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US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

генры Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

The Political Evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

Стывен Беннетт

“Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

Since its early days in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood has created much controversy, as some argue that the organization advocates violence in the name of Islam. According to Dr. Mamoun Fandy of the James A. Baker III Institute of Public Policy, jihadism and the activation of the views of the world of the house of Islam and the house of war are the ideas that emerged from the writings and the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood” (Livesy, 2005). The primary evidence for this argument is notable member of the Brotherhood, Sayeed Qutb, who is credited with developing the revisionist and controversial interpretation of jihad that provided religious justifications for violence committed by offshoot organizations of the Brotherhood like al-jihad, al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, ХАМАС, і al-Qaeda.

Yet that is still a debatable position, because despite being the ideological parent of these violent organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood itself has always maintained an official stance against violence and instead has promoted Islamic civil and social action at the grassroots level. Within the first twenty years of its existence the Muslim Brotherhood gained status as the most influential of all major groups in the Middle East through its popular activism. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.

While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob also tells us that of the current Islamist opposition groups that exist today “the more ‘radical’ or militant of these groups insist upon revolutionary change that is to be imposed on the masses and political system, whereas… the new Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, call for gradual change that is to be undertaken from within the political system and with the enlistment of the Muslim masses”

MUSLIM INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

SARA Сільвестр

In Europe, and most of the Western world, Muslim presence in the publicsphere is a recent phenomenon that characterised the last decade of the 20thcentury and has deeply marked the beginning of the 21st. This visiblepresence, which amounts to something between 15 і 20 millionindividuals, can best be analysed if dissected into a number of components.The first part of this chapter illustrates where, when and why organisedMuslim voices and institutions have emerged in Europe, and which actorshave been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.

High noon in Egypt

Devika Parashar

F. Andy Messing


The parallels between President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and the deposed shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran, are attention-getting. У 1979, prior to the notorious Islamic Revolution, which was instigated and controlled by radical Muslim cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the shah wielded personal and authoritarian power in a manner comparable to the dictators of the time: Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and earlier, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. These rulers brandished their power with little restraint, unencumbered by the rule of law and basically insensitive to the needs of their populace. Unfortunately, Hosni Mubarak alarmingly resembles these former dictators in social, political, economic and security issues. He is inadvertently pushing his country towards an Islamic revolution. As an earlier example, the shah of Iran slowly strangled his country by reigning with a heavy-hand through his unfettered security force. He narrowed the sociopolitical base of his government and distorted the economy by monopolistic actions. This modus operandi reflects Mr. Mubarak’s current regime, whose survival depends on his ability to reverse these trends. Accordingly, Mr. Mubarak uses hisCentral Security Force,” that now consists of more than half of his entire military, to impose a measure of censorship on the mass media and ban most forms of political organization, activities and literary expression. Like the shah, he has established control over physical action, selectively executing opposition, imprisoning and exiling thousands of people who oppose his policies. Recently, the leading English language newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly reported an upsurge in deaths due to police brutality. Another Arab news source reported the barring of human-rights groups from attending secret military trials. Economically, Mr. Mubarak monopolistically privatizes the highly regulated Egyptian economy, fostering creation of an exclusive industrial bourgeoisie. He invites only pro-Mubarak businesses to work within his development schemes. Like the shah, he has alienated large sections of the public and private sectors, thus suppressing any real economic growth. Politically, Mr. Mubarak cracks down on civil participation, essentially repressing political opposition; while his lack of government transparency practically guarantees rife corruption throughout the 4 million strong bureaucracy. Equally important, is the lack of government response to crises. Al-Ahram Weekly reported 20 train crashes between 1995 and August 2006. In each case, the government formed an ineffectual and disorganized crisis-management council that failed to correct
the problem. As the government failed to meet the needs of its people, Браты-мусульмане (al-Ikhwan) filled a void by establishing social services, such as health clinics and youth programs, to effectively respond to various situations. The first and best-known example of this was their mobilization after the 1992 earthquake struck Southern Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood provided disaster relief then, and continues to do so, thereby enhancing its traction. Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood has nonviolently taken control of 15 percent of major professional associations that form the greater part of Egypt’s middle class. In the most recent parliamentary election in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood presented the largest threat to Mr. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, securing an unprecedented 34 з 454 seats. They demonstrated their ability to draw support despite government opposition. Mr. Mubarak unwittingly nurtured the regrowth of the essentially Fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood by alienating segments of the Egyptian populace and eliminating soft-line opposition (such as the secular Wafd and al-Ghad parties). He must seek more innovative methods to remain in power. Напрыклад, Chile managed to open the economy and encourage free enterprise under Augusto Pinochet, even though his government was considered authoritarian. Mr. Mubarak must tap into the tremendous energy of the Egyptian people by increasing the pace of capitalization and democratization, thereby improving their standard of living. If he succeeds, Mr. Mubarak could eventually create a legacy for himself as an Arab leader who effectively modernized and democratized thiskeystonenation. In doing so, he would secure major assets such as the Suez Canal, Egypt’s oil production and tourism, for not only his country but for the global economy, while providing a positive example for the entire Muslim world. Акрамя таго, U.S. ability to deal with Egypt will be enhanced, and our aid to that country will become completely justified. But if Mr. Mubarak fails, his regime will fall to the same type of radical elements that claimed the shah’s government in 1979, creating compounded turmoil for Egypt and the world. Devika Parashar spent eight months in Egypt into 2007 and is a research assistant at the National Defense Council Foundation. F. Andy Messing, a retired Special Forces officer, is NDCF’s executive director and met with a Muslim Brotherhood Representative in Cairo in 1994. He has been to 27 conflict areas worldwide.


Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma

Шадзі Хамід

U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, але, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 і 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Аднак, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, і, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.

Хасан аль-Банна

Guilain Denoelcx

Hasan al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood or Society of the Muslim Brothers, thelargest and most influential Sunni revivalist organization in the 20th century. Created in Egypt in1928, the Muslim Brotherhood became the first mass-based, overtly political movement to opposethe ascendancy of secular and Western ideas in the Middle East. The brotherhood saw in theseideas the root of the decay of Islamic societies in the modern world, and advocated a return toIslam as a solution to the ills that had befallen Muslim societies. Al-Banna’s leadership was criticalto the spectacular growth of the brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s. By the early 1950s,branches had been established in Syria, Sudan, and Jordan. Soon, the movement’s influence would be felt inplaces as far away as the Gulf and non-Arab countries such as Iran, Пакістан, Інданезія, and Malaysia. Drivingthis expansion was the appeal of the organizational model embodied in the original, Egypt-based section of thebrotherhood, and the success of al-Banna’s writings. Translated into several languages, these writings haveshaped two generations of Sunni religious activists across the Islamic world.

International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & палітыка

Стимсон цэнтр & Інстытут палітычных даследаванняў

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Егіпет, India,Інданезія, Kenya, Малайзія, Пакістан, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Нарэшце, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

жанчыны, work, and Islam in Arab societies

Юсуф Гэта

Arab societies are currently in a state of confusion. Problems of underdevelopment,inequity, institutional deficiencies, and illiteracy are rampant (Arab HumanDevelopment Report, 2002). Arabs seem to be in a futile search for a new identity ina world that is transforming: power structures are shifting, societal expectations arechanging, and male-female relations are developing. The Arabs seem to yearn for anew identity that does not displace them from their roots, and at the same timeconnects them to the future; the search seems incessantly fruitless. Even non-Arabsseem to be confused about the issue. Vivid movie images mostly portray the Arab maleas a primitive, fanatic, brutal, lunatic, vicious, and splendidly prosperous individualwhile the Arab woman is portrayed as a belly dancer or whore, a veiled submissivemember of a luxurious harem, or a speechless oppressed character with no identity(Boullata, 1990). The political developments of the past few years did not help bringabout a better image. The rise of Islamic activism, end of the cold war, Huntington’s“clash of civilizations” supposition, and the events of 11th September only reinforcedthe bewilderment and confusion.In addressing the notion of women’s participation in the business and politicalarenas in Arab societies, conflicting remarks are brought forward. Some refer to therole of culture and the prevailing religion in the area – Islam and interpretations ofIslam – as possible reasons for such lack of participation (El-Saadawi, 1997; Mernissi,1991). Islam, it is asserted, is not merely a set of beliefs and rituals but is also a socialorder that has an all-pervading influence on its followers (Weir, 2000). This essayattempts to present varying discourses pertaining to women’s work and how it isimpacted by interpretations of Islam. We present current discourses from variousviewpoints including Muslim scholars on the one hand and active feminists on theother hand. We address the disagreements that exist in the camps of the religiousscholars in their interpretations of religious texts impacting women and their work. Inaddition, we tackle the feminist discourse pertaining to the role of Islam, orunderstandings of Islam, in their participation and development.

Islamic Movements and the Use of Violence:

Эсен Kirdis

.


Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? First, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Second, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, Я. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) Браты-мусульмане, (3) "Джемаа ісламу", і (4) Tablighi Jamaat

Islamic Movements and Democratization

Айсегул Козак

Gülseren чалавек

In recent years, many sociologists as well as political scientists argued over and offered theories about the factors that promote democracy. Some suggested that a country may more likely to become democratic if it becomes richer, if it redistributes the country’s wealth and income in an egalitarian manner.
To still others, becoming more capitalististic and rapidly converting its peasantry into proletarians is a condition of democratization. Being a former British colony and being a Protestant are also offered as factors that increase the likelihood of being a successful democracy (see Dahl, 1971; Bollen & Jackman 1985; Huntington 1991; Lipset, 1994; Moore, 1966; Muller, 1995).
Up to date, the majority of the studies on the democratization of the Islamic countries have dealt with the issue under the lenses of Islam’s adverse effects on the level of democratization in the Muslim countries. These studies, Аднак, mostly failed to notice the positive drive to democratization brought by the Islamic parties into the existing political system. This paper aims to address this deficiency within the democracy literature.
More specifically, the aim of the paper, via case studies of Turkey and Egypt, is to examine the effect of the inclusion or exclusion of the Islamic parties in the political system of Muslim countries’ transitions to democracy. We argue that, inclusion of the Islamic parties in the democratic system in Turkey increased the state’s legitimacy, diminished civil conflict, and encouraged liberalization of the Turkish political system, the parties and their constituency thus, promoted a drive to successful democratization.
On the other hand, the exclusion of Islamists from the political system in Egypt weakened the state’s legitimacy, intensified the civil conflict, and radicalized the Islamic 4 movement and its constituency. The state gradually became more and more autocratic thus, hindered democratization.

In recent years, many sociologists as well as political scientists argued over andoffered theories about the factors that promote democracy. Some suggested that a countrymay more likely to become democratic if it becomes richer, if it redistributes thecountry’s wealth and income in an egalitarian manner. To still others, becoming morecapitalististic and rapidly converting its peasantry into proletarians is a condition ofdemocratization. Being a former British colony and being a Protestant are also offered asfactors that increase the likelihood of being a successful democracy (see Dahl, 1971;Bollen & Jackman 1985; Huntington 1991; Lipset, 1994; Moore, 1966; Muller, 1995).Up to date, the majority of the studies on the democratization of the Islamic countrieshave dealt with the issue under the lenses of Islam’s adverse effects on the level ofdemocratization in the Muslim countries. These studies, Аднак, mostly failed to noticethe positive drive to democratization brought by the Islamic parties into the existingpolitical system. This paper aims to address this deficiency within the democracyliterature.More specifically, the aim of the paper, via case studies of Turkey and Egypt, is toexamine the effect of the inclusion or exclusion of the Islamic parties in the politicalsystem of Muslim countries’ transitions to democracy. We argue that, inclusion of theIslamic parties in the democratic system in Turkey increased the state’s legitimacy,diminished civil conflict, and encouraged liberalization of the Turkish political system,the parties and their constituency thus, promoted a drive to successful democratization.On the other hand, the exclusion of Islamists from the political system in Egyptweakened the state’s legitimacy, intensified the civil conflict, and radicalized the Islamic4movement and its constituency. The state gradually became more and more autocraticthus, hindered democratization.

Assessing the Islamist mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘StateHegemony’: assessing the Islamistmainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

Студзень STRONGMalaysia-Islamists

International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as themost popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam sincethe 11 September attacks.

This paper argues that both the self-proclaimeddoctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneousIslamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the oftenambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity andconservatism.

As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia,which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderateIslamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisationand the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamicresurgence’.

Shared experiences like coalition building and active participationwithin the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groupssuch as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).

These groups haveshaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards politicalparticipation and democracy at the grassroots level.

The Internet and Islamist Politics in Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a
dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and
commerce. The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the
researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the
Bedouin in Egypt. Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches
across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously
silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites. Political organizations
across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future,
and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, і
administrative papers through their sites. Дакладна, religious groups display their beliefs online
through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of
eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues. Fusing the two, Islamist
political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing
their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their
theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by
Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and
Егіпет.
Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to
publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions
of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization. This paper will
examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in
2
Іарданія, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home
and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes. First, Islamist
organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere
through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.
Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which
officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media
restrictions imposed by the state. Нарэшце, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a
counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an
international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim
Братэрства, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western
style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists. The MB
has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties
attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies
between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section
on the Muslim Brotherhood. These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and
desired outcomes; Аднак, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the
рэжым. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study
analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.
1

Эндру Хэлмс

Ikhwanweb

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. Дакладна, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamist political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

First, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

Нарэшце, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; Аднак, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Islamic Movements in the Middle East: Egypt as a case study

ÖZLEM TÜR KAVLİ

Akef

The Islamic challenge remains a central issue within the ongoing debate on the nature of Middle East
politics. As the main opposition to government policies, the Islamic movements enjoy widespread
popularity, especially among the lower echelons of those populations —people who are
economically or politically alienated. Egypt has been a pioneer of Arab countries in many aspects of
economic, political and cultural development. It has also been the pioneer in the rise of Islamic
movements and the state’s fight with these groups. The aim of this paper is to look at Egypt as a case
study in Middle East’s Islamist movements in general.
The first part of this paper looks briefly at nineteenth century Islamic reformers who had an impact
on the development of modern Islamic movements. In the second part, the focus will be on the
formation of the Islamic movements and their cadres and main ideologies. The third part looks at
contemporary movements and their position in Egyptian society.
ISLAMIC REFORMISTS
Islamic reformism is a modern movement that came into the scene in the nineteenth century as a
reaction to European supremacy and expansion. It was during this period that Muslim religious
leaders and politicians began to realise that their state of affairs was inferior to that of Europe and
was in steady decline. Although Islam has suffered many defeats by Europeans, it was in the
nineteenth century that Muslims felt for the first time their weakness and decline and the need to
borrow from their ‘enemy’. This painful awareness made Muslim intellectuals think about the
defects and the weaknesses they were suffering from and they started to search for a remedy.1 On the
one hand, Islamic reformists embarked on studies of Europe’s pre-industrial phase in order to trace
ways of building a strong state and economy. On the other, they sought viable cultural paradigms
capable of checking the dominance of Europe. The Islamic reformist movement was an urban
movement and tried to establish strategies for the development of the Muslim world. The frustration
of the early reformists with the status quo did not entail a demonising of the West or even a rejection
of modernisation per se. In their quest for progress, Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani and Mohammad
Abduh looked upon the West both as a model and as a rival. They perceived the challenge the
Umma, the Muslim community, was facing as shaped by a need to readjust their worldview to the
realities of the approaching new age. The Muslim people were given priority as citizens, whereas
Islam as a normative system “assumed the role of a defensive weapon that had to be restored in order
to stop deterioration and check the decline”.2 Rashid Rida had more radical views about society as
being corrupt and the heads of Arab states as being the apostates of Islam and he supported the
implementation of Koranic punishments. These three reformists desired to bring back the glory of
Islam by embracing ijtihad, rejecting the superstitions of popular religion and the stagnant thinking
of the ulama. They aimed at “creating a synthesis of Islam and the modern West rather than a
purified society constructed primarily along Islamic lines”.3 It is ironic that these reformists became
the founding ideologues of the Islamic movements that demand strictly purified Islamic
communities.

The Islamic challenge remains a central issue within the ongoing debate on the nature of Middle East politics. As the main opposition to government policies, the Islamic movements enjoy widespread popularity, especially among the lower echelons of those populations —people who are economically or politically alienated.

Egypt has been a pioneer of Arab countries in many aspects of economic, political and cultural development. It has also been the pioneer in the rise of Islamic movements and the state’s fight with these groups. The aim of this paper is to look at Egypt as a case study in Middle East’s Islamist movements in general.

The first part of this paper looks briefly at nineteenth century Islamic reformers who had an impact on the development of modern Islamic movements. In the second part, the focus will be on the formation of the Islamic movements and their cadres and main ideologies. The third part looks at contemporary movements and their position in Egyptian society.

ISLAMIC REFORMISTS

Islamic reformism is a modern movement that came into the scene in the nineteenth century as a reaction to European supremacy and expansion.

It was during this period that Muslim religious leaders and politicians began to realise that their state of affairs was inferior to that of Europe and was in steady decline. Although Islam has suffered many defeats by Europeans, it was in the nineteenth century that Muslims felt for the first time their weakness and decline and the need to borrow from their ‘enemy’.

This painful awareness made Muslim intellectuals think about the defects and the weaknesses they were suffering from and they started to search for a remedy.On the one hand, Islamic reformists embarked on studies of Europe’s pre-industrial phase in order to trace ways of building a strong state and economy. On the other, they sought viable cultural paradigms capable of checking the dominance of Europe.

The Islamic reformist movement was an urban movement and tried to establish strategies for the development of the Muslim world. The frustration of the early reformists with the status quo did not entail a demonising of the West or even a rejection of modernisation per se.

In their quest for progress, Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani and Mohammad Abduh looked upon the West both as a model and as a rival. They perceived the challenge the Umma, the Muslim community, was facing as shaped by a need to readjust their worldview to the realities of the approaching new age.

The Muslim people were given priority as citizens, whereas Islam as a normative system “assumed the role of a defensive weapon that had to be restored in order to stop deterioration and check the decline”. Rashid Rida had more radical views about society as being corrupt and the heads of Arab states as being the apostates of Islam and he supported the implementation of Koranic punishments.

These three reformists desired to bring back the glory of Islam by embracing ijtihad, rejecting the superstitions of popular religion and the stagnant thinking of the ulama. They aimed at “creating a synthesis of Islam and the modern West rather than a purified society constructed primarily along Islamic lines”.

It is ironic that these reformists became the founding ideologues of the Islamic movements that demand strictly purified Islamic communities.

The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States

MBusThe leadership of the U.S. Мусульманскае братэрства " (мегабайт, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal
was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within. The Brotherhood leadership has
also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the
U.S. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the early 1960s, the Brotherhood has
constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or
“front” organizations. The current U.S. Brotherhood leadership has attempted to deny this history,
both claiming that it is not accurate and at the same time that saying that it represents an older
form of thought inside the Brotherhood. An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents,
Аднак, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken
no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.sss

Стывен MerleyMBus

The leadership of the U.S. Мусульманскае братэрства " (мегабайт, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within.

The Brotherhood leadership has also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the U.S. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since the early 1960s, the Brotherhood has constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or “front” organizations.

The current U.S. Brotherhood leadership has attempted to deny this history, both claiming that it is not accurate and at the same time that saying that it represents an older form of thought inside the Brotherhood.

An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents, Аднак, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.

Мусульманскае братэрства ": Хасан аль-Hudaybi і ідэалогія

Хасан Ісмаіл>Іл аль-Hudaybi прывялі грамадства Мусульманскае братэрства "падчас
час крызісу і роспуску. Наступныя Хасан аль-Баннана ", які быў заснавальнікам
і Fi лідэрам першага арганізацыі, аль-Hudaybi павінен быў быць яго кіраўніком больш чым
дваццаць гадоў. Падчас свайго кіраўніцтва ён сутыкнуўся з сур'ёзнай крытыкай з боку іншых братоў.
Пасля ліпеньскай рэвалюцыі 1952, Ён выступіў у якасці праціўніка антаганізм
з >Абд аль-Насир, які становіцца ўсё больш Infl uential ў савет
Бясплатныя вядучых Offi ССВ. >вызначэнне Абд аль-Насир, каб перашкодзіць прычынай
Братэрства і яго Infl uence на грамадства было часткай яго шляху да абсалютнай улады.
Улічваючы істотна cance гадоў аль-Hudaybi як лідэра мусульманскага
Братэрства, Дзіўна, што існуе вельмі мала навуковых работ па тэме.
Калі ўлічыць, што яго ўмеранае ідэі працягваюць аказваць моцнае Infl uence
на палітыку і стаўленне мусульманскіх сённяшняй Брацтва, G. яго прымірэнчы
пазіцыю ў адносінах да дзяржаўнай сістэме і яго абвяржэнне радыкальных ідэй, факт
што так мала ўвагі надаецца яго лісты яшчэ больш дзіўныя. Вядома, ёсць
быў цікавасць да "Мусульманскае братэрства". Ёсць даволі шырокія даследаванні
даступныя на Хасан аль-Баннана ": заснавальнік і кіраўнік першага Fi "Мусульманскага братэрства"
была апісана як мадэль Fi малюнка ісламскай кампаніі; іншыя малююць
яго стваральнік пагражае палітычнай дзейнасці ў імя ісламу. Там
быў нават больш цікавасці да ідэяў Саід Кутб; некаторыя бачаць у ім
ідэолагам ісламскага радыкалізму, канцэпцыі якіх навучанне экстрэмісцкіх груп; іншыя
апісваюць яго як ахвяра дзяржаўнага пераследу, які распрацаваў тэалогіі вызвалення
у адказ на яго жорсткае абыходжанне. Няма сумневу, Важна, каб вывучыць
Праца гэтых мысляроў, каб зразумець, токі ісламісцкай ідэалогіі і
Ісламісцкія руху. Незалежна прысуд у дачыненні аль-Баннана і Кутб, гэта факт
што некаторыя ідэі двух мысляроў былі ўключаныя ў сучаснай
Мусульманскае братэрства ". Аднак, Такая скіраванасць прывяла да няправільным меркаванне, што
Ісламскі рух абавязкова радыкал ў сваім мысленні і / або ў баявой
справы, здагадка, якое мае, У апошнія гады, былі дапытаныя шэраг
навукоўцаў, Сярод іх Джон L. Эспазіта, Фрэд Холлидей, Франсуа Burgat, і
Гудрун Крамер. 1 Далейшага вывучэння "Браты-мусульмане Егіпта па
кіраўніцтвам Хасана аль-Hudaybi будзе форма таго, каб гэтыя тэзісы, рашэння
і пераацэнкі меркаванне, што палітычны іслам з'яўляецца маналітным блокам, усяго
настроены да гвалтоўных сродкаў.
2 Увядзенне
Ёсьць прычыны, чаму аль-Hudaybi ледзь згадваецца ў літаратуры па
Мусульманскае братэрства ". Fi першае, што прыходзіць на розум, з'яўляецца назіранне, што ісламісцкія
руху, па вызначэнні дакладнасці, разглядаць як прынцыпова радыкальнай, антыдэмакратычныя і
антызаходняй. Гэта разважанне пытанні якога-небудзь адрозненні паміж памяркоўнымі ісламізму
і яго радыкальныя калегі. Аргумент, што абодва маюць мэта
ўстанаўлення ісламскага стану сістэмы, што яны абодва з мэтай замены існуючых
свецкага кіравання і што таму яны адрозніваюцца толькі ў ступені іх метады,
але ў прынцыпе не. Гэтая кніга, Аднак, выразна злучае навуковыя круг на
палітычнага ісламу, which identifi es arguments such as these as neo-Orientalist. Як
Эспазіта паказвае, такі падыход да палітычнага ісламу заснаваны на тым, што ён называе "свецкім
фундаменталізму ".
Знешні выгляд палітычнага ісламу сканцэнтравана галоўным чынам на радыкальныя думкі,
і гэта можа быць звязана са стварэннем, па частцы палітыкі з пазіцыі сілы, ад страху
Іслам як рэлігія, якая адрозніваецца, дзіўныя і, здавалася б ў апазіцыі да
Заходняй думкі. Па чарзе, гэта можа быць таму, што радыкальныя або нават групы баевікоў
пастаянна з'яўляюцца ў СМІ па прычыне іх дзеянні. На самай справе, актывіст
Ісламістаў на самай справе імкнуцца да такога рэкламы. Хоць радыкальныя думкі і баявой дзеянняў
Зрабіць гэта неабходна для вывучэння экстрэмісцкіх груп, засяродзіць увагу на тэрарызм ва імя
ісламу ізалюе ўмераных ісламістаў. Гэта таксама робіць цяжкасці культ растлумачыць
Адрозненні паміж радыкальным і ўмераным ісламізму. У эфекту, навуковых увагу
на радыкальныя або груп баевікоў ўзмацняе ў цэлым негатыўнае грамадскае ўспрыманне
ісламу на Захадзе.
Яшчэ адна прычына, чаму аль-Hudaybi, у прыватнасці, не быў вывучаны заходнімі
навукоўцаў звязана з унутранымі справамі братэрства. Дзіўна,
што яго імя не згадваецца шмат па пісьменнікаў Мусульманскае братэрства "
сам. Існуе не простае тлумачэнне гэтага. Адной з прычын можа быць тое, што члены
асабліва падкрэсліць іх сімпатыі да аль-Баннана ", якая паказвае яго як ідэал
Лідэр, які памёр за яго перакананні актывіста. Аднак, як шмат братоў перажылі
пазбаўленне волі, катаржныя работы і нават катаванні ўнутры >Абд аль-Насир у турмах і
лагера, іх асабістыя гісторыі прывялі да недахопу дыскурсу на Хасан
аль-Hudaibiyah. Такім чынам, існуе тэндэнцыя да памятаеце перыяд аль-Hudaybi аб кіраўніцтве
як час паблізу паразы і знішчэння. Яшчэ, вопыту
пераследам патрапілі ў двухсэнсоўныя адносіны паміж забываючы і пераацэнка.
Многія асабістыя рахункі часу былі апублікаваныя, пачынаючы з сярэдзіны
1970s, 2 апавядае гісторыі катаванняў і падкрэсліваючы непахіснасць веры. Толькі
Некаторыя з кніг, напісаных Браты-мусульмане "прыняць больш шырокі падыход, якія
ўключае ў сябе абмеркаванне крызісу ў рамках арганізацыі і часткі аль-Hudaybi's
у ім. Тыя аўтары, якія робяць вырашэння гэтага пытання не толькі выявіць слабыя грамадства
становішча ў адносінах да >Абд аль-Насир, але і падвяргаць прыкметы распаду ў
Мусульманскае братэрства ". 3 Гэта прывяло да рознага стаўлення да аль-Hudaybi, з
Найбольш адлюстроўваючы яго як некампетэнтнага лідэра адсутнічае харызматычная асоба
свайго папярэдніка, аль-Баннана ". У прыватнасці, ён быў абвінавачаны не камандзір
ўлады аб'яднаць розныя крылы "Мусульманскага братэрства"
або прымаць моцныя пазіцыі па стаўленні да аўтарытарнай дзяржаўнай сістэмы. У
Апошняя кропка гледжання заключаецца двухсэнсоўнасць, для гэтага, як уяўляецца, паказваюць, аль-Hudaybi не толькі як
Увядзенне 3
правал, але і як ахвяра палітычнай сітуацыі. Нарэшце, гэтыя рахункі паказваюць
ідэалагічнага разрыву які адкрыўся ў пачатку перыяду пераследаў у
1954. У пэўнай ступені, Сейід Кутб Fi lled гэты прабел. Падчас яго турэмнага зняволення
ён распрацаваў радыкальны падыход, адхіленні, то стан сістэмы як незаконныя
і "не-ісламскага". Пры распрацоўцы рэвалюцыйнай канцэпцыі і тлумачачы тым самым
Прычыны, якія ляжаць у аснове пераследу, ён павярнуўся ўмовы виктимизации
ў адзін з гонару. Такім чынам, Ён даў шмат турму Браты-мусульмане ", асабліва
маладых членаў, ідэалогіі, якую яны маглі трымацца за.
Гэта павінна быць сказана, што аль-Hudaybi не дзейнічаць рашуча, каб становішча
ўнутраны крызіс і роспуск. Сапраўды, ў пэўнай ступені яго нерашучасць спрацоўвае
гэтай сітуацыі. Гэта было асабліва відавочна ў перыяд ганенняў
(1954–71), , Калі ён апушчаны даць любыя кіруючыя прынцыпы, каб дапамагчы ў пераадоленні
пачуццё безнадзейнасці адкрылі па >Абд аль-Насир ў вязніцах масы. Яго
рэакцыя на радыкальныя ідэі, якія FL ourished ў турмах і лагерах сярод
вызначаных, асабліва маладых, Члены прыйшоў даволі позна. Нават тады, яго навуковыя і
юрыдычных аргументацыі не было ж радыкальныя эфект як Саід Кутб's
пісаніна. У 1969, аль-Hudaybi прапанаванай канцэпцыі ўмеранай ў яго пісьмовым Du<ў
Qudat (Прапаведнікі не суддзі). 4 Гэты ліст, які быў таемна размеркаваных
сярод братам, лічыцца Fi першага істотнага абвяржэнне Саіда
Кутб ідэі. 5 Кутб, , Які быў павешаны ў 1966, быў да таго часу лічыцца
пакутнік, свае думкі, якія ўжо маюць значны Infl uence. Гэта не азначае,
што большасць Браты-мусульмане "не пераследвалі ўмераны падыход, але
адсутнасць кіруючых прынцыпаў пакінуў іх галасы і ўзмоцненага ўспрымання аль-Hudaybi
як слабы лідэр.
Тым не менш, аль-Hudayb'is ўмеранай думка ўплыў на сваіх калегаў
Браты-мусульмане ". Пасля ўсеагульнай амністыі 1971, аль-Hudaybi гуляе важную
удзел у аднаўленні арганізацыі. Хоць ён і памёр у 1973, яго ўмеранай
і прымірэнчы ідэі працягваюць быць актуальнымі. Той факт, што блізкія таварышы
such as Muhammad Hamid Abu Nasr, >Умар аль-Tilmisani і Мухамад
Машхур, , Якая нядаўна памерла, змяніў яго ў якасці лідэраў паказвае працяг яго
думкі. Акрамя таго, яго сын аль-Мамун Hudaybi гуляе важную ролю ў
яго якасці сакратар Брацтва і прадстаўнік. Іншая прычына, чаму
яго мысленне стала важным ляжыць у змянілася стаўленне да мусульманскай
Брацтва з старшынствам Анвар аль-Садата. Аль-Садат, якім атрымалася >Абд
аль-Насир, Дата выхаду турму Браты і прапанаваў арганізацыі паўлегальных
хоць і не афіцыйна прызнаны статус асабліва. Перыяд рэарганізацыі (1971–77) варта,
на працягу якога ўрад адмяніў цэнзуры кніг, напісаных
Браты-мусульмане ". Шмат ўспамінаў былых зняволеных у турму членаў былі апублікаваныя,
such as Zaynab al-Ghazali’s account or al-Hudaybi’s book Du<, Якія дазваляюць Qudat
(Прапаведнікі не суддзі). Зварот з мінулым, гэтыя кнігі не проста захаваць
памяць аб жорсткасці >Абд аль-Насир у перасьледзе. Аль-Садат варта
яго ўласную парадак дня, калі ён дазволіў гэтых публікацый Fi LL рынку; гэта
быў наўмыснай палітычнай хітрасці, якое разумее змена кірунку і накіраваных на
дыстанцыяванне урада ад старога новага. Пасмяротнай публікацыі
пісаніна аль-Hudaybi было не проста, накіраваных на забеспячэнне ідэалагічнай ўказанні
4 Увядзенне
Браты-мусульмане "; яны былі распаўсюджаныя з-за іх заявы, накіраваныя супраць
радыкальнай думкі, і, такім чынам, выкарыстоўвацца для вырашэння новых і расце праблемай, а менавіта
стварэнне ісламісцкіх груповак, якія пачалі Fi GHT актыўна супраць
палітычнай сістэмы ў пачатку 1970-х. У гэтых тэрмінах, З<у Ла Qudat застаецца
важна крытыка радыкальнай думкі.
Асноўная мэта Хасана аль-Hudaybi ў тым, каб змяніць грамадства, Я. Егіпецкім грамадстве,
якія, На яго думку,, не было вядома пра палітычны характар ісламскай веры. Такім чынам,
рэальныя змены могуць быць прад'яўленыя толькі аб шляхам стварэння дасведчанасці і
вырашэнні пытання аб ісламскай ідэнтычнасці (у адрозненне ад заходніх ўспрымання). Толькі
шляхам развіцця пачуцці ісламскага свядомасці можа канчатковая мэта
стварэнне ісламскай грамадства быць дасягнута. Пры такім падыходзе, аль-Hudaibiyah
абвергнутыя рэвалюцыйнае звяржэнне, замест пропаведзі паступовае развіццё ад
ў. Асноўныя пункты Таму адукацыю і сацыяльнае ўзаемадзеянне, а таксама
Удзел у палітычнай сістэме, прывабным з дапамогай місіі ( з<Вашынгтон ) да
свядомасць вернікаў.
Гэты шлях яго ў цяперашні час ідуць мусульманскія сённяшняй Брацтва, якая імкнецца
быць прызнаным у якасці палітычнай партыі і якія Infl uences палітычнае рашэнне
рашэнняў бясконца ltrating палітычнага ўдзелу структур (парламент, адміністрацыі,
няўрадавых арганізацый). Гэта даследаванне "Мусульманскага братэрства"
з 1950 да пачатку 1970-х, Таму, гэта не толькі частка даследаванні ў
сучаснай палітычнай гісторыі Егіпта і аналіз рэлігійнай ідэалогіі, але
мае таксама стаўленне да бягучай палітыцы.

Барбара Яго правасхадзіцельства. Zollner

HasanHasan Ismail al-Hudaybi led the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood during a time of crisis and dissolution. Наступныя Хасан аль-Баннана ", who was the founder and first leader of the organisation, al-Hudaybi was to be its head for more than twenty years. Падчас свайго кіраўніцтва ён сутыкнуўся з сур'ёзнай крытыкай з боку іншых братоў.

Пасля ліпеньскай рэвалюцыі 1952, he was pitted against the antagonism of Abd al-Nasir, who became increasingly infl uential in the council of leading Free Officers. Abd al-Nasir’s determination to thwart the cause of the Brotherhood and its infl uence on society was part of his path to absolute rule. Considering the signifi cance of al-Hudaybi’s years as leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Дзіўна, што існуе вельмі мала навуковых работ па тэме.

When taking into account that his moderate ideas continue to have a strong infl uence on the policy and attitude of today’s Muslim Brotherhood, G. his conciliatory position towards the state system and his refutation of radical ideas, the fact that so little attention is paid to his writing is even more startling. Вядома, there has been interest in the Muslim Brotherhood.

There are quite extensive studies available on Hasan al-Banna’: the founder and fi rst leader of the Muslim Brotherhood has been described as a model figure of Islamic campaigning; others depict him as the originator of threatening political activism in the name of Islam.

There has been even more interest in the ideas of Sayyid Qutb; some see him as the ideologue of Islamist radicalism, канцэпцыі якіх навучанне экстрэмісцкіх груп; others describe him as a victim of state persecution who developed a theology of liberation in reaction to his maltreatment.

Няма сумневу, it is important to examine the work of these thinkers in order to understand currents of Islamist ideology and Islamist movements. Незалежна прысуд у дачыненні аль-Баннана і Кутб, it is a fact that certain ideas of the two thinkers have been incorporated into the modern-day Muslim Brotherhood.

Аднак, this focus has led to an incorrect perception that the Islamic movement is necessarily radical in its thinking and/or militant in its deeds, здагадка, якое мае, У апошнія гады, been questioned by a number of scholars, Сярод іх Джон L. Эспазіта, Фрэд Холлидей, Франсуа Burgat, and Gudrun Krämer.

The following study of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Hasan al-Hudaybi will form an addition to these theses, addressing and reassessing the viewpoint that political Islam is a monolithic block, all in all disposed towards violent means.

There are reasons why al-Hudaybi is hardly mentioned in the literature on the Muslim Brotherhood. The fi rst that comes to mind is the observation that Islamist movements are, па вызначэнні дакладнасці, разглядаць як прынцыпова радыкальнай, anti-democratic and anti-Western.

This reasoning questions any distinction between moderate Islamism and its radical counterpart. The argument goes that both have the objective of establishing an Islamic state system, that they both aim to replace existing secular governance and that they therefore differ only in the degree of their methods, але ў прынцыпе не.

Гэтая кніга, Аднак, clearly joins the scholarly circle on political Islam, which identifi es arguments such as these as neo-Orientalist. As Esposito shows, this approach to political Islam is based on what he terms ‘secular fundamentalism’.

Знешні выгляд палітычнага ісламу сканцэнтравана галоўным чынам на радыкальныя думкі, і гэта можа быць звязана са стварэннем, па частцы палітыкі з пазіцыі сілы, of a fear of Islam as a religion, якая адрозніваецца, дзіўныя і, здавалася б ў апазіцыі да

Заходняй думкі. Па чарзе, it may be because radical or even militant groups are constantly appearing in the media by reason of their actions. На самай справе, militant Islamists actually seek such publicity.

While radical thought and militant action make it necessary to study extremist groups, the focus on terrorism in the name of Islam marginalises moderate Islamists.

It also makes it difficult to explain the differences between radical and moderate Islamism. У эфекту, the scholarly focus on radical or militant groups reinforces the generally negative public perception of Islam in the West.

A further reason why al-Hudaybi in particular has not been studied by Western scholars has to do with the internal affairs of the Brotherhood. It is astonishing that his name is not mentioned much by the writers of the Muslim Brotherhood itself. Існуе не простае тлумачэнне гэтага.

One reason may be that members particularly stress their sympathies for al-Banna’, depicting him as an ideal leader who died for his activist convictions. Аднак, as many Brothers endured imprisonment, hard labour and even torture insideAbd al-Nasir’s prisons and camps, their personal histories have resulted in a dearth of discourse on Hasan al-Hudaybi.

Такім чынам, there is a tendency to remember al-Hudaybi’s period of leadership as a time of near defeat and destruction. Яшчэ, the experiences of the persecuted are caught in the ambiguous relationship between forgetting and reappraisal.

Many personal accounts of the time have been published since the mid 1970s, 2 апавядае гісторыі катаванняў і падкрэсліваючы непахіснасць веры. Only a few of the books written by Muslim Brothers take a broader approach, which includes discussion of a crisis within the organisation and of al-Hudaybi’s part therein. Those authors who do tackle this issue not only reveal the society’s weak position vis-à-vis Abd al-Nasir, але і падвяргаць прыкметы распаду ў

Мусульманскае братэрства ". 3 Гэта прывяло да рознага стаўлення да аль-Hudaybi, with most portraying him as an incompetent leader lacking the charismatic personality of his predecessor, аль-Баннана ". У прыватнасці, he was accused of not commanding the authority to bring together the different wings of the Muslim Brotherhood or to adopt a strong position in relation to the authoritarian state system.

In the latter view lies an ambiguity, for it would appear to show al-Hudaybi not just as a failure, але і як ахвяра палітычнай сітуацыі. Нарэшце, these accounts reveal an ideological gap which opened at the beginning of the period of persecution in 1954.

У пэўнай ступені, Сейід Кутб Fi lled гэты прабел. During his imprisonment he developed a radical approach, rejecting the then state system as illegitimate and ‘un-Islamic’. In developing a revolutionary concept and explaining thereby the reasons underlying the persecution, he turned the condition of victimisation into one of pride.

Такім чынам, Ён даў шмат турму Браты-мусульмане ", particularly young members, ідэалогіі, якую яны маглі трымацца за.

It has to be said that al-Hudaybi did not react decisively to the situation of internal crisis and dissolution. Сапраўды, to a certain extent his indecisiveness triggered this situation.

Гэта было асабліва відавочна ў перыяд ганенняў (1954–71), when he omitted to provide any guidelines to help in overcoming the feeling hopelessness ushered in by Abd al-Nasir’s mass imprisonments. His reaction to the radical ideas which fl ourished in the prisons and camps among certain, асабліва маладых, Члены прыйшоў даволі позна.

Нават тады, his scholarly and juridical argumentation did not have the same sweeping effect as Sayyid Qutb’s writings. У 1969, al-Hudaybi proposed a moderate concept in his writing Duat la Qudat (Прапаведнікі не суддзі).

Гэты ліст, which was secretly distributed among fellow Brothers, is considered the fi rst substantial refutation of Sayyid Qutb’s ideas. 5 Кутб, , Які быў павешаны ў 1966, was by then considered to be a martyr, свае думкі, якія ўжо маюць значны Infl uence.

This does not mean that the majority of Muslim Brothers did not pursue a moderate approach, but the lack of guidelines left them voiceless and reinforced the perception of al-Hudaybi as a weak leader.

Тым не менш, al-Hudayb’is moderate thought had an impact on his fellow Muslim Brothers. Пасля ўсеагульнай амністыі 1971, al-Hudaybi played a major part in the re-establishment of the organisation. Хоць ён і памёр у 1973, his moderate and conciliatory ideas continued to be relevant.

The fact that close companions such as Muhammad Hamid Abu Nasr, Umar al-Tilmisani and Muhammad Mashhur, , Якая нядаўна памерла, succeeded him as leaders shows the continuance of his thought.

Акрамя таго, his son Ma’mun al-Hudaybi has played a major role in his capacity as the Brotherhood’s secretary and spokesman.

Another reason why his thinking became important lies in the changed attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood since Anwar al-Sadat’s presidency. Аль-Садат, who succeeded Abd al-Nasir, released the imprisoned Brothers and offered the organisation a half-legal though not offi cially recognised status.

Перыяд рэарганізацыі (1971–77) варта, during which the government lifted the censorship of books written by Muslim Brothers. Шмат ўспамінаў былых зняволеных у турму членаў былі апублікаваныя, such as Zaynab al-Ghazali’s account or al-Hudaybi’s book Du<, Якія дазваляюць Qudat (Прапаведнікі не суддзі).

Зварот з мінулым, these books did not merely preserve the memory of the cruelties of Abd al-Nasir’s persecution.

Al-Sadat followed his own agenda when he allowed these publications to fi ll the market; this was a deliberate political stratagem, implying a change of direction and aimed at distancing the new government from the old.

The posthumous publication of al-Hudaybi’s writings was not merely aimed at providing ideological guidance to the Muslim Brothers; they were distributed because of their statements against radical thought, і, такім чынам, выкарыстоўвацца для вырашэння новых і расце праблемай, namely the establishment of Islamist groups, which began to fi ght actively against the political system in the early 1970s. У гэтых тэрмінах, Duat la Qudat remains an important critique of radical thought.

Асноўная мэта Хасана аль-Hudaybi ў тым, каб змяніць грамадства, Я. Егіпецкім грамадстве, якія, На яго думку,, не было вядома пра палітычны характар ісламскай веры. Такім чынам, real change could only be brought about through creating awareness and by tackling the issue of Islamic identity (у адрозненне ад заходніх ўспрымання).

Only through developing a sense of Islamic consciousness could the ultimate goal of the establishment of an Islamic society be reached. Пры такім падыходзе, al-Hudaybi refuted revolutionary overthrow, instead preaching gradual development from within. Асноўныя пункты Таму адукацыю і сацыяльнае ўзаемадзеянне, as well as participation in the political system, прывабным з дапамогай місіі ( dawa ) to the consciousness of the individual believer.

Гэты шлях яго ў цяперашні час ідуць мусульманскія сённяшняй Брацтва, which endeavors to be recognised as a political party and which infl uences political decision making by infi ltrating the political participatory structures (парламент, адміністрацыі, няўрадавых арганізацый).

This study of the Muslim Brotherhood from the 1950s until the early 1970s, Таму, is not only a piece of research into the modern political history of Egypt and an analysis of a religious ideology, but has also a relationship to current politics.

Goldstone Report On Israel’s War On Gaza

Goldstone in Gaza

1. On 3 April 2009, the President of the Human Rights Council established the United Nations
Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict with the mandate “to investigate all violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been
committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza
during the period from 27 снежні 2008 і 18 January 2009, whether before, during or
after.”
2. The President appointed Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to head the Mission. The other three appointed members were:
Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics
and Political Science, who was a member of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun
(2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, who was a
member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); and Colonel Desmond
Travers, a former Officer in Ireland’s Defence Forces and member of the Board of Directors of
the Institute for International Criminal Investigations.
3. As is usual practice, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) established a secretariat to support the Mission.
4. The Mission interpreted the mandate as requiring it to place the civilian population of the
region at the centre of its concerns regarding the violations of international law.
5. The Mission convened for the first time in Geneva between 4 і 8 May 2009. Additionally,
the Mission met in Geneva on 20 May, на 4 і 5 ліпеня, and between 1 і 4 Аўгусту 2009. The
Mission conducted three field visits: two to the Gaza Strip between 30 May and 6 Чэрвень, і
between 25 June and 1 ліпеня 2009; and one visit to Amman on 2 і 3 ліпеня 2009. Several staff of

1. On 3 April 2009, the President of the Human Rights Council established the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict with the mandate “to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 снежні 2008 і 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.”

2. The President appointed Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to head the Mission. The other three appointed members were Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, who was a member of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun (2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, who was a member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); and Colonel Desmond Travers, a former Officer in Ireland’s Defence Forces and member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for International Criminal Investigations.

3. As is usual practice, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established a secretariat to support the Mission.

4. The Mission interpreted the mandate as requiring it to place the civilian population of the region at the centre of its concerns regarding the violations of international law.

5. The Mission convened for the first time in Geneva between 4 і 8 May 2009. Additionally, the Mission met in Geneva on 20 May, на 4 і 5 ліпеня, and between 1 і 4 Аўгусту 2009. The Mission conducted three field visits: two to the Gaza Strip between 30 May and 6 Чэрвень, and between 25 June and 1 ліпеня 2009; and one visit to Amman on 2 і 3 ліпеня 2009. Several staff ofthe Mission’s secretariat were deployed in Gaza from 22 May to 4 ліпеня 2009 to conduct field investigations.

6. Notes verbales were sent to all Member States of the United Nations and United Nations organs and bodies on 7 May 2009. On 8 Чэрвень 2009 the Mission issued a call for submissions inviting all interested persons and organizations to submit relevant information and documentation to assist in the implementation of its mandate.

7. Public hearings were held in Gaza on 28 і 29 June and in Geneva on 6 і 7 ліпеня 2009.

8. The Mission repeatedly sought to obtain the cooperation of the Government of Israel. After numerous attempts had failed, the Mission sought and obtained the assistance of the Government of Egypt to enable it to enter the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing.

9. The Mission has enjoyed the support and cooperation of the Palestinian Authority and of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. Due to the lack of cooperation from the Israeli Government, the Mission was unable to meet members of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The Mission did, Аднак, meet officials of the Palestinian Authority, including a cabinet minister, in Amman. During its visits to the Gaza Strip, the Mission held meetings with senior members of the Gaza authorities and they extended their full cooperation and support to the Mission.

10. Subsequent to the public hearings in Geneva, the Mission was informed that a Palestinian participant, Mr. Muhammad Srour, had been detained by Israeli security forces when returning to the West Bank and became concerned that his detention may have been a consequence of his appearance before the Mission. The Mission is in contact with him and continues to monitor developments.