Svi unosi označeni: "POLITIČKI"
Islam and the New Political Landscape
IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 rujan 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 i 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
In Search of Islamic Constitutionalism
Nadirsyah hosen
Islamska politička kultura, Demokracija, i ljudska prava
Daniele. Cijena
Hamas and political reform in the middle east
Politička evolucija Muslimanskog bratstva u Egiptu
Stephen Bennett
“Allah je naš cilj. Poslanik je naš vođa. Kur’an je naš zakon. Džihad je naš put. Smrt na Allahovom putu je naša najveća nada.”
Od svojih prvih dana u Egiptu, Muslimansko bratstvo izazvalo je mnogo kontroverzi, jer neki tvrde da organizacija zagovara nasilje u ime islama. Prema Dr. Mamoun Fandy iz James A. Baker III Institut za javnu politiku, “džihadizam i aktiviranje pogleda na svijet kuće islama i kuće rata su ideje proizašle iz spisa i učenja Muslimanskog bratstva” (živahno, 2005). Primarni dokaz za ovaj argument je istaknuti član Bratstva, Sayeed Qutb, koji je zaslužan za razvoj revizionističke i kontroverzne interpretacije džihad koji je pružao vjerska opravdanja za nasilje koje su počinile organizacije ogranci Bratstva poput al-džihad, al-Takfir ve al-Hijra, Hamas, i al-Qaeda.
Ipak, to je još uvijek diskutabilno stajalište, jer unatoč tome što je ideološki roditelj tih nasilnih organizacija, samo Muslimansko bratstvo uvijek je zadržalo službeni stav protiv nasilja i umjesto toga promicalo je islamsko građansko i društveno djelovanje na lokalnoj razini. Unutar prvih dvadeset godina svog postojanja Muslimansko bratstvo je svojim popularnim aktivizmom steklo status najutjecajnije od svih velikih grupa na Bliskom istoku. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.
While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob također nam kaže da od trenutnih islamističkih oporbenih skupina koje danas postoje "'radikalnije' ili militantnije od tih skupina inzistiraju na revolucionarnoj promjeni koja se treba nametnuti masama i političkom sustavu, dok... novo Muslimansko bratstvo Egipta, poziv na postupnu promjenu koja se treba poduzeti unutar političkog sustava i uz uključivanje muslimanskih masa”
Muslimansko bratstvo u Belgiji
Steve Merley,
Viši analitičar
Globalno muslimansko bratstvo prisutno je u Europi od 1960 kada je rekao ramazan, unuk Hassana Al-Banne, osnovao džamiju u Münchenu.1 Od tog vremena,Bratstva su osnovana u gotovo svim zemljama EU, kao i zemlje koje nisu članice EU poput Rusije i Turske. Unatoč tome što djeluje pod drugim imenima, neke od organizacija u većim zemljama priznate su kao dio globalnog Muslimanskog bratstva. Na primjer, Savez islamskih organizacija Francuske (UOIF) općenito se smatra dijelom Muslimanskog bratstva u Francuskoj. Mreža također postaje poznata u nekim manjim zemljama poput Nizozemske, gdje je nedavno izvješće Zaklade NEFA detaljno opisalo aktivnosti Muslimanskog bratstva u toj zemlji.2 Susjedna Belgija također je postala važno središte za Muslimansko bratstvo u Europi. A 2002 izvješće Odbora za obavještajne poslove belgijskog parlamenta objasnilo je kako Bratstvo djeluje u Belgiji:“Služba državne sigurnosti od tada prati aktivnosti Međunarodnog muslimanskog bratstva u Belgiji 1982. Međunarodno Muslimansko bratstvo ima tajnu strukturu već skoro 20 godine. Identitet članova je tajan; djeluju u najvećoj diskreciji. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,in this context, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005
Noha Antar
In the context of an unprecedented opening of the political system in Egypt in 2004/2005, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) scored an impressive success in the 2005 legislative elections that showed that the mainstream non-violent Islamist movement, despite the legal ban of the movement itself and of its political activities, is the only influential and organised political opposition in the face of the veteran National Democratic Party (NDP).Reasons for the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral success in 2005The first set of reasons for the MB’s success is related to the changes that occurred in the political context. Above all, the first presidential elections that took place in September 2005 had a direct impact on the legislative elections in November the same year: By opening up competition for the post of the president, the election signalled the unprecedented impasse of the regime seeking to patch up its legitimacy. U Dodatku, civic protest movements had emerged that rejected the political system much more fundamentally and called for comprehensive reform. The most important of these has been the dynamic protest movement called the Egyptian Movement for Change, Kifaja. Međutim, as a second set of factors, the regime itself can also be considered a factor in the MB’s rising influence: The NDP and government officials have relied heavily on religious arguments; they have oppressed secular or liberal opponents; they have nourished obscurantist religious trends in Al-Azhar and among religious groups; and they have let the MB take charge of welfare services in order to save on the state budget. Također, the regime has allowed Islamist activists to enter trade unions, while reserving the leadership positions for the NDP. There is a third set of reasons for the MB’s success which is related to the movement’s long term strategy to build a societal base: The MB’s strategic approach has been to invest in welfare services so as to build a large power base among the population that they are able to mobilize politically. And indeed, not only have many MB candidates gained credibility and respect through their daily contacts with the people, the movement has been investing in the social sphere for more than 30 godine. In a society in which 40 percent of the population lives under the poverty line and the political participation rate is only 25 percent, providing services in all vital sectors – education, health, and employment – has proved to be the fastest and most successful way to gain supporters. Fourth, using the religious sphere as a place for political mobilisation has been a successful strategy of the MB. Those affiliated with the MB, members and sympathizers, often saw it as a religious duty to vote for a candidate of the movement. Despite the doubts the slogan “Islam is the solution” raised among many, the MB continued to use it because it wanted to focus on religion as the determining factor for the vote, and because it had gained the trust of the people as being the movement representing Islamic identity. On top of this, the movement was able to make use of the unprecedented coincidence of growing internal and external pressures on the regime, by starting open and direct political activity in the name of the movement. The MB has also understood the importance of rallying with other opposition forces, and it has sought coordination with these forces for creating more pressure on the regime. Related to this is another important factor for the MB’s success: its organisational capacity.Has the MB changed its agenda and priorities?While the MB has opted to participate peacefully in the political process in Egypt, it remains unclear as to whether it represents a genuine democratic force or if it will use the democratic opening to pursue an authoritarian agenda. Still, participation in the political system has already transformed the movement. During the 2005 election campaign the concepts of “democracy” and “political participation” found their way into the MB’s rhetoric and, most importantly, into its political strategies of creating grassroot networks for popular support. The experience of elaborating a political programme for the legislative elections pushed the movement to publicly clarify its positions on concepts such as party pluralism – something that had previously been refused in some trends of Islamic thought as “al-tahazzub” (partisanship) with the argument that Islam calls for unity of the nation rather than its fragmentation. The MB can be considered to be part of Egypt’s reform forces, but that is primarily so because it agrees with other political reformers on the tools for bringing about reforms: rule of law, good governance and free elections. The MB’s activities in Parliament have so far demonstrated their devotion to serving their voters and retaining credibility. They have been more efficient in dealing with public needs, in revealing corruption cases and in rapidly interacting with victims of injustice than other deputies. As has been discussed above, political change in Egypt until now has not meant a significant move toward democracy. Prvi, this has reflected on the MB’s organisation, strategy and agenda. The “mutual fear reflex” as an outcome of the relationship between the illegal MB and the regime has required the movement to adopt a strategy of secrecy which prevents them from being transparent for security reasons. Također, maintaining ambiguous positions is a defence mechanism used by both Islamist and non-Islamist opposition forces in Egypt.
Smrt političkog islama
Jon B. Alterman
Počele su se pisati osmrtnice političkom islamu. Nakon godina naizgled nezaustavljivog rasta, Islamske stranke su počele posrtati. U Maroku, Stranke pravde i razvoja (ili PJD) prošli daleko lošije od očekivanog na izborima u rujnu prošle godine, i jordanska Fronta islamske akcije izgubila je više od polovice svojih mjesta u prošlomjesečnim izborima. Željno iščekivani manifest egipatskog Muslimanskog bratstva, čiji se nacrt pojavio prošlog rujna,nije pokazao ni snagu ni smjelost. Umjesto toga, sugeriralo je da je skupina opsjednuta intelektualnim proturječjima i obuzeta unutarnjim sukobima. Prerano je proglasiti smrt političkog islama, jer je bilo preuranjeno proglasiti rođenje liberalizma u arapskom svijetu u 2003-04, ali njegovi se izgledi čine osjetno slabijima nego prije godinu dana. Nekima, pad iz milosti bio je neizbježan; politički islam se srušio pod vlastitim proturječjima, oni kažu. To tvrde, u objektivnom smislu, politički islam nikada nije bio više od dima i ogledala. Religija se odnosi na vjeru i istinu, a politika je oko kompromisa i prilagodbe. Ovako gledano, politički islam nikada nije bio sveti pothvat, već samo pokušaj da se potaknu politički izgledi jedne strane u političkoj raspravi. Poduprt vjerskim autoritetom i legitimitetom, protivljenje volji islamista prestalo je biti samo političko - postalo je krivovjerje - a islamisti su imali koristi. Ovi skeptici vide politički islam kao koristan način zaštite političkih pokreta,kravlji politički neprijatelji, i podršku skupa. Kao strategija vladanja, međutim, oni tvrde da politički islam nije polučio nikakve uspjehe. U dva područja u kojima je nedavno porastao, palestinske vlasti i Iraka, upravljanje je bilo anemično. U Iranu, gdje su mule bile na vlasti gotovo tri desetljeća, Svećenici se bore za poštovanje, a zemlja izlijeva novac u Dubai i druga prekomorska tržišta s predvidljivijim pravilima i pozitivnijim povratima. Najizrazitije religiozna država na Bliskom istoku, Saudijska Arabija, ima znatno manje intelektualne slobode od mnogih svojih susjeda, a tamošnji čuvari pravovjerja pažljivo ograničavaju religioznu misao. Kao francuski učenjak islama,Olivier Roy, zapamćeno prije više od desetljeća, stapanje vjere i politike nije posvetilo politiku, politiziralo je religiju. Ali dok islam nije pružio koherentnu teoriju upravljanja, a kamoli univerzalno prihvaćen pristup problemima čovječanstva, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, kada su različite mjere praznovjerja i duhovnosti upravljale svakodnevnim životom. Točnije, iako, ono što vidimo je uspon “neotradicionalizma,” u kojoj se upisuju simboli i slogani prošlosti u težnji za bržim ulaskom u budućnost. Islamske financije — što će reći, financije koje se oslanjaju na dionice i povrate, a ne na kamate—cvjetaju, a elegantne bankovne poslovnice imaju odvojene ulaze za muškarce i žene. Uglađeni mladi teleevanđelisti oslanjaju se na tropove posvećivanja svakodnevice i traženja oprosta, privlačeći desetke tisuća na svoje sastanke i milijunsku televizijsku publiku. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Islam, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,ali države nemaju puno veze s kreativnošću koja se javlja na vjerskom polju. Opasnost je da će ova islamizacija javnog života odbaciti ono malo tolerancije što je preostalo na Bliskom istoku, nakon stoljeća asa—u osnovi islamsko—multikulturalno poduzeće. Teško je zamisliti kako islamizirana društva mogu cvjetati ako ne prihvate inovacije i kreativnost, različitosti i različitosti. “Islamski” nije samorazumljiv koncept, kao što je moj prijatelj Mustapha Kamal Pasha jednom primijetio, ali ne može biti izvor snage u modernim društvima ako je vezan za okoštale i parohijalne predodžbe o svojoj prirodi. Suočavanje s razlikama u osnovi je politički zadatak, i tu će se politički islam suočiti sa svojim pravim ispitom. Formalne strukture vlasti na Bliskom istoku pokazale su se izdržljivima, i malo je vjerojatno da će se raspasti pod valom islamskog aktivizma. Da bi politički islam uspio, treba pronaći način da ujedini različite koalicije različitih vjera i stupnjeva vjere, ne samo govoriti svojoj bazi. Još nije pronašao način za to, ali to ne znači da ne može.
Democracy Protecting Itself from Itself?
Ebru Erdem
Studies on government in Muslim societies and in the Middle East in particular have mostly focused on authoritarianism. They sought to answer why authoritarianism is the most often observed regime type, and why it persists. Recent work has looked at the role of elections and elected bodies under authoritarianism, explaining why they exist and what purposes they serve (Blaydes 2008; Lust-Okar 2006). The goal of this paper is to shift the spotlight onto the judiciary, and to the political role of high courts in Muslim societies with different levels of authoritarianism.Judiciaries and the judicial processes in Muslim societies have not caught much scholarly attention. Much of the work in this area has revolved around Shari’a. Shari’a law, incorporation of the Shari’a into western style judicial systems and legal codes, conflicts between western and Shari’a inspired codes of family law, and especially the impact of the latter on women’s rights are some of the extensively studied topics concerning the judicial processes in these societies. S druge strane, work on judiciary as a political institution in the Muslim world is scarce, notable exceptions being Moustafa (2003) and Hirschl (2004). Judiciaries may take different institutional forms, be based on different legal traditions, or vary in the level of independence they enjoy, but they are still a political institutions.Why study the judiciary in the Muslim World? Is a focus on the judiciary meaningful given the dominance of the executives in countries with authoritarian regimes? The justification for a focus on the judiciary has different dimensions. From a rational choice-institutionalist perspective: if an institution exists, there must be a reason for it, and we think that investigating the raison d’être of the judiciaries will provide interesting insights about political processes and executive strategies. From an institutional-design perspective, the shape that an institution takes2is related to the strategies of the actors negotiating over that institution, and we would like to use the observed variance in judicial institutions and powers across countries and time periods to learn about different aspects of political bargains that scholars have studied in other political realms. From a democratic development perspective, the establishment of the checks and balances is central to a functioning and sustainable democracy, and we would argue that studying the judiciary is central to understanding the prospects towards establishment of rule of law and a credible commitment to democracy (Weingast 1997).