RSSTutte le voci con il tag: "Islam politico"

Il Domani arabo

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

ottobre 6, 1981, doveva essere un giorno di festa in Egitto. Ha segnato l'anniversario del più grande momento di vittoria dell'Egitto in tre conflitti arabo-israeliani, quando l'esercito sfavorito del paese attraversò il Canale di Suez nei giorni di apertura del 1973 Yom Kippur War e ha inviato le truppe israeliane in ritirata. Su un fresco, mattina senza nuvole, lo stadio del Cairo era gremito di famiglie egiziane venute a vedere i militari che si pavoneggiavano sul suo hardware, Presidente Anwar el-Sadat,l'architetto della guerra, osservava con soddisfazione gli uomini e le macchine che sfilavano davanti a lui. Ero nelle vicinanze, un corrispondente estero appena arrivato, uno dei camion dell'esercito si fermò proprio davanti al banco di prova proprio mentre sei jet Mirage ruggivano in alto in un'esibizione acrobatica, dipingendo il cielo con lunghe scie di rosso, giallo, viola,e fumo verde. Sadat si alzò, apparentemente si preparava a scambiare saluti con un altro contingente di truppe egiziane. Si è reso un bersaglio perfetto per quattro assassini islamisti che sono saltati dal camion, ha preso d'assalto il podio, e crivellò il suo corpo di proiettili, mentre gli assassini continuavano per quella che sembrava un'eternità a spruzzare il supporto con il loro fuoco mortale, Ho considerato per un istante se toccare il suolo e rischiare di essere calpestato a morte da spettatori in preda al panico o restare a piedi e rischiare di prendere un proiettile vagante. L'istinto mi ha detto di restare in piedi, e il mio senso del dovere giornalistico mi spinse a scoprire se Sadat fosse vivo o morto.

Notes on the Isocratic Legacy and Islamic Political Thought: The Example of Education

James Muir

An unfortunate feature of human history is the tendency for religious differences and con icts to nourish themselves with the poisonous brew of ignorance and prejudice. While much can sometimes be done to reduce prejudice, it seems to me that scholars and educators ought to be primarily concerned with the more fundamental and enduring goal of reducing ignorance. One’s success in reducing ignorance—including one’s own—will depend upon one’s motives.
The study of Islamic educational philosophy may be motivated by current practical concerns: the desire of British Muslims to have Islamic schools, whether funded privately or by the state, is one topical example. From the perspective of educational philosophy, però, such a motive is exceedingly narrow, circumscribed by the concepts and categories of the local political disputes of the moment. For those motivated by a desire for knowledge and understanding of a tradition outside their own, it is most doubtful that any study of Islamic philosophy restricted by current practical concerns can be at all productive. There is no simple correspondence between knowledge and “relevance.”
There must, però, be some connection between two traditions of thought and practice if there is to be a point of departure, and a point of entry, which allows the scholar to step from one tradition to another. The legacy of Isocrates may constitute one such point of departure, which will help us to understand the relation between two traditions, the classical Greek and the Islamic. The dominance of the Isocratic legacy in Western education is well established and widely known among historians, classicists
and political philosophers, although awareness of it has only just begun to surface among educationists.2 Similarly, the Isocratic legacy to education (and the rich tradition of Arabic Platonism in philosophy) has in uenced Islamic thought, though in ways that are
still not yet well understood. The intention of this paper is to suggest that a modiŽ ed form of the Isocratic educational tradition is a fundamental component of Islamic political thought, vale a dire, Islamic educational thought. This general wording of the intention of this paper in terms of Islamic political thought may give rise to a misunderstanding. Islam, of course, is regarded by its adherents as a uniŽ ed and universal system of belief and behaviour.

Islam and the New Political Landscape

The Back, Michael Keith, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos

IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 Settembre 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 e 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.

L'Islam in Occidente

Jocelyne Cesari

L'immigrazione dei musulmani in Europa, Nord America, e l'Australia e le complesse dinamiche socio-religiose che si sono successivamente sviluppate hanno reso l'Islam in Occidente un nuovo e avvincente campo di ricerca. L'affare Salman Rushdie, controversie sull'hijab, gli attacchi al World Trade Center, e il furore per le vignette danesi sono tutti esempi di crisi internazionali che hanno portato alla luce le connessioni tra i musulmani in Occidente e il mondo musulmano globale. Queste nuove situazioni comportano sfide teoriche e metodologiche per lo studio dell'Islam contemporaneo, ed è diventato cruciale evitare di essenzializzare l'Islam o i musulmani e resistere alle strutture retoriche dei discorsi che si preoccupano della sicurezza e del terrorismo.
In questo articolo, Io sostengo che l'Islam come tradizione religiosa è una terra incognita. Una ragione preliminare di questa situazione è che non c'è consenso sulla religione come oggetto di ricerca. Religione, come disciplina accademica, è diventato diviso tra storico, sociologico, e metodologie ermeneutiche. Con l'Islam, la situazione è ancora più intricata. Nell'ovest, lo studio dell'Islam è nato come branca degli studi orientalisti e quindi ha seguito un percorso separato e distintivo dallo studio delle religioni. Anche se la critica dell'orientalismo è stata centrale per l'emergere dello studio dell'Islam nel campo delle scienze sociali, restano forti le tensioni tra islamisti e antropologi e sociologi. Il tema dell'Islam e dei musulmani in Occidente è radicato in questa lotta. Un'implicazione di questa tensione metodologica è che gli studenti dell'Islam che hanno iniziato la loro carriera accademica studiando l'Islam in Francia, Germania, o l'America trova difficile stabilire credibilità come studiosi dell'Islam, in particolare nel mondo accademico nordamericano
contesto.

ISLAM, DEMOCRAZIA & GLI USA:

Fondazione Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


Nonostante sia un dibattito sia perenne che complesso, Arches Quarterly riesamina da basi teologiche e pratiche, l'importante dibattito sul rapporto e la compatibilità tra Islam e Democrazia, come riecheggiato nell'agenda di speranza e cambiamento di Barack Obama. Mentre molti celebrano l'ascesa di Obama allo Studio Ovale come catarsi nazionale per gli Stati Uniti, altri rimangono meno ottimisti riguardo a un cambiamento nell'ideologia e nell'approccio nell'arena internazionale. Mentre gran parte della tensione e della sfiducia tra il mondo musulmano e gli Stati Uniti può essere attribuita all'approccio della promozione della democrazia, favorendo tipicamente dittature e regimi fantoccio che rispettano i valori democratici e i diritti umani, la scossa di assestamento di 9/11 ha davvero cementato ulteriormente i dubbi attraverso la posizione dell'America sull'Islam politico. Ha creato un muro di negatività come scoperto da worldpublicopinion.org, secondo cui 67% degli egiziani crede che globalmente l'America stia giocando un ruolo “principalmente negativo”.
La risposta dell'America è stata quindi azzeccata. Eleggendo Obama, molti in tutto il mondo ripongono le loro speranze per lo sviluppo di una meno belligerante, ma una politica estera più giusta nei confronti del mondo musulmano. Il test per Obama, mentre discutiamo, è così che l'America ei suoi alleati promuovono la democrazia. Sarà facilitante o imponente?
inoltre, può essere, soprattutto, un broker onesto in zone di conflitto prolungate? Arruolando l'esperienza e l'intuizione di prolifi
c studiosi, accademici, giornalisti e politici esperti, Arches Quarterly porta alla luce il rapporto tra Islam e Democrazia e il ruolo dell'America - così come i cambiamenti portati da Obama, nella ricerca del terreno comune. Anas Altikriti, il CEO della Fondazione Th e Cordoba fornisce la mossa di apertura di questa discussione, dove riflette sulle speranze e le sfide che riposa sul percorso di Obama. A seguito di Altikriti, l'ex consigliere del presidente Nixon, Il dottor Robert Crane offre un'analisi approfondita del principio islamico del diritto alla libertà. Anwar Ibrahim, ex Vice Primo Ministro della Malaysia, arricchisce la discussione con le realtà pratiche dell'attuazione della democrazia nelle società a predominanza musulmana, vale a dire, in Indonesia e Malesia.
Abbiamo anche il dottor Shireen Hunter, della Georgetown University, Stati Uniti, che esplora i paesi musulmani in ritardo nella democratizzazione e nella modernizzazione. Questo è completato dallo scrittore di terrorismo, La spiegazione del dottor Nafeez Ahmed della crisi della postmodernità e del
fine della democrazia. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Direttore del Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (ex corrispondente ITN e BBC Panorama; autore di Sionism: Il vero nemico degli ebrei) e Asem Sondos (Direttore del settimanale egiziano Sawt Al Omma) concentrarsi su Obama e sul suo ruolo nei confronti della promozione della democrazia nel mondo musulmano, così come le relazioni degli Stati Uniti con Israele e la Fratellanza Musulmana.
Il Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Maldive, Ahmed Shaheed specula sul futuro dell'Islam e della Democrazia; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– un membro dello Sinn Féin che ha sopportato quattro anni di carcere per attività repubblicane irlandesi e un attivista per il Guildford 4 e Birmingham 6, riflessioni sul suo recente viaggio a Gaza, dove ha assistito all'impatto della brutalità e dell'ingiustizia inflitte ai palestinesi; Dott.ssa Marie Breen-Smyth, Il direttore del Center for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence discute le sfide della ricerca critica sul terrorismo politico; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, scrittore e drammaturgo, discute le prospettive di pace in Darfur; e infine il giornalista e attivista per i diritti umani Ashur Shamis guarda in modo critico alla democratizzazione e politicizzazione dei musulmani oggi.
Ci auguriamo che tutto ciò sia una lettura completa e una fonte di riflessione su questioni che ci riguardano tutti in una nuova alba di speranza.
Grazie

Stati Uniti la politica di Hamas blocchi pace in Medio Oriente

Henry Siegman


Impossibile colloqui bilaterali in questi ultimi 16 anni hanno dimostrato che un accordo di pace in Medio Oriente non può mai essere raggiunto dalle parti stesse. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Purtroppo, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

MAHA Azzam

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Luglio 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; e (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Democrazia, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 elezioni. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Islam e democrazia

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

In Search of Islamic Constitutionalism

Nadirsyah Pants

While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. For instance, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. Come
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. Tuttavia, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
First, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Fratelli Musulmani, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, però, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Speech of Dr,MUHAMMAD BADIE

Dr,Muhammad Badie

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; dunque, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

BETWEEN YESTERDAY AND TODAY

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in esso, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, e provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. Il Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

A Muslim Archipelago

Max L. Lordo

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.