RSSهمه نوشته های با برچسب: "اصلاحات"


دکتر,محمد بدیع

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; therefore, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

Islamic Political Culture, دموکراسی, and Human Rights

دانیل E. قیمت

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. در نتیجه, عالمان, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, however, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Europe’s Engagement with Moderate Islamists

کریستینا Kausch

Direct engagement1 with Islamist political movements has typically been a no-go for European governments. In recent years, however, the limits of the European Union’s (EU) stability-oriented approach towards cooperation with authoritarian rulers in the Middle East and North Africa (منا) to defend EU strategic interests in the region have become increasingly obvious. Incumbent MENA rulers’ attempts to portray the European choice of interlocutors in the region as either stabilising governments or de-stabilising Islamists are increasingly perceived as short-sighted and contradictory. Recent debates suggest that the search for viable alternative policy approaches is leading to a shift in European policy makers’ attitude towards moderate2 Islamist actors.
There is no shortage of incentives to redirect the course of EU policies in the region. Preventing the
radicalisation of Islamist movements in the region is an integral part of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy. It
has become common wisdom that substantial political reform will only happen through effective pressure from
within. Non-violent, non-revolutionary Islamist parties that aspire to take power by means of a democratic
process have therefore often been portrayed as potential reform actors that carry the hopes of a volatile region
for genuine democratic development and long-term stability

Hamas and political reform in the middle east

دیوید Mepham

The lesson of Palestine’s election is that the international community should become more serious and sophisticated about political reform in the middle east, says David Mepham of the Institute for Public Policy Research.
Hamas’s stunning victory in the 25 January elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council raises three critical questions for international policymakers:
• why did it happen – that an organisation labelled asterroristby the Israelis, the European Union and the United States manages to win the support of a majority of Palestinian voters?
• how should the international community now respond?
• where does Hamas’s victory leave the cause of political reform and democratisation in the middle east?
The rise of Hamas
Much of the immediate international commentary on the election result has focused on the failings of Fatah during the decade in which the movement held power in the Palestinian Authority (PA) – including the rampant corruption of senior Fatah officials and the lack of meaningful democracy within the PA. There was also a sizeable positive vote for Hamas. The organisation is seen by many Palestinians as untainted by corruption, و, unlike the PA, it has a good track record of providing health, education and other services.
The other part of the explanation for the Hamas victory – less discussed in the international media – has been the failure of thepeace processand the radicalising and impoverishing effects of the Israeli occupation. Under the premiership of Ariel Sharon since 2001, Israel has all but destroyed the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority. Israel has also continued its policy of illegal settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank and east Jerusalem, and it is in the process of building aseparation barrier”.
Israel is not building the barrier on its pre-1967 occupation border (which it would be allowed to do under international law). Rather it plans to build 80% of the barrier inside Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory. This involves incorporating the main Israeli settlement blocs, as well as taking over Palestinian agricultural lands and water resources. This restricts Palestinian freedom of movement, and makes it much harder for Palestinians to access their schools, health facilities and jobs.
These policies are oppressive and humiliating; they also have disastrous economic consequences. The United Nations estimates that poverty levels have more than trebled in the last five years, that 60% of Palestinians are now living in poverty, and that unemployment is around 30%. These conditions have provided very fertile soil for the radicalisation of Palestinian opinion and for the rise of Hamas.
The short-term challenge
Hamas’s electoral victory presents the international community with a real conundrum.
On the one hand, theQuartet” (the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations) is right to say that full-scale peace negotiations with Hamas will require significant movement on Hamas’s part. Hamas does not recognise the state of Israel. It also supports violence, including attacks on Israeli civilians, as part of its strategy for Palestinian national liberation. Anyone expecting an immediate and formal shift in Hamas policy on these issues is likely to be disappointed.
But intelligent international diplomacy can still make a difference. While they are reluctant to formally proclaim it, there is evidence that some senior Hamas leaders accept the reality of Israel within its pre-1967 borders. Moreover, on the question of violence Hamas has largely maintained a unilateral truce (tahdi’a) for the past year. Extending this truce, and working for a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire, should be the immediate focus of international diplomacy towards Hamas, if necessary through third-party intermediaries.
The other critical international objective should be to avoid the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Fatah’s mismanagement and the disastrous consequences of Israeli occupation and closures have left the PA in a desperate state and entirely dependent on donor funding to stay afloat. In 2005, the EU provided £338 million, while the US contributed £225 million. Cutting that assistance overnight would plunge tens of thousands of Palestinians into acute poverty, triggering social implosion and anarchy. But donors are rightly worried about transferring resources to a government dominated by Hamas.
One possibility would be to press for a government of Palestinian technocrats, without senior Hamas figures in key ministerial positions, and to rely on Mahmoud Abbas, the directly elected Palestinian president, as the main interlocutor for the international community. Something along these lines appears to command support amongst the Quartet. If the immediate economic situation can be stabilised, then there is at least a possibility of encouraging Hamas to move in a political direction through a policy of gradual, conditional engagement. Pressure on Israel to live up to its obligations under international law, for example by ending illegal settlement activity, would also help: persuading a sceptical Palestinian public that the world does care about their plight and is committed to a two-state solution.
The regional prospect
While Hamas’s victory has focused attention on the immediate crisis in the Palestinian territories, it raises wider questions about the process of political reform and democratisation in the broader middle east, a process advocated so publicly by the Bush administration. It is ironic, to say the least, that Hamas – a group with which the United States refuses to deal – should be the beneficiary of a free and fair election encouraged by US policy. Some will draw from this the conclusion that democratic reform in the middle east is a hopelessly misguided enterprise and one that should be abandoned forthwith. Smallcconservatives, on all sides of the political spectrum, will feel vindicated in highlighting the risks of rapid political change and in pointing out the virtues of stability.
It is true that political change carries risks, including the risk that radical Islamists like Hamas will be the major beneficiaries of political liberalisation. While this is a reasonable concern, those who highlight it tend to overlook the diversity of political Islamists in the region, the special circumstances that account for the rise of Hamas, and the extent to which some Islamists have moderated their positions in recent years. Unlike Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and the Justice & Development Party in Morocco all reject violence and have committed themselves to pluralistic politics.
Nor do the critics suggest a better alternative for addressing the phenomenon of political Islamism across the region than the attempted engagement of Islamists in the political process. Repression of Islamists and their systematic exclusion from political institutions has been a recipe for instability and extremism, not moderation.
There is obviously a strong critique to be made of the Bush administration’s attempts to promote political change in the middle east, not least the multiple failings of its policy in Iraq. More broadly, the US lacks credibility in the region as a force for democracy and human rights because of its largely uncritical support for Israel, and its military, diplomatic and often financial backing for many of the more authoritarian regimes in the region. Even when it is particularly outspoken on the need for greater democracy, for example in its recent dealings with President Mubarak of Egypt, the administration’s anti-terrorism agenda consistently trumps its political reform objectives.
But exposing the folly and ineffectiveness of US policy is one thing; ditching the commitment to political reform in the middle east is quite another. The international community needs to strengthen not weaken its commitment to accountable government and human rights in the region. In thinking about political change in the middle east – where the concept of a democratic culture is often very weak – international actors need to give as much emphasis toconstitutionalismas to elections, important though elections are. In this context, constitutionalism means a balance of powers, including checks on the executive, a fair and independent legal process, a free press and media, and the protection of the rights of minorities.
It is important too for international actors to be realistic about what can be achieved in particular countries and over particular timescales. In some cases, support for political reform might involve pushing hard now for genuinely free elections. In other cases, a higher short-term priority for political reform might be encouraging an enlarged space in which opposition groups or civil society can function, greater freedom for the press, support for educational reforms and cultural exchanges, and promoting more inclusive economic development.
It is also vital to think more imaginatively about creating incentives for political reform in the middle east. There is a particular role for the European Union here. The experience of political change in other parts of the world suggests that countries can be persuaded to undertake very significant political and economic reforms if this is part of a process that yields real benefits to the ruling elite and the wider society. The way in which the prospect of EU membership has been used to bring about far-reaching change in eastern and central Europe is a good example of this. The process of Turkey’s accession to the EU can be seen in a similar vein.
A critical question is whether such a process might be used more broadly to stimulate political reform across the middle east, through initiatives like the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP will provide participating middle-eastern states with a stake in EU institutions, in particular the single market, providing a powerful incentive for reform. It also allows for the EU to reward countries that make faster progress against agreed benchmarks for political reform.
There are no simple answers to the current problems besetting the middle east. But the lesson to be drawn from the Hamas result is emphatically not that the international community should give up on the cause of political reform in the region. Rather it should become more serious and sophisticated about helping to support it.

High noon in Egypt

Devika Parashar

F. Andy Messing

The parallels between President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and the deposed shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran, are attention-getting. In 1979, prior to the notorious Islamic Revolution, which was instigated and controlled by radical Muslim cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the shah wielded personal and authoritarian power in a manner comparable to the dictators of the time: Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and earlier, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. These rulers brandished their power with little restraint, unencumbered by the rule of law and basically insensitive to the needs of their populace. Unfortunately, Hosni Mubarak alarmingly resembles these former dictators in social, سیاسی, economic and security issues. He is inadvertently pushing his country towards an Islamic revolution. As an earlier example, the shah of Iran slowly strangled his country by reigning with a heavy-hand through his unfettered security force. He narrowed the sociopolitical base of his government and distorted the economy by monopolistic actions. This modus operandi reflects Mr. Mubarak’s current regime, whose survival depends on his ability to reverse these trends. Accordingly, آقای. Mubarak uses hisCentral Security Force,” that now consists of more than half of his entire military, to impose a measure of censorship on the mass media and ban most forms of political organization, activities and literary expression. Like the shah, he has established control over physical action, selectively executing opposition, imprisoning and exiling thousands of people who oppose his policies. Recently, the leading English language newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly reported an upsurge in deaths due to police brutality. Another Arab news source reported the barring of human-rights groups from attending secret military trials. Economically, آقای. Mubarak monopolistically privatizes the highly regulated Egyptian economy, fostering creation of an exclusive industrial bourgeoisie. He invites only pro-Mubarak businesses to work within his development schemes. Like the shah, he has alienated large sections of the public and private sectors, thus suppressing any real economic growth. Politically, آقای. Mubarak cracks down on civil participation, essentially repressing political opposition; while his lack of government transparency practically guarantees rife corruption throughout the 4 million strong bureaucracy. Equally important, is the lack of government response to crises. Al-Ahram Weekly reported 20 train crashes between 1995 and August 2006. In each case, the government formed an ineffectual and disorganized crisis-management council that failed to correct
the problem. As the government failed to meet the needs of its people, اخوان المسلمین (al-Ikhwan) filled a void by establishing social services, such as health clinics and youth programs, to effectively respond to various situations. The first and best-known example of this was their mobilization after the 1992 earthquake struck Southern Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood provided disaster relief then, and continues to do so, thereby enhancing its traction. Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood has nonviolently taken control of 15 percent of major professional associations that form the greater part of Egypt’s middle class. In the most recent parliamentary election in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood presented the largest threat to Mr. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, securing an unprecedented 34 out of 454 seats. They demonstrated their ability to draw support despite government opposition. آقای. Mubarak unwittingly nurtured the regrowth of the essentially Fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood by alienating segments of the Egyptian populace and eliminating soft-line opposition (such as the secular Wafd and al-Ghad parties). He must seek more innovative methods to remain in power. For example, Chile managed to open the economy and encourage free enterprise under Augusto Pinochet, even though his government was considered authoritarian. آقای. Mubarak must tap into the tremendous energy of the Egyptian people by increasing the pace of capitalization and democratization, thereby improving their standard of living. If he succeeds, آقای. Mubarak could eventually create a legacy for himself as an Arab leader who effectively modernized and democratized thiskeystonenation. In doing so, he would secure major assets such as the Suez Canal, Egypt’s oil production and tourism, for not only his country but for the global economy, while providing a positive example for the entire Muslim world. علاوه بر این, ایالات متحده قرار گرفت. ability to deal with Egypt will be enhanced, and our aid to that country will become completely justified. But if Mr. Mubarak fails, his regime will fall to the same type of radical elements that claimed the shah’s government in 1979, creating compounded turmoil for Egypt and the world. Devika Parashar spent eight months in Egypt into 2007 and is a research assistant at the National Defense Council Foundation. F. Andy Messing, a retired Special Forces officer, is NDCF’s executive director and met with a Muslim Brotherhood Representative in Cairo in 1994. He has been to 27 conflict areas worldwide.

Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma

شادی حمید

ایالات متحده قرار گرفت. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 و 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. با این حال, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, و, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.

Political Transitions in the Arab World

در شحاته

The year 2007 marked the end of a brief interval of political liberalization in the Arab world which began shortly after the occupation of Iraq and which resulted primarily from external pressures on Arab regimes to reform and democratize. External pressures during the 2003-2006 period created a political opening which activists across the region used to press for longstanding demands for political and constitutional reform.Faced with a combination of growing external and internal pressures to reform, Arab regimes were forced to make some concessions to their challengers.In Egypt, upon the request of the President, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to allowfor direct competitive presidential elections. In September2005, Egypt witnessed its first competitive presidential election ever and as expected Mubarak was elected for a fifth term with 87%of the vote. Moreover,during the November 2005 parliamentary elections,which were freer than previous elections, اخوان المسلمین, the largest opposition movement in Egypt, won 88 seats. This was the largest number of seats won by an opposition group in Egypt since the 1952 revolution.Similarly, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority of the seats.Hamas was thereby able to establish control over the Palestinian Legislative Council which had been dominated by Fatah since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. In Lebanon, in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 14th February2005, a coalition of pro-Hariri political forces was ablet hrough broad-based mass mobilization and external support to force Syrian troops to pull out from Lebanon and the pro-Syrian Government to resign. Elections were held, and the 14th February coalition was able to win a plurality of the votes and to form a new government.In Morocco, King Mohamed VI oversaw the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee which sought to address the grievances of those who had been abused under the reign of his father.The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) also under took some important reforms during the 2003-2006 period. In 2003 Qatar promulgated a written constitution for the first time in its history. In 2005,Saudi Arabia convened municipal elections for the firsttime in five decades. And in 2006, Bahrain held parliamentaryelections in which the Shiite society of AlWefaqwon 40%of the seats. Subsequently, the first Shiitedeputy prime minister in Bahrain was appointed.Theses events, which came to be known as ‘the Arab Spring,’ led some optimists to believe that the Arabworld was on the brink of a democratic transformation similar to those experienced in Latin American and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1980s and1990s. با این حال, که در 2007, as political liberalization gave way to heightened polarization and to renewed repression,these hopes were dispelled. The failure ofthe openings of the 2003-2006 period to create a sustained momentum towards democratization can beat tributed to a number of factors. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the failure of the United States to create a stable and democratic regime dampened support for democracy promotion efforts within the American administration and reinforced the views ofthose who held that security and stability must come before democracy. Moreover, the electoral successes of Islamists in Egypt and in Palestine further dampened Western support for democracy promotion efforts in the region since the principals of thesemovements were perceived to be at odds with the interestsof theWest.

مصر: پیشینه و ایالات متحده. روابط

جرمی M. تیز

در سال گذشته, سیاست خارجی مصر, خصوصاً رابطه آن با ایالات متحده, به طور قابل توجهی از هر دو تغییر در ایالات متحده بهره مند شده است. و از حوادث موجود در زمین. دولت اوباما, همانطور که در ژوئن رئیس جمهور مشهود است 2009 سخنرانی در قاهره, اهمیت مصر را برای ایالات متحده افزایش داده است. سیاست خارجی در منطقه, به عنوان ایالات متحده. سیاست گذاران برای احیای روند صلح اعراب و اسرائیل تلاش می کنند. در انتخاب قاهره به عنوان محلی برای سخنرانی رئیس جمهور در جهان اسلام, مصریان احساس می کنند که ایالات متحده نسبت به قد و قامت درک شده خود در جهان عرب احترام کشور خود را نشان داده است. در همان زمان, تنش های مداوم با ایران و حماس موقعیت مصر را به عنوان نیروی تجاوز کننده در منطقه تقویت کرده و سودمندی دیپلماتیک این کشور را به ایالات متحده نشان داده است.. سیاست خارجی. براساس منافع خودش, مصر با مداخله ایران در شام و غزه مخالفت کرده است و اخیراً همکاری نظامی با اسرائیل را گسترش داده است تا عزم خود را در برابر تحریکات بعدی ایران نشان دهد., مانند مسلح کردن حماس یا اجازه دادن به حزب الله برای عملیات خاک مصر. علاوه بر این, عملیات سرب بازیگران اسرائیل (دسامبر 2008 تا ژانویه 2009) رفتار حماس را مورد نیاز تا حد متوسط ​​قرار داد, رسیدن به وحدت فلسطین, و به یک تبادل طولانی مدت اسرائیل ، حماس سوز - آتش / زندانی برسند, اهدافی که مصر برای دستیابی به آنها تلاش کرده است, البته تاکنون با موفقیت محدود. علائم بهبود روابط دو جانبه به وضوح مشهود است. در شش ماه گذشته, انبوه مبادلات دیپلماتیک وجود داشته است, اوج سفر رئیس جمهور اوباما در ژوئن 2009 به مصر و سفر رئیس جمهور مصر حسنی مبارک به واشنگتن در آگوست 2009 ، اولین سفر وی به ایالات متحده در بیش از 5 سال. پس از سفر رئیس جمهور اوباما در ژوئن, دو دولت گفتگوی استراتژیک سالانه خود را برگزار می کردند. چندین ماه زودتر, ایالات متحده متعهد شد تجارت و سرمایه گذاری در مصر را گسترش دهد. علی رغم ظاهر فضای مثبت تر, تنش ها و تناقضات ذاتی در روابط ایالات متحده و مصر همچنان وجود دارد. برای ما. سیاست گذاران و اعضای کنگره, سوال چگونه می توان به طور همزمان روابط استراتژیک ایالات متحده و مصر را که از توافقنامه CampDavid و 1979 پیمان صلح ضمن ترویج حقوق بشر و دموکراسی در مصری ها یک چالش اساسی است و هیچ مسیر مشخصی ندارد. از آنجا که شخصیت های مخالف مصر سال ها درباره موضوعاتی مانند جانشینی رهبری ، بیشتر حرف می زدند, فساد, و نابرابری اقتصادی, و رژیم متعاقباً در پاسخ به درخواستهای بیشتر برای اصلاح سرکوبگرتر شده است,فعالان خواستار فشار آمریكا به مصر برای ایجاد فضای تنفس بیشتر برای مخالفان شده اند. دولت مصر در برابر هرگونه آمریکا مقاومت کرده است. تلاش می کند تا در سیاست داخلی خود دخالت کند و به شدت به ایالات متحده آشکار پاسخ داده است. خواستار اصلاحات سیاسی است. همزمان, همانطور که اوضاع اسرائیلی و فلسطین بیشتر خراب شده است, نقش مصر به عنوان واسطه برای ایالات متحده قابل ارزیابی است. سیاست خارجی در منطقه. مصر توافق نامه های آتش بس و مذاکرات میانجیگری با حماس در مورد آزادی زندانیان را تأمین کرده است, ترتیبات آتش بس, و سایر موارد. از آنجا که حماس یک سازمان تروریستی خارجی تعیین شده توسط ایالات متحده است (دعوت) و خواستار نابودی اسرائیل است, نه اسرائیل و نه دولت ایالات متحده مستقیماً با مقامات رسمی خود مذاکره نمی کنند, به جای استفاده از مصر به عنوان وسط. با همکاری دولت اوباما صلح مهم خاورمیانه را متعهد شد, این نگرانی وجود دارد که ایالات متحده. مقامات ممکن است به قیمت حقوق بشر و اصلاحات دموکراتیک اولویت بیشتری به نقش منطقه ای مصر قایل شوند.

Democratization and Islamic Politics:

یوکوتا تاکایوکی�

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. On the other hand,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, however, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: democracy, sharī‘a (Islamic law), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.

Arab reform bulletin

Arab reform bulletin

Ibrahim al-Houdaiby

Muslim Brotherhood Guide Mohamed Mahdi Akef’s decision to step down at the end of his first term in January 2009 is an important milestone for the largest opposition group in Egypt for two reasons. First, whoever the successor is, he will not enjoy the same historical legitimacy as Akef, who joined the Brotherhood at an early stage and worked with its founder, حسن البنا. All of the potential replacements belong to another generation and lack the gravitas of Akef and his predecessors, which helped them resolve or at least postpone some organizational disputes. The second reason is that Akef, who presided over a major political opening of the group in which its various intellectual orientations were clearly manifested, has the ability to manage diversity. This has been clear in his relations with leaders of the organization’s different currents and generations and his ability to bridge gaps between them. No candidate for the post seems to possess this skill, except perhaps Deputy Guide Khairat al-Shater, whose chances seem nil because he is currently imprisoned.

ابتکار اخوان المسلمین به عنوان یک برنامه اصلاحات

سید محمود AL-Qumni
در ماه مارس 3, 2004, آقای. مهدی عاکف, رهبر و راهنمای اخوان المسلمین راه اندازی طرح اخوان برای شرکت در اصلاحات دموکراتیک موعود, ارائه اخوان به عنوان یک جناح سیاسی که بداند خود را صالح به شرکت. اخوان المسلمین خود را ارائه – به طور طبیعی – در بهترین نور ممکن, که حق همه است. و در ماه مه 8, 2004, دکتر. عصام آریایی, چهره برجسته اخوان همچنین با توجه به حضور خود شناخته شده در ایستگاه ماهواره ای مصر محلی, رویای تلویزیون, گفت که این ابتکار جامع است, برنامه کامل برای به زودی تبدیل اخوان به یک حزب سیاسی.
دموکراسی, در مفهوم لیبرال آن, معنی حکومت مردم, وضع قوانین برای خود با توجه به شرایط خود. این کار نه تنها به معنای انتخابات. از همه مهمتر, و به ذخیره کردن پایه برای انتخابات, دموکراسی یک نظام کثرت گرایانه که شهروندان را تضمین است’ آزادی های عمومی و خصوصی, بخصوص آزادی بیان و عقیده. همچنین حقوق بشر خود را تضمین می کند, به ویژه آزادی مذهب. این آزادی مطلق هستند, بدون هیچ گونه محدودیت یا نظارت. نظام دموکراتیک اجازه می دهد تا تغییر مسالمت آمیز قدرت در جامعه است و در تفکیک قوا بر اساس. قوه قضائیه, بخصوص, باید کاملا مستقل باشد. دموکراسی اتخاذ اقتصاد بازار آزاد است که بر روی رقابت مبتنی بر, و تشویق می کند که ابتکارات فردی. دموکراسی در کانال های dialgoue و درک مسالمت آمیز در میان شهروندان بر اساس. در برخورد با درگیری های محلی و بین المللی, آنها جلوگیری از گزینه نظامی را به عنوان آنجا که ممکن است. همراه با کسانی که به دموکراسی اعتقاد, آن مواجه ذهنیت تروریسم و ​​دگماتیسم بنیادگرا خشونت. دموکراسی علیه اندیشههای مطلق که ادعا می کنند خود حقیقت مطلق, و دفاع از اصول نسبیتی و کثرت گرا. با انجام این کار, آنها را فراهم همه ادیان حق به آن فعال باشد با خیال راحت, به جز نظرات است که با هدف مصادره آزادی یا خود را در احزاب دیگر با توسل به زور یا خشونت تحمیل. بنابراین دموکراسی با دین آزاد از انحصار یک تفسیر یا یک فرقه نگران.
به طور خلاصه, دموکراسی یک گروه از اقدامات قانونی و حقوقی برای جامعه ای که بشر پس از سابقه ای طولانی در درگیری رسیده به اصلاح مقامات که در آن شخصیت های مذهبی بتوانند اراده خود را تحمیل نمی باشد. مقامات مذهبی از جدا و منفصل شدند
مقامات دولت, برای تضمین بی طرفی دولت نسبت به همه ادیان. این چیزی است که اجازه می دهد تا برای آزادی دین و عقیده, و آزادی عبادت برای همه در آزادی کامل و برابری. این به جلوگیری از جنگ به نام دین, که منجر به امنیت کشور و شهروندان آن.

در ماه مارس 3, 2004, آقای. مهدی عاکف, رهبر و راهنمای اخوان المسلمین راه اندازی طرح اخوان برای شرکت در اصلاحات دموکراتیک موعود, ارائه اخوان به عنوان یک جناح سیاسی که بداند خود را صالح به شرکت. اخوان المسلمین خود را ارائه – به طور طبیعی – در بهترین نور ممکن, که حق همه است. و در ماه مه 8, 2004, دکتر. عصام آریایی, چهره برجسته اخوان همچنین با توجه به حضور خود شناخته شده در ایستگاه ماهواره ای مصر محلی, رویای تلویزیون, گفت که این ابتکار جامع است, برنامه کامل برای به زودی تبدیل اخوان به یک party.Democracy سیاسی, در مفهوم لیبرال آن, معنی حکومت مردم, وضع قوانین برای خود با توجه به شرایط خود. این کار نه تنها به معنای انتخابات. از همه مهمتر, و به ذخیره کردن پایه برای انتخابات, دموکراسی یک نظام کثرت گرایانه که شهروندان را تضمین است’ آزادی های عمومی و خصوصی, بخصوص آزادی بیان و عقیده. همچنین حقوق بشر خود را تضمین می کند, به ویژه آزادی مذهب. این آزادی مطلق هستند, بدون هیچ گونه محدودیت یا نظارت. نظام دموکراتیک اجازه می دهد تا تغییر مسالمت آمیز قدرت در جامعه است و در تفکیک قوا بر اساس. قوه قضائیه, بخصوص, باید کاملا مستقل باشد. دموکراسی اتخاذ اقتصاد بازار آزاد است که بر روی رقابت مبتنی بر, و تشویق می کند که ابتکارات فردی. دموکراسی در کانال های dialgoue و درک مسالمت آمیز در میان شهروندان بر اساس. در برخورد با درگیری های محلی و بین المللی, آنها جلوگیری از گزینه نظامی را به عنوان آنجا که ممکن است. همراه با کسانی که به دموکراسی اعتقاد, آن مواجه ذهنیت تروریسم و ​​دگماتیسم بنیادگرا خشونت. دموکراسی علیه اندیشههای مطلق که ادعا می کنند خود حقیقت مطلق, و دفاع از اصول نسبیتی و کثرت گرا. با انجام این کار, آنها را فراهم همه ادیان حق به آن فعال باشد با خیال راحت, به جز نظرات است که با هدف مصادره آزادی یا خود را در احزاب دیگر با توسل به زور یا خشونت تحمیل. بنابراین دموکراسی با دین آزاد از انحصار یک تفسیر یا یک خلاصه sect.In نگران, دموکراسی یک گروه از اقدامات قانونی و حقوقی برای جامعه ای که بشر پس از سابقه ای طولانی در درگیری رسیده به اصلاح مقامات که در آن شخصیت های مذهبی بتوانند اراده خود را تحمیل نمی باشد. مقامات مذهبی از theauthorities از دولت جدا و منفصل شدند, برای تضمین بی طرفی دولت نسبت به همه ادیان. این چیزی است که اجازه می دهد تا برای آزادی دین و عقیده, و آزادی عبادت برای همه در آزادی کامل و برابری. این به جلوگیری از جنگ به نام دین, که منجر به امنیت کشور و شهروندان آن.

Dissent and Reform in Egypt: Challenges to Democratization

Ayat M. ابوالقاسم ابوالفتوح

Over the last two years, Egypt has witnessed large demonstrations led by newdemocratic civil society movements, including Kefaya (Arabic for “enough”), the JudgesClub of Egypt, journalist advocacy groups, civil society coalitions, and other human rightsactivists.These groups have championed a number of causes including an independentjudiciary, contested presidential elections, presidential term limits, and the annulment ofemergency law. While most of these demands have yet to be met, some gains, asexemplified by the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, have been made.However, it remains to be seen whether or not this surge of democratic fervor willsucceed in pressuring President Hosni Mubarak’s regime to take meaningful steps towardopening the system and allowing for broader democratic participation. Egypt’s rulers havenot been seriously challenged by a domestic opposition for over five decades. Behind afortress of restrictive laws, the regime has managed to undermine nascent political partiesand keep them weak, fragmented, and unable to develop any constituency among thepeople. Civil society is likewise shackled by laws that have constrained their formation andactivities.Since the late 1970s, following Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, the Egyptiangovernment has received unwavering financial and moral support from Westerndemocracies—particularly the United States. Egypt is seen as a staunch ally in the region, apartner in managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Arab-Israeli relations, و, after the9/11 attacks, a valuable source of intelligence in the war on terror. The regime has usedthis support to maintain its suffocating grip on political activity.Then, starting in 2004, it seemed a new day had dawned for Egyptian reformers.Calls by the United States for Arab governments to democratize resonated strongly withincivil society, rapidly escalating domestic demands for radical political reforms. PresidentBush has often cited Egypt as an example of a developing democracy in the region. But theEgyptian regime is a hybrid of deeply rooted authoritarian elements and pluralistic andliberal aspects. There are strong state security forces, but also an outspoken oppositionpress and an active, albeit constrained, civil society. In short, Egypt is the perfect model of a“semi-authoritarian” state, rather than a “transitional democracy.”President Mubarak’s government continues to proclaim its commitment to liberaldemocracy, pointing to a vast array of formal democratic institutions. The reality, however,is that these institutions are highly deficient. The ruling elite maintains an absolutemonopoly over political power. President Hosni Mubarak was elected last September for afifth six-year term in office. In order for democratic reforms to advance in Egypt,substantial institutional and legal changes must be made.