RSSL-Entrati Kollha Tikkettati Bi: "Shadi Hamid"

STRATEĠIJI GĦALL-IMPENĠĠ TAL-IŻLAM POLITIKU

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

L-Iżlam Politiku huwa l-aktar forza politika waħda attiva fil-Lvant Nofsani llum. Il-futur tagħha huwa marbut mill-qrib ma’ dak tar-reġjun. Jekk l-Istati Uniti u l-Unjoni Ewropea huma impenjati li jappoġġaw ir-riforma politika fir-reġjun, se jkollhom bżonn ifasslu l-konkrit, strateġiji koerenti għall-involviment ta' gruppi Iżlamiċi. Madankollu, l-U.S. ġeneralment ma kienx lest li jiftaħ djalogu ma’ dawn il-movimenti. Bl-istess mod, L-impenn tal-UE mal-Iżlamisti kien l-eċċezzjoni, mhux ir-regola. Fejn jeżistu kuntatti ta’ livell baxx, huma prinċipalment iservu għal skopijiet ta' ġbir ta' informazzjoni, mhux għanijiet strateġiċi. L-U.S. u l-UE għandhom għadd ta’ programmi li jindirizzaw l-iżvilupp ekonomiku u politiku fir-reġjun – fosthom l-Inizjattiva ta’ Sħubija fil-Lvant Nofsani (MEPI), il-Korporazzjoni tal-Isfida tal-Millenju (MCC), l-Unjoni għall-Mediterran, u l-Politika Ewropea tal-Viċinat (ENP) – iżda ftit għandhom xi jgħidu dwar kif l-isfida tal-oppożizzjoni politika Iżlamista tidħol fi ħdan objettivi reġjonali usa'. L-Istati Uniti. u l-assistenza u l-ipprogrammar tad-demokrazija tal-UE huma diretti kważi kollha kemm lejn gvernijiet awtoritarji nfushom jew gruppi sekulari tas-soċjetà ċivili b’appoġġ minimu fis-soċjetajiet tagħhom stess..
Wasal iż-żmien għal valutazzjoni mill-ġdid tal-politiki attwali. Mill-attakki terroristiċi ta’ Settembru 11, 2001, l-appoġġ għad-demokrazija fil-Lvant Nofsani ħa importanza akbar għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika tal-Punent, li jaraw rabta bejn in-nuqqas ta’ demokrazija u l-vjolenza politika. Attenzjoni akbar ġiet iddedikata għall-fehim tal-varjazzjonijiet fi ħdan l-Islam politiku. L-amministrazzjoni l-ġdida Amerikana hija aktar miftuħa biex twessa’ l-komunikazzjoni mad-dinja Musulmana. Sadanittant, il-maġġoranza l-kbira tal-organizzazzjonijiet Islamisti mainstream – inkluż il-Fratellanza Musulmana fl-Eġittu, Front ta’ Azzjoni Iżlamika tal-Ġordan (IAF), Partit tal-Ġustizzja u l-Iżvilupp tal-Marokk (PJD), il-Moviment Kostituzzjonali Iżlamiku tal-Kuwajt, u l-Jemen Islah Party – għamlu dejjem aktar l-appoġġ għar-riforma politika u d-demokrazija komponent ċentrali fil-pjattaformi politiċi tagħhom. Barra minn hekk, ħafna wrew interess qawwi fil-ftuħ ta’ djalogu mal-U.S. u l-gvernijiet tal-UE.
Il-futur tar-relazzjonijiet bejn in-nazzjonijiet tal-Punent u l-Lvant Nofsani jista’ jkun iddeterminat fil-biċċa l-kbira mill-grad sa liema l-ewwel jimpenjaw partiti Iżlamiċi mhux vjolenti fi djalogu wiesa’ dwar interessi u għanijiet kondiviżi.. Kien hemm proliferazzjoni riċenti ta 'studji dwar l-involviment mal-Iżlamisti, iżda ftit jindirizzaw b'mod ċar x'jista' jinvolvi fil-prattika. Bħala Zoe Nautre, sħabi viżitatur fil-Kunsill Ġermaniż dwar ir-Relazzjonijiet Barranin, tpoġġiha, “l-UE qed taħseb dwar l-impenn iżda ma tafx verament kif.”1 Bit-tama li tiċċara d-diskussjoni, niddistingwu bejn tliet livelli ta’ “ingaġġ,” kull wieħed b’mezzi u għanijiet differenti: kuntatti ta’ livell baxx, djalogu strateġiku, u sħubija.

Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma: Lessons from South and Southeast Asia

Shadi Hamid
L-Istati Uniti. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 u 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Madankollu, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, u, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt. The situation in Jordan is similar. The Bush administration and the Democratic congress have hailed the country as a “model” of Arab reform at precisely the same time that it has been devising new ways to manipulate the electoral process to limit Islamist representation, and just as it held elections plagued by widespread allegations of outright fraud
and rigging.1 This is not a coincidence. Egypt and Jordan are the only two Arab countries that have signed peace treaties with Israel. Barra minn hekk, they are seen as crucial to U.S. efforts to counter Iran, stabilize Iraq, and combat terrorism.

Engaging Political Islam to Promote Democracy

Shadi Hamid

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans have struggled toarticulate an overarching, long-term strategy for fighting religious extremism and terror in the Middle East. Most experts on both the left and right agree that promoting democracy will help address the root causes of terrorism in theregion, though they differ on to what degree. The reasoning is simple: If Arabs and Muslims lack legitimate, peaceful outlets with which to express their grievances, they are more likely to resort to violence. In one important 2003study, Princeton University’s Alan Krueger and Czech scholar Jitka Maleckova analyzed extensive data on terrorist attacks and concluded that “the only variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties. Countries with more freedom were less likely to be the birthplace of international terrorists.

Parting the Veil

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Illum,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. L-Eġittu, Il-Ġordan, It-Tuneżija, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Il-Libanu, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Mill-bidu tas-snin disgħin, L-Istati Uniti. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma

Shadi Hamid

L-Istati Uniti. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 u 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Madankollu, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, u, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.