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US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

The Political Evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

Stephen Bennett

“Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

Since its early days in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood has created much controversy, as some argue that the organization advocates violence in the name of Islam. According to Dr. Mamoun Fandy of the James A. Baker III Institute of Public Policy, jihadism and the activation of the views of the world of the house of Islam and the house of war are the ideas that emerged from the writings and the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood” (Livesy, 2005). The primary evidence for this argument is notable member of the Brotherhood, Sayeed Qutb, who is credited with developing the revisionist and controversial interpretation of jihad that provided religious justifications for violence committed by offshoot organizations of the Brotherhood like al-jihad, al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, Hamas, dan al-Qaeda.

Yet that is still a debatable position, because despite being the ideological parent of these violent organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood itself has always maintained an official stance against violence and instead has promoted Islamic civil and social action at the grassroots level. Within the first twenty years of its existence the Muslim Brotherhood gained status as the most influential of all major groups in the Middle East through its popular activism. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.

While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob also tells us that of the current Islamist opposition groups that exist today “the more ‘radical’ or militant of these groups insist upon revolutionary change that is to be imposed on the masses and political system, whereas… the new Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, call for gradual change that is to be undertaken from within the political system and with the enlistment of the Muslim masses”

MUSLIM INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

SARA SILVESTRI

In Europe, and most of the Western world, Muslim presence in the publicsphere is a recent phenomenon that characterised the last decade of the 20thcentury and has deeply marked the beginning of the 21st. This visiblepresence, which amounts to something between 15 dan 20 millionindividuals, can best be analysed if dissected into a number of components.The first part of this chapter illustrates where, when and why organisedMuslim voices and institutions have emerged in Europe, and which actorshave been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.

High noon in Egypt

Devika Parashar

F. Andy Messing


The parallels between President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and the deposed shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran, are attention-getting. Dalam 1979, prior to the notorious Islamic Revolution, which was instigated and controlled by radical Muslim cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the shah wielded personal and authoritarian power in a manner comparable to the dictators of the time: Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and earlier, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. These rulers brandished their power with little restraint, unencumbered by the rule of law and basically insensitive to the needs of their populace. Unfortunately, Hosni Mubarak alarmingly resembles these former dictators in social, political, economic and security issues. He is inadvertently pushing his country towards an Islamic revolution. As an earlier example, the shah of Iran slowly strangled his country by reigning with a heavy-hand through his unfettered security force. He narrowed the sociopolitical base of his government and distorted the economy by monopolistic actions. This modus operandi reflects Mr. Mubarak’s current regime, whose survival depends on his ability to reverse these trends. Accordingly, Mr. Mubarak uses hisCentral Security Force,” that now consists of more than half of his entire military, to impose a measure of censorship on the mass media and ban most forms of political organization, activities and literary expression. Like the shah, he has established control over physical action, selectively executing opposition, imprisoning and exiling thousands of people who oppose his policies. Recently, the leading English language newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly reported an upsurge in deaths due to police brutality. Another Arab news source reported the barring of human-rights groups from attending secret military trials. Economically, Mr. Mubarak monopolistically privatizes the highly regulated Egyptian economy, fostering creation of an exclusive industrial bourgeoisie. He invites only pro-Mubarak businesses to work within his development schemes. Like the shah, he has alienated large sections of the public and private sectors, thus suppressing any real economic growth. Politically, Mr. Mubarak cracks down on civil participation, essentially repressing political opposition; while his lack of government transparency practically guarantees rife corruption throughout the 4 million strong bureaucracy. Equally important, is the lack of government response to crises. Al-Ahram Weekly reported 20 train crashes between 1995 and August 2006. In each case, the government formed an ineffectual and disorganized crisis-management council that failed to correct
the problem. As the government failed to meet the needs of its people, the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan) filled a void by establishing social services, such as health clinics and youth programs, to effectively respond to various situations. The first and best-known example of this was their mobilization after the 1992 earthquake struck Southern Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood provided disaster relief then, and continues to do so, thereby enhancing its traction. Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood has nonviolently taken control of 15 percent of major professional associations that form the greater part of Egypt’s middle class. In the most recent parliamentary election in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood presented the largest threat to Mr. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, securing an unprecedented 34 out of 454 seats. They demonstrated their ability to draw support despite government opposition. Mr. Mubarak unwittingly nurtured the regrowth of the essentially Fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood by alienating segments of the Egyptian populace and eliminating soft-line opposition (such as the secular Wafd and al-Ghad parties). He must seek more innovative methods to remain in power. For example, Chile managed to open the economy and encourage free enterprise under Augusto Pinochet, even though his government was considered authoritarian. Mr. Mubarak must tap into the tremendous energy of the Egyptian people by increasing the pace of capitalization and democratization, thereby improving their standard of living. If he succeeds, Mr. Mubarak could eventually create a legacy for himself as an Arab leader who effectively modernized and democratized thiskeystonenation. In doing so, he would secure major assets such as the Suez Canal, Egypt’s oil production and tourism, for not only his country but for the global economy, while providing a positive example for the entire Muslim world. Selanjutnya, A.S.. ability to deal with Egypt will be enhanced, and our aid to that country will become completely justified. But if Mr. Mubarak fails, his regime will fall to the same type of radical elements that claimed the shah’s government in 1979, creating compounded turmoil for Egypt and the world. Devika Parashar spent eight months in Egypt into 2007 and is a research assistant at the National Defense Council Foundation. F. Andy Messing, a retired Special Forces officer, is NDCF’s executive director and met with a Muslim Brotherhood Representative in Cairo in 1994. He has been to 27 conflict areas worldwide.


Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma

Shadi Hamid

A.S.. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, tetapi, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 dan 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Walau bagaimanapun, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, dan, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.

Hasan Al-Banna

Guilain Denoelcx

Hasan al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood or Society of the Muslim Brothers, thelargest and most influential Sunni revivalist organization in the 20th century. Created in Egypt in1928, the Muslim Brotherhood became the first mass-based, overtly political movement to opposethe ascendancy of secular and Western ideas in the Middle East. The brotherhood saw in theseideas the root of the decay of Islamic societies in the modern world, and advocated a return toIslam as a solution to the ills that had befallen Muslim societies. Al-Banna’s leadership was criticalto the spectacular growth of the brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s. By the early 1950s,branches had been established in Syria, Sudan, and Jordan. Soon, the movement’s influence would be felt inplaces as far away as the Gulf and non-Arab countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Drivingthis expansion was the appeal of the organizational model embodied in the original, Egypt-based section of thebrotherhood, and the success of al-Banna’s writings. Translated into several languages, these writings haveshaped two generations of Sunni religious activists across the Islamic world.

International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & Politik

Pusat Stimson & Institut Kajian Dasar

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Mesir, India,Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Akhirnya, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

Wanita, work, and Islam in Arab societies

Yusuf Sidani

Arab societies are currently in a state of confusion. Problems of underdevelopment,inequity, institutional deficiencies, and illiteracy are rampant (Arab HumanDevelopment Report, 2002). Arabs seem to be in a futile search for a new identity ina world that is transforming: power structures are shifting, societal expectations arechanging, and male-female relations are developing. The Arabs seem to yearn for anew identity that does not displace them from their roots, and at the same timeconnects them to the future; the search seems incessantly fruitless. Even non-Arabsseem to be confused about the issue. Vivid movie images mostly portray the Arab maleas a primitive, fanatic, brutal, lunatic, vicious, and splendidly prosperous individualwhile the Arab woman is portrayed as a belly dancer or whore, a veiled submissivemember of a luxurious harem, or a speechless oppressed character with no identity(Boullata, 1990). The political developments of the past few years did not help bringabout a better image. The rise of Islamic activism, end of the cold war, Huntington’s“clash of civilizations” supposition, and the events of 11th September only reinforcedthe bewilderment and confusion.In addressing the notion of women’s participation in the business and politicalarenas in Arab societies, conflicting remarks are brought forward. Some refer to therole of culture and the prevailing religion in the area – Islam and interpretations ofIslam – as possible reasons for such lack of participation (El-Saadawi, 1997; Mernissi,1991). Islam, it is asserted, is not merely a set of beliefs and rituals but is also a socialorder that has an all-pervading influence on its followers (Weir, 2000). This essayattempts to present varying discourses pertaining to women’s work and how it isimpacted by interpretations of Islam. We present current discourses from variousviewpoints including Muslim scholars on the one hand and active feminists on theother hand. We address the disagreements that exist in the camps of the religiousscholars in their interpretations of religious texts impacting women and their work. Inaddition, we tackle the feminist discourse pertaining to the role of Islam, orunderstandings of Islam, in their participation and development.

Islamic Movements and the Use of Violence:

Esen Kirdis

.


Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? First, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Second, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, i.e.. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) the Muslim Brotherhood, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, dan (4) Tablighi Jamaat

Islamic Movements and Democratization

Aysegul Kozak

Gulseren Isik

In recent years, many sociologists as well as political scientists argued over and offered theories about the factors that promote democracy. Some suggested that a country may more likely to become democratic if it becomes richer, if it redistributes the country’s wealth and income in an egalitarian manner.
To still others, becoming more capitalististic and rapidly converting its peasantry into proletarians is a condition of democratization. Being a former British colony and being a Protestant are also offered as factors that increase the likelihood of being a successful democracy (see Dahl, 1971; Bollen & Jackman 1985; Huntington 1991; Lipset, 1994; Moore, 1966; Muller, 1995).
Up to date, the majority of the studies on the democratization of the Islamic countries have dealt with the issue under the lenses of Islam’s adverse effects on the level of democratization in the Muslim countries. These studies, namun begitu, mostly failed to notice the positive drive to democratization brought by the Islamic parties into the existing political system. This paper aims to address this deficiency within the democracy literature.
More specifically, the aim of the paper, via case studies of Turkey and Egypt, is to examine the effect of the inclusion or exclusion of the Islamic parties in the political system of Muslim countries’ transitions to democracy. We argue that, inclusion of the Islamic parties in the democratic system in Turkey increased the state’s legitimacy, diminished civil conflict, and encouraged liberalization of the Turkish political system, the parties and their constituency thus, promoted a drive to successful democratization.
On the other hand, the exclusion of Islamists from the political system in Egypt weakened the state’s legitimacy, intensified the civil conflict, and radicalized the Islamic 4 movement and its constituency. The state gradually became more and more autocratic thus, hindered democratization.

In recent years, many sociologists as well as political scientists argued over andoffered theories about the factors that promote democracy. Some suggested that a countrymay more likely to become democratic if it becomes richer, if it redistributes thecountry’s wealth and income in an egalitarian manner. To still others, becoming morecapitalististic and rapidly converting its peasantry into proletarians is a condition ofdemocratization. Being a former British colony and being a Protestant are also offered asfactors that increase the likelihood of being a successful democracy (see Dahl, 1971;Bollen & Jackman 1985; Huntington 1991; Lipset, 1994; Moore, 1966; Muller, 1995).Up to date, the majority of the studies on the democratization of the Islamic countrieshave dealt with the issue under the lenses of Islam’s adverse effects on the level ofdemocratization in the Muslim countries. These studies, namun begitu, mostly failed to noticethe positive drive to democratization brought by the Islamic parties into the existingpolitical system. This paper aims to address this deficiency within the democracyliterature.More specifically, the aim of the paper, via case studies of Turkey and Egypt, is toexamine the effect of the inclusion or exclusion of the Islamic parties in the politicalsystem of Muslim countries’ transitions to democracy. We argue that, inclusion of theIslamic parties in the democratic system in Turkey increased the state’s legitimacy,diminished civil conflict, and encouraged liberalization of the Turkish political system,the parties and their constituency thus, promoted a drive to successful democratization.On the other hand, the exclusion of Islamists from the political system in Egyptweakened the state’s legitimacy, intensified the civil conflict, and radicalized the Islamic4movement and its constituency. The state gradually became more and more autocraticthus, hindered democratization.

Assessing the Islamist mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘StateHegemony’: assessing the Islamistmainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

JAN STARKMalaysia-Islamists

International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.

This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.

As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.

Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).

These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.

The Internet and Islamist Politics in Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a
dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and
commerce. The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the
researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the
Bedouin in Egypt. Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches
across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously
silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites. Political organizations
across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future,
and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, dan
administrative papers through their sites. Similarly, religious groups display their beliefs online
through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of
eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues. Fusing the two, Islamist
political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing
their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their
theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by
Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and
Mesir.
Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to
publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions
of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization. This paper will
examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in
2
Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home
and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes. First, Islamist
organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere
through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.
Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which
officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media
restrictions imposed by the state. Akhirnya, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a
counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an
international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim
Persaudaraan, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western
style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists. The MB
has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties
attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies
between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section
on the Muslim Brotherhood. These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and
desired outcomes; namun begitu, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the
regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study
analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.
1

Andrew Helms

Ikhwanweb

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. Similarly, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamist political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

First, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

Akhirnya, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; namun begitu, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Islamic Movements in the Middle East: Egypt as a case study

ÖZLEM TÜR KAVLİ

Akef

The Islamic challenge remains a central issue within the ongoing debate on the nature of Middle East
politics. As the main opposition to government policies, the Islamic movements enjoy widespread
popularity, especially among the lower echelons of those populations —people who are
economically or politically alienated. Egypt has been a pioneer of Arab countries in many aspects of
economic, political and cultural development. It has also been the pioneer in the rise of Islamic
movements and the state’s fight with these groups. The aim of this paper is to look at Egypt as a case
study in Middle East’s Islamist movements in general.
The first part of this paper looks briefly at nineteenth century Islamic reformers who had an impact
on the development of modern Islamic movements. In the second part, the focus will be on the
formation of the Islamic movements and their cadres and main ideologies. The third part looks at
contemporary movements and their position in Egyptian society.
ISLAMIC REFORMISTS
Islamic reformism is a modern movement that came into the scene in the nineteenth century as a
reaction to European supremacy and expansion. It was during this period that Muslim religious
leaders and politicians began to realise that their state of affairs was inferior to that of Europe and
was in steady decline. Although Islam has suffered many defeats by Europeans, it was in the
nineteenth century that Muslims felt for the first time their weakness and decline and the need to
borrow from their ‘enemy’. This painful awareness made Muslim intellectuals think about the
defects and the weaknesses they were suffering from and they started to search for a remedy.1 On the
one hand, Islamic reformists embarked on studies of Europe’s pre-industrial phase in order to trace
ways of building a strong state and economy. On the other, they sought viable cultural paradigms
capable of checking the dominance of Europe. The Islamic reformist movement was an urban
movement and tried to establish strategies for the development of the Muslim world. The frustration
of the early reformists with the status quo did not entail a demonising of the West or even a rejection
of modernisation per se. In their quest for progress, Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani and Mohammad
Abduh looked upon the West both as a model and as a rival. They perceived the challenge the
Umma, the Muslim community, was facing as shaped by a need to readjust their worldview to the
realities of the approaching new age. The Muslim people were given priority as citizens, whereas
Islam as a normative system “assumed the role of a defensive weapon that had to be restored in order
to stop deterioration and check the decline”.2 Rashid Rida had more radical views about society as
being corrupt and the heads of Arab states as being the apostates of Islam and he supported the
implementation of Koranic punishments. These three reformists desired to bring back the glory of
Islam by embracing ijtihad, rejecting the superstitions of popular religion and the stagnant thinking
of the ulama. They aimed at “creating a synthesis of Islam and the modern West rather than a
purified society constructed primarily along Islamic lines”.3 It is ironic that these reformists became
the founding ideologues of the Islamic movements that demand strictly purified Islamic
communities.

The Islamic challenge remains a central issue within the ongoing debate on the nature of Middle East politics. As the main opposition to government policies, the Islamic movements enjoy widespread popularity, especially among the lower echelons of those populations —people who are economically or politically alienated.

Egypt has been a pioneer of Arab countries in many aspects of economic, political and cultural development. It has also been the pioneer in the rise of Islamic movements and the state’s fight with these groups. The aim of this paper is to look at Egypt as a case study in Middle East’s Islamist movements in general.

The first part of this paper looks briefly at nineteenth century Islamic reformers who had an impact on the development of modern Islamic movements. In the second part, the focus will be on the formation of the Islamic movements and their cadres and main ideologies. The third part looks at contemporary movements and their position in Egyptian society.

ISLAMIC REFORMISTS

Islamic reformism is a modern movement that came into the scene in the nineteenth century as a reaction to European supremacy and expansion.

It was during this period that Muslim religious leaders and politicians began to realise that their state of affairs was inferior to that of Europe and was in steady decline. Although Islam has suffered many defeats by Europeans, it was in the nineteenth century that Muslims felt for the first time their weakness and decline and the need to borrow from their ‘enemy’.

This painful awareness made Muslim intellectuals think about the defects and the weaknesses they were suffering from and they started to search for a remedy.On the one hand, Islamic reformists embarked on studies of Europe’s pre-industrial phase in order to trace ways of building a strong state and economy. On the other, they sought viable cultural paradigms capable of checking the dominance of Europe.

The Islamic reformist movement was an urban movement and tried to establish strategies for the development of the Muslim world. The frustration of the early reformists with the status quo did not entail a demonising of the West or even a rejection of modernisation per se.

In their quest for progress, Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani and Mohammad Abduh looked upon the West both as a model and as a rival. They perceived the challenge the Umma, the Muslim community, was facing as shaped by a need to readjust their worldview to the realities of the approaching new age.

The Muslim people were given priority as citizens, whereas Islam as a normative system “assumed the role of a defensive weapon that had to be restored in order to stop deterioration and check the decline”. Rashid Rida had more radical views about society as being corrupt and the heads of Arab states as being the apostates of Islam and he supported the implementation of Koranic punishments.

These three reformists desired to bring back the glory of Islam by embracing ijtihad, rejecting the superstitions of popular religion and the stagnant thinking of the ulama. They aimed at “creating a synthesis of Islam and the modern West rather than a purified society constructed primarily along Islamic lines”.

It is ironic that these reformists became the founding ideologues of the Islamic movements that demand strictly purified Islamic communities.

The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States

MBusThe leadership of the U.S. Ikhwanul Muslimin (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal
was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within. The Brotherhood leadership has
also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the
A.S.. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the early 1960s, the Brotherhood has
constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or
“front” organizations. The current U.S. Brotherhood leadership has attempted to deny this history,
both claiming that it is not accurate and at the same time that saying that it represents an older
form of thought inside the Brotherhood. An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents,
namun begitu, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken
no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.sss

Steven MerleyMBus

The leadership of the U.S. Ikhwanul Muslimin (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within.

The Brotherhood leadership has also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the U.S. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since the early 1960s, the Brotherhood has constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or “front” organizations.

The current U.S. Brotherhood leadership has attempted to deny this history, both claiming that it is not accurate and at the same time that saying that it represents an older form of thought inside the Brotherhood.

An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents, namun begitu, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.

Ikhwanul Muslimin: Hasan al-Hudaybi dan Ideologi

Hasan Isma>il al-Hudaybi mengetuai Persatuan Ikhwanul Muslimin pada tahun a
masa krisis dan pembubaran. Kejayaan Hasan al-Banna ’, siapa pengasasnya
dan pemimpin organisasi yang pertama, al-Hudaybi menjadi ketua untuk lebih daripada
dua puluh tahun. Semasa kepimpinannya, dia menghadapi kritikan hebat dari rakan-rakan Brothers.
Mengikuti Revolusi Julai 1952, dia diadu dengan antagonisme
daripada >Abd al-Nasir, yang menjadi semakin berpengaruh di dewan
terkemuka Pegawai Percuma. >Kesungguhan Abd al-Nasir untuk menggagalkan penyebab
Persaudaraan dan pengaruhnya terhadap masyarakat adalah sebahagian dari jalannya menuju pemerintahan mutlak.
Mengingat kekuatan penting tahun-tahun al-Hudaybi sebagai pemimpin umat Islam
Persaudaraan, amat mengejutkan bahawa terdapat sedikit karya ilmiah mengenai perkara ini.
Apabila mengambil kira bahawa ideanya yang sederhana terus berpengaruh kuat
mengenai dasar dan sikap Ikhwanul Muslimin hari ini, cth. pendamainya
kedudukan terhadap sistem negara dan penolakannya terhadap idea-idea radikal, fakta
bahawa sedikit perhatian yang diberikan kepada penulisannya lebih mengejutkan. Tentunya, di sana
telah meminati Ikhwanul Muslimin. Terdapat kajian yang cukup luas
terdapat di Hasan al-Banna ’: pengasas dan pemimpin pertama Ikhwanul Muslimin
telah digambarkan sebagai model kempen Islam; yang lain menggambarkan
dia sebagai pencetus mengancam aktivisme politik atas nama Islam. Di sana
malah lebih berminat dengan idea-idea Sayyid Qutb; ada yang melihatnya sebagai
ideologi radikalisme Islam, yang konsepnya melatih kumpulan pelampau; yang lain
menggambarkan dia sebagai mangsa penganiayaan negara yang mengembangkan teologi pembebasan
sebagai reaksi terhadap penganiayaannya. Tanpa ragu ragu, adalah penting untuk memeriksa
karya para pemikir ini untuk memahami arus ideologi Islam dan
Gerakan Islam. Apa pun keputusan mengenai al-Banna ’dan Qutb, ianya adalah fakta
bahawa idea-idea tertentu dari dua pemikir telah dimasukkan ke dalam zaman moden
Ikhwanul Muslimin. Walau bagaimanapun, fokus ini telah menyebabkan persepsi yang salah bahawa
gerakan Islam semestinya radikal dalam pemikirannya dan / atau militan di dalamnya
perbuatan, andaian yang mempunyai, beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini, telah disoal oleh nombor
para sarjana, antaranya John L. Esposito, Fred Halliday, François Burgat, dan
Gudrun Krämer. 1 Kajian berikut mengenai Ikhwanul Muslimin Mesir di bawah
kepemimpinan Hasan al-Hudaybi akan menjadi tambahan kepada tesis-tesis ini, menangani
dan menilai semula pandangan bahawa Islam politik adalah blok monolitik, semua dalam semua
dibuang ke arah kekerasan.
2 Pengenalan
Terdapat sebab mengapa al-Hudaybi hampir tidak disebut dalam literatur mengenai
Ikhwanul Muslimin. Yang pertama terlintas di fikiran adalah pemerhatian yang dilakukan oleh Islamis
pergerakan adalah, mengikut definisi, dilihat sebagai asasnya radikal, anti demokratik dan
anti-Barat. Alasan ini mempersoalkan perbezaan antara Islamisme sederhana
dan rakan sejawatnya yang radikal. Hujahnya mengatakan bahawa kedua-duanya mempunyai objektif
mewujudkan sistem negara Islam, bahawa mereka berdua bertujuan untuk menggantikan yang ada
pemerintahan sekular dan oleh itu mereka hanya berbeza mengikut tahap kaedah mereka,
tetapi tidak pada prinsipnya. Buku ini, namun begitu, jelas bergabung dengan kalangan ilmiah di
Islam politik, yang mengenal pasti hujah seperti ini sebagai neo-Orientalis. Sebagai
Tayangan Esposito, pendekatan Islam politik ini berdasarkan apa yang dia sebut sebagai ‘sekular
fundamentalisme ’.
Pandangan luaran Islam politik tertumpu pada pemikiran radikal,
dan ini mungkin disebabkan oleh penciptaan, di pihak politik kuasa, rasa takut akan
Islam sebagai agama, yang berbeza, pelik dan nampaknya bertentangan dengan
Pemikiran Barat. Sebagai alternatif, ia mungkin kerana kumpulan radikal atau militan
selalu muncul di media dengan alasan tindakan mereka. Sebenarnya, militan
Orang Islam sebenarnya mencari publisiti seperti itu. Sementara pemikiran radikal dan tindakan militan
menjadikannya perlu untuk mengkaji kumpulan pelampau, tumpuan terhadap keganasan dalam nama
Islam meminggirkan Islamis sederhana. Ia juga sukar untuk menjelaskan
perbezaan antara Islamisme radikal dan sederhana. Dalam kesan, tumpuan ilmiah
pada kumpulan radikal atau militan memperkuat persepsi masyarakat yang umumnya negatif
Islam di Barat.
Sebab lain mengapa al-Hudaybi khususnya tidak dikaji oleh Barat
para sarjana mempunyai kaitan dengan urusan dalaman Ikhwan. Sungguh menghairankan
bahawa namanya tidak banyak disebut oleh penulis Ikhwanul Muslimin
sendiri. Tidak ada penjelasan mudah untuk ini. Salah satu sebabnya ialah ahli
terutamanya menekankan rasa simpati mereka terhadap al-Banna ’, menggambarkan dia sebagai seorang yang ideal
pemimpin yang mati kerana keyakinan aktivisnya. Walau bagaimanapun, kerana banyak Saudara yang bertahan
penjara, kerja keras dan juga penyeksaan di dalam >Penjara Abd al-Nasir dan
perkhemahan, sejarah peribadi mereka telah mengakibatkan kurangnya wacana mengenai Hasan
al-Hudaybi. Oleh itu, ada kecenderungan untuk mengingati zaman kepemimpinan al-Hudaybi
sebagai masa hampir kekalahan dan kehancuran. Masih, pengalaman dari
dianiaya terjebak dalam hubungan samar-samar antara lupa dan penilaian semula.
Banyak akaun peribadi pada masa itu telah diterbitkan sejak pertengahan
1970s, 2 menceritakan kisah penyiksaan dan menekankan keteguhan iman. Hanya a
beberapa buku yang ditulis oleh Muslim Brothers mengambil pendekatan yang lebih luas, yang mana
merangkumi perbincangan mengenai krisis dalam organisasi dan bahagian al-Hudaybi
di dalamnya. Para pengarang yang menangani masalah ini bukan sahaja memperlihatkan kelemahan masyarakat
kedudukan vis-à-vis >Abd al-Nasir, tetapi juga memperlihatkan tanda-tanda perpecahan di dalam
Ikhwanul Muslimin. 3 Ini menyebabkan berlainan sikap terhadap al-Hudaybi, dengan
kebanyakan menggambarkannya sebagai pemimpin yang tidak cekap dan tidak mempunyai keperibadian yang berkarisma
pendahulunya, al-Banna ’. Khususnya, dia dituduh tidak memerintah
wewenang untuk menyatukan pelbagai sayap Ikhwanul Muslimin
atau untuk mengambil kedudukan yang kuat berhubung dengan sistem negara otoriter. Di dalam
pandangan terakhir terletak pada kesamaran, kerana nampaknya menunjukkan al-Hudaybi bukan hanya sebagai
Pengenalan 3
kegagalan, tetapi juga sebagai mangsa keadaan politik. Akhirnya, akaun ini mendedahkan
jurang ideologi yang dibuka pada awal tempoh penganiayaan di
1954. Ke tahap tertentu, Sayyid Qutb mengatasi jurang ini. Semasa dipenjarakan
dia mengembangkan pendekatan radikal, menolak sistem negara ketika itu sebagai tidak sah
dan ‘tidak Islamik’. Dalam mengembangkan konsep revolusi dan menerangkannya
sebab-sebab yang mendasari penganiayaan, dia mengubah keadaan menjadi mangsa
menjadi salah satu kebanggaan. Oleh itu, dia memberi banyak Saudara Muslim yang dipenjarakan, terutamanya
ahli muda, ideologi yang dapat mereka pegang.
Harus dikatakan bahawa al-Hudaybi tidak bertindak balas dengan tegas terhadap situasi
krisis dalaman dan pembubaran. Sesungguhnya, hingga tahap tertentu ketidaktentuannya mencetuskan
situasi ini. Ini jelas sekali berlaku semasa tempoh penganiayaan
(1954–71), ketika dia tidak memberikan panduan untuk membantu mengatasi
perasaan putus asa diantar oleh >Penjara besar-besaran Abd al-Nasir. Dia
reaksi terhadap idea-idea radikal yang melenyapkan di penjara dan kem di antara mereka
pasti, terutamanya muda, ahli datang agak lewat. Walaupun begitu, keilmuannya dan
hujah perundangan tidak mempunyai kesan yang sama seperti Sayyid Qutb's
tulisan. Dalam 1969, al-Hudaybi mengemukakan konsep sederhana dalam penulisannya Du<di
yang Qudat (Pendakwah bukan Hakim). 4 Penulisan ini, yang diedarkan secara rahsia
sesama Saudara, dianggap sebagai pertolongan pertama Sayyid
Idea Qutb. 5 Qutb, yang digantung di 1966, pada masa itu dianggap sebagai
syahid, pemikirannya sudah mempunyai pengaruh yang besar. Ini tidak bermaksud
bahawa majoriti saudara Muslim tidak mengambil pendekatan sederhana, tetapi
kekurangan garis panduan menjadikannya tidak bersuara dan memperkuatkan persepsi al-Hudaybi
sebagai pemimpin yang lemah.
Walaupun begitu, pemikiran sederhana al-Hudayb memberi kesan kepada rakannya
Saudara Muslim. Selepas amnesti am 1971, al-Hudaybi memainkan jurusan
bahagian dalam penubuhan semula organisasi. Walaupun dia meninggal dunia di 1973, dia sederhana
dan idea pendamaian terus relevan. Fakta bahawa sahabat rapat
seperti Muhammad Hamid Abu Nasr, >Umar al-Tilmisani dan Muhammad
Terkenal, yang meninggal dunia baru-baru ini, menggantikannya sebagai pemimpin menunjukkan kesinambungannya
berfikir. Selanjutnya, anaknya Ma'mun al-Hudaybi telah memainkan peranan utama dalam
keupayaannya sebagai setiausaha dan jurucakap Ikhwan. Sebab lain mengapa
pemikirannya menjadi kebohongan penting dalam perubahan sikap terhadap Muslim
Persaudaraan sejak presiden Anwar al-Sadat. Al-Sadat, yang berjaya >Abd
al-Nasir, membebaskan Brothers yang dipenjarakan dan menawarkan organisasi itu separuh undang-undang
walaupun tidak diiktiraf secara rasmi. Tempoh penyusunan semula (1971–77) diikuti,
semasa kerajaan mengangkat penapisan buku yang ditulis oleh
Saudara Muslim. Banyak memoar anggota yang sebelumnya dipenjara diterbitkan,
seperti akaun Zaynab al-Ghazali atau buku Du al-Hudaybi<di la Qudat
(Pendakwah bukan Hakim). Berurusan dengan masa lalu, buku-buku ini bukan sekadar menyimpan
kenangan kekejaman dari >Penganiayaan Abd al-Nasir. Al-Sadat mengekori
agendanya sendiri ketika dia membenarkan penerbitan ini memenuhi pasaran; ini
adalah strategi politik yang disengajakan, menyiratkan perubahan arah dan bertujuan untuk
menjauhkan pemerintahan baru dari yang lama. Penerbitan selepas kematian
Tulisan al-Hudaybi tidak hanya bertujuan untuk memberikan panduan ideologi kepada
4 Pengenalan
saudara Muslim; mereka diedarkan kerana kenyataan mereka menentang
pemikiran radikal, dan dengan itu digunakan untuk mengatasi masalah yang baru dan meningkat, iaitu
penubuhan kumpulan Islam, yang mula aktif menentang
sistem politik pada awal tahun 1970-an. Dalam istilah ini, Daripada<di la Qudat tetap menjadi
kritikan penting pemikiran radikal.
Tujuan utama Hasan al-Hudaybi adalah mengubah masyarakat, i.e.. Masyarakat Mesir,
yang mana, pada pandangannya, tidak menyedari sifat politik kepercayaan Islam. Oleh itu,
perubahan yang nyata hanya dapat dilakukan melalui kesedaran dan oleh
menangani isu identiti Islam (berbanding dengan persepsi Barat). Sahaja
dengan mengembangkan rasa kesedaran Islam dapat menjadi tujuan utama
pembentukan masyarakat Islam dapat dicapai. Memandangkan pendekatan ini, al-Hudaybi
membantah penggulingan revolusi, sebaliknya memberitakan pembangunan secara beransur-ansur dari
dalam. Oleh itu, perkara utama adalah pendidikan dan penglibatan sosial, begitu juga
penyertaan dalam sistem politik, menarik dengan misi ( memberi<wa ) kepada
kesedaran individu yang beriman.
Jalannya sekarang diikuti oleh Ikhwanul Muslimin hari ini, yang berusaha
untuk dikenali sebagai parti politik dan mempengaruhi keputusan politik
membuat dengan menyusup struktur partisipatif politik (parlimen, pentadbiran,
badan bukan kerajaan). Kajian Ikhwanul Muslimin ini
dari tahun 1950-an hingga awal 1970-an, Oleh itu, bukan sahaja merupakan satu kajian
sejarah politik moden Mesir dan analisis ideologi agama, tetapi
juga mempunyai hubungan dengan politik semasa.

Barbara H.E. Zollner

HasanHasan Ismail al-Hudaybi memimpin Persatuan Ikhwanul Muslimin pada masa krisis dan pembubaran. Kejayaan Hasan al-Banna ’, yang merupakan pengasas dan pemimpin pertama organisasi, al-Hudaybi menjadi ketua selama lebih dari dua puluh tahun. Semasa kepimpinannya, dia menghadapi kritikan hebat dari rakan-rakan Brothers.

Mengikuti Revolusi Julai 1952, dia diadu melawan antagonisme Abd al-Nasir, yang menjadi semakin berpengaruh dalam dewan Pegawai Percuma yang terkemuka. Kesungguhan Abd al-Nasir untuk menggagalkan perjuangan Ikhwan dan pengaruhnya terhadap masyarakat adalah sebahagian dari jalannya menuju pemerintahan mutlak. Mengingat kekuatan penting tahun-tahun al-Hudaybi sebagai pemimpin Ikhwanul Muslimin, amat mengejutkan bahawa terdapat sedikit karya ilmiah mengenai perkara ini.

Apabila mengambil kira bahawa idea-idea moderatnya terus mempengaruhi kebijakan dan sikap Ikhwanul Muslimin masa kini, cth. kedudukan pendamainya terhadap sistem negara dan penolakan idea radikalnya, hakikat bahawa perhatian yang sedikit diberikan kepada penulisannya lebih mengejutkan. Tentunya, terdapat minat dalam Ikhwanul Muslimin.

Terdapat kajian yang cukup luas mengenai Hasan al-Banna ’: pengasas dan pemimpin pertama Ikhwanul Muslimin telah digambarkan sebagai tokoh model kempen Islam; yang lain menggambarkannya sebagai pencetus mengancam aktivisme politik atas nama Islam.

Terdapat lebih banyak minat untuk idea-idea Sayyid Qutb; ada yang melihatnya sebagai ideologi radikalisme Islam, yang konsepnya melatih kumpulan pelampau; yang lain menggambarkannya sebagai mangsa penganiayaan negara yang mengembangkan teologi pembebasan sebagai reaksi terhadap penganiayaannya.

Tanpa ragu ragu, adalah penting untuk mengkaji karya pemikir ini untuk memahami arus ideologi Islam dan gerakan Islam. Apa pun keputusan mengenai al-Banna ’dan Qutb, adalah kenyataan bahawa idea-idea tertentu dari dua pemikir telah dimasukkan ke dalam Ikhwanul Muslimin moden.

Walau bagaimanapun, fokus ini telah menyebabkan persepsi yang salah bahawa gerakan Islam semestinya radikal dalam pemikirannya dan / atau militan dalam perbuatannya, andaian yang mempunyai, beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini, telah disoal oleh sebilangan ulama, antaranya John L. Esposito, Fred Halliday, François Burgat, dan Gudrun Krämer.

Kajian berikut mengenai Ikhwanul Muslimin Mesir di bawah kepemimpinan Hasan al-Hudaybi akan menjadi tambahan kepada tesis-tesis ini, menangani dan menilai semula pandangan bahawa Islam politik adalah blok monolitik, semuanya cenderung ke arah kekerasan.

Terdapat sebab mengapa al-Hudaybi hampir tidak disebut dalam literatur mengenai Ikhwanul Muslimin. Yang pertama yang terlintas di fikiran adalah pemerhatian bahawa gerakan Islam, mengikut definisi, dilihat sebagai asasnya radikal, anti-demokratik dan anti-Barat.

Alasan ini mempersoalkan perbezaan antara Islamisme sederhana dan rakan sejawatnya yang radikal. Hujahnya mengatakan bahawa kedua-duanya mempunyai objektif untuk mewujudkan sistem negara Islam, bahawa kedua-duanya bertujuan untuk menggantikan pemerintahan sekular yang ada dan oleh itu mereka hanya berbeza tahap kaedah mereka, tetapi tidak pada prinsipnya.

Buku ini, namun begitu, jelas bergabung dengan kalangan ilmiah mengenai Islam politik, yang mengenal pasti hujah seperti ini sebagai neo-Orientalis. Seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh Esposito, pendekatan Islam politik ini berdasarkan apa yang dia sebut sebagai 'fundamentalisme sekular'.

Pandangan luaran Islam politik tertumpu pada pemikiran radikal, dan ini mungkin disebabkan oleh penciptaan, di pihak politik kuasa, ketakutan terhadap Islam sebagai agama, yang berbeza, pelik dan nampaknya bertentangan dengan

Pemikiran Barat. Sebagai alternatif, mungkin kerana kumpulan radikal atau bahkan kumpulan militan selalu muncul di media dengan alasan tindakan mereka. Sebenarnya, militan Islam sebenarnya mencari publisiti seperti itu.

Walaupun pemikiran radikal dan tindakan militan menjadikannya perlu untuk mengkaji kumpulan ekstremis, tumpuan terhadap keganasan atas nama Islam meminggirkan golongan Islam sederhana.

Ini juga menyukarkan untuk menjelaskan perbezaan antara Islamisme radikal dan sederhana. Dalam kesan, tumpuan ilmiah pada kumpulan radikal atau militan memperkuat persepsi masyarakat umum terhadap Islam di Barat.

Alasan selanjutnya mengapa al-Hudaybi khususnya tidak dikaji oleh sarjana Barat ada kaitannya dengan urusan dalaman Ikhwan. Sungguh mengejutkan bahawa namanya tidak banyak disebut oleh penulis Ikhwanul Muslimin itu sendiri. Tidak ada penjelasan mudah untuk ini.

Salah satu sebabnya ialah para anggota menekankan rasa simpati mereka terhadap al-Banna ’, menggambarkan dia sebagai pemimpin ideal yang mati kerana keyakinan aktivisnya. Walau bagaimanapun, sebilangan besar Saudara menjalani hukuman penjara, kerja keras dan juga penyeksaan di dalam penjara dan kem Abd al-Nasir, sejarah peribadi mereka telah mengakibatkan kurangnya wacana mengenai Hasan al-Hudaybi.

Oleh itu, ada kecenderungan untuk mengingati zaman kepemimpinan al-Hudaybi sebagai masa hampir kalah dan musnah. Masih, pengalaman yang dianiaya terjebak dalam hubungan samar-samar antara lupa dan penilaian semula.

Banyak akaun peribadi pada masa itu telah diterbitkan sejak pertengahan tahun 1970-an, 2 menceritakan kisah penyiksaan dan menekankan keteguhan iman. Hanya sebilangan buku yang ditulis oleh Muslim Brothers mengambil pendekatan yang lebih luas, yang merangkumi perbincangan mengenai krisis dalam organisasi dan bahagian al-Hudaybi di dalamnya. Pengarang-pengarang yang menangani masalah ini tidak hanya mengungkapkan kedudukan masyarakat yang lemah terhadap Abd al-Nasir, tetapi juga memperlihatkan tanda-tanda perpecahan di dalam

Ikhwanul Muslimin. 3 Ini menyebabkan berlainan sikap terhadap al-Hudaybi, dengan kebanyakan menggambarkannya sebagai pemimpin yang tidak kompeten dan tidak mempunyai keperibadian karismatik pendahulunya, al-Banna ’. Khususnya, dia dituduh tidak memerintahkan wewenang untuk menyatukan sayap Ikhwanul Muslimin yang berlainan atau mengambil kedudukan yang kuat dalam kaitannya dengan sistem negara otoriter.

Pada pandangan terakhir terletak kekaburan, kerana nampaknya menunjukkan al-Hudaybi bukan sekadar kegagalan, tetapi juga sebagai mangsa keadaan politik. Akhirnya, akaun ini menunjukkan jurang ideologi yang dibuka pada awal masa penganiayaan di 1954.

Ke tahap tertentu, Sayyid Qutb mengatasi jurang ini. Selama dipenjarakan, dia mengembangkan pendekatan radikal, menolak sistem negara ketika itu sebagai tidak sah dan 'tidak Islamik'. Dalam mengembangkan konsep revolusioner dan menerangkan sebab-sebab yang mendasari penganiayaan, dia mengubah keadaan menjadi mangsa kebanggaan.

Oleh itu, dia memberi banyak Saudara Muslim yang dipenjarakan, terutamanya ahli muda, ideologi yang dapat mereka pegang.

Harus dikatakan bahawa al-Hudaybi tidak bertindak balas dengan tegas terhadap situasi krisis dan pembubaran dalaman. Sesungguhnya, hingga tahap tertentu ketidaktentuannya mencetuskan keadaan ini.

Ini jelas sekali berlaku semasa tempoh penganiayaan (1954–71), ketika dia tidak memberikan pedoman untuk membantu mengatasi rasa putus asa yang ditanggung oleh penjara besar-besaran Abd al-Nasir. Reaksinya terhadap idea-idea radikal yang melenyapkan di penjara dan kem di antara pihak tertentu, terutamanya muda, ahli datang agak lewat.

Walaupun begitu, hujah ilmiah dan perundangannya tidak mempunyai kesan yang sama seperti tulisan Sayyid Qutb. Dalam 1969, al-Hudaybi mengemukakan konsep sederhana dalam penulisannya Duat la Qudat (Pendakwah bukan Hakim).

Penulisan ini, yang diedarkan secara diam-diam di antara rakan-rakan Saudara, dianggap sebagai penolakan pertama idea Sayyid Qutb. 5 Qutb, yang digantung di 1966, pada masa itu dianggap sebagai syahid, pemikirannya sudah mempunyai pengaruh yang besar.

Ini tidak bermaksud bahawa majoriti saudara Muslim tidak mengikuti pendekatan sederhana, tetapi kekurangan garis panduan menjadikannya tidak bersuara dan memperkuatkan persepsi al-Hudaybi sebagai pemimpin yang lemah.

Walaupun begitu, pemikiran al-Hudayb yang sederhana memberi kesan kepada saudara-saudaranya yang beragama Islam. Selepas amnesti am 1971, al-Hudaybi memainkan peranan utama dalam penubuhan semula organisasi. Walaupun dia meninggal dunia di 1973, ideanya yang sederhana dan pendamaian terus relevan.

Fakta bahawa sahabat dekat seperti Muhammad Hamid Abu Nasr, Umar al-Tilmisani dan Muhammad Mashhur, yang meninggal dunia baru-baru ini, menggantikannya sebagai pemimpin menunjukkan kesinambungan pemikirannya.

Selanjutnya, puteranya Ma'mun al-Hudaybi telah memainkan peranan penting dalam jawatannya sebagai setiausaha dan jurucakap Ikhwan.

Sebab lain mengapa pemikirannya menjadi penting terletak pada perubahan sikap terhadap Ikhwanul Muslimin sejak presiden Anwar al-Sadat. Al-Sadat, yang menggantikan Abd al-Nasir, membebaskan Brothers yang dipenjarakan dan menawarkan organisasi itu separuh sah walaupun tidak diiktiraf secara rasmi.

Tempoh penyusunan semula (1971–77) diikuti, semasa kerajaan mengangkat penapisan buku-buku yang ditulis oleh Muslim Brothers. Banyak memoar anggota yang sebelumnya dipenjara diterbitkan, seperti akaun Zaynab al-Ghazali atau buku Du al-Hudaybi<di la Qudat (Pendakwah bukan Hakim).

Berurusan dengan masa lalu, buku-buku ini bukan sekadar menyimpan ingatan tentang kekejaman penganiayaan Abd al-Nasir.

Al-Sadat mengikuti agendanya sendiri ketika dia membenarkan penerbitan ini memenuhi pasaran; ini adalah strategi politik yang disengajakan, menyiratkan perubahan arah dan bertujuan menjauhkan pemerintahan baru dari yang lama.

Penerbitan tulisan al-Hudaybi selepas kematian tidak hanya bertujuan untuk memberi panduan ideologi kepada Saudara Muslim; mereka disebarkan kerana kenyataannya menentang pemikiran radikal, dan dengan itu digunakan untuk mengatasi masalah yang baru dan meningkat, iaitu penubuhan kumpulan Islam, yang mula aktif menentang sistem politik pada awal tahun 1970-an. Dalam istilah ini, Duat la Qudat tetap menjadi kritikan penting terhadap pemikiran radikal.

Tujuan utama Hasan al-Hudaybi adalah mengubah masyarakat, i.e.. Masyarakat Mesir, yang mana, pada pandangannya, tidak menyedari sifat politik kepercayaan Islam. Oleh itu, perubahan yang nyata hanya dapat dicapai dengan memberi kesedaran dan menangani masalah identiti Islam (berbanding dengan persepsi Barat).

Hanya dengan mengembangkan rasa kesedaran Islam dapat dicapai tujuan utama pembentukan masyarakat Islam. Memandangkan pendekatan ini, al-Hudaybi membantah penggulingan revolusi, sebaliknya memberitakan perkembangan secara beransur-ansur dari dalam. Oleh itu, perkara utama adalah pendidikan dan penglibatan sosial, serta penyertaan dalam sistem politik, menarik dengan misi ( ubat ) kepada kesedaran individu yang beriman.

Jalannya sekarang diikuti oleh Ikhwanul Muslimin hari ini, yang berusaha untuk diiktiraf sebagai sebuah parti politik dan yang mempengaruhi pengambilan keputusan politik dengan melakukan penyusunan struktur partisipatif politik (parlimen, pentadbiran, badan bukan kerajaan).

Kajian Ikhwanul Muslimin ini dari tahun 1950-an hingga awal 1970-an, Oleh itu, bukan hanya sekumpulan penyelidikan sejarah politik moden Mesir dan analisis ideologi agama, tetapi juga mempunyai hubungan dengan politik semasa.

Goldstone Report On Israel’s War On Gaza

Goldstone in Gaza

1. On 3 April 2009, the President of the Human Rights Council established the United Nations
Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict with the mandate “to investigate all violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been
committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza
during the period from 27 Disember 2008 dan 18 January 2009, whether before, during or
after.”
2. The President appointed Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to head the Mission. The other three appointed members were:
Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics
and Political Science, who was a member of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun
(2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, who was a
member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); and Colonel Desmond
Travers, a former Officer in Ireland’s Defence Forces and member of the Board of Directors of
the Institute for International Criminal Investigations.
3. As is usual practice, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) established a secretariat to support the Mission.
4. The Mission interpreted the mandate as requiring it to place the civilian population of the
region at the centre of its concerns regarding the violations of international law.
5. The Mission convened for the first time in Geneva between 4 dan 8 May 2009. Additionally,
the Mission met in Geneva on 20 May, pada 4 dan 5 Julai, and between 1 dan 4 Ogos 2009. The
Mission conducted three field visits: two to the Gaza Strip between 30 May and 6 June, dan
between 25 June and 1 Julai 2009; and one visit to Amman on 2 dan 3 Julai 2009. Several staff of

1. On 3 April 2009, the President of the Human Rights Council established the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict with the mandate “to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 Disember 2008 dan 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.”

2. The President appointed Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to head the Mission. The other three appointed members were Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, who was a member of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun (2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, who was a member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); and Colonel Desmond Travers, a former Officer in Ireland’s Defence Forces and member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for International Criminal Investigations.

3. As is usual practice, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established a secretariat to support the Mission.

4. The Mission interpreted the mandate as requiring it to place the civilian population of the region at the centre of its concerns regarding the violations of international law.

5. The Mission convened for the first time in Geneva between 4 dan 8 May 2009. Additionally, the Mission met in Geneva on 20 May, pada 4 dan 5 Julai, and between 1 dan 4 Ogos 2009. The Mission conducted three field visits: two to the Gaza Strip between 30 May and 6 June, and between 25 June and 1 Julai 2009; and one visit to Amman on 2 dan 3 Julai 2009. Several staff ofthe Mission’s secretariat were deployed in Gaza from 22 May to 4 Julai 2009 to conduct field investigations.

6. Notes verbales were sent to all Member States of the United Nations and United Nations organs and bodies on 7 May 2009. On 8 June 2009 the Mission issued a call for submissions inviting all interested persons and organizations to submit relevant information and documentation to assist in the implementation of its mandate.

7. Public hearings were held in Gaza on 28 dan 29 June and in Geneva on 6 dan 7 Julai 2009.

8. The Mission repeatedly sought to obtain the cooperation of the Government of Israel. After numerous attempts had failed, the Mission sought and obtained the assistance of the Government of Egypt to enable it to enter the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing.

9. The Mission has enjoyed the support and cooperation of the Palestinian Authority and of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. Due to the lack of cooperation from the Israeli Government, the Mission was unable to meet members of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The Mission did, namun begitu, meet officials of the Palestinian Authority, including a cabinet minister, in Amman. During its visits to the Gaza Strip, the Mission held meetings with senior members of the Gaza authorities and they extended their full cooperation and support to the Mission.

10. Subsequent to the public hearings in Geneva, the Mission was informed that a Palestinian participant, Mr. Muhammad Srour, had been detained by Israeli security forces when returning to the West Bank and became concerned that his detention may have been a consequence of his appearance before the Mission. The Mission is in contact with him and continues to monitor developments.