_200910/ai_n42040707/
Source:
http://findarticle The ‘Alawis of Syria are part of the Shi’a stream; dies hat zu einem Bündnis mit dem Iran geführt, Zentrum des schiitischen Islam. Dieses Bündnis verschärfte die oppositionelle syrische Muslimbruderschaft (MB), deren Mitglieder seitdem im Exil sind 1982. Nach ihnen, Das Bündnis ist eine Stufe in einem schiitischen Plan zur Übernahme der sunnitischen Länder, einschließlich Syrien. Aber, Im vergangenen Jahr hat die MB ihre Strategie geändert, and we are currently witnessing a rapprochement between the Brotherhood and Damascus.The purpose of this article is to examine the attitude of the Syrian Muslim Brothers towards the ‘Alawi regime as a sectarian Shi’ite regime and as a part of a Shi’ite/Iranian scheme that intends to take over the Sunni worlThe Muslim Brothers of Syria, die prominente Opposition gegen das derzeitige Regime, sind eine sunnitisch-islamistische Bewegung, während die ‘Alawiten, die derzeitigen Herrscher Syriens, werden als Schiiten bezeichnet. Dies bringt das alte sunnitisch-schiitische Schisma an die Oberfläche, in dem jeder den anderen beschuldigt, vom wahren Weg des Islam abgewichen zu sein. Die Lage in Syrien, in dem eine schiitische Minderheit durch die säkulare Ba'th-Partei über eine sunnitische Mehrheit herrscht, wird von den sunnitischen Muslimbrüdern als inakzeptabel angesehen, die glauben, dass diese Situation geändert werden sollte – auch unter Anwendung von Gewalt. Die Muslimbrüder glauben, dass Syrien von der sunnitischen Scharia regiert werden sollte (Islamisches Gesetz) und nicht von dem Ketzer Nusayris, wie die schiitischen Alawiten genannt werden. Als Ergebnis des gewalttätigen muslimischen Widerstands gegen das säkulare Ba'th-Regime in den 1960er Jahren und gegen das säkulare, sektiererisches Asad-Regime in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, Viele Brüder wurden getötet und inhaftiert, während die Führung der Bruderschaft Syrien verließ und nie mehr zurückkehren durfte. Heute leben die syrischen Muslimbrüder in London, unter der Führung von ‘Ali Sadr al-Din al-BayanuniDie Nusayris von Syrien

Die ‘Alawiten, die dominierende Elite Syriens, waren bis in die 1920er Jahre als Nusayris bekannt. Der Begriff Nusayris leitet sich vom Namen Muhammad ibn Nusayr ab, der im neunten Jahrhundert lebte. Ibn Nusayr behauptete, dass 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, Cousin und Schwiegersohn des Propheten, war göttlich, und er stellte ihn über den Propheten Muhammad. Die Nusayris glauben auch an das trinitarische Konzept von „A.M.S. („Ali. Muhammad. Salman.).1 Sie glauben an die Seelenwanderung, und sie greifen auf religiöse Verstellung zurück, oder taqiyya. Seit dem 13. Jahrhundert bewohnen sie die nach ihrem Namen bekannte Bergregion, Jabal al-Nusayriya (der Nusayriya-Berg) im Nordwesten Syriens und in der Region Hatay in der Südtürkei.2

Seit Jahrhunderten, die Nusayris, obwohl als extremistische muslimische Sekte angesehen, wurden von den lokalen syrischen Sunniten und von aufeinanderfolgenden sunnitischen Regierungen misshandelt, die sie als Ketzer außerhalb des Islam betrachteten. Die Nusayris lebten isoliert in ihren Bergen, und ihre Begegnungen mit den Einheimischen, sowohl Muslime als auch Christen, waren selten. Sie bewirtschafteten ihr Land nicht und lebten davon, Nachbardörfer zu überfallen und Reisende auszurauben, was ihnen einen negativen Ruf einbrachte.

Zu Beginn der französischen Mandatszeit in Syrien (1920-1946), Die Gruppe änderte ihren Namen in “„Alawiten.” Einige Forscher, wie Daniel Pipes, sagen, dass die Franzosen ihnen diesen Namen gaben, um sie auf ihre Seite zu ziehen.3 Andere argumentieren, dass die Nusayris diejenigen waren, die ihren Namen ändern wollten “„Alawiten,” Gemeint sind die Anhänger von ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, was sie enger mit dem Islam verbunden hat.4 Annahme des Namens ‘Alawiten und Erhalt von Fatawa (Rechtsgutachten) die sie mit dem Schiismus in Verbindung brachten, sollten ihnen helfen, sich in die syrische muslimische Bevölkerung zu integrieren und ihren Ketzerstatus zu beenden. Als Nusayris, Sie galten als ausgestoßene Sekte, sondern als ‘Alawiten, und die Anhänger von ‘Ali, Sie waren Teil des Schiismus und damit Teil der muslimischen Gemeinschaft. Obwohl während des französischen Mandats und des Unabhängigkeitskampfes, Sunnitische Nationalisten hatten die nationale Solidarität über die religiöse Treue gestellt und die Alawiten als arabische Mitbürger anerkannt, es gab immer noch viele, die sie als bezeichneten “Nusayris,” was impliziert, dass sie Ungläubige und Extremisten waren, die weder mit dem sunnitischen noch mit dem schiitischen Islam verwandt sind.5 Allerdings, Anders als die Sunniten, die Schiiten umarmten die Alawiten und gewannen schließlich ihre Unterstützung.

Das sunnitische/schiitische Schisma

Um die Trennungen zwischen Schiiten6 und Sunniten zu verstehen, müssen wir zuerst die historischen Wurzeln und Lehrunterschiede verstehen, die zu dieser Dichotomie geführt haben. Nach dem Tod des Propheten Muhammad im siebten Jahrhundert und den internen Streitigkeiten darüber, wer den Platz des Propheten als Oberhaupt der muslimischen Gemeinschaft erben würde, Es kam zu einer Spaltung zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten. Besonders akut wurden die Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen den beiden bei der Nachfolgeregelung (gegenüber dem Kalifat und dem Imamat) und die Rolle des islamischen Rechts ohne eine klare koranische Aussage zu einer bestimmten Angelegenheit.

Heute sind die Schiiten eine Minderheit in der muslimischen Welt, bestehend aus etwa 10%-15% der Bevölkerung, einschließlich all der verschiedenen Sekten wie Ismailiten, Zaydis, und ‘Alawiten. Obwohl die Alawiten innerhalb der schiitischen Lehre als Sekte gelten, Es gibt nur wenige Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den Schiiten und den Alawiten. Beide verehren 'Ali und die 12 Imame – obwohl sie unterschiedliche Ansichten über sie haben – und beide greifen auf religiöse Verstellung zurück (taqiyya), aber die Ähnlichkeiten enden dort. Beispielsweise, die Nusayris/’Alawiten haben viele Überzeugungen, die von den Schiiten nicht akzeptiert werden, wie der Glaube an die Seelenwanderung, ihre Platzierung von 'Ali über dem Propheten Muhammad, und ihre eigenen religiösen Bücher und Zeremonien.

Ihre theologischen Unterschiede hinderten die beiden von Schiiten regierten Staaten Iran und Syrien jedoch nicht daran, sich zu verbünden. Einige betrachteten das Bündnis als politisch begründet, Sicherheit, und wirtschaftlichen Interessen, aber die syrischen Muslimbrüder sahen das anders. Nach ihnen, Dieses Bündnis ist nur eine Stufe im iranisch-schiitischen Plan, ein iranisch-schiitisches Reich in der gesamten muslimischen Welt zu bilden, mit dem Ziel, die sunnitische Welt zu übernehmen. Bevor wir das Thema weiter vertiefen, müssen wir zunächst die Frage beantworten, wie und wann die Nusayris zu Schiiten wurden.

Schiiten werden

Jahrhundertelang hatten die Alawiten/Nusayris sowohl sozial als auch wirtschaftlich unter aufeinanderfolgenden sunnitischen Herrschern gelitten. Unter den Osmanen, für wen Syrien regierte 400 Jahre, die ‘Alawiten litten sehr. Isoliert in ihren Bergschanzen, in baufälligen Dörfern leben, Sie mussten Hunger und Armut ertragen, während sie von ihren hauptsächlich sunnitischen Grundbesitzern ausgebeutet wurden, die sie verachteten und als Ungläubige betrachteten.7 Nach dem Untergang des Osmanischen Reiches in 1918, Syrien kam unter französisches Mandat 1920. Dies wurde von den Nusayris als Gelegenheit gesehen, in der Region des Nusayriya-Berges, in der sie die Mehrheit bildeten, Autonomie oder Unabhängigkeit zu erlangen.

Mit Beginn des französischen Mandats in Syrien, Die Führer der ‘Alawiten forderten die Franzosen auf, ihnen einen eigenen Staat zu geben. Die Franzosen, die eine Politik des Teilens und Herrschens verfolgten, gewährte den Alawiten einen eigenen Staat, das “Staat der Alawiten” (1920-1936) im Nusayriya-Gebirge entlang der Küste Syriens, Dadurch wird verhindert, dass die inneren Regionen Syriens einen Abfluss zum Mittelmeer haben. Obwohl sie in diesen Jahren Autonomie genossen, die ‘Alawiten wurden untereinander aufgeteilt. Einige Alawiten, hauptsächlich diejenigen, die gebildet wurden, unterstützte einen breiteren Nationalismus und wünschte die Vereinigung von ganz Syrien, während andere den Separatismus unterstützten und ihren unabhängigen Staat behalten wollten. Unter den Separatisten war ‘Ali Sulayman al-Asad, der Vater von Hafiz al-Asad. Während sich die Anhänger des Separatismus auf religiöse Differenzen als Grundlage für ihre Forderung nach einem unabhängigen Staat stützten, Es wurden ernsthafte Maßnahmen ergriffen, hauptsächlich von den nationalistischen Alawiten, um ihre Verbindungen zur schiitischen Lehre zu betonen.8

Die ‘Alawiten, die den Nationalismus unterstützten, sahen, dass der einzige Weg, ihre Existenz zu bewahren, die Integration in ein vereintes Syrien war, anstatt ein eigenes Land zu haben, und sie förderten diese Idee ab den 1920er Jahren. Sie erkannten, dass es für sie wichtig war, zunächst als Schiiten als Teil der muslimischen Gemeinschaft anerkannt zu werden. Als Nusayris wurden sie sowohl von Sunniten als auch von Schiiten als Ungläubige angesehen, aber als ‘Alawiten würden sie Teil des Islam werden und nicht länger als verstoßene Sekte angesehen werden.

In 1926 Die 'Alawiten unternahmen den ersten Schritt, um Teil des muslimischen Glaubens zu werden, als eine Gruppe von 'Alawiten-Scheichs eine Proklamation herausgab, die dies besagte: “Jeder ‘Alawi ist ein Muslim … Jeder Alawit, der seinen islamischen Glauben nicht bekennt oder leugnet, dass der Koran das Wort Gottes ist und dass Muhammad sein Prophet ist, ist kein Alawit … Die Alawiten sind schiitische Muslime … sie sind die Anhänger des Imam Ali.”9 Im April 1933 eine Gruppe von 'Alawiten' Ulama’ hielt ein Treffen ab und gab eine Erklärung heraus, die die Alawiten mit dem Islam verband, und beantragte, unter dem Namen in den Bevölkerungsregistern eingetragen zu werden “Alawische Muslime.”10 Im Juli 1936 Ein weiterer wichtiger Schritt wurde unternommen, um die Integration der Alawiten in den muslimischen Glauben zu unterstützen, als der palästinensische Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni,11 ein Panarabist, der die Idee von Großsyrien unterstützte, eine Fatwa erlassen, die die Alawiten als Muslime anerkennt. Seine Fatwa wurde in der syrischen Zeitung al-Sha’b veröffentlicht [Die Menschen].12 Das Ziel des Hajj Amin war es, alle muslimischen Araber für eine Sache zu vereinen – Arabische Einheit und der Kampf gegen die Besetzung durch die Westmächte. Diese Fatwa war das erste offizielle religiöse Dekret, das die Alawiten als Muslime anerkannte.

In diesem Jahr verloren die Alawiten ihre Unabhängigkeit, autonomer Staat und wurden von Syrien annektiert, das damals noch unter französischem Mandat stand. Während des Mandats (1936-1946), Die Alawiten, die den Separatismus unterstützten, forderten weiterhin, dass die Franzosen ihre Unabhängigkeit wiederherstellen, aber vergeblich. Zur selben Zeit, die nationalistische Strömung unter den Alawiten erstarkte. Auf der einen Seite, die nationalistischen Alawiten betonten weiterhin ihre Verbindung zum Islam, und auf der anderen Seite die muslimische Gemeinschaft, sowohl Sunniten als auch Schiiten, wollte sie für die Sache des syrischen Nationalstaates gewinnen, indem sie mehrere Fatwas und Erklärungen herausgab, die die ‘Alawiten-Sekte als Teil des muslimischen Glaubens legitimierten. Die Franzosen verließen Syrien im April 1946, und die Alawiten, die den Separatismus unterstützten, wussten, dass sie keine andere Alternative hatten als die Integration in den unabhängigen Staat Syrien.

Obwohl während der 26 Jahren des französischen Mandats übernahmen die Alawiten den Schiismus, ihnen zu helfen, sich in die muslimische Welt und in die syrische Nation zu integrieren, sie hatten seine Lehren nie gelernt. In 1947, die führende schiitische Autorität in Nadschaf, Ayatullah Muhsin al-Hakim, beschlossen, den ersten formellen Schritt zu tun, um die Alawiten zu umarmen und sie zu einem Teil der schiitischen Gemeinschaft zu machen. In 1948, die erste Delegation ‘alawiischer Studenten ging nach Nadschaf, um schiitische Theologie zu studieren und Rechtswissenschaften zu studieren.13 Dieser Schritt blieb erfolglos, da die 'alawiischen Studenten mit schiitischen Anfeindungen konfrontiert und als Extremisten angesehen wurden (Warten), Die meisten Schüler brechen ab und kehren nach Hause zurück. Nach diesem Misserfolg, zu Ja'fari (Zwölf) Die Gesellschaft wurde in Latakia gegründet, die Bildungsarbeit und religiöse Führung übernahmen, und eröffnete mehrere Filialen in anderen Städten wie Jabla, in Tartu, und Banias.

Trotz dieser Aktionen, Die ‘Alawiten wurden auch von den Schiiten noch nicht als echte Muslime angesehen, die glaubten, dass sie mehr Führung brauchten.14 Zwischen 1950-1960 Einige ‘alawiische Studenten studierten an der sunnitischen al-Azhar-Universität in Kairo, die ihren Absolventen ein in Syrien anerkanntes Diplom verlieh.15 In jenen Jahren ergriff die Ba’th-Partei unter ‘Alawiten-Führung die Macht in Syrien als Vorstufe zur Übernahme des gesamten Landes. Wie Martin Kramer es ausdrückt: “Diese Situation war reich an Ironie. Die ‘Alawiten, ihnen wurde von den sunnitischen Nationalisten ein eigener Staat verweigert, hatte stattdessen ganz Syrien eingenommen.”16

Das ‘Alawiten-Regime und die syrischen Muslimbrüder

Es gab zwei Hauptkanäle, die den Alawiten halfen, die Macht in Syrien zu erobern: der Sozialist, säkulare Ba'th-Partei, die besonders die ländliche Klasse und nicht-sunnitische Minderheiten anzog, und die Streitkräfte, wo verschiedene religiöse Minderheiten während des französischen Mandats überrepräsentiert waren und dies auch nach ihrer Abreise blieben. Der Staatsstreich vom März 1963 und Februar 1966, in denen die Alawiten eine große Rolle spielten, markiert die ‘Alawiten’ Konsolidierung der Macht. Der letzte syrische Putsch fand im November statt 1970, und wurde als bekannt “Asad-Putsch.”17 In 1971 Hafiz al-Asad wurde der erste alawitische Präsident Syriens. Aber, Einige Zweige der syrischen Nation weigerten sich, diese Tatsache zu akzeptieren. Dies waren hauptsächlich die Muslimbrüder Syriens, die, von 1964 bis heute, sind die wichtigste syrische Opposition gegen die Herrschaft der Ba'th-Partei und gegen die “sektiererisch” Regel, wie sie es nennen, der Familie Asad.18 In 1945-1946, Dr. Mustafa al-Siba’i gründete die syrische Muslimbruderschaft, die gegen die Franzosen für einen islamischen Staat kämpfte.19 In den ersten Jahren nach ihrer Gründung, Die Gesellschaft veröffentlichte Zeitungen und Literatur und spielte eine aktive Rolle in der syrischen Politik. Im selben Zeitraum entwickelte sich das säkulare Ba'th, und im Gegensatz zu den Muslimbrüdern, die gegen die Säkularisierung gekämpft haben, es erhielt Unterstützung aus verschiedenen Sektoren der syrischen Gesellschaft, vor allem unter Minderheiten, Damit wurde sie zur wichtigsten politischen Partei in Syrien.

Die säkulare Doktrin der regierenden Ba'th-Partei verstärkte nur die Ängste der Sunniten, und Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den Säkularen, Das sozialistische Ba’th und die religiösen Muslimbrüder waren unvermeidlich. In 1964, Das Baath-Regime verbot die Muslimbrüder, und sein neuer Anführer, ‘Isam al-’Attar, wurde verbannt. Im selben Jahr eine von den Muslimbrüdern und anderen Oppositionsfraktionen angeführte Revolte, einschließlich Sozialisten, Liberale, und Nasseristen, brach in der Stadt Hama gegen die Säkularen aus, ländlich, und Minderheitencharakter der syrischen herrschenden Elite. Die Revolte wurde nach einem Bombenanschlag auf die Al-Sultan-Moschee der Stadt niedergeschlagen, was viele Verluste verursachte.20

Im April kam es erneut zu Zusammenstößen zwischen den beiden Seiten 1967 als ein junger alawitischer Offizier namens Ibrahim Khallas einen Artikel in der Armeezeitschrift Jaysh al-Sha’b veröffentlichte (Die Volksarmee) unter dem Titel “Der Weg zur Erschaffung eines neuen arabischen Menschen,” worin er diesen Glauben an Gott und Religion verkündete, Feudalismus, Kapitalismus, Imperialismus, und alle Werte, die die Gesellschaft beherrschten, sollten in ein Museum gestellt werden.21 Dieser Artikel verursachte Streiks und Unruhen in verschiedenen Teilen Syriens, die von den ‘Ulama’ geführt wurden, darunter Mitglieder der Muslimbruderschaft und sogar christliche Geistliche. Als Ergebnis, Khallas wurde aus dem Amt entlassen.22 Laut den Muslimbrüdern, sie lehnten die Ba'th ab, weil sie eine säkulare Partei war. Sie glaubten, dass der Islam zur Staatsreligion erklärt werden sollte und dass die Scharia die Grundlage der Gesetzgebung sein sollte.23 Sie lehnten Asad auch nicht wegen seiner „alawiischen“ Herkunft ab, aber weil, aus ihrer Sicht, sein Regime war sektiererisch, tyrannisch, korrupt, bedrückend, und ungerecht.24

Während der 1970er Jahre, Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Asad-Regime und den Muslimbrüdern verschlechterten sich. In 1973, erneute Unruhen brachen aus, als die syrische Verfassung veröffentlicht wurde und den Islam nicht zur Staatsreligion erklärte. Die Muslimbrüder forderten den Islam als Staatsreligion, obwohl es nie als solches bezeichnet wurde. In 1950, die syrische Versammlung verkündete die syrische Verfassung und, auf Antrag des MB, fügte eine Klausel hinzu, dass die Religion des Staatsoberhauptes der Islam sei. Diese Klausel wurde später weggelassen, und nach dem Aufstieg in die Präsidentschaft, Asad hat diese Klausel wieder in die syrische Verfassung eingefügt, aber als die Verfassung für die Volkszählung eingeführt wurde, die Klausel wurde wieder weggelassen. Diese Tat löste eine Welle wütender Demonstrationen aus, die von den Muslimbrüdern organisiert wurden, der Asad als den bezeichnete “Feind Gottes” und rief zum Dschihad gegen ihn und gegen seine auf “atheistisches und korruptes Regime.”25Als Ergebnis, Asad fügte eine Klausel in die Verfassung ein, die besagte “Der Islam ist die Religion des Staatsoberhauptes,” was bedeutet, dass, seit er der Präsident war, er betrachtete sich als Muslim. Außerdem, im selben Jahr, er befahl den Druck eines neuen Korans mit seinem Bild auf der Titelseite, genannt werden “Asad Koran,” wodurch der Zorn der Sunniten und der Muslimbrüder geschürt wird.26

Asad machte viele versöhnliche Gesten, um das Vertrauen der sunnitischen Mehrheit und der Muslimbrüder zu gewinnen. Er betete freitags in Moscheen27 und an den wichtigsten muslimischen Feiertagen wie 'Id al-Fitr und 'Id al-Adha.28 Er hob Beschränkungen für religiöse Einrichtungen auf und erlaubte den Bau neuer Moscheen.29 Im Dezember 1972, er erhielt eine Legitimation von Hasan al-Shirazi, ein irakischer schiitischer Geistlicher im Exil im Libanon, das aussagen “der Glaube der Alawiten entsprach in jeder Hinsicht dem ihrer zwölf schiitischen Brüder.”30 Später, im Juli 1973, Musa al-Sadr, Vorsitzender des Obersten Rates der Schiiten im Libanon und Vertrauter Asads,31 erklärte, die Alawiten seien eine schiitische Sekte,32 und im folgenden Jahr führte Asad die Umrah nach Mekka durch. Auch Asad wurde vom Großmufti von Syrien zum gläubigen Muslim erklärt, Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaru.33 Aber die Muslimbrüder betrachteten ihn immer noch als Nicht-Muslim und führten einen gewalttätigen Kampf gegen das Asad-Regime.34

In den 1970er Jahren litten die Muslimbrüder auch unter internen Problemen, Spaltung in zwei Fraktionen. Eine Fraktion, die in Jordanien war, gegen heftigen Widerstand, während die andere Fraktion, in Aleppo stationiert, forderten den Dschihad gegen das Asad-Regime und seine Ersetzung durch ein sunnitisches Regime.35 Von 1976 zu 1982, Das Asad-Regime sah sich sowohl säkularer als auch islamistischer Opposition gegenüber. Die Intervention im Libanon in 1976 und innenpolitische Probleme wie Inflation, offizielle Korruption, and the domination of the ‘Alawis in every sphere of life in Syria were the driving force for the opposition’s efforts to overthrow Asad’s non-Muslim, tyrannical regime.36 The Asad regime was viewed as a sectarian government in which an infidel religious minority ruled over the majority. According to the Muslim Brothers, this was an unnatural situation that ought to be changed.

In 1979 the Muslim Brothers carried out an armed attack against the Aleppo Artillery School where 83 young recruits, all ‘Alawis, were killed.37 The Minister of the Interior, ‘Adnan Dabbagh, accused the Muslim Brothers of being agents subservient to the United States andthe Zionist influence,”38 and as a result many Islamists were imprisoned and others were executed.39 In April 1980, armed clashes between the Muslim Brothers and the security forces occurred in the city of Aleppo. Using tanks, armored vehicles, and rockets, the government troops, backed by armed party irregulars,40 occupied the city after killing between 1,000 und 2,000 people and arresting some 8,000.41

In June 1980, the Muslim Brothers were accused of a failed attempt to assassinate President Asad, and as a result Rif’at al-Asad, the President’s brother, led a revenge campaign against the Muslim Brothers held in Tadmor (Palymra) prison, massacring hundreds of defenseless Islamist prisoners.42 The Muslim Brothers struck back by attacking ‘Alawi officials and placing car bombs outside government installations and military bases, killing and injuring hundreds. In Beantwortung, the government carried out brutal reprisals against the Islamists. Many were arrested, summary executions were carried out, and thousands went into exile.43 In July 1980, membership or association with the Muslim Brothers was made a crime punishable by death.44

In November 1980, as the next step in their anti-regime struggle, the Muslim Brothers issued a manifesto that contained their detailed program for the future Islamic state of Syria. The manifesto included an attack against the corrupt, sectarian ‘Alawi regime of theAsad brothers,” and emphasized that a minority cannot and should not rule over a majority.45

The Hama Massacre

The city of Hama was one of the main centers of the Muslim Brotherhood opposition to the regime. The first encounter between the Muslim Brothers and the military in the city occurred in April 1981 when the Brothers ambushed a security checkpoint. In revenge, special forces units moved into the city and began a house-to-house search. About 350 people were killed, many fled into exile, others disappeared or were imprisoned, and clashes between the two sides continued.46 When Anwar al-Sadat was killed by Islamists on October 6, 1981, flyers were distributed in Damascus threatening Asad with the same fate, and the confrontation between the rival forces became inevitable.47 In February 1982, bloody clashes between the Syrian army and the Muslim Brothers occurred in the city of Hama, where about 100 government and party representatives were killed by the armed Brothers. Special forces were sent to the city to fight the rebels. The city was strafed by helicopters and bombarded with rocket, artillery, and tank fire. Large parts of the city were destroyed, leaving hundreds of people homeless. Many more deserted the city. Estimates of the number killed vary, but it is clear that thousands were killed or injured.48

In the same period, there were several violent demonstrations against the regime that were unrelated to the Muslim opposition. März 1980, violent demonstrations against the government erupted in the small town of Jisr al-Shughur (between Aleppo and Latakia). The government regained control in the town after using mortars and rockets. Many houses and stores were destroyed and 150-200 people were killed. Demonstrations also erupted in Idlib, Ma’arra (März 1980), and Dayr al-Zur (April 1980).49

After the clashes with the Muslim Brothers, Asad felt that his position was in danger, and he accused Israel, Ägypten, and the United States of using the Muslim Brothers against him.50 In a speech that he gave on the 19th anniversary of the Ba’th revolution, Asad shouted, “Death to the hired Muslim Brothers who tried to play havoc with the homeland! Death to the Muslim Brothers who were hired by US intelligence, reactionaries and Zionists!”51

During the following years Asad decided to change his internal and external policy. Internally, many Muslim Brothers in Syria and abroad were granted amnesty, and many were released from jails. He also allowed the opening of new Qur’anic schools and the building of new mosques, and he lifted the restrictions on Islamic publications and dress.52 Externally, he was alienated since, in addition to his unfriendly relations with the West, his relations with some Arab countries, such as Iraq, Ägypten, und Jordanien, were remarkably bad. He felt that he needed new allies in the region, and therefore began to enhance his relations with different countries and Muslim organizations. Among the countries with which Asad chose to strengthen his alliance was the Islamic Republic of Iran. Among the Muslim organizations that gained Asad’s support and hospitality were the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Sunni) and the Lebanese Hizbullah (Shi’ite).53 After the peace treaties signed by Israel with Egypt and Jordan, and the unofficial relations between Israel and other Arab countries, Syria under the Asads (both father and son) remained the only frontline Arab country carrying the banner of the pan-Arab, anti-Zionist, and anti-Israeli campaign, thus gaining the support of the Arab population.54 However, the recent Syrian-Iranian alliance has aroused suspicion among the Arab population and leadership concerning the motivations for this alliance with the Shi’ite, non-Arab Islamic Republic of Iran.

Syria and Iran Become Allies

The relationship between Syria and Iran began in the 1970s. During those years the Syrian authorities accorded privileges and protection to some major Iranian opposition figures.55 In 1978, President Asad offered to receive the main Iranian opposition leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,56 in Damascus after he was expelled from Iraq in 1978. Khomeini declined Asad’s invitation, and instead settled in Paris until the 1979 revolution, when he returned to Iran as head of state and became the only leader in the Muslim world to combine political and religious authority through the doctrine of velayat-e faqih.57 The Muslim Brothers in general, including those in Syria, supported the Iranian Islamic Revolution and saw it as a revolution of all the Islamic movements of the various schools and sects. Shortly after assuming his position, Khomeini began calling for Islamic revolutions across the entire Muslim world. The Syrian Muslim Brothers saw this as a positive step for change, and hoped that it would lead to a similar revolution in Syria and the overthrow of the oppressiveAsad rule.”58 Although the Brothers had publicly stated their support of the Iranian Revolution, to their disappointment the Islamic Republic of Iran maintained close relations with the Asad regime59 despite the fact that the Ba’th Party proclaimed itself to be a socialist, secular, Arab party whereas Iran was a Muslim, non-Arab theocracy.60

Since the 18th century, the Iranian Shi’ite ‘ulamahave enjoyed wide religious and political power, but during the 20th century the Pahlavi Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza, took official measures to erode the position of the ‘ulama’. Following the revolution and the overthrow of the Shah, Iran became a kind of informal center for the Shi’a of different countries. The Iranians tried to export their revolution to neighboring Arab states, causing turbulence in Arab Gulf states with Shi’ite populations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. In 1981, the Iranians even backed an unsuccessful plot to overthrow the Sunni government of Bahrain, a country with a Shi’ite majority.61 Later, the Gulf region became an arena of terrorism against local and Western targets, and was shaken by suicide attacks. These Iranian terrorist actions in support of other Shi’ites led to a violent response by the Kuwaiti Sunni Muslim Brothers, who bombed Iranian offices in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Brothers even denounced the Shi’a as anathema.62 Today, in retrospect, the Kuwaiti Brothers perceive these terrorist actions as part of a long-term Shi’ite scheme to take over the Sunni world.

It is hard to explain the reasons behind Khomeini’s preference for Asad over the Muslim Brothers, or as Martin Kramer puts it, “when religion is subordinate to politics, miracles again become possible, and Syria’s ‘Alawis may get recognition as Twelver Shi’is.”63

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Syrien, unlike other Arab countries, supported Iran, and the cooperation and strategic alliance between the two countries grew stronger in the following years.64 In exchange for their support, the Iranians supplied Syria with free petroleum products and oil at concession rates.65 In April 1980, when there were clashes between the Muslim Brothers and security forces in Syria, the Iranians condemned the actions of the Muslim Brothers, accusing them of conspiring with Egypt, Israel, and the United States against Syria.66 For their part, the Syrian Muslim Brothers, as well as the Kuwaiti Muslim Brothers, began to view Iran as a sectarian Shi’ite regime. Parallel with the growing ties between Syria and Iran, the Muslim Brothers of Syria supported and were supported politically and financially by the Iraqi regime under Saddam Husayn.67 In the 1980s, the attacks of the Muslim Brothers against the Islamic Republic of Iran intensified. In a book written by Sa’id Hawwa, the chief ideologist of the Syrian Muslim Brothers in the 1980s, he stressed that the People of the Sunna are the real Muslim community, thus widening the gap between the Muslim Brothers and Iran.68 In April 1982, a coalition of different Syrian opposition groups, including the Syrian MB, set up theNational Alliance for the Liberation of Syria,” which was backed by the Iraqi regime.69 During the 1980s relations between Iran and Syria remained generally close, despite the fact that some Iranian actions had aggravated the Syrians, such as the announcement of a four-stage plan for the establishment of an Islamic Shi’ite regime in Iraq in early 1982. In March of the same year, some Iraniantourists” (who were actually Iranian revolutionary activists) had visited Syria and distributed posters of Khomeini and hung religious slogans on the walls of the Damascus airport and its surroundings.70 Such actions caused a cooling in the relationship between the two countries, but since Iran was alienated from the rest of the region due to the war with Iraq, its relations with the Arab countries were nearly universally poor, making Syria too precious an ally for Iran to lose. The Iranian leadership did whatever was needed to maintain its alliance with Syria, the only Arab state with which it had good relations.

At present, the Shi’ite Hizbullah of Lebanon, currently under the leadership of Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, is another ally of the Asad regime, constituting the third component of the Shi’ite triple alliance. In den frühen 1980er Jahren, while the Syrians were in Lebanon, the Iranians began to cultivate the Shi’ite community of Lebanon. Iran sent Shi’ite clerics to the country to indoctrinate the local Shi’ites with their ideology.71 Iran regarded Lebanon as fertile soil for exporting its revolution, and Hizbullah was the means through which Iran planned toovercomeLebanon in order to attack theZionistenemy, Israel, from the north, and to liberate Palestine. Iran supplied Hizbullah with money, weapons, and military and religious guidance,72 in addition to supporting health, education, and social welfare institutions.73

According to the Syrian Muslim Brothers, the basis of the alliance between the three parties – Syrien, Iran, and Hizbullahis their common Shi’ite doctrine. This allegation was not true in the 1980s, when the relationship between Hizbullah and the Asad regime was marked by tension. During the 1980s, relations between Syria and Hizbullah were indeed more of a rivalry than an alliance, despite Iran’s dissatisfaction with this lack of accord between her two allies.74 In February 1987, the Syrians even perpetrated a massacre against Hizbullah militiamen. After Hizbullah abducted a number of Western citizens, Syrian troops deployed in Beirut’s southern suburbs, where 23 Hizbullah members were subsequently killed. As a result thousands of outraged Lebanese Shi’ite mourners protested against Syria, with some even accusing it of conspiring with Israel.75 For its part, Iran never held Syria responsible for this action but rather attributed it to renegades within the Syrian army. But Iran, knowing this was not true, warned Syria that any action against its allies in Lebanon would be considered an attack against Iran.76

Despite the tension between the two states, Iran was careful not to lose its ally and continued to supply it with free or discounted crude oil. As it became increasingly isolated from the rest of the Arab and Western states, Iran’s relations with Syria became more valuable, especially since there were some diplomatic efforts made on the part of the Arab states to separate the two allies and restore Arab unity.77 During 1987, Iran faced another problem that needed Syrian mediation when Iranian pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca, resulting in bloody clashes with the Saudi security forces. In the incident, 275 Iranians and 85 members of the Saudi security forces were killed, causing a crisis in Saudi/Arab- Iran relations. This incident was regarded by Saudi Arabia as an Iranian plot intended to shake the foundations of Sunni Saudi Arabia. The situation deteriorated to a level where the Iran-Iraq War became regarded as war between the Arabs and the Persians.78

According to the Syrian Muslim Brothers, considering all the aforementioned violent actions committed by Iran in different Arab countries, the Shi’ite Iranians, under the cover of Islam, are more dangerous to the Muslim countries than the Zionists or the Americans. According to the Brothers, the latter’s plan is obvious, but the Shi’ite Iranians manage to obtain Sunni support by waving the flag of war against the Zionists and the Americans, while their genuine aim is to take over these countries and rebuild the Shi’ite Safavid empire.79

In 1987, Sa’id Hawwa, the chief ideologist of the Syrian Muslim Brothers, wrote a book called The Khumayniyya: Deviation in Beliefs and Deviation in Behavior (al- Khumayniyya: shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif), in which he presents the disappointment of the Muslim Brothers in the Islamic Revolution in Iran and exposes thedeviationof Khomeini. In his book, Hawwa quotes from works written by Khomeini himself that, according to Hawwa, reveal the deviation in Khomeini’s thoughts and Shi’ite beliefs. Hawwa goes so far as to regard the Shi’ites and Khomeini as a danger to the existence of the Sunni world, warning young Sunnis against believing the false statements of thisMuslim Revolution.”80 According to Hawwa, the purpose of this revolution is to take over the Sunni world and turn it into a Shi’ite world. To prove his claims, Hawwa points to the Iranian interference in Lebanon and its support for Shi’ite movements such as Hizbullah and Amal, and also presents the odd relationship between Iran and Syria. In his view, the main purpose of the Iran-Iraq War was toconquerIraq and turn it into a Shi’ite state, and then conquer the rest of the Gulf Arab states as a preliminary stage in taking over the whole of the Sunni world.81 Hawwa concludes his book by stating that the Shi’a are different from the Sunnis, their beliefs are different, their prayers are different, and whoever supports them is considered a traitor against God and his Prophet.82

The Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, and Khomeini died the following year. ‘Ali Khameine’i, who had been Iran’s President, became its Supreme Leader,83 and Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani84 was elected President, remaining in office until 1997. Rafsanjani and the Presidents who suceeded him, under the guidance of Khameine’i, pursued Khomeini’s legacy. März 1991, the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Ägypten, and Syria participated in the Damascus meeting,85 and later on in October, the Arab countries, einschließlich Syrien, participated in the Madrid peace talks with Israel. These actions caused tension between Syria and Iran, but after the failure of these talks, the tension between the two allies declined.86 During the 1990s, Syria also played an important role as mediator between Iran and the Arab Gulf states.87 Syria played a mediating role in the dispute between Abu Dhabi and Iran over Iran’s annexation of Abu Musa Island in the Persian Gulf in early 1992, and in the internal Shi’ite disturbances in Bahrain in early 1995.88

Until the 1970s, the ‘Alawis and later President Asad sought religious confirmation as Shi’ite Muslims from prominent Muslim leaders, and especially from Shi’ite leaders. After the Iranian Revolution and the imposition of religious rule, Iran sought an ally in the region, and Syria was that ally. It is fair to say that these two countries built their alliance out of mutual necessity. Over the years their alliance faced numerous obstacles, but managed to survive. Many elements contributed to the survival of this alliance, amongst them the failure of the peace talks in the Middle East, the Palestinian problem, and Western policy that seemed to favor the Israeli side, thus driving Syria to seek a strong ally as a counterweight. Asad’s commitment to the Palestinian cause did not change the attitude of the Muslim Brothers towards him, because they still regarded his regime as an oppressive, sectarian regime and sought to overthrow it, and his alliance with Shi’ite Iran only aggravated them and aroused their suspicions.

The Shi’ite Revolution

The Muslim Brothers of Syria view the ‘Alawi/Shi’ite Asad regime as a part of a Shi’ite/Iranian scheme intended to establish or restore the glory of the old Persian empire and impose Shi’ite doctrine in the various Arab and Muslim states. To support their claims of this purported scheme, they rely on an alleged secret letter that was published in 1998 by the Iranian Sunni League in London, and which they claim was sent from the Iranian Revolution Assembly to different Iranian provinces. This alleged letter included a very detailed five-stage Iranian/Shi’ite plan on how toexportthe Iranian/ Shi’ite revolution to other Muslim countries. The duration of each stage of this plan is ten years, with a total duration of 50 Jahre. The plan’s goal is to unite the Muslims by striking at the Sunni regimes that consider Shi’ite doctrine heretical. According to the plan, controlling these countries would result in control of half the world.

The first step of this plan is: “To improve the relations between Iran and the neighboring Arab states. When the cultural, the economic and the political relations between Iran and those states are good, it will be easy for Iranian agents to enter those countries as immigrants.

The Iranian agents will buy houses, apartments, and lands and help their Shi’ite brothers living in these countries. They will foster good business and personal relations with the powerful figures in these countries, obey the laws of these countries, and obtain permits to celebrate their feasts and to build their own mosquesObtain local nationality through bribes or by using their connections. Encourage the young Shi’ites to incorporate themselves within the local administrations and to enlist in the local armyArouse suspicion and mistrust between the local authorities and the [Sunni] religious authorities by spreading flyers allegedly published by religious leaders criticizing the actions of the local government. This action would lead to friction in the relations between the two sides causing the government to suspect every act of the religious leaders.

The third step is: “After incorporation within the local bureaucracy and army, the task of the Shi’ite religious leaders, contrary to the local Sunni religious leaders, will be to declare publicly their loyalty to the local government, thus gaining their goodwill and trust. Then begins the step of striking at the local economy.

The fourth step is: When mistrust is caused between the religious and political leaders and the collapse of their economy, anarchy will prevail everywhere, and the agents will be the only protectors of the country. After building trust with the ruling elite, the crucial stage will begin by announcing the political leaders as traitors, thus causing their expulsion or their replacement by the Iranian agents. Incorporating Shi’a in the different governmental offices will arouse the anger of the Sunnis who will respond by attacking the government. The agent’s role at this point is to ‘stand bythe head of state and buy the property of those who decide to flee the country.

The fifth step is: “Help to regain peace in those countries by appointing a People’s Assembly, where the Shi’ite candidates will have the majority and will later take over the country, if not through those peaceful measures, then by causing a revolution. After taking over the country, Shi’ism will be imposed.”89

The Syrian Muslim Brothers used this letter to prove90 that the alliance between the ‘Alawi regime and Iran was actually a part of the Shi’ite scheme against the Sunni world. Dr. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, a Syrian author of the Muslim Brothers information bureau, published a series of articles on the Syrian Muslim Brothersofficial website under the titleThe Suspicious Iranian Safavid Persian Scheme in the Arab and Muslim Countries” (al-Mashrual-Irani al-Safawi al-Farisi al-Mashbuh fi Bilad al-‘Arab). The aim of these articles was to reveal the Iranian scheme and the true face of the ‘Alawi regime. In his articles, Dr. Yusuf begins with a description of how the Shi’ite Safavids took over Iran in 1501, and how their influence expanded to Iraq down to the present time. Außerdem, he emphasizes that the Iranianscruel treatment of the Sunni inhabitants under their rule is an illustration of their hate for the Sunnis.91

Actually, Dr. Yusuf’s allegations coincide with Khomeini’s declarations. In his speeches and religious sermons, Khomeini regarded some Sunni governments as illegitimate, claiming that the only truly Islamic state was Iran, and thus believing that Iran has the right to force these states (including by the use of violence), even those that claim to advocate Islamic law, to adopt reforms.92 In his sermons and speeches, Khomeini also attacked the Western powers, especially the United States and their allies (oder “puppetsas he called them) in the region. He fiercely attacked Saudi Arabia, the unofficial leader of the Sunni world, for betraying Islam, as well as Saddam Husayn’s Iraq, which he regarded as an infidel, atheistic government.93 Khomeini’s death did not end the implementation of the Iranian scheme; his successors continued his legacy. The Muslim Brothers believe that the overthrow of Saddam coincided with the goals of Iran, welche, according to the Brothers, is working inside Iraq more than ever to turn it into a Shi’ite state.94

Laut Dr.. Yusuf, what we are seeing now in countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein, Sudan, Jemen, Jordan, Syrien, and Lebanon is the implementation of the Iranian five-stage scheme. In Syria, zum Beispiel, the plan is being implemented under the protection of the Asad regime, and it is the duty of the Muslim Brothers to stop them andsaveSyria.95 On their official website, the Muslim Brothers elaborate and illustrate the Iranianconquestof Syria and their attempts to turn it into a Shi’ite state. “What is conquest?” they ask;

Is it the existence of foreign intelligence in the country that works side by side with local intelligence and controls it? Is it the existence of foreign weapons, troops, and military bases such as the Iranian weapons, troops, and military bases that exist in Damascus? Is not the massive Iranian missionary activity in the villages and the towns of Syria under the protection of the government an attempt to turn them into Shi’a? Is not taking over some regions, by buying them or by using force, and building shrines on them through the help of the government an attempt to turn Syria into a Shi’ite center? They say that they strive for ‘Muslim Unityand wage actions against the West and the Zionists to deceive the Muslim world and build their Empire.96

These allegations of the Muslim Brothers are refuted by the Syrian Grand Mufti, Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassun, who has stated that these allegations are false andridiculous,” rejecting their doubts that ‘Alawis are Muslims, and emphasizing again that the ‘Alawis, Isma’ilis, and the Druze are all true Muslims.97

The Muslim Brothers view the alliance between Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah (or theKhameine’i Party,” wie sie es nennen) as the implementation of the Shi’ite scheme, since the common link between the three is Shi’ism. According to the Muslim Brothers, Hizbullah’s provocative act, in which two Israeli soldiers were abducted in July 2006, precipitating that summer’s Israel-Hizbullah war, only caused the destruction of Lebanon because the war’s goals, such as freeing Lebanese prisoners in Israel and liberating the Sheb’a Farms, the Golan Heights, and Palestine, were never achieved.98 The only achievements of thisDivine Victorywere the death and injury of many innocent people, the crippling of the Lebanese economy, and the destruction of many houses and villages, which left thousands homeless. According to the Muslim Brothers, the Lebanese discovered that thisDivine Victorywas their destruction, rather than the destruction of the Zionist enemy.

The Muslim Brothers regard the war with Israel as a part of the Iranian scheme. The goal of the war was not to fight in Lebanon’s name, but to destroy the country as a preparatory step to taking it over by causing the fall of its legitimate government, and dominating the country in accordance with the Iranian scheme.99 To support his thesis, Dr. Yusuf relies on Iranian statements during the war, in which they declared that if the war extended to Syria, they would stand by the side of the Syrian regime. Außerdem, according to him, it is well known that the Iranians supplied Hizbullah with the weapons used in the war.100 To support their arguments, the Muslim Brothers also quote the words of the Secretary General of Hizbullah, Hasan Nasrallah, who, according to the Brothers, proclaimed that he is merely asmall soldierunder the service of the Imam Khameine’i and that his soldiers fought in the name of Khameine’i and the Imam Husayn (‘Ali ibn Abi Talib’s son), rather than in the name of God. According to the Muslim Brothers these statements are heresy, and Nasrallah’s loyalty is first and foremost to Iran and not to God or the Arab world. His army and military preparations, which were funded by the Iranians, will soon turn against the Arabs, and especially the Syrians, Lebanese, and the Palestinians. The Syrian Brothers believe that it is their duty to warn the Sunni world before it is too late.101

März 2008, they sent a letter to the Arab leaders at the Arab summit held in Damascus complaining of the Syrian regime’s aggression against the Syrian people and the Syrian Muslim Brothers, underlining the alleged Shi’ite scheme that endangered Syrian identity and demography.102 The bloody clashes in Lebanon on May 7, 2008, when armed Hizbullahsoldiersturned their weapons against their fellow Lebanese, both Sunnis and Christians, only served to strengthen the claims of the Syrian Muslim Brothers that an Iranian-armed Hizbullah was planning to take over Lebanon to implement velayat-e faqih in Lebanon.103 However, during the June 7, 2009 elections in Lebanon, Hizbullah did not win, as most polls had anticipated. The election results were viewed by the Muslim Brothers as a victory for democracy.104 Some observers say that Hizbullah lost the elections because they had turned their weapons against the Lebanese, which they had promised they would never do, and because Nasrallah called this act of aggression aglorious day for the resistance,” stating that it would be easy for Hizbullah and its allies to govern Lebanon.105 Some say that this result was due to Western interference, while others say that it was Hizbullah that chose to lose the elections.

During most of 2008, the Muslim Brothers continued their attack against the Syrian-Iranian alliance, accusing Asad of allowing Iran to control Syria’s economy, Politik, and army.106 According to them, there is a contest in the region between two main forcesIran and the United Statesbut Iran has the advantage because it shares the same religion with the people of the region. In their view, neither Israel nor the United States can compete with Iran in this sphere. Since many Muslims regard Iran as a strong Muslim state facing off against the Zionist/American program in the region, there are manycrazy advocatesof Iran, as they call them, who disregard much of Iran’s own program in the region and defend its overall regional policy.107 According to them, the different assassinations that took place in Syria, such as the assassination of Brigadier-General Muhammad Sulayman, Asad’s right hand man and security advisor, are warnings by a fretful Iran and Hizbullah to the Asad regime for making conciliatory gestures towards Israel, Libanon, and the West.108

The Syrian Muslim Brothers continued their attack against Iran’s hidden regional agenda, questioning the real reason for Iran’s eagerness to free Palestine: “Do they want to free Palestine for the Palestinians or for the velayat-e faqih and its interests in the region?”109 Aber, the Syrian Muslim Brothers faced a problem in late 2008 when Israel attacked the Gaza Strip. The prominent supporters of the Hamas government in Gaza were Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah, while Egypt faced heavy criticism for not opening its border with Gaza. Hasan Nasrallah attacked Egypt for its actions and accused it of complicity with Israel. The Egyptian government saw this as an intentional act by Hizbullah, with Iran’s backing, aimed at causing the fall of the Egyptian government. Hizbullah had attempted to undermine Egypt’s role as a leading Arab country, because Egypt had sought to preserve its relations with Israel rather than help the besieged Palestinians. Für ihren Teil, during the Israeli attack against the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Muslim Brothers decided to suspend their actions against the Syrian regime,110 and this action was considered by some opposition figures as an act of rapprochement towards Damascus.111 Yet the Muslim Brothers were in an awkward situation: it was Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah, their enemies, who stood with the Palestinians, and they could not attack them anymore.

During the months that followed the Gaza Strip war, the Muslim Brothersattacks moderated. März 2009 they published an article under the titleIs It Not about Time?” (“Ama ‘an al-‘awan?”), in which they revealed their disappointment at the cold reaction of the regime towards their attempts at rapprochement. They stated that they wanted to be able to return to their country, to work within Syria for what is best for the nation.112 Since 1982 the main leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brothers had been residing outside Syria, and neither they nor their children were allowed to return.

Im April 2009, when a Hizbullah terrorist cell was caught in Egypt, relations between Egypt and Hizbullah deteriorated even further. The cell was intended to help the Palestinians in Gaza against Israel. Egypt accused Hizbullah of using its soil for terrorist actions and also accused it of spreading Shi’ism in Egypt.113 Like the Syrian Muslim Brothers, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak accused thePersians” (Iran) of trying to take over the Arab countries;114 jedoch, the Muslim Brothers did not make any statement regarding this affair.

Though the Syrian Muslim Brothers believe that Syria is endangered by the Shi’ite Asad regime and that it is their duty to awaken the Sunni community and save it from the Iranian-‘Alawi/Shi’ite scheme before it is too late, they have changed their behavior towards the government. Early in April 2009 they withdrew from theNational Salvation Front,” which had been formed in June 2006 under the leadership of ex-Vice President ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, seit, according to them, this alliance only caused damage to their image.115 Khaddam accused them of seeking a rapprochement with Damascus and meeting with agents of the regime.116 Although the Muslim Brothers did not cease their attacks against the Asad regime, Iran, and Hizbullah, they became more moderate. It seems that after over 30 years as an opposition force outside of Syria, they understood that this caused them to be a weak opposition. Heute, they no longer have an ally, such as Saddam Husayn, to support them, and the support they receive from some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, where some of the Muslim Brothers reside, depends upon the relations between these countries and Syria. When these relations are good, the Muslim Brothers are not granted the same privileges and the freedom to attack the Syrian regime as when relations are bad. They know that they cannot change the situation inside Syria while remaining outside it, and therefore they are striving to return to Syria. But so far the regime is not showing any flexibility in response to their conciliatory actions.

In the last few months we are viewing, to the dissatisfaction of the Muslim Brothers, signs of rapprochement between Syria and some Arab countries such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, backed by a new American policy towards Syria which attempts to shatter its Iranian alliance and to isolate Iran in the region. The recent bloody disturbances that occurred in Iran after its presidential elections on June 12, 2009 – when the regime was accused of forging the resultsmight cause Syria to notice that its interests are with the West and the Sunni Arab countries rather than with Iran, where the future of the current regime is in doubt. The Syrian Muslim Brothers supported117 the presidential candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi, who stood for election in opposition to Asad’s ally, Mahmud Ahmadinejad.

Conclusion

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has sought to emphasize the religious dimension of the triple alliance between Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah, since they see Shi’ite doctrine as the link among the three. The MB has claimed for several years that these allies portray themselves as protecting the Muslim world from the Zionists and the West, but they have relied on religious segregation to reach their goal. They carry the flag of protecting the Muslim world as a cover for their real intention, which is to take over the Sunni states. The MB has tried to stir up Sunni fears in Syria, and worldwide, of a possible Shi’ite takeover of Syria and other Sunni states. The fact that Iran, Syrien, and Hizbullah are regarded by many Muslims worldwide as the primary front against the Zionist/American program has minimized their ability to convince the Muslim world generally and Syrian Sunnis specifically of their claims. To their disappointment, the strategy they had adopted until recently has kept them from emerging as a strong opposition and as a possible future alternative to the existing regime.

As an opposition with a leadership residing outside Syria, they face a major problem because they have lost contact with the Syrians still living in the country and neither they nor their children have been allowed to return to Syria. Their attachment to their mother country is therefore becoming weaker as years go by, and they are viewed by many Syrians as outsiders. With the recent rapprochement in which the United States and the Arab states are courting Syria in order to advance the peace process and weaken its alliance with Iran, the MB has understood that they too should change their approach and adopt a new policy which will help them achieve their aims, since their previous strategy did not garner much success. Probably for this reason, during the past year we have witnessed a significant change in the attitude of the MB. For the first time after more than 40 years of attacking the Ba’th regime, and after 27 years in exile, they finally decided to suspend their opposition to the regime and President Bashar al-Asad. They now claim that the Muslim world is in danger and is under attack and that defending it is more important than fighting the regime in Syria; they do not call for an armed resistance of any kind inside or outside Syria. They also have left the SyrianNational Salvation Front,” which they now view as having damaged their image, particularly in their alliance with ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, who was for over 30 years one of the most powerful figures in the Syrian regime. They now emphasize that the suspension of their actions against the regime stems from their perception of a more significant threat to the Muslim world, das “open war against the Arab and Muslim States.They also emphasize, perhaps for the first time, that they do not hold President Asad responsible for the past, but they want changes in Syria for the benefit of the country and its people. Despite their denial that there is a rapprochement with Damascus, all signs show that the MB has moderated their attack against the regime. Despite these conciliatory gestures, some questions remain: Are these gestures genuine, or are they merely a tactical maneuver to allow the MB leadership to return to Syria and regain their hold inside it? Außerdem, will President Asad respond positively to these gestures and allow the MB leadership to return to Syria?

1. For more on the Nusayri religion seeA Catechism of the Nusayri religion,” in Meir Bar-Asher and Aryeh Kofsky, The Nusayri-‘Alawi Religion (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002), pp. 163-199.

2. About the Nusayriya/’Alawi religion see: Bar-Asher and Kofsky, The Nusayri-‘Alawi Religion.

3. Daniel Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of power in Syria,” Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1989), pp. 429-450.

4. Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), p. 44.

5. Martin Kramer, Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 237-238.

6. The largest denomination within the Shi’ite sect is Ithna ‘Ashriyya/Twelver Shi’ism, also known as Ja’fariyya or Imamiyya.

7. For more on the history of the ‘Alawis/Nusayris in the 19th century see Yvette Talhamy, “The Nusayriya Uprisings in Syria in the 19th Century,” PhD thesis, Haifa University, 2006.

8. Kais M. Firro, “The ‘Alawis in Modern Syria: From Nusayriya to Islam via ‘Alawiya,” Der Islam, Bd. 82 (2005), pp. 1-31.

9. ‘Ali ‘Aziz Al-Ibrahim, al-‘Alawiyun wa al-tashayyu’ (Beirut, 1992), pp. 87-88.

10. Gitta Yafee, “Between Separatism and Union: The Autonomy of the Alawi Region in Syria, 1920-1936,” PhD thesis, Tel-Aviv University, 1992, pp. 251-257.

11. For the fatwa see: Paulo Boneschi, “Une fatw? du Grand Mufti de J?rusalem Muhammad ‘Amin al-husayni sur les ‘Alawites,” Revue de l’Histoire des Religions [Review of the History of Religions], Vol. 122 (July-August 1940), pp. 42-54.

12. Husayn Muhammad Al-Mazlum, al-Muslimun al-‘alawiyun: bayna muftarayat al-aqlam wajawr al-hukkam (1999), p. 127

13. Sulayman Ahmad Khadir, al-Irfan, Vol. 37, No. 3 (März 1950), pp. 337-338.

14. Ayatullah Muhsin al-Hakim of Najaf assumed the ‘Alawis to be deficient in their understanding of the true religion and in need of additional guidance. Kramer, Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, p. 244.

15. Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, pp. 244-245.

16. Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution.

17. Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of power in Syria,” p. 440.

18. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 43.

19. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “The Islamic Movement in Syria: Sectarian Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian-Populist Regime,” in Ali Hilal Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 151.

20. Hinnebusch, “The Islamic Movement in Syria,” p. 157.

21. Eyal Zisser, “Hafiz al-Asad Discovers Islam,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 1 (März 1999), p. 49.

22. Adrienne L. Edgar, “The Islamic Opposition in Egypt and Syria: A Comparative Study,” Journal of Arab Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (April 1987), p. 88.

23. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba’athist Syria (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 278.

24. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 43.

25. Moshe Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Eviland ‘Pax Americana’,” in Bruce Cummings et al, eds., Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth about North Korea, Iran and Syria (New York: The New Press, 2004), p. 183.

26. Robert Olson, The Ba’th and Syria, 1947 zu 1982: The Evolution of Ideology, Party and State from the French Mandate to the Era of Hafiz Al Asad (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1982), p. 169.

27. R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 107.

28. Mordechai Kedar, “In Search of Legitimacy: Asad’s Islamic Image in the Syrian Official Press,” in Moshe Maoz et al, eds., Modern Syria from Ottoman Rule to Pivotal Role in the Middle East (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), p. 24.

29. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Eviland ‘Pax Americana’,” p. 182.

30. Martin Kramer, “Syria’s Alawis and Shi’ism,” in Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, p. 249.

31. Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), p. 352.

32. Hanna Batatu, “Syria’s Muslim Brethren,” MERIP REPORTS, Vol.12, No. 110 (November/ December 1982), p. 20. Musa al-Sadr was of Iranian origin, and was one of the opponents of the Shah of Iran.

33. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Eviland ‘Pax Americana’,” p. 182.

34. The Muslim Brothers accused and still accuse Asad of treason. Nach ihnen, during the 1967 war, Asad, who served as Minister of Defense, handed the Golan Heights to Israel without a struggle. http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task=view&id=2003&itemid=84.

35. The factions also split over questions of leadership. Edgar, “The Islamic Opposition in Egypt and Syria: A Comparative Study,” p. 88.

36. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 8.

37. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 10.

38. Thomas Mayer, “The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961-1982,” Orient (1983), p. 589.

39. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 10.

40. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 328.

41. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 15.

42. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 16.

43. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 17.

44. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, p. 109.

45. For the full manifesto translated to English see: Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 201-267.

46. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 17-21.

47. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 331.

48. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 17-21.

49. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 10-13.

50. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 335.

51. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 337.

52. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ und “Pax Americana’,” p. 184.

53. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ und “Pax Americana’,” p. 185.

54. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ und “Pax Americana’,” p. 187.

55. Particularly the opposition to Muhammad Reza Shah’s rule.

56. Khomeini was expelled from Iran in 1964; he spent his exile years in Najaf, Iraq until 1978. When he was exiled from Iraq he moved to Paris, Frankreich.

57. Hussein J. Agha and Ahmad S. Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995), p. 4. Khomeini was the Supreme Leader of Iran. The Supreme Leader is elected by the Assembly of Experts and is considered the ultimate head of the Iranian political and governmental establishment, above Iran’s President, who is elected by a direct public vote.

58. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 184.

59. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 186-187.

60. Yair Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” in Moshe Ma’oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 105.

61. Joseph Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” in Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, p. 180.

62. Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” p. 184.

63. Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, p. 14.

64. Zisser, “Hafiz al-Asad Discovers Islam,” p. 52.

65. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 194.

66. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 183.

67. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power, p. 285.

68. Batatu, “Syria’s Muslim Brethren,” p. 13.

69. Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” p. 115.

70. Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” pp. 113-114.

71. Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (London: Tauris, 2006), p. 88.

72. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 144.

73. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 81.

74. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, pp. 200-206.

75. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 202.

76. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 204.

77. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, pp. 212-217.

78. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 228.

79. http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task=view&id=203&itemid=84.

80. Sa’id Hawwa, al-Khuminyya: Shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-Shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif [The Khumayniyya: Deviation in Beliefs and Deviation in Behavior] (Amman: Dar Amman li al-Nashr wa-al- Tawzi’, 1987).

81. Hawwa, al-Khuminyya: Shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-Shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif, pp. 45-46.

82. Hawwa, al-Khuminyya: Shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-Shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif, pp. 55-56.

83. ‘Ali Khameine’i also served as Iran’s President during 1981-1989.

84. President Rafsanjani was succeeded by Muhammad Khatimi (1997-2005) and later by Mahmud Ahmadinejad (2005 to the present).

85. März 1991, after Operation Desert Storm, the Arab states of the GCC, Ägypten, and Syria participated in the Damascus meeting, issuing theDamascus declarationwherein they declared their intention to establish a deterrent force to protect Kuwait.

86. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 65.

87. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 31.

88. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 87.

89. The letter was published on the following website: http://www.alburhan.com/articles. aspx?id=1568&page_id=0&page_size=5&links=False&gate_id=0.

90. This letter was sent from the opposition Iranian Sunni League in London and first published in al-Bayan magazine and later published in several Sunni and anti-Shi’ite websites, magazines, and newspapers. Those publications presented the letter as authentic and regarded the situations in Arab Sunni countries such as Egypt, Tunesien, Sudan, Jemen, the Gaza Strip, and others as the implementation of this Shi’ite scheme. The letter seems to be genuine, but one always should bear in mind that since it was published in Sunni media, its publishers may have had an ulterior, sectarian motive in publishing it. Sharif Qindil, http://www.alwatan.com.sa/news/newsdetail.asp?id=72921&issueno=2932.

91. http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task=view&id=1967&item id=84.

92. Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg, “Shi’ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: An Ideology of Revolution Violence,” in Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Widerstand, and Revolution, p. 50.

93. Zonis and Brumberg, “Shi’ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: An Ideology of Revolution Violence,” p. 52.

94. Ma’d Fayad, http://www.asharqalawsat.com/details.asp?section=45&issue=10398&articl e=419648.

95. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content& task=view&id=2223&itemid=84.

96. ‘Abdallah al-Qahtany, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task =view&id=3638&itemid=5.

97. http://www.alaweenonline.com/site/modules/news/article.php?storyid=80.

98. Samir Quntar and four Lebanese prisoners were freed from Israeli prisons on July 16, 2008 in exchange for the bodies of the two abducted Israeli soldiers.

99. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content& task=view&id=2876&itemid=84.

100. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content &task=view&id=2876&itemid=84.

101. Faysal al-Shaykh Muhammad, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_cont ent&task=view&id=3564&itemid=5.

102. “Kitab maftuh ila al-qadah al-‘arab fi mu’tamar al-qimah,”http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7107&Itemid=141.

103. Muhammad Sayf, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=7744&Itemid=141.

104. Zuhir Salim,

105. Therese Sfeir, “Nasrallah hails May 7 ‘glorious dayfor Resistance,” Daily Star, May 16, 2009, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=102027.

106. Muhammad Sayf, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=8771&Itemid=141.

107. ‘Abdallah al-Qahtany, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=8955&Itemid=141.

108. Muhammad Sayf, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=10142&Itemid=141.

109. ‘Abdallah al-Qahtany, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=11031&Itemid=141.

110. Zuhir Salim, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id =11558&Itemid=141.

111.”Ab’ad al-inshiqaq fi jabhat al-khalas al-suriyya al-mu’arida, Hier

112. Hassan Riyad, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& id=12689&Itemid=141.

113. Bahiya Mardiny, http://www.elaph.com/Web/Politics/2009/4/428050.htm.

114. Ian Siperco, “Iran: Shia Tide Rising,” Middle East Policy Council,http://www.mepc.org/ resources/Siperco001.asp.

115. “Hawl al-mawaqif min jabhat al-khalas al-wataniya,”http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index. php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12824&Itemid=141.

116. “Jama’t al-ikhwan al-muslimin tansahib min jabhat al-khalas al-wataniya al-suriyya al-muarida,” http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=513896&issueno=11086.

117. On their site, the MB proclaimed that the Iranians were fed up with 30 years of velayat-e faqih and wanted change. The MB asked the international community to support the Iranian people in achieving this goal. They see Moussavi as a good man who was part of the Iranian Revolution, but who did not join any political party and is very supportive of the poor and stands against Ahmadinejad. For the MB’s support of the Moussavi see: Faysal al-Shaykh Muhammad, ; Faysal al-Shaykh Muhammad, .

Dr. Yvette Talhamy is Fellow Teacher in the University of Haifa’s Department of Middle Eastern Studies. Her forthcoming publications will appear in the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, and Chronos History Journal. She spent 2008-9 on a post-doctoral fellowship in Tel Aviv University’s Department of Middle Eastern and African History.

Copyright Middle East Institute Autumn 2009

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Talhamy, Yvette “Syrische Muslimbrüder und die syrisch-iranische Beziehung, Der”. Middle East Journal, Der. FindArticles.com. 15 Dezember, 2009. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7664/is_200910/ai_n42040707/