RSSVsi vnosi z oznako: "politični islam"

Arabska Jutri

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktober 6, 1981, je bil v Egiptu mišljen kot dan praznovanja. Obeležili so obletnico največjega trenutka zmage Egipta v treh arabsko-izraelskih konfliktih, ko je podcenjena državna vojska v prvih dneh vdrla čez Sueški prekop 1973 Jomkipurska vojna in poslala izraelske čete v umik. Na hladnem, jutro brez oblačka, stadion v Kairu je bil nabito poln egipčanskih družin, ki so si prišle ogledat vojsko, kako postavlja svojo opremo. Na stojnici za pregled, Predsednik Anwar el-Sadat,vojni arhitekt, z zadovoljstvom gledal, kako pred njim paradirajo ljudje in stroji. Bil sem v bližini, novoprispeli tuji dopisnik.Nenadoma, eden od vojaških tovornjakov se je ustavil neposredno pred pregledovalno stojnico ravno v trenutku, ko je nad glavami v akrobatski izvedbi zarjovelo šest letal Mirage, slikanje neba z dolgimi sledmi rdeče barve, rumena, vijolična,in zeleni dim. Sadat je vstal, očitno se pripravlja na izmenjavo pozdravov s še enim kontingentom egiptovskih vojakov. Postal je odlična tarča za štiri islamistične atentatorje, ki so skočili s tovornjaka, vdrl na stopničke, in njegovo telo prerešetali s kroglami. Ko so morilci nadaljevali, kar se je zdelo večnost, škropili tribuno s svojim smrtonosnim ognjem, Za trenutek sem premišljeval, ali naj udarim ob tla in tvegam, da me panični gledalci poteptajo do smrti, ali pa ostanem na nogah in tvegam, da me bo zadela zalutala krogla.. Instinkt mi je govoril, naj ostanem na nogah, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Pojasnila o izokratično Legacy in islamske politične misli: Primer izobraževanje

JAMES MUIR

Nesrečno značilnost človeške zgodovine je težnja za verske razlike in con ?? IKT, da se prehranjuje s strupenimi pivo nevednosti in predsodkov. Čeprav je včasih mogoče storiti veliko za zmanjšanje predsodkov, zdi se mi, da bi se morali učenjaki in izobraževalci ukvarjati predvsem z bolj temeljnim in trajnim ciljem zmanjševanja nevednosti. Nek uspeh pri zmanjševanju nevednosti – vključno z lastno – bo odvisen od njegovih motivov.
Študij islamske izobraževalne filozofije lahko motivirajo trenutni praktični pomisleki: želja britanskih muslimanov po islamskih šolah, financirana zasebno ali s strani države, je en aktualen primer. Z vidika pedagoške filozofije, vendar, takšen motiv je nadvse ozek, omejeno s koncepti in kategorijami trenutnih lokalnih političnih sporov. Za tiste, ki jih motivira želja po poznavanju in razumevanju tradicije izven njihove lastne, zelo dvomljivo je, da je kakršna koli študija islamske filozofije, omejena s trenutnimi praktičnimi vprašanji, sploh lahko produktivna. Med znanjem in »relevantnostjo« ni preprostega ujemanja.
Mora biti, vendar, biti neka povezava med dvema tradicijama mišljenja in prakse, če naj obstaja izhodišče, in vstopno točko, ki učenjaku omogoča korak iz ene tradicije v drugo. Izokratova zapuščina je lahko eno takšnih izhodišč, ki nam bo pomagal razumeti odnos med dvema tradicijama, klasične grške in islamske. Prevlada izokratske zapuščine v zahodnem izobraževanju je dobro uveljavljena in splošno znana med zgodovinarji, klasicisti
in politični filozofi, čeprav se je zavedanje o tem med pedagogi šele začelo pojavljati.2 Podobno, izokratsko dediščino izobraževanja (in bogato tradicijo arabskega platonizma v filozofiji) je vplival na islamsko misel, čeprav na načine, ki so
še vedno ni dobro razumljen. Namen tega prispevka je predlagati, da je spremenjena oblika izokratske izobraževalne tradicije temeljna sestavina islamske politične misli., namreč, Islamska izobraževalna misel. Ta splošna formulacija namena tega dokumenta v smislu islamske politične misli lahko povzroči nesporazum. Islam, seveda, privrženci ga obravnavajo kot enoten in univerzalen sistem verovanja in vedenja.

Islam in novo politično ozadje

Back, Michael Keith, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra in John Solomos

PO napadu na Svetovni trgovinski center na 11 september 2001, ter bombni napad v Madridu in Londonu 2004 in 2005, literatura, ki obravnava oblike in modalitete verskega izražanja – zlasti islamskega verskega izražanja – je cvetela v polsenčnih regijah, ki povezujejo mainstream družboslovje z oblikovanjem socialne politike, think tanki in novinarstvo. Veliko dela je poskušalo opredeliti stališča ali predispozicije muslimanskega prebivalstva na določenem območju napetosti, kot sta London ali Združeno kraljestvo. (Barnes, 2006; Etno svetovanje, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), ali kritiziral posamezne oblike posredovanja socialne politike (Svetlo, 2006a; Mirza idr., 2007). Študije islamizma in džihadizma so ustvarile poseben poudarek na sinkretičnih in kompleksnih povezavah med islamsko versko vero ter oblikami družbenih gibanj in politične mobilizacije. (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Konvencionalno, analitični fokus je osvetlil kulturo islama, sistemi verovanja vernikov, ter zgodovinske in geografske poti muslimanskega prebivalstva po vsem svetu na splošno in še posebej na "Zahodu". (Abas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade in Garbin, 2002; Husein, 2006; Načini, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). V tem članku je poudarek drugačen. Trdimo, da je treba študije islamske politične udeležbe skrbno kontekstualizirati brez zatekanja k velikim splošnostim o kulturi in veri. To je zato, ker sta tako kultura kot vera strukturirani in posledično strukturirani kulturi, institucionalne in deliberativne krajine, skozi katere so artikulirane. Na primeru britanskih izkušenj, skrite sledi krščanstva v nastajanju socialne države v prejšnjem stoletju, hitro spreminjajoča se kartografija prostorov političnega in vloga "verskih organizacij" pri prestrukturiranju zagotavljanja blaginje ustvarja materialni družbeni kontekst, ki določa priložnosti in obrise novih oblik politične participacije..

Islam na Zahodu

Jocelyne Cesari

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Še več, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namreč, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ZDA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Na žalost, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 leta, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 julij 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (kvota)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; in (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

demokracija, Volitve in egipčanska Muslimanska bratovščina

Izrael Elad-Altman

Kampanja za reforme in demokratizacijo Bližnjega vzhoda, ki so jo vodili ZDA v zadnjih dveh letih, je pomagala oblikovati novo politično realnost v Egiptu. Odprle so se možnosti za nestrinjanje. Z ZDA. in evropsko podporo, lokalne opozicijske skupine so lahko prevzele pobudo, pospešujejo svoje cilje in izvabljajo koncesije od države. Egiptovsko gibanje Muslimanska bratovščina (MB), ki je uradno prepovedana kot politična organizacija, je zdaj med skupinami, ki se soočajo z obema novima priložnostma
in nova tveganja.
zahodne vlade, vključno z vlado Združenih držav, obravnavajo MB in druge »zmerne islamistične« skupine kot potencialne partnerje pri pomoči pri napredovanju demokracije v svojih državah, in morda tudi pri izkoreninjenju islamističnega terorizma. Ali bi lahko egiptovski MB izpolnil to vlogo? Ali bi lahko sledil turški stranki za pravičnost in razvoj (AKP) in indonezijska uspešna stranka pravičnosti (PKS), dve islamistični stranki, ki, po mnenju nekaterih analitikov, se uspešno prilagajajo pravilom liberalne demokracije in vodijo svoje države k večji integraciji z, oz, Evropa in »poganska« Azija?
Ta članek preučuje, kako se je MB odzval na novo realnost, kako se je spoprijela z ideološkimi in praktičnimi izzivi in ​​dilemami, ki so se pojavile v zadnjih dveh letih. V kolikšni meri se je gibanje prilagodilo svojim pogledom na nove okoliščine? Kakšni so njeni cilji in njena vizija politične ureditve? Kako se je odzval na U.S. reforme in kampanje za demokratizacijo?
Kako je na eni strani vodil svoje odnose z egiptovskim režimom, in druge opozicijske sile na drugi, ko se je država bližala dvema dramatičnim jesenskim volitvam 2005? V kolikšni meri lahko MB velja za silo, ki bi lahko vodila Egipt?
proti liberalni demokraciji?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Raziskave

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) zavračanje popuščanja njenega primeža tvega zaostrovanje napetosti v času tako politične negotovosti glede predsedniškega nasledstva kot resnih socialno-ekonomskih nemirov. Čeprav bo to verjetno dolgotrajno, postopen proces, režim bi moral sprejeti predhodne korake za normalizacijo sodelovanja Muslimanskih bratov v političnem življenju. Muslimanski bratje, katerih družbene dejavnosti so bile dolgo tolerirane, njihova vloga v formalni politiki pa je strogo omejena, zmagal brez primere 20 odstotkov poslanskih sedežev v 2005 volitve. To jim je uspelo kljub temu, da so se potegovali le za tretjino razpoložljivih mest in ne glede na precejšnje ovire, vključno s policijsko represijo in volilnimi goljufijami. Ta uspeh je potrdil njihov položaj izjemno dobro organizirane in globoko zakoreninjene politične sile. Ob istem času, poudarila je slabosti tako legalne opozicije kot vladajoče stranke. Režim je morda stavil, da bi lahko skromno povečanje parlamentarne zastopanosti Muslimanskih bratov uporabili za podžiganje strahov pred islamističnim prevzemom in s tem služilo kot razlog za zastoj reform. Če je tako, obstaja veliko tveganje, da bo strategija imela povratne rezultate.

Islam and Democracy

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

In Search of Islamic Constitutionalism

Nadirsyah Hosen

While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. Na primer, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. Vendar pa, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
Prvič, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Od svoje ustanovitve l 1928, the Brotherhood (brat) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, vendar, bratovščina ima
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
režim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Namesto tega, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Speech of Dr,MUHAMMAD BADIE

dr,Mohamed Badie

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; torej, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

MED VČERAJEM IN DANES

HASAN AL-BANNA

Prva islamska država
Na temeljih te krepostne kur'anske družbene ureditve je nastala prva islamska država, ki ima neomajno vero v to, natančno uporablja, in ga razširil po vsem svetu, tako da je prvi Kilafa rekel: 'Če jaz bi moral izgubiti prednost kamele, Našel bi ga v Allahovi knjigi. '. Boril se je proti tistim, ki niso hoteli plačati zakah, glede kot odpadnike, ker so strmoglavili enega od stebrov tega reda, govoriti: ‘Za božjo voljo, če bi zavrnili meni svinec, ki bi ga predali Allahovemu apostolu (PBUH), Z njimi bi se boril takoj, ko bi imel meč v moji roki!'Za enotnost, v vseh njegovih pomenih in manifestacijah, prežemali ta novi prihajajoči narod.
Popolna družbena enotnost je nastala z oblikovanjem kur'anskega reda in je jezik univerzalen, medtem ko je popolna politična enotnost je bila pod senco Amirja Al-Mumineena in pod standardom Kilafe v prestolnici.
Dejstvo, da je bila islamska ideologija decentralizacija oboroženih sil, državne blagajne, in provincialni guvernerji pri tem niso bili ovira, saj so vsi delovali v skladu z eno veroizpovedjo in enotno in celovit nadzor. Kur'anska načela so razblinila in položila praznoverno malikovanje, ki je prevladovalo na Arabskem polotoku in v Perziji. Pregnali so lažniv judaizem in ga omejili na ozko provinco, konec njene verske in politične avtoritete. S krščanstvom so se borili tako, da je bil njegov vpliv močno zmanjšala na azijski in afriški celini, omejena le na Evropo pod bizantinsko stražo Cesarstvo v Carigradu. Tako je islamska država postala središče duhovne in politične prevlade znotraj dve največji celini. Ta država je vztrajala v napadih na tretjo celino, napad Konstantinopel z vzhoda in obleganje, dokler obleganje ni postalo dolgočasno. Potem je prišlo do njega z zahoda,
potopil v Španijo, s svojimi zmagovalnimi vojaki, ki so dosegli osrčje Francije in prodrli do severa in južni Italiji. V zahodni Evropi je ustanovila impozantno državo, obsijan z znanostjo in znanjem.
Potem, končalo je osvajanje Konstantinopla in omejeno krščanstvo na omejenem območju Srednje Evrope. Islamske flote so se podale v globine Sredozemskega in Rdečega morja, oba sta postala Islamska jezera. In tako so oborožene sile islamske države prevzele prevlado nad morji tako na vzhodu in zahod, uživanje popolnega obvladovanja kopnega in morja. Ti islamski narodi so že združili in vključil marsikaj iz drugih civilizacij, vendar so zmagali z močjo svoje vere in trdnost njihovega sistema pred drugimi. Arabizirali so jih, ali mu je to uspelo do neke mere, in bili jih lahko zamajal in spremenil v sijaj, lepota in vitalnost njihovega jezika in vere. The Muslimani so lahko sprejeli karkoli koristnega od drugih civilizacij, kolikor ni imel škodljivih učinkov o njihovi družbeni in politični enotnosti.

A Muslim Archipelago

Max L. bruto

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.