Tous les articles taggés avec: "POLITIQUE"

Islam et nouveau paysage politique

À la suite de l'attentat contre le World Trade Center le 11 Septembre 2001, et les attentats de Madrid et de Londres 2004 et 2005, une littérature qui aborde les formes et les modalités de l'expression religieuse - en particulier l'expression religieuse islamique - s'est épanouie dans les régions pénombres qui relient les sciences sociales dominantes à la conception des politiques sociales, groupes de réflexion et journalisme. Une grande partie du travail a tenté de définir les attitudes ou les prédispositions d'une population musulmane dans un site de tension particulier comme Londres ou le Royaume-Uni (Barnes, 2006; Conseil Ethnos, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), ou critiqué des formes particulières d'intervention en matière de politique sociale (Brillant, 2006une; Mirza et al., 2007). Les études sur l'islamisme et le djihadisme ont mis l'accent sur les liens syncrétiques et complexes entre la foi religieuse islamique et les formes de mouvement social et de mobilisation politique. (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; Mc Roy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionnellement, l'accent analytique a mis en lumière la culture de l'islam, les systèmes de croyance des fidèles, et les trajectoires historiques et géographiques des populations musulmanes à travers le monde en général et en « Occident » en particulier (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade et Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modes, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). Dans cet article, l'accent est différent. Nous soutenons que les études sur la participation politique islamique doivent être soigneusement contextualisées sans recourir à de grandes généralités sur la culture et la foi.. C'est parce que la culture et la foi sont structurées par et structurent à leur tour le patrimoine culturel., les paysages institutionnels et délibératifs à travers lesquels ils s'articulent. Dans le cas de l'expérience britannique, les traces cachées du christianisme dans la formation de l'État-providence au siècle dernier, l’évolution rapide de la cartographie des espaces du politique et le rôle des « organisations confessionnelles » dans la restructuration de l’offre sociale génèrent le contexte social matériel déterminant les opportunités et les contours de nouvelles formes de participation politique.

FRÈRES MUSULMANS ÉGYPTE: CONFRONTATION OU INTÉGRATION?

Rechercher

À la recherche du constitutionnalisme islamique

Pantalon Nadirsyah

La culture islamique politiques, Démocratie, et droits de l'homme

Daniel E. Prix

Le Hamas et la réforme politique au Moyen-Orient

L'évolution politique des Frères musulmans en Egypte

Stephen Bennett

«Allah est notre objectif. Le Prophète est notre chef. Coran est notre loi. Le djihad est notre chemin. Mourir dans le chemin d'Allah est notre plus grand espoir. "

Depuis ses débuts en Egypte des Frères musulmans a suscité beaucoup de controverse, comme certains l'affirment que l'organisation prônant la violence au nom de l'islam. Selon le Dr. Mamoun Fandy, de l'A James. Institut Baker III de politique publique, "djihadisme et l'activation des points de vue du monde de la maison de l'islam et la maison de la guerre sont les idées qui ont émergé dans les écrits et les enseignements des Frères musulmans " (Livesy, 2005). La principale preuve de cet argument est remarquable membre de la Fraternité, Sayeed Qutb, qui est crédité de développement du révisionnisme et controversé de l'interprétation jihad qui a fourni des justifications religieuse de la violence commise par des organisations émanation de la Fraternité comme Al-Jihad, Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, Hamas, et Al-Qaïda.

Pourtant, c'est encore une position discutable, parce que même s'il est le parent idéologique de ces organisations violentes, la Fraternité musulmane elle-même a toujours maintenu une position officielle contre la violence et a plutôt favorisé l'action islamique civile et sociale au niveau local. Dans les vingt premières années de son existence, la Confrérie musulmane a obtenu le statut comme le plus influent de tous les grands groupes au Moyen-Orient grâce à son activisme populaire. Il a également la propagation de l'Egypte vers les autres nations à travers la région et a servi de catalyseur pour de nombreux mouvements de libération succès populaire contre le colonialisme occidental au Moyen-Orient.

Si elle a conservé la plupart de ses principes fondateurs depuis sa création, les Frères musulmans ont procédé à une transformation spectaculaire dans certains aspects fondamentaux de son idéologie politique. Autrefois, dénoncé par beaucoup comme une organisation terroriste, À la fin de la Fraternité musulmane a été étiquetée par la plupart des spécialistes actuels du Moyen-Orient comme politiquement «modérés», «Politiquement centriste", et "accommodationist" aux structures politiques et gouvernementales de l'Égypte (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob nous dit aussi que des groupes d'opposition courant islamiste qui existent aujourd'hui », plus« radicale »ou des militants de ces groupes d'insister sur un changement révolutionnaire qui doit être imposée sur les masses et le système polit, Attendu que ... la nouvelle Frères musulmans d'Egypte, appel au changement graduel qui doit être entrepris au sein du système politique et avec l'enrôlement des masses musulmanes "

Les Frères musulmans en Belgique

Steve Merley,
Analyste principal

Les Frères musulmans mondiaux sont présents en Europe depuis 1960 quand SaidRamadan, le petit-fils de Hassan Al-Banna, a fondé une mosquée à Munich.1 Depuis lors,Des organisations de fraternité ont été créées dans presque tous les pays de l'UE, ainsi que des pays tiers comme la Russie et la Turquie. Bien qu'il opère sous d'autres noms, Certaines des organisations des plus grands pays sont reconnues comme faisant partie des Frères musulmans mondiaux.. Par exemple, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) est généralement considéré comme faisant partie des Frères musulmans en France. Le réseau est également de plus en plus connu dans certains petits pays comme les Pays-Bas., où un récent rapport de la Fondation NEFA détaillait les activités des Frères musulmans dans ce pays.2 La Belgique voisine est également devenue un centre important pour les Frères musulmans en Europe.. UN 2002 un rapport de la Commission du renseignement du Parlement belge explique comment les Frères musulmans opèrent en Belgique:« La Sûreté de l’État suit les activités des Frères musulmans internationaux en Belgique depuis 1982. Les Frères musulmans internationaux ont une structure clandestine depuis près de 20 ans. L'identité des membres est secrète; ils opèrent dans la plus grande discrétion. Ils cherchent à diffuser leur idéologie au sein de la communauté islamique de Belgique et s'adressent particulièrement aux jeunes de la deuxième et troisième génération d'immigrés.. En Belgique comme dans d'autres pays européens, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,dans ce contexte, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

Les Frères musulmans de réussite lors des élections législatives en Egypte 2005

Bien que Antar

In the context of an unprecedented opening of the political system in Egypt in 2004/2005, les Frères musulmans (MB) scored an impressive success in the 2005 legislative elections that showed that the mainstream non-violent Islamist movement, despite the legal ban of the movement itself and of its political activities, is the only influential and organised political opposition in the face of the veteran National Democratic Party (NPD).Reasons for the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral success in 2005The first set of reasons for the MB’s success is related to the changes that occurred in the political context. Above all, the first presidential elections that took place in September 2005 had a direct impact on the legislative elections in November the same year: By opening up competition for the post of the president, the election signalled the unprecedented impasse of the regime seeking to patch up its legitimacy. en outre, civic protest movements had emerged that rejected the political system much more fundamentally and called for comprehensive reform. The most important of these has been the dynamic protest movement called the Egyptian Movement for Change, Kifaya. Cependant, as a second set of factors, the regime itself can also be considered a factor in the MB’s rising influence: The NDP and government officials have relied heavily on religious arguments; they have oppressed secular or liberal opponents; they have nourished obscurantist religious trends in Al-Azhar and among religious groups; and they have let the MB take charge of welfare services in order to save on the state budget. Aussi, the regime has allowed Islamist activists to enter trade unions, while reserving the leadership positions for the NDP. There is a third set of reasons for the MB’s success which is related to the movement’s long term strategy to build a societal base: The MB’s strategic approach has been to invest in welfare services so as to build a large power base among the population that they are able to mobilize politically. And indeed, not only have many MB candidates gained credibility and respect through their daily contacts with the people, the movement has been investing in the social sphere for more than 30 ans. In a society in which 40 percent of the population lives under the poverty line and the political participation rate is only 25 percent, providing services in all vital sectors – education, health, and employment – has proved to be the fastest and most successful way to gain supporters. Fourth, using the religious sphere as a place for political mobilisation has been a successful strategy of the MB. Those affiliated with the MB, members and sympathizers, often saw it as a religious duty to vote for a candidate of the movement. Despite the doubts the slogan “Islam is the solution” raised among many, the MB continued to use it because it wanted to focus on religion as the determining factor for the vote, and because it had gained the trust of the people as being the movement representing Islamic identity. On top of this, the movement was able to make use of the unprecedented coincidence of growing internal and external pressures on the regime, by starting open and direct political activity in the name of the movement. The MB has also understood the importance of rallying with other opposition forces, and it has sought coordination with these forces for creating more pressure on the regime. Related to this is another important factor for the MB’s success: its organisational capacity.Has the MB changed its agenda and priorities?While the MB has opted to participate peacefully in the political process in Egypt, it remains unclear as to whether it represents a genuine democratic force or if it will use the democratic opening to pursue an authoritarian agenda. Toujours, participation in the political system has already transformed the movement. During the 2005 election campaign the concepts of “democracy” and “political participation” found their way into the MB’s rhetoric and, most importantly, into its political strategies of creating grassroot networks for popular support. The experience of elaborating a political programme for the legislative elections pushed the movement to publicly clarify its positions on concepts such as party pluralism – something that had previously been refused in some trends of Islamic thought as “al-tahazzub” (partisanship) with the argument that Islam calls for unity of the nation rather than its fragmentation. The MB can be considered to be part of Egypt’s reform forces, but that is primarily so because it agrees with other political reformers on the tools for bringing about reforms: règle de loi, good governance and free elections. The MB’s activities in Parliament have so far demonstrated their devotion to serving their voters and retaining credibility. They have been more efficient in dealing with public needs, in revealing corruption cases and in rapidly interacting with victims of injustice than other deputies. As has been discussed above, political change in Egypt until now has not meant a significant move toward democracy. Première, this has reflected on the MB’s organisation, strategy and agenda. The “mutual fear reflex” as an outcome of the relationship between the illegal MB and the regime has required the movement to adopt a strategy of secrecy which prevents them from being transparent for security reasons. Aussi, maintaining ambiguous positions is a defence mechanism used by both Islamist and non-Islamist opposition forces in Egypt.

La mort de l'islam politique

Jon B. Alterman

The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. Plutôt, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, cependant, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, SaudiArabia, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Islam, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

La démocratie se protège d'elle-même?

Ebru Erdem

Studies on government in Muslim societies and in the Middle East in particular have mostly focused on authoritarianism. They sought to answer why authoritarianism is the most often observed regime type, and why it persists. Recent work has looked at the role of elections and elected bodies under authoritarianism, explaining why they exist and what purposes they serve (Blaydes 2008; Lust-Okar 2006). The goal of this paper is to shift the spotlight onto the judiciary, and to the political role of high courts in Muslim societies with different levels of authoritarianism.Judiciaries and the judicial processes in Muslim societies have not caught much scholarly attention. Much of the work in this area has revolved around Shari’a. Shari’a law, incorporation of the Shari’a into western style judicial systems and legal codes, conflicts between western and Shari’a inspired codes of family law, and especially the impact of the latter on women’s rights are some of the extensively studied topics concerning the judicial processes in these societies. D'autre part, work on judiciary as a political institution in the Muslim world is scarce, notable exceptions being Moustafa (2003) and Hirschl (2004). Judiciaries may take different institutional forms, be based on different legal traditions, or vary in the level of independence they enjoy, but they are still a political institutions.Why study the judiciary in the Muslim World? Is a focus on the judiciary meaningful given the dominance of the executives in countries with authoritarian regimes? The justification for a focus on the judiciary has different dimensions. From a rational choice-institutionalist perspective: if an institution exists, there must be a reason for it, and we think that investigating the raison d’être of the judiciaries will provide interesting insights about political processes and executive strategies. From an institutional-design perspective, the shape that an institution takes2is related to the strategies of the actors negotiating over that institution, and we would like to use the observed variance in judicial institutions and powers across countries and time periods to learn about different aspects of political bargains that scholars have studied in other political realms. From a democratic development perspective, the establishment of the checks and balances is central to a functioning and sustainable democracy, and we would argue that studying the judiciary is central to understanding the prospects towards establishment of rule of law and a credible commitment to democracy (Weingast 1997).