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ISLAMISTINIS MOTERŲ AKTYVIZMAS OKUPUOTOJE PALESTINOJE

Khaledo Amayreho interviu

Interviu su Sameera Al-Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka yra išrinkta Palestinos įstatymų leidžiamosios tarybos narė. Ji buvo

gimė Shoyoukh kaime netoli Hebrono m 1964. Ji turi šariato bakalauro laipsnį (Islamo

Jurisprudencija) iš Hebrono universiteto. Ji dirbo žurnaliste nuo 1996 į 2006 kada

ji pateko į Palestinos įstatymų leidžiamąją tarybą kaip išrinkta narė 2006 rinkimai.

Ji ištekėjusi ir turi septynis vaikus.

K: Kai kuriose Vakarų šalyse susidaro bendras įspūdis, kad moterys gauna

islamo pasipriešinimo grupėse, tokių kaip Hamas. Ar tai tiesa?

Kaip „Hamas“ elgiamasi su moterimis aktyvistėmis?
Musulmonių moterų teisės ir pareigos pirmiausia kyla iš islamo šariato arba įstatymų.

Tai nėra savanoriški ar labdaringi veiksmai ar gestai, kuriuos gauname iš Hamas ar kieno nors kito

Kitas. Taigi, kiek tai susiję su politiniu įsitraukimu ir aktyvumu, moterys paprastai turi

tos pačios teisės ir pareigos kaip ir vyrų. Po visko, moterų sudaro bent 50 procentų

visuomenė. Tam tikra prasme, jie yra visa visuomenė, nes jie gimdo, ir pakelti,

naujoji karta.

Todėl, Galiu pasakyti, kad moterų statusas „Hamas“ ją visiškai atitinka

statusas pačiame islame. Tai reiškia, kad ji yra visavertė partnerė visais lygiais. Iš tikrųjų, tai būtų

nesąžininga ir neteisinga islamo atžvilgiu (arba islamistas, jei norite) moteris turi būti partnerė kančiose

while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in

Hamas has always been pioneering.

K: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is

a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts

regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to

pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued

Israeli occupation?

There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from

political participation. I believe the opposite is truethere are numerous Quranic verses

and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public

issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, political activism

is not compulsory but voluntary, and is largely decided in light of each woman’s abilities,

qualifications and individual circumstances. None the less, showing concern for public

matters is mandatory upon each and every Muslim man and woman. The Prophet

Muhammed said: “He who doesn’t show concern for the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim.”

Moreover, Palestinian Islamist women have to take all objective factors on the ground into

account when deciding whether to join politics or get involved in political activism.


Islamas, Politinis islamas ir Amerika

Arabų įžvalga

Ar įmanoma „brolystė“ su Amerika?

chalilas al-anani

„nėra jokios galimybės bendrauti su jokiu JAV. administracija tol, kol Jungtinės Valstijos išlaikys savo ilgalaikį požiūrį į islamą kaip į realų pavojų, požiūrio, pagal kurį JAV atsiduria vienoje valtyje su sionistų priešu. Mes neturime jokių išankstinių nuomonių apie Amerikos žmones ar JAV. visuomenė ir jos pilietinės organizacijos bei ekspertų grupės. Mums nėra problemų bendrauti su Amerikos žmonėmis, tačiau nėra dedamos tinkamos pastangos mus suartinti,“, – sakė dr. Issamas al-Iryanas, Musulmonų brolijos politinio skyriaus vadovas interviu telefonu.
Al-Iryano žodžiai apibendrina Musulmonų brolijos požiūrį į Amerikos žmones ir JAV. vyriausybė. Kiti Musulmonų brolijos nariai sutiktų, kaip ir velionis Hassanas al-Banna, kas įkūrė grupę 1928. Al- Banna į Vakarus žiūrėjo kaip į moralinio nuosmukio simbolį. Kiti salafiai – islamo mąstymo mokykla, kuri remiasi protėviais kaip pavyzdiniais modeliais – laikosi to paties požiūrio į JAV., tačiau trūksta ideologinio lankstumo, kurio palaiko Musulmonų brolija. Nors Musulmonų brolija tiki įtraukti amerikiečius į pilietinį dialogą, kitos ekstremistų grupės nemato prasmės dialogui ir teigia, kad jėga yra vienintelis būdas susidoroti su Jungtinėmis Valstijomis.

The Death of Political Islam

Jonas B. Altermanas

The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. Instead, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, tačiau, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, Saudo Arabija, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Islamas, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.