RSSTous les articles taggés avec: "Sayyed Qutb"

Islam en occident

Jocelyne Cesari

L'immigration des musulmans en Europe, Amérique du Nord, et l'Australie et les dynamiques socioreligieuses complexes qui se sont développées par la suite ont fait de l'islam en Occident un nouveau champ de recherche fascinant. L'affaire Salman Rushdie, controverses sur le hijab, les attentats du World Trade Center, et la fureur suscitée par les caricatures danoises sont autant d'exemples de crises internationales qui ont mis en lumière les liens entre les musulmans d'Occident et le monde musulman mondial. Ces nouvelles situations entraînent des défis théoriques et méthodologiques pour l'étude de l'islam contemporain, et il est devenu crucial d'éviter d'essentialiser ni l'islam ni les musulmans et de résister aux structures rhétoriques des discours préoccupés par la sécurité et le terrorisme.
Dans cet article, Je soutiens que l'Islam en tant que tradition religieuse est une terra incognita. Une raison préliminaire à cette situation est qu'il n'y a pas de consensus sur la religion comme objet de recherche.. La religion, en tant que discipline universitaire, est déchiré entre l'histoire, sociologique, et méthodologies herméneutiques. Avec l'islam, la situation est encore plus complexe. Dans l'ouest, l'étude de l'islam a commencé comme une branche des études orientalistes et a donc suivi une voie distincte et distincte de l'étude des religions. Même si la critique de l'orientalisme a été centrale dans l'émergence de l'étude de l'islam dans le domaine des sciences sociales, les tensions restent vives entre les islamistes et les anthropologues comme les sociologues. Le sujet de l'islam et des musulmans en Occident est ancré dans cette lutte. Une implication de cette tension méthodologique est que les étudiants en islam qui ont commencé leur carrière universitaire en étudiant l'islam en France, Allemagne, ou l'Amérique et il est difficile d'établir sa crédibilité en tant qu'érudits de l'islam, en particulier dans le milieu universitaire nord-américain
le contexte.

Islam et Démocratie: Texte, Tradition, et d'Histoire

Ahmad Ahrar

les stéréotypes populaires dans l'Ouest ont tendance à poser une progressive, rationnelle, et de l'Ouest gratuite contre un retour en arrière, oppressif, et menaçant l'islam. Les sondages d'opinion publique menés aux États-Unis dans les années 1990 ont révélé une tendance constante des Américains à qualifier les musulmans de « fanatiques religieux » et à considérer l'éthos de l'islam comme fondamentalement « antidémocratique ».1 Ces caractérisations
et les appréhensions ont, pour des raisons évidentes, considérablement aggravé depuis le drame de 9/11. Cependant, ces perceptions ne se reflètent pas simplement dans la conscience populaire ou les représentations médiatiques grossières. Des universitaires respectés ont également contribué à ce climat d'opinion en écrivant sur les différences supposées irréconciliables entre l'Islam et l'Occident., le fameux « choc des civilisations » censé être imminent et inévitable, et sur l'incompatibilité apparente entre l'islam et la démocratie. Par exemple, Le professeur Peter Rodman s'inquiète que "nous soyons défiés de l'extérieur par une force militante atavique motivée par la haine de toute pensée politique occidentale qui renvoie à des griefs séculaires contre la chrétienté". Docteur. Daniel Pipes proclame que les musulmans défient l'Occident plus profondément que les communistes ne l'ont jamais fait, car "alors que les communistes ne sont pas d'accord avec nos politiques, les musulmans fondamentalistes méprisent tout notre mode de vie. Le professeur Bernard Lewis met sombrement en garde contre « la réaction historique d'un ancien rival contre notre héritage judéo-chrétien, notre présent séculier, et l'expansion des deux. demande le professeur Amos Perlmutter: « L'islam est-il, fondamentaliste ou autre, compatible avec la démocratie représentative de style occidental axée sur les droits de l'homme? La réponse est catégorique non." Et le professeur Samuel Huntington suggère avec panache que « le problème n'est pas l'intégrisme islamique, mais l'islam lui-même. Il serait intellectuellement paresseux et simple d'esprit de rejeter leurs positions comme basées simplement sur la rancune ou les préjugés. En réalité, si l'on ignore certaines exagérations rhétoriques, certains de leurs frais, bien que gênant pour les musulmans, sont pertinents pour une discussion sur la relation entre l'islam et la démocratie dans le monde moderne. Par exemple, la position des femmes ou parfois des non-musulmans dans certains pays musulmans est problématique en termes de prétendue égalité juridique de tous les peuples dans une démocratie. De la même manière, l'intolérance dirigée par certains musulmans contre les écrivains (par exemple., Salman Rushdie au Royaume-Uni, Taslima Nasrin au Bangladesh, et le professeur Nasr Abu Zaid en Egypte) compromet ostensiblement le principe de la liberté d'expression, ce qui est essentiel à une démocratie.
Il est également vrai que moins de 10 des plus de 50 les membres de l'Organisation de la conférence islamique ont institutionnalisé des principes ou des processus démocratiques tels qu'ils sont compris en Occident, et ça aussi, seulement provisoirement. Pour terminer, le type de stabilité interne et de paix externe qui est presque une condition préalable au fonctionnement d'une démocratie est vicié par la turbulence de l'implosion interne ou de l'agression externe évidente dans de nombreux pays musulmans aujourd'hui (par exemple., Somalie, Soudan, Indonésie, Pakistan, Irak, Afghanistan, Algérie, et la Bosnie).

La vie de Hasan al Banna & Syed Qutb.

Les Frères musulmans (Ikhwan al Muslimin) a été fondée par Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) dans la ville égyptienne d'al- Isma'iliyyah dans 1928. Le fils d'un érudit azharite, qui gagnait sa vie en réparant des montres, Hasan al-Banna a montré dès ses débuts
les jours d'école une inclination et un grand zèle pour appeler les gens aux valeurs et traditions islamiques. Son sens aigu de la religiosité et sa conscience spirituelle l'ont poussé à rejoindre la Hasafiyyah tariqah, l'une des nombreuses tariqah soufies répandues en Égypte à cette époque. Même s'il n'était pas formellement associé à cette tariqah après avoir fondé l'Ikhwan, il, Néanmoins, entretenait de bonnes relations avec lui, comme d'ailleurs avec d'autres organisations islamiques et personnalités religieuses, et persistait à réciter les litanies (awrad, PL. de volonté) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .

Sayyid Qutb: Le Karl Marx de la révolution islamique

Leslie Evans

Sayyid Qutb (octobre 9, 1906-Août 29, 1966), the Egyptian literary critic, philosopher, and theorist of the contemporary jihadist movement is only becoming a familiar name in the West in recent years, but his voluminous writings have had and continue to have enormous impact in the Muslim world. It is not an overstatement to say that it is hardly possible to understand the reasoning and goals of the Islamic militants without some familiarity with the outlook Qutb (pronounced KUH-tahb) enunciated.
A search of Amazon.com returns no less than seven books in English about Sayyid Qutb as well as collections of his writings and many of his own books in translation. The two works touched on here are only a random sampling of a very large literature which is again but a minute fraction of what exists in Arabic. These two are quite different in scope and attitude. Adnan Ayyub Musallam, a Palestinian native of Bethlehem, holds a doctorate from the University of Michigan
and is currently professor of history, la politique, and cultural studies at Bethlehem University in the West Bank. His generally sympathetic but critical biography concentrates on the evolving politics of Qutb’s affiliations and thought. The quite brief and more critical piece by Paul Berman for the New York Times looks at Qutb’s theology and helps to clarify his argument with Christianity and Western secularism.
Brilliant from his earliest youth, Sayyid Qutb was an unlikely figure to serve as the inspiration for a global revolutionary movement. Although for a brief period he was a member of the militant Muslim Brothers, where he served as an editor not as an organizer, he spent most of his life as a lone intellectual. Where Marx, the theorist of world communism, labored in the British Museum, Sayyid Qutb wrote his most influential works in an Egyptian prison, where he spent most of the last eleven years of his life, until his execution by the Nasser government in 1966. Even his turn to Islam in any serious way did not take place until he was past forty, yet in prison in his fifties he produced a controversial rethinking of the religion that reverberates around the world.
Qutb was born in the village of Musha, between Cairo and Aswan into a family of small landowners. He was sent to the local madrasa, the government school, rather than the still more religious kuttab, the Islamic school, but he won a contest between the two schools for the best memorization of the Qur’an. He recalled his life there in his only biographical work, “Child from the Village,” recording local customs and superstitions. From that period he acquired a belief in the world of spirits that he carried with him all his life

Les Ikhwan en Amérique du Nord: Un peu d'histoire

Douglas Farah

Ron Sandee


Le procès en cours fédérales contre la Holy Land Foundation pour les secours et le développement (HLF) à Dallas, Texas,1 offre un regard intérieur sans précédent sur l'histoire des Frères musulmans aux États-Unis, ainsi que ses objectifs et sa structure. Les documents parlent de recrutement, organisme, l'idéologie et le développement de l'organisation en différentes phases aux États-Unis. L'accusation dans cette affaire a présenté de nombreux documents internes des Frères musulmans des années 1980 et du début des années 1990 qui donnent une première, vision publique de l'histoire et de l'idéologie derrière les opérations des Frères musulmans (connu sous le nom d'Ikhwan ou Le Groupe) aux Etats-Unis. au cours des quatre dernières décennies. Pour les chercheurs, les documents ont le poids supplémentaire d'être rédigés par les dirigeants Ikhwan eux-mêmes, plutôt que des interprétations de sources secondaires.

L'ISLAMISME DANS LE SUD DE L'EGYPTE

James Toth

For years, religious violence and terrorism in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypthave splashed across the headlines and surged across the screen, announcing yet anotherround of senseless death and destruction. While Arabists and Islamicists attemptto pick their way carefully through the ideological and intellectual minefields to makesense of what is happening, the wider public generally disregards their insights andinstead sticks to what it knows best: deeply ingrained prejudices and biases. Égyptien,Arabe, Muslim—all are painted in a very unfavorable light. Even in Egypt, manybystanders show the same sorry prejudices. In the end, people simply blame the brutalityon inexplicable backward religious ideas and then move on.Yet comprehending terrorism and violence in places such as Egypt by recourse toan unnuanced religious fundamentalism is generally acknowledged not only to begthe question of why these events actually happen, but also to lead to misunderstandingsand misperceptions, and perhaps even to exacerbating existing tensions.1 Mostscholars agree that such seemingly “irrational” social behavior instead needs to beplaced in its appropriate context to be properly understood, and hence made rational.Analyzing these actions, alors, involves situating this violence and destruction in theireconomic, politique, and ideological milieu as these have developed historically, forthis so-called Islamic terrorism does not merely arise, ex nihilo, out of a timeless void.What follows, alors, is one case study of one portion of the Islamic movement as itemerged principally in southern Egypt and as it was revealed through anthropologicalfieldwork conducted in one of this region’s major cities. This account takes a completelydifferent direction from that of stigmatizing this movement as a sordid collectionof terrorist organizations hell bent on the senseless destruction of Egypt and itsIslamic civilization.2 Because this view is somewhat at odds with the perceptions oflocal spectators, Egyptians in Cairo, and non–Egyptians inside and outside the country,I go to some length not only to discuss the movement itself but also to shed lighton why it might have received such negative publicity.

Les Frères musulmans: Hasan al-Hudaybi et idéologie

Hasan Isma>il al-Hudaybi led the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood during a
time of crisis and dissolution. Succeeding Hasan al-Banna’, who was the founder
and fi rst leader of the organisation, al-Hudaybi was to be its head for more than
twenty years. During his leadership he faced severe criticism from fellow Brothers.
Following the Revolution of July 1952, he was pitted against the antagonism
of >Abd al-Nasir, who became increasingly infl uential in the council of
leading Free Offi cers. >Abd al-Nasir’s determination to thwart the cause of the
Brotherhood and its infl uence on society was part of his path to absolute rule.
Considering the signifi cance of al-Hudaybi’s years as leader of the Muslim
Fraternité, it is surprising that there is little scholarly work on the subject.
When taking into account that his moderate ideas continue to have a strong infl uence
on the policy and attitude of today’s Muslim Brotherhood, e.g. his conciliatory
position towards the state system and his refutation of radical ideas, the fact
that so little attention is paid to his writing is even more startling. Assurément, there
has been interest in the Muslim Brotherhood. There are quite extensive studies
available on Hasan al-Banna’: the founder and fi rst leader of the Muslim Brotherhood
has been described as a model fi gure of Islamic campaigning; others depict
him as the originator of threatening political activism in the name of Islam. There
has been even more interest in the ideas of Sayyid Qutb; some see him as the
ideologue of Islamist radicalism, whose concepts trained extremist groups; others
describe him as a victim of state persecution who developed a theology of liberation
in reaction to his maltreatment. No doubt, it is important to examine the
work of these thinkers in order to understand currents of Islamist ideology and
Mouvements islamistes. Whatever the verdict on al-Banna’ and Qutb, it is a fact
that certain ideas of the two thinkers have been incorporated into the modern-day
Frères musulmans. Cependant, this focus has led to an incorrect perception that
the Islamic movement is necessarily radical in its thinking and/or militant in its
deeds, an assumption which has, in recent years, been questioned by a number
of scholars, among them John L. Edwards, Fred Halliday, François Burgat, et
Gudrun Krämer. 1 The following study of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood under the
leadership of Hasan al-Hudaybi will form an addition to these theses, addressing
and reassessing the viewpoint that political Islam is a monolithic block, all in all
disposed towards violent means.
2 Introduction
There are reasons why al-Hudaybi is hardly mentioned in the literature on the
Frères musulmans. The fi rst that comes to mind is the observation that Islamist
movements are, by defi nition, seen as fundamentally radical, anti-democratic and
anti-Western. This reasoning questions any distinction between moderate Islamism
and its radical counterpart. The argument goes that both have the objective
of establishing an Islamic state system, that they both aim to replace existing
secular governance and that they therefore differ only in the degree of their methods,
but not in principle. This book, cependant, clearly joins the scholarly circle on
l'islam politique, which identifi es arguments such as these as neo-Orientalist. Comme
Esposito shows, this approach to political Islam is based on what he terms ‘secular
fundamentalism’.
The external view of political Islam is focused primarily on radical thought,
and this may be due to the creation, on the part of power politics, of a fear of
Islam as a religion, which is different, strange and seemingly in opposition to
Western thought. Alternatively, it may be because radical or even militant groups
are constantly appearing in the media by reason of their actions. En réalité, militant
Islamists actually seek such publicity. While radical thought and militant action
make it necessary to study extremist groups, the focus on terrorism in the name
of Islam marginalises moderate Islamists. It also makes it diffi cult to explain the
differences between radical and moderate Islamism. In effect, the scholarly focus
on radical or militant groups reinforces the generally negative public perception
of Islam in the West.
A further reason why al-Hudaybi in particular has not been studied by Western
scholars has to do with the internal affairs of the Brotherhood. It is astonishing
that his name is not mentioned much by the writers of the Muslim Brotherhood
itself. There is no simple explanation for this. One reason may be that members
particularly stress their sympathies for al-Banna’, depicting him as an ideal
leader who died for his activist convictions. Cependant, as many Brothers endured
imprisonment, hard labour and even torture inside >Abd al-Nasir’s prisons and
camps, their personal histories have resulted in a dearth of discourse on Hasan
al-Hudaybi. Ainsi, there is a tendency to remember al-Hudaybi’s period of leadership
as a time of near defeat and destruction. Still, the experiences of the
persecuted are caught in the ambiguous relationship between forgetting and reappraisal.
Many personal accounts of the time have been published since the mid
1970s, 2 narrating stories of torture and stressing steadfastness of faith. Only a
few of the books written by Muslim Brothers take a broader approach, lequel
includes discussion of a crisis within the organisation and of al-Hudaybi’s part
therein. Those authors who do tackle this issue not only reveal the society’s weak
position vis-à-vis >Abd al-Nasir, but also expose signs of disintegration within the
Frères musulmans. 3 This has led to differing attitudes towards al-Hudaybi, avec
most portraying him as an incompetent leader lacking the charismatic personality
of his predecessor, al-Banna’. En particulier, he was accused of not commanding
the authority to bring together the different wings of the Muslim Brotherhood
or to adopt a strong position in relation to the authoritarian state system. In the
latter view lies an ambiguity, for it would appear to show al-Hudaybi not just as a
Introduction 3
failure, but also as a victim of the political situation. Pour terminer, these accounts reveal
an ideological gap which opened at the beginning of the period of persecution in
1954. To a certain extent, Sayyid Qutb fi lled this gap. During his imprisonment
he developed a radical approach, rejecting the then state system as illegitimate
and ‘un-Islamic’. In developing a revolutionary concept and explaining thereby
the reasons underlying the persecution, he turned the condition of victimisation
into one of pride. Ainsi, he gave many imprisoned Muslim Brothers, particulièrement
young members, an ideology that they could hold on to.
It has to be said that al-Hudaybi did not react decisively to the situation of
internal crisis and dissolution. En effet, to a certain extent his indecisiveness triggered
this situation. This was especially obvious during the period of persecution
(1954–71), when he omitted to provide any guidelines to help in overcoming
the feeling hopelessness ushered in by >Abd al-Nasir’s mass imprisonments. His
reaction to the radical ideas which fl ourished in the prisons and camps among
certain, especially young, members came fairly late. Even then, his scholarly and
juridical argumentation did not have the same sweeping effect as Sayyid Qutb’s
writings. Dans 1969, al-Hudaybi proposed a moderate concept in his writing Du
la Qudat (Preachers not Judges). 4 This writing, which was secretly distributed
among fellow Brothers, is considered the fi rst substantial refutation of Sayyid
Qutb’s ideas. 5 Qutb, who was hanged in 1966, was by then considered to be a
martyr, his thoughts already having a considerable infl uence. This does not mean
that the majority of Muslim Brothers did not pursue a moderate approach, but the
lack of guidelines left them voiceless and reinforced the perception of al-Hudaybi
as a weak leader.
Néanmoins, al-Hudayb’is moderate thought had an impact on his fellow
Frères musulmans. After the general amnesty of 1971, al-Hudaybi played a major
part in the re-establishment of the organisation. Although he died in 1973, his moderate
and conciliatory ideas continued to be relevant. The fact that close companions
such as Muhammad Hamid Abu Nasr, >Umar al-Tilmisani and Muhammad
Mashhur, who died recently, succeeded him as leaders shows the continuance of his
thought. en outre, his son Ma’mun al-Hudaybi has played a major role in
his capacity as the Brotherhood’s secretary and spokesman. Another reason why
his thinking became important lies in the changed attitude towards the Muslim
Brotherhood since Anwar al-Sadat’s presidency. Al-Sadat, who succeeded >Abd
al-Nasir, released the imprisoned Brothers and offered the organisation a half-legal
though not offi cially recognised status. A period of reorganisation (1971–77) followed,
during which the government lifted the censorship of books written by
Frères musulmans. Many memoirs of formerly imprisoned members were published,
such as Zaynab al-Ghazali’s account or al-Hudaybi’s book Du<at la Qudat
(Preachers not Judges). Dealing with the past, these books did not merely preserve
the memory of the cruelties of >Abd al-Nasir’s persecution. Al-Sadat followed
his own agenda when he allowed these publications to fi ll the market; this
was a deliberate political stratagem, implying a change of direction and aimed at
distancing the new government from the old. The posthumous publication of
al-Hudaybi’s writings was not merely aimed at providing ideological guidance to
4 Introduction
the Muslim Brothers; they were distributed because of their statements against
radical thought, and were thus used to address a new and rising problem, à savoir
the establishment of Islamist groups, which began to fi ght actively against the
political system in the early 1970s. In these terms, Du<at la Qudat remains an
important critique of radical thought.
Hasan al-Hudaybi’s main aim was to change society, Je. Egyptian society,
lequel, in his view, was not aware of the political nature of Islamic belief. Ainsi,
real change could only be brought about through creating awareness and by
tackling the issue of Islamic identity (as opposed to a Western perception). Only
through developing a sense of Islamic consciousness could the ultimate goal of the
establishment of an Islamic society be reached. Given this approach, al-Hudaybi
refuted revolutionary overthrow, instead preaching gradual development from
within. A major point was therefore education and social engagement, as well as
participation in the political system, appealing by means of mission ( da<wa ) to the
consciousness of the individual believer.
This path of his is now followed by today’s Muslim Brotherhood, which endeavours
to be recognised as a political party and which infl uences political decision
faire en infiltrant les structures politiques participatives (parlement, administration,
organisations non gouvernementales). Cette étude des Frères musulmans
des années 1950 au début des années 1970, donc, n'est pas seulement une recherche sur
l'histoire politique moderne de l'Égypte et l'analyse d'une idéologie religieuse, mais
a aussi un rapport avec la politique actuelle.

Barbara SE. Zollner

HasanHasan Ismail al-Hudaybi a dirigé la Société des Frères musulmans pendant une période de crise et de dissolution. Succeeding Hasan al-Banna’, qui a été le fondateur et le premier dirigeant de l'organisation, al-Hudaybi devait en être le chef pendant plus de vingt ans. During his leadership he faced severe criticism from fellow Brothers.

Following the Revolution of July 1952, il a été opposé à l'antagonisme d'Abd al-Nasir, qui devinrent de plus en plus influents au sein du conseil des principaux Officiers Libres. La détermination d'Abd al-Nasir à contrecarrer la cause de la Confrérie et son influence sur la société faisait partie de son chemin vers le pouvoir absolu. Considérant l'importance des années d'al-Hudaybi en tant que chef des Frères musulmans, it is surprising that there is little scholarly work on the subject.

Si l'on tient compte du fait que ses idées modérées continuent d'avoir une forte influence sur la politique et l'attitude des Frères musulmans d'aujourd'hui, e.g. sa position conciliante envers le système étatique et sa réfutation des idées radicales, le fait que si peu d'attention soit accordée à son écriture est encore plus surprenant. Assurément, il y a eu de l'intérêt pour les Frères musulmans.

Il existe des études assez approfondies sur Hasan al-Banna’: le fondateur et premier dirigeant des Frères musulmans a été décrit comme une figure modèle de la campagne islamique; others depict him as the originator of threatening political activism in the name of Islam.

There has been even more interest in the ideas of Sayyid Qutb; some see him as the ideologue of Islamist radicalism, whose concepts trained extremist groups; others describe him as a victim of state persecution who developed a theology of liberation in reaction to his maltreatment.

No doubt, it is important to examine the work of these thinkers in order to understand currents of Islamist ideology and Islamist movements. Whatever the verdict on al-Banna’ and Qutb, it is a fact that certain ideas of the two thinkers have been incorporated into the modern-day Muslim Brotherhood.

Cependant, this focus has led to an incorrect perception that the Islamic movement is necessarily radical in its thinking and/or militant in its deeds, an assumption which has, in recent years, been questioned by a number of scholars, among them John L. Edwards, Fred Halliday, François Burgat, and Gudrun Krämer.

The following study of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Hasan al-Hudaybi will form an addition to these theses, addressing and reassessing the viewpoint that political Islam is a monolithic block, all in all disposed towards violent means.

There are reasons why al-Hudaybi is hardly mentioned in the literature on the Muslim Brotherhood. The fi rst that comes to mind is the observation that Islamist movements are, by defi nition, seen as fundamentally radical, anti-democratic and anti-Western.

This reasoning questions any distinction between moderate Islamism and its radical counterpart. The argument goes that both have the objective of establishing an Islamic state system, that they both aim to replace existing secular governance and that they therefore differ only in the degree of their methods, but not in principle.

This book, cependant, clearly joins the scholarly circle on political Islam, which identifi es arguments such as these as neo-Orientalist. As Esposito shows, this approach to political Islam is based on what he terms ‘secular fundamentalism’.

The external view of political Islam is focused primarily on radical thought, and this may be due to the creation, on the part of power politics, of a fear of Islam as a religion, which is different, strange and seemingly in opposition to

Western thought. Alternatively, it may be because radical or even militant groups are constantly appearing in the media by reason of their actions. En réalité, militant Islamists actually seek such publicity.

While radical thought and militant action make it necessary to study extremist groups, the focus on terrorism in the name of Islam marginalises moderate Islamists.

It also makes it difficult to explain the differences between radical and moderate Islamism. In effect, the scholarly focus on radical or militant groups reinforces the generally negative public perception of Islam in the West.

A further reason why al-Hudaybi in particular has not been studied by Western scholars has to do with the internal affairs of the Brotherhood. It is astonishing that his name is not mentioned much by the writers of the Muslim Brotherhood itself. There is no simple explanation for this.

One reason may be that members particularly stress their sympathies for al-Banna’, depicting him as an ideal leader who died for his activist convictions. Cependant, as many Brothers endured imprisonment, hard labour and even torture insideAbd al-Nasir’s prisons and camps, their personal histories have resulted in a dearth of discourse on Hasan al-Hudaybi.

Ainsi, there is a tendency to remember al-Hudaybi’s period of leadership as a time of near defeat and destruction. Still, the experiences of the persecuted are caught in the ambiguous relationship between forgetting and reappraisal.

Many personal accounts of the time have been published since the mid 1970s, 2 narrating stories of torture and stressing steadfastness of faith. Only a few of the books written by Muslim Brothers take a broader approach, which includes discussion of a crisis within the organisation and of al-Hudaybi’s part therein. Those authors who do tackle this issue not only reveal the society’s weak position vis-à-vis Abd al-Nasir, but also expose signs of disintegration within the

Frères musulmans. 3 This has led to differing attitudes towards al-Hudaybi, with most portraying him as an incompetent leader lacking the charismatic personality of his predecessor, al-Banna’. En particulier, he was accused of not commanding the authority to bring together the different wings of the Muslim Brotherhood or to adopt a strong position in relation to the authoritarian state system.

In the latter view lies an ambiguity, for it would appear to show al-Hudaybi not just as a failure, but also as a victim of the political situation. Pour terminer, these accounts reveal an ideological gap which opened at the beginning of the period of persecution in 1954.

To a certain extent, Sayyid Qutb fi lled this gap. During his imprisonment he developed a radical approach, rejecting the then state system as illegitimate and ‘un-Islamic’. In developing a revolutionary concept and explaining thereby the reasons underlying the persecution, he turned the condition of victimisation into one of pride.

Ainsi, he gave many imprisoned Muslim Brothers, particularly young members, an ideology that they could hold on to.

It has to be said that al-Hudaybi did not react decisively to the situation of internal crisis and dissolution. En effet, to a certain extent his indecisiveness triggered this situation.

This was especially obvious during the period of persecution (1954–71), when he omitted to provide any guidelines to help in overcoming the feeling hopelessness ushered in by Abd al-Nasir’s mass imprisonments. His reaction to the radical ideas which fl ourished in the prisons and camps among certain, especially young, members came fairly late.

Even then, his scholarly and juridical argumentation did not have the same sweeping effect as Sayyid Qutb’s writings. Dans 1969, al-Hudaybi proposed a moderate concept in his writing Duat la Qudat (Preachers not Judges).

This writing, which was secretly distributed among fellow Brothers, is considered the fi rst substantial refutation of Sayyid Qutb’s ideas. 5 Qutb, who was hanged in 1966, was by then considered to be a martyr, his thoughts already having a considerable infl uence.

This does not mean that the majority of Muslim Brothers did not pursue a moderate approach, but the lack of guidelines left them voiceless and reinforced the perception of al-Hudaybi as a weak leader.

Néanmoins, al-Hudayb’is moderate thought had an impact on his fellow Muslim Brothers. After the general amnesty of 1971, al-Hudaybi played a major part in the re-establishment of the organisation. Although he died in 1973, his moderate and conciliatory ideas continued to be relevant.

The fact that close companions such as Muhammad Hamid Abu Nasr, Umar al-Tilmisani and Muhammad Mashhur, who died recently, succeeded him as leaders shows the continuance of his thought.

en outre, his son Ma’mun al-Hudaybi has played a major role in his capacity as the Brotherhood’s secretary and spokesman.

Another reason why his thinking became important lies in the changed attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood since Anwar al-Sadat’s presidency. Al-Sadat, who succeeded Abd al-Nasir, released the imprisoned Brothers and offered the organisation a half-legal though not offi cially recognised status.

A period of reorganisation (1971–77) followed, during which the government lifted the censorship of books written by Muslim Brothers. Many memoirs of formerly imprisoned members were published, such as Zaynab al-Ghazali’s account or al-Hudaybi’s book Du<at la Qudat (Preachers not Judges).

Dealing with the past, these books did not merely preserve the memory of the cruelties of Abd al-Nasir’s persecution.

Al-Sadat followed his own agenda when he allowed these publications to fi ll the market; this was a deliberate political stratagem, implying a change of direction and aimed at distancing the new government from the old.

The posthumous publication of al-Hudaybi’s writings was not merely aimed at providing ideological guidance to the Muslim Brothers; they were distributed because of their statements against radical thought, and were thus used to address a new and rising problem, namely the establishment of Islamist groups, which began to fi ght actively against the political system in the early 1970s. In these terms, Duat la Qudat remains an important critique of radical thought.

Hasan al-Hudaybi’s main aim was to change society, Je. Egyptian society, lequel, in his view, was not aware of the political nature of Islamic belief. Ainsi, real change could only be brought about through creating awareness and by tackling the issue of Islamic identity (as opposed to a Western perception).

Only through developing a sense of Islamic consciousness could the ultimate goal of the establishment of an Islamic society be reached. Given this approach, al-Hudaybi refuted revolutionary overthrow, instead preaching gradual development from within. A major point was therefore education and social engagement, as well as participation in the political system, appealing by means of mission ( dawa ) to the consciousness of the individual believer.

This path of his is now followed by today’s Muslim Brotherhood, which endeavors to be recognised as a political party and which infl uences political decision making by infi ltrating the political participatory structures (parlement, administration, organisations non gouvernementales).

This study of the Muslim Brotherhood from the 1950s until the early 1970s, donc, is not only a piece of research into the modern political history of Egypt and an analysis of a religious ideology, but has also a relationship to current politics.