RSSTüm Entries Tagged: "Siyasal İslam"

Arap Yarın

DAVID B. Ottaway

Ekim 6, 1981, Mısır'da kutlama günü olması gerekiyordu. Üç Arap-İsrail çatışmalarında zaferin Mısır'ın görkemli anın yıldönümünü kutladı, ne zaman açılış günlerde Süveyş Kanalı üzerinden ülkenin ezilen ordusu itme ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur Savaşı ve İsrail askerleri geri çekilmekte yuvarladı. Bir serin üzerinde, bulutsuz sabah, Kahire stadyum askeri onun hardware.On inceleme standını payanda görmeye gelmişti Mısırlı aileler ile doluydu, Başkan Enver Sedat,savaşın mimarı, erkek ve makineler ondan önce teşhir olarak memnuniyetle izledim. Yakınlardaydım, Bir yeni gelen yabancı correspondent.Suddenly, Altı Mirage jetlerinin bir akrobatik performans havai kükredi gibi ordu kamyon biri inceleme standında doğrudan önünde durdurdu, kırmızı uzun yollar ile gökyüzü boyama, Sarı, mor,ve yeşil duman. Sedat ayağa kalktı, görünüşte Mısır askerlerinin bir başka olasılık olsa da değişim selamı hazırlanıyor. Kamyonun atlayan dört İslamcı suikastçiyi kendini mükemmel bir hedef haline, podyumu bastı, ve bullets.As ile ölümcül ateşle standını sprey için bir sonsuzluk görünüyordu devam katilleri bedenini deşik, Yere ve riski vurmak ister bir an için kabul paniklemiş seyirci tarafından ezilerek veya ayakta kalması ve risk serseri bir kurşun alarak ediliyor. İçgüdü ayaklarımın üzerinde durmamı söyledi, ve gazetecilik görev alma duyum Sedat ölü ya da diri olup olmadığını öğrenmek gitmemi iten.

Isokratik Legacy ve İslam Siyaset Düşüncesi Notlar: Eğitim Örneği

JAMES Muir

insanlık tarihinin talihsiz bir özelliği dini farklılıklar ve con için eğilim ?? BİT cehalet ve önyargı zehirli demlemek kendilerini beslemek için. çok bazen önyargıyı azaltmak için yapılabilir iken, Bana öyle geliyor ki akademisyenlerin ve eğitimcilerin öncelikli cehaleti azaltmak daha temel ve kalıcı hedefi ile ilgili gerektiğini. azaltmada One başarı cehalet dahil kimse kendi-olacak kişinin nedenleri bağlıdır.
İslam eğitim felsefesinin çalışma akımı pratik kaygılarla motive edilebilir: İngiliz Müslümanların arzusu İslami okullara sahip, kendi finans olsun veya devlet tarafından, Bir topikal örnektir. eğitim felsefesinin açısından bakıldığında, Ancak, Bu tür bir tahrik derece dar olmasına, Anın yerel siyasi uyuşmazlıkların kavram ve kategoriler tarafından çevrelenen. Bu bilgiye isteğinden ve kendi dışındaki bir geleneğin anlaşılması için, o anki pratik kaygılarla sınırlı İslam felsefesinin çalışma tüm üretken de olabilir en şüphelidir. bilgi ve arasında basit bir yazışma yok “alaka.”
Orada olmalı, Ancak, bir kalkış noktası olacaksa eğer düşünce ve pratiğin iki gelenek arasında bir bağlantı olabilir, giriş ve bir noktadan, hangi başka bir gelenekten adıma âlimi verir. İsocrates mirası çıkış böyle bir nokta teşkil edebilir, iki gelenek arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamamıza yardımcı olacak, klasik Yunan ve İslam. Batı eğitimde izokratik mirası hakimiyeti iyi kurulmuş ve yaygın tarihçiler arasında bilinir, Klasikçiler
ve politik filozoflar, Bunun bilinci daha yeni Benzer educationists.2 arasında yüzeye başladı rağmen, eğitime Isokratik mirası (ve felsefe Arapça Platonculuğun zengin gelenek) içinde var ?? etkilendiği İslam düşünce, yollarla olsa
Hala henüz iyi anlaşılamamıştır. Bu yazının niyeti bir modi önermek mi ?? Isokratik eğitim geleneğinin ed formu İslami siyasi düşünce temel bir bileşenidir, yani, İslami eğitim düşüncesi. İslami siyasi düşünce bakımından bu yazının niyeti bu genel ifadeler bir yanlış anlama yol açabilecek. İslâm, elbette, Bir uni olarak savunucuları tarafından kabul edilir ?? ed ve inanç ve davranış evrensel sistemi.

İslam ve Yeni Bir Siyasi Manzara

Geri, Michael Keith, Azra Karaca,
Kalbir Shukra ve John Solomos

YILINDA Dünya Ticaret Merkezi'ne yapılan saldırının üzerindeki arasında uyanmak 11 Eylül 2001, ve Madrid ve Londra bombalamaları 2004 ve 2005, Özellikle İslam dini ifade - - adresleri formları ve dini ifade modaliteleri bir literatür halkalı bölgelerde gelişti sosyal politika tasarımına bağlantı ana akım sosyal bilimler, tanklar ve gazetecilik düşünüyorum. İşin büyük kısmı, Londra veya İngiltere gibi gerginlik belirli bir site Müslüman nüfusun tutumlarını veya yatkınlığı tanımlamak için çalıştı (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Danışmanlığı, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), veya sosyal politika müdahalesinin belirli formları critiqued (Parlak, 2006bir; Mirza ve diğ., 2007). İslamcılık ve Cihad'ın Çalışmalar İslam dini inanç ve toplumsal hareket ve siyasi hareket biçimleri arasındaki senkretik ve karmaşık bağlantıları belirli bir odak oluşturduk (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones ve ark., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). geleneksel olarak, Analitik odak İslam'ın kültürünü spotlighted etti, Sadık inanç sistemleri, ve genel olarak ve özellikle de ‘Batı’ da dünya çapında Müslüman nüfusun tarihsel ve coğrafi yörüngelerini (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade ve Garbin, 2002; Hüseyin, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramazan, 1999, 2005). Bu yazıda vurgu farklıdır. Biz İslami siyasi katılım ihtiyacının çalışmalar kültür ve inanç hakkında büyük genellemeler başvurmaksızın dikkatle bağlamsallaştırılmış edilecek iddia. kültür ve inanç her ikisi tarafından ve dönme yapısı kültürel yapılandırılmış olmasıdır, onlar dile getirildiği aracılığıyla kurumsal ve müzakereci manzaralar. İngiliz tecrübesi durumunda, Geçen yüzyılda refah devletinin oluşumunda Hıristiyanlığın gizli izleri, siyasi ait alanların hızla değişen haritacılık ve refah hükmün yeniden yapılandırılmasında ‘inanç örgütleri’ rolü fırsatlar ve politik katılımın yeni biçimlerinin ana hatlarını belirleyen toplumsal bağlamını oluşturmak.

Islam in the West

Jocelyne Cesari

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

İSLÂM, DEMOKRASİ & AMERİKA:

Cordoba Vakfı

Abdullah Faliq

giriş ,


Hem çok yıllık hem de karmaşık bir tartışma olmasına rağmen, Arches Quarterly, teolojik ve pratik gerekçelerle yeniden inceliyor, İslam ve Demokrasi arasındaki ilişki ve uyumluluk hakkında önemli tartışma, Barack Obama'nın umut ve değişim gündeminde yankılandığı gibi. Birçoğu Obama'nın Oval Ofis'e yükselişini ABD için ulusal bir arınma olarak kutlarken, diğerleri, uluslararası arenada ideoloji ve yaklaşımda bir değişim konusunda daha az iyimser kalıyor. Müslüman dünya ile ABD arasındaki gerilim ve güvensizliğin çoğu demokrasiyi teşvik etme yaklaşımına bağlanabilir., tipik olarak demokratik değerlere ve insan haklarına sözde hizmet eden diktatörlükleri ve kukla rejimleri tercih eder, artçı şok 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Dahası, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly, İslam ve Demokrasi arasındaki ilişkiyi ve Amerika'nın rolünü ve Obama'nın getirdiği değişiklikleri gün ışığına çıkarıyor., ortak zemin arayışında. Anas Altıkriti, The Cordoba Foundation'ın CEO'su bu tartışmanın açılış oyununu sunuyor, Obama'nın yoluna dayanan umutları ve zorlukları yansıttığı yer. Altikriti'yi takip etmek, Başkan Nixon'ın eski danışmanı, Dr Robert Crane, İslami özgürlük hakkı ilkesinin kapsamlı bir analizini sunuyor. Enver İbrahim, Malezya eski Başbakan Yardımcısı, Müslüman egemen toplumlarda demokrasiyi uygulamanın pratik gerçekleriyle tartışmayı zenginleştirir, yani, Endonezya ve Malezya'da.
Dr Shireen Hunter'ımız da var., Georgetown Üniversitesi'nden, ABD, demokratikleşme ve modernleşmede geri kalmış Müslüman ülkeleri araştıran. Th terörizm yazar tarafından tamamlanmaktadır, Dr Nafeez Ahmed'in post-modernitenin krizine ilişkin açıklaması ve
demokrasinin ölümü. Dr. Davud Abdullah (Ortadoğu Medya Monitörü Direktörü), Alan Hart (eski ITN ve BBC Panorama muhabiri; Siyonizm'in yazarı: Yahudilerin Gerçek Düşmanı) ve Asem Sondos (Mısırlı Sawt Al Omma haftalık editörü) Obama'ya ve İslam dünyasında demokrasinin teşviki karşısındaki rolüne odaklanmak, ABD'nin İsrail ve Müslüman Kardeşler ile ilişkilerinin yanı sıra.
Dışişleri Bakanı, Maldivler, Ahmed Shaheed, İslam'ın ve Demokrasinin geleceği hakkında spekülasyon yapıyor; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– İrlanda Cumhuriyetçi faaliyetleri nedeniyle dört yıl hapis cezasına çarptırılan bir Sinn Féin üyesi ve Guildford için bir kampanya yürütücüsü 4 ve Birmingham 6, Filistinlilere karşı uygulanan vahşet ve adaletsizliğin etkisine tanık olduğu Gazze'ye yaptığı son ziyareti yansıtıyor; Doktor Marie Breen-Smyth, Radikalleşme ve Çağdaş Siyasi Şiddet Araştırmaları Merkezi Direktörü, siyasi terörü eleştirel bir şekilde araştırmanın zorluklarını tartışıyor; Dr Halid el Mübarek, yazar ve oyun yazarı, Darfur'da barış umutlarını tartışıyor; ve son olarak gazeteci ve insan hakları aktivisti Ashur Shamis bugün Müslümanların demokratikleşmesine ve siyasallaşmasına eleştirel bir gözle bakıyor..
Tüm bunların, yeni bir umut şafağında hepimizi etkileyen konular hakkında kapsamlı bir okuma ve bir yansıma kaynağı olmasını umuyoruz..
Teşekkürler

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

MAHA Azzam

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 yıllar, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Temmuz 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Orta Doğu, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; ve (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Demokrasi, Seçimler ve Mısırlı Müslüman Kardeşler

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. Cevap olarak, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 seçimler. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Aynı zamanda, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

İslam ve Demokrasi

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

In Search of Islamic Constitutionalism

Nadirsyah Pantolon

While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. Örneğin, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. Olarak
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. ancak, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
İlk, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Müslüman Kardeşler, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, Ancak, Kardeşlik var
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
rejim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Bunun yerine, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Speech of Dr,MUHAMMAD BADIE

Dr,Muhammed Badie

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; bu nedenle, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

BETWEEN YESTERDAY AND TODAY

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in o, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (asm), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, ve provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. The Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

A Muslim Archipelago

Max L. Brüt

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.