Сви уноси означени са: "Палестина"
Демократија, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World
Ф. Грегори Гаусе
Hamas can set an example
Кхадер Кхадер
POLICY AND PRACTICE NOTES
КЕННЕТХ РОТХ
Escalation in the Middle East: a lasting damage to peace and democracy
Паоло Цотта
The rapid and dangerous escalation of war operations in the Middle East has resulted in a very significant loss of life among Lebanese, Palestinians and Israelis, and serious damage to civilian infrastructures. Major operations began with a low-level conflict around Gaza,that involved the launching of some missiles into Israel, some (more deadly) Israeli retaliation on Gaza, and the attack on an Israeli military post outside Gaza to which Israel reacted swiftly and very strongly. In the chain reaction that followed, admittedly Israel’ sintention was, and is, to inflict on the other side a far heavier punishment than that taken by Israel—which may appear as a militarily sound posture aimed at avoiding incidents andattacks, али, in fact, it is the civilian population that has been mainly affected. As a result,the suffering of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations (in terms of deaths,wounded and destroyed infrastructures) has to date been largely disproportionate to that of Israel. When, in the case of Palestine, this discrimination already follows about 40 years of discrimination in the same direction, hostility and adversarial relations are bound toincrease. So while Israel’s heavy deterrence through punishment may work temporarily and occasionally in preventing or reducing attacks, the general sentiment of hostility in the region is increased, and creates in the long range a bigger obstacle to peace.
Forcing Choices
Regardless of what happens in future Palestinian parliamentaryelections, Hamas has already won a historic victory. The organization, whosename is an acronym for “the Islamic Resistance Movement,” enjoyed tremendoussuccess in municipal elections, and its readiness to participate onthe national level constitutes nothing less than an earthquake in Palestinianpolitics, signaling the clear end of one-party rule. For a movement that hasmorphed from a militant organization into a political party in less than a generation,Hamas’s participation on the national level is evidence of theorganization’s adaptability and durability within Palestinian society and politics.Among the United States, Израел, and Europe, as well as Arab governments,speculation and uneasiness has surrounded Hamas’s newfound role.Skeptics argue that electoral politics do not make one democratic, and thatHamas’s electoral ambitions mask the group’s true intention of establishingan Islamic state in all of historic Palestine—a goal that includes Israel’s destruction.1 These critics believe that, once Hamas has secured its positionwithin the Palestinian Authority (PA) and institutions of the Palestine LiberationOrganization (ПЛО), the movement will resume its campaign of terrorand attempt to control the Palestinian national agenda by force.Despite the inherent risks, proponents of expanding Hamas’s role in Palestiniannational politics argue that political activity will ultimately moderatethe movement. These advocates point to the fact that Hamas’s leadershave long called for transparent and accountable governing institutions andhave demonstrated political pragmatism, suggesting that the group could acceptless than its absolutist demands.
Хасан Ал-Банна
Гуилаин Деноелцк
Hasan al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood or Society of the Muslim Brothers, thelargest and most influential Sunni revivalist organization in the 20th century. Created in Egypt in1928, the Muslim Brotherhood became the first mass-based, overtly political movement to opposethe ascendancy of secular and Western ideas in the Middle East. The brotherhood saw in theseideas the root of the decay of Islamic societies in the modern world, and advocated a return toIslam as a solution to the ills that had befallen Muslim societies. Al-Banna’s leadership was criticalto the spectacular growth of the brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s. By the early 1950s,branches had been established in Syria, Sudan, and Jordan. Soon, the movement’s influence would be felt inplaces as far away as the Gulf and non-Arab countries such as Iran, Пакистан, Индонезија, and Malaysia. Drivingthis expansion was the appeal of the organizational model embodied in the original, Egypt-based section of thebrotherhood, and the success of al-Banna’s writings. Translated into several languages, these writings haveshaped two generations of Sunni religious activists across the Islamic world.
Ангажовање исламиста и промовисање демократије
Мона Јакубијан
Сматрајући демократске промене дугорочним противотровом исламистичком екстремизму, Бушова администрација упоредила је своје војне интервенције у Авганистану и Ираку са интензивираним напорима да промовише демократију у арапском свету, наглашавајући потребу за слободним и поштеним изборима. До данас, широм региона одржани су парламентарни избори различите отворености, од Марока до Кувајта. Избори су увели талас победа исламиста, многи називају „исламистичким цунамијем“. 1Успеси исламиста потичу из њихове ефикасности као покретача народне опозиције. Док либерални, секуларне опозиционе странке остају у великој мери одвојене од већег дела становништва, Исламисти су развили огромне и лако мобилисане локалне мреже кроз добротворне организације и џамије. Руководство је често млађе и динамичније, са јаким везама са заједницом, а партијске организације врве од енергије и идеја, привлачећи оне који траже промене.У.С. Влада је тихо ангажовала низ умерених и легалних исламистичких партија широм региона већ неколико година, понекад кроз нормалну дипломатску активност, понекад кроз грантове које финансира држава САД. организације. Овај специјални извештај испитује ангажовање у правном сектору које финансирају САД, ненасилне исламистичке странке преко Националног демократског института (ИС) и Међународни републикански институт (ИРИ), које имају најобимније искуство у дружењу са исламистима у региону, и фокусира се на Мароко, Јордан, и Јемен, због њихове релативне политичке отворености и снаге и живахности њихове исламистичке политичке опозиције.Успешна стратегија. Успешна стратегија ангажовања исламиста оснажује појединце и јача институције како би донела већу транспарентност, више одговорности, и помера се ка умерености. Обука и оснаживање појединаца негује умерене у партијама и повећава њихову политичку софистицираност и утицај. У међувремену, док се режими у арапском свету опиру политичким реформама или манипулишу њима, јачање демократске инфраструктуре једнако је важно као и подршка појединцима. Независне изборне процедуре и праћење помажу успостављању слободних и фер избора. Изградња институција обезбеђује одговарајуће провере извршне власти и јаку владавину права. Посебно је кључно јачање парламената, пошто исламисти учествују првенствено у законодавним тијелима.У процјени да ли су исламистичке странке модерирали у одговору на У.С. ангажовање, тешко је, ако не и немогуће, квантификовати или измерити помаке који сами по себи могу бити релативни и субјективни. Директно повезивање веће умерености са одређеним САД. активности ангажовања су такође веома проблематичне. У најбољем случају, ово ангажовање треба сматрати фактором који доприноси. Ипак, пробни резултати у Мароку, Јордан, и Јемен довољно обећавају да би требало охрабрити наставак ангажмана са умереним исламистима, иако са већим нагласком на изградњу институција и оком на шири контекст идеолошке битке у муслиманском свету између екстремизма и умерености.
Ислам, Политички ислам и Америка
иако су фактори који су довели до погоршања репутације Америке у арапском и муслиманском свету након 9. 11 су бројни, Сједињене Америчке Државе. позиција у односу на политички ислам остаје важан фактор у јачању негативног погледа на Америку. Важно питање које је покренуло већи део антиамериканизма који данас посматрамо у региону односи се на евидентну контрадикцију између америчког дискурса о демократизацији и политичких реформи с једне стране, и њен негативан одговор на изборну добит коју су оствариле групе попут Хамаса на палестинским територијама или Муслиманског братства у Египту. Као резултат овог неслагања, многи посматрачи су предложили алтернативне начине за Вашингтон да унапреди ствар демократије у арапском свету. Једна од предложених идеја укључује одлагање расписивања хитних избора, и уместо тога фокусирајући се на промовисање других предуслова политичке реформе. Други су предложили употребу нових стратегија које би гарантовале пораз политичких исламиста на гласачким кутијама. Несумњиво, постоји велика потреба за бољим разумевањем исламистичких покрета у региону, с обзиром на фундаменталне разлике међу таквим групама.Штавише, многи исламистички покрети доживљавају процес промене који захтева ревизију постојеће конвенционалне мудрости о политичком исламу. Не само то, али многе од тих група остају непознате на Западу, посебно амерички, дискусије о исламистичким покретима. Стога, формулисање конструктивне и ефикасне америчке политике према исламу у ширем смислу, већ конкретније према политичком исламу, захтеваће ново и нијансираније интелектуално мапирање савременог ислама и политичког ислама у региону. С обзиром на ове различите захтеве, Уреднички тим Араб Инсигхт-а преузео је иницијативу да расветли тему америчке политике и према исламу и према политичком исламу. Тема је представљена у два одељка:Први део представља неколико арапских одговора на америчку политику према исламистима.
Egypt’s Constitutional Test: Averting the March toward Islamic Fundamentalism
Египат: Background and U.S. Relations
Јереми М.. Оштар
In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. Furthermore, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (Децембра 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Истовремено, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.
IN PURSUIT OF LEGITIMACY
Middle East Democracy Promotion Is Not a One-way Street
Марина Оттаваи
The U.S. administration is under pressure to revive democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East,but momentum toward political reform has stalled in most of the region. Opposition parties are at lowebb, and governments are more firmly in control than ever. While new forms of activism, such as laborprotests and a growing volume of blogging critical of government and opposition parties have becomewidespread, they have yet to prove effective as means of influencing leaders to change long-standingpolicies.The last time a U.S. administration faced such unfavorable circumstances in advancing political reformswas over 30 years ago, when the Helsinki process was launched during the Cold War. That experiencetaught us that the United States needs to give reluctant interlocutors something they want if itexpects them to engage on issues they would rather not address. If Washington wants Arab countriesto discuss the universal democratic principles that should underpin their political systems, it needs to beprepared to discuss the universal principles that should underpin its own Middle East policies.
OF ISLAMISTS AND BALLOT BOXES
Vickie Langohr
As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”
Palestine Question and Islamic Movement
Azzam TAMIMI
The top leadership of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) in the Gaza Strip heldan emergency meeting on the evening of Wednesday 9 December 1987 to deliberate what todo a day after the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) erupted. The eruption was ignited by the coldbloodedmurder of several Palestinian laborers at the hands of an Israeli army trailer driver. Theseven men, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Dr. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Rantisi, Salah Shihadah, Abd Al-FattahDukhan, Muhammad Shamah, Ibrahim Al-Yazuri and Isa Al-Nashar, took the historic decision totransform the Ikhwan organization in Palestine into a resistance movement that was called Harakatal-Muqawamah Al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Resistance Movement) known from then on by theacronym HAMAS.Although the decision was triggered by the unplanned simultaneous popular uprising, SheikhYassin and his comrades had been preparing for that eventuality for many years. They had for toolong been detached from the earlier history of the movement when it was best known for puttingup the most credible resistance to the Zionists who founded the Jewish state on land taken from thePalestinians by force in 1948.Intended to be a comprehensive reform movement, the Ikhwan was originally Egyptian buthas since its inception grown into a global network. The mother organization was founded byHassan Al-Banna (1906-1949) in the Egyptian town of Al-Ismailiyah in 1928 where he taught at aprimary school not far from the headquarters of the British occupation troops’ garrison. Combiningelements of spirituality acquired from his association with the Hasafiyah Sufi order with thepristine monotheistic teachings of Islam learned inside the Salafi school of Muhammad RashidRida (1865-1935) – a disciple and close associate of Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Al-Banna’sproject had a great popular appeal. Soon after its birth, the Ikhwan movement grew rapidly withinEgypt and beyond it. Inside Egypt, it had four branches in 1929, 15 in 1932, 300 by 1938 and morethan 2000 in 1948. By 1945, it had half a million active members in Egypt alone. Between 1946 and1948, Ikhwan branches were opened in Palestine, Sudan, Iraq and Syria.
Goldstone Report On Israel’s War On Gaza
1. On 3 April 2009, the President of the Human Rights Council established the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict with the mandate “to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.”
2. The President appointed Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to head the Mission. The other three appointed members were Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, who was a member of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun (2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, who was a member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); and Colonel Desmond Travers, a former Officer in Ireland’s Defence Forces and member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for International Criminal Investigations.
3. As is usual practice, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established a secretariat to support the Mission.
4. The Mission interpreted the mandate as requiring it to place the civilian population of the region at the centre of its concerns regarding the violations of international law.
5. The Mission convened for the first time in Geneva between 4 and 8 May 2009. Additionally, the Mission met in Geneva on 20 May, on 4 and 5 July, and between 1 and 4 August 2009. The Mission conducted three field visits: two to the Gaza Strip between 30 May and 6 June, and between 25 June and 1 July 2009; and one visit to Amman on 2 and 3 July 2009. Several staff ofthe Mission’s secretariat were deployed in Gaza from 22 May to 4 July 2009 to conduct field investigations.
6. Notes verbales were sent to all Member States of the United Nations and United Nations organs and bodies on 7 May 2009. On 8 June 2009 the Mission issued a call for submissions inviting all interested persons and organizations to submit relevant information and documentation to assist in the implementation of its mandate.
7. Public hearings were held in Gaza on 28 and 29 June and in Geneva on 6 and 7 July 2009.
8. The Mission repeatedly sought to obtain the cooperation of the Government of Israel. After numerous attempts had failed, the Mission sought and obtained the assistance of the Government of Egypt to enable it to enter the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing.
9. The Mission has enjoyed the support and cooperation of the Palestinian Authority and of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. Due to the lack of cooperation from the Israeli Government, the Mission was unable to meet members of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The Mission did, however, meet officials of the Palestinian Authority, including a cabinet minister, in Amman. During its visits to the Gaza Strip, the Mission held meetings with senior members of the Gaza authorities and they extended their full cooperation and support to the Mission.
10. Subsequent to the public hearings in Geneva, the Mission was informed that a Palestinian participant, Mr. Muhammad Srour, had been detained by Israeli security forces when returning to the West Bank and became concerned that his detention may have been a consequence of his appearance before the Mission. The Mission is in contact with him and continues to monitor developments.