Lahat ng Entries Na Naka-tag Sa: "Palestine"
PEMINISMO SA PAGITAN NG SEKULARISMO AT ISLAMISMO: ANG KASO NG PALESTIN
Sinabi ni Dr., Islah Jad
Legislative elections na ginanap sa West Bank at Gaza Strip sa 2006 dinala sa kapangyarihan ang kilusang Islam na Hamas, na nagpatuloy sa pagbuo ng mayorya ng Palestinian Legislative Council at gayundin ang unang mayoryang pamahalaan ng Hamas. Ang mga halalan na ito ay nagresulta sa paghirang ng unang babaeng ministro ng Hamas, na naging Ministro ng Women’s Affairs. Sa pagitan ng Marso 2006 at Hunyo 2007, dalawang magkaibang babaeng ministro ng Hamas ang umako sa post na ito, ngunit pareho silang nahirapang pamahalaan ang Ministri dahil karamihan sa mga empleyado nito ay hindi miyembro ng Hamas ngunit kabilang sa ibang mga partidong pampulitika, at karamihan ay miyembro ng Fatah, ang nangingibabaw na kilusan na kumokontrol sa karamihan ng mga institusyong Awtoridad ng Palestinian. Ang isang maigting na panahon ng pakikibaka sa pagitan ng mga kababaihan ng Hamas sa Ministry of Women's Affairs at ng mga babaeng miyembro ng Fatah ay natapos kasunod ng pagkuha ng kapangyarihan ng Hamas sa Gaza Strip at ang resulta ng pagbagsak ng gobyerno nito sa West Bank – isang pakikibaka na kung minsan ay nagiging marahas. Ang isang dahilan sa kalaunan ay binanggit upang ipaliwanag ang pakikibaka na ito ay ang pagkakaiba sa pagitan ng sekular na feminist na diskurso at Islamist na diskurso sa mga isyu ng kababaihan. Sa kontekstong Palestinian, ang hindi pagkakasundo na ito ay nagkaroon ng mapanganib na kalikasan dahil ginamit ito upang bigyang-katwiran ang pagpapatuloy ng madugong pakikibaka sa pulitika., ang pagtanggal sa mga kababaihan ng Hamas sa kanilang mga posisyon o post, at ang pulitikal at heograpikal na mga paghahati na namamayani sa panahong iyon sa parehong West Bank at sa sinasakop na Gaza Strip.
Ang pakikibaka na ito ay nagtataas ng ilang mahahalagang katanungan: dapat ba nating parusahan ang kilusang Islamista na nasa kapangyarihan, o dapat nating isaalang-alang ang mga dahilan na humantong sa kabiguan ni Fateh sa larangan ng pulitika? Maaari bang mag-alok ang feminismo ng komprehensibong balangkas para sa kababaihan, anuman ang kanilang panlipunan at ideolohikal na kaakibat? Can a discourse of a shared common ground for women help them to realize and agree upon their common goals? Is paternalism only present in Islamist ideology, and not in nationalism and patriotism? What do we mean by feminism? Is there only one feminism, or several feminisms? What do we mean by Islam – is it the movement known by this name or the religion, the philosophy, or the legal system? We need to go to the bottom of these issues and consider them carefully, and we must agree upon them so that we can later decide, as feminists, if our criticism of paternalism should be directed at religion (pananampalataya), which should be confined to the heart of the believer and not be allowed to take control of the world at large, or the jurisprudence, na nauugnay sa iba't ibang paaralan ng pananampalataya na nagpapaliwanag sa sistemang legal na nakapaloob sa Quran at mga kasabihan ng Propeta – ang Sunnah.
| Sep 19, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
AKTIBISMO NG MGA KABABAIHAN ISLAM SA SINAKOP NA PALESTIN
Mga panayam ni Khaled Amayreh
Panayam kay Sameera Al-Halayka
Si Sameera Al-Halayka ay isang nahalal na miyembro ng Palestinian Legislative Council. Siya ay
ipinanganak sa nayon ng Shoyoukh malapit sa Hebron noong 1964. Mayroon siyang BA sa Sharia (Islamic
Jurisprudence) mula sa Hebron University. Nagtrabaho siya bilang isang mamamahayag mula sa 1996 sa 2006 kailan
pumasok siya sa Palestinian Legislative Council bilang nahalal na miyembro sa 2006 halalan.
Siya ay may asawa at may pitong anak.
Q: Mayroong pangkalahatang impresyon sa ilang kanluraning bansa na natatanggap ng mga kababaihan
mababang pagtrato sa loob ng mga grupo ng paglaban sa Islam, tulad ng Hamas. Totoo ba ito?
Paano ginagamot ang mga babaeng aktibista sa Hamas?
Ang mga karapatan at tungkulin ng mga babaeng Muslim ay nagmumula sa Islamic Sharia o batas.
Ang mga ito ay hindi boluntaryo o kawanggawa o mga kilos na natatanggap namin mula sa Hamas o sinuman
iba pa. Sa gayon, hanggang sa pakikilahok sa pulitika at aktibismo ay nababahala, karaniwang mayroon ang mga kababaihan
ang parehong mga karapatan at tungkulin ng mga lalaki. Kung tutuusin, ang mga kababaihan ay bumubuo ng hindi bababa sa 50 porsyento ng
lipunan. Sa isang tiyak na kahulugan, sila ang buong lipunan dahil pinanganak nila, at itaas,
ang bagong henerasyon.
Samakatuwid, Masasabi kong ang katayuan ng mga kababaihan sa loob ng Hamas ay ganap na umaayon sa kanya
katayuan sa Islam mismo. Nangangahulugan ito na siya ay ganap na kasosyo sa lahat ng antas. Sa totoo lang, ito ay magiging
hindi patas at hindi makatarungan para sa isang Islam (o Islamist kung gusto mo) babaeng magiging katuwang sa paghihirap
while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in
Hamas has always been pioneering.
Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is
a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts
regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to
pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued
Israeli occupation?
There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from
political participation. I believe the opposite is true — there are numerous Quranic verses
and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public
issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, aktibismo sa pulitika
ay hindi sapilitan ngunit boluntaryo, at higit na napagpasyahan ayon sa kakayahan ng bawat babae,
mga kwalipikasyon at indibidwal na kalagayan. None the less, nagpapakita ng pagmamalasakit sa publiko
ang mga bagay ay ipinag-uutos sa bawat at bawat Muslim na lalaki at babae. Ang Propeta
sabi ni Muhammad: "Siya na hindi nagpapakita ng pagmamalasakit sa mga gawain ng mga Muslim ay hindi isang Muslim."
At saka, Ang mga Palestinian Islamist na kababaihan ay kailangang kunin ang lahat ng layunin na mga kadahilanan sa lupa
account kapag nagpapasya kung sasali sa pulitika o makisali sa aktibismo sa pulitika.
| Sep 19, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Trabaho, Kolonyalismo, Apartheid?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (ibig sabihin, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, at
Gaza, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, at, kung gayon, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. At the same time, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, saka, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| Sep 07, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
ISLAM, DEMOKRASYA & ANG USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq |
Intro ,
Sa kabila ng pagiging parehong pangmatagalan at kumplikadong debate, Ang Arches Quarterly ay muling nagsusuri mula sa teolohiko at praktikal na mga batayan, ang mahalagang debate tungkol sa relasyon at pagkakatugma sa pagitan ng Islam at Demokrasya, bilang echoed sa Barack Obama's agenda ng pag-asa at pagbabago. Habang marami ang nagdiriwang sa pag-akyat ni Obama sa Oval Office bilang isang pambansang catharsis para sa US, ang iba ay nananatiling hindi gaanong optimistiko sa pagbabago ng ideolohiya at diskarte sa internasyonal na arena. Habang ang karamihan sa tensyon at kawalan ng tiwala sa pagitan ng mundo ng Muslim at ng USA ay maaaring maiugnay sa diskarte ng pagtataguyod ng demokrasya, karaniwang pinapaboran ang mga diktadurya at papet na rehimen na nagbibigay ng lip-service sa mga demokratikong halaga at karapatang pantao, ang aftershock ng 9/11 ay tunay na pinatibay ang mga pag-aalinlangan sa pamamagitan ng posisyon ng Amerika sa politikal na Islam. Lumikha ito ng pader ng negatibiti gaya ng natagpuan ng worldpublicopinion.org, ayon sa kung saan 67% naniniwala ang mga taga-Ehipto na sa buong mundo ang America ay gumaganap ng isang "pangunahing negatibo" na papel.
Ang tugon ng Amerika ay naging angkop. Sa pamamagitan ng pagpili kay Obama, marami sa buong mundo ang umaasa sa pagbuo ng hindi gaanong palaaway, ngunit mas patas na patakarang panlabas patungo sa mundo ng Muslim. Ang pagsubok para kay Obama, habang tinatalakay natin, ay kung paano itaguyod ng Amerika at ng kanyang mga kaalyado ang demokrasya. Magiging facilitating ba ito o kahanga-hanga?
At saka, maaari ba itong maging isang matapat na broker sa matagal na mga lugar ng mga salungatan? Pagkuha ng kadalubhasaan at pananaw ng prolifi
c mga iskolar, akademya, mga batikang mamamahayag at pulitiko, Binibigyang liwanag ng Arches Quarterly ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng Islam at Demokrasya at ang papel ng Amerika – pati na rin ang mga pagbabagong dulot ni Obama, sa paghahanap ng karaniwang batayan. Anas Altikriti, ang CEO ng Th e Cordoba Foundation ay nagbibigay ng pambungad na sugal sa talakayang ito, kung saan siya ay sumasalamin sa mga pag-asa at hamon na nakasalalay sa landas ni Obama. Kasunod ng Altikriti, ang dating tagapayo ni Pangulong Nixon, Nag-aalok si Dr Robert Crane ng masusing pagsusuri sa prinsipyo ng Islam ng karapatan sa kalayaan. Anwar Ibrahim, dating Deputy Prime Minister ng Malaysia, pinayaman ang talakayan sa mga praktikal na katotohanan ng pagpapatupad ng demokrasya sa mga dominanteng lipunan ng Muslim, ibig sabihin, sa Indonesia at Malaysia.
Mayroon din kaming Dr Shireen Hunter, ng Georgetown University, USA, na gumagalugad sa mga bansang Muslim na nahuhuli sa demokratisasyon at modernisasyon. Ito ay kinukumpleto ng manunulat ng terorismo, Ang paliwanag ni Dr Nafeez Ahmed sa krisis ng post-modernity at ang
pagkamatay ng demokrasya. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Direktor ng Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (dating ITN at BBC Panorama correspondent; may-akda ng Zionism: Ang Tunay na Kaaway ng mga Hudyo) at Asem Sondos (Editor ng Egypt's Sawt Al Omma linggu-linggo) tumutok kay Obama at sa kanyang tungkulin vis-à-vis democracy-promote sa Muslim world, gayundin ang relasyon ng US sa Israel at sa Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Nag-isip si Ahmed Shaheed sa hinaharap ng Islam at Demokrasya; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– isang miyembro ng Sinn Féin na nagtiis ng apat na taon sa bilangguan para sa mga aktibidad ng Irish Republican at isang campaigner para sa Guildford 4 at Birmingham 6, sumasalamin sa kanyang kamakailang paglalakbay sa Gaza kung saan nasaksihan niya ang epekto ng kalupitan at kawalang-katarungang ginawa laban sa mga Palestinian; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Ang Direktor ng Center for the Study of Radicalization at Contemporary Political Violence ay tumatalakay sa mga hamon ng kritikal na pagsasaliksik ng politikal na terorismo; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, manunulat at manunulat ng dula, tinatalakay ang mga prospect ng kapayapaan sa Darfur; at sa wakas ang mamamahayag at aktibistang karapatang pantao na si Ashur Shamis ay tumitingin nang kritikal sa demokratisasyon at pamumulitika ng mga Muslim ngayon.
Inaasahan namin na ang lahat ng ito ay gumagawa para sa isang komprehensibong pagbabasa at isang mapagkukunan para sa pagmumuni-muni sa mga isyu na nakakaapekto sa ating lahat sa isang bagong bukang-liwayway ng pag-asa.
salamat po
| Sep 07, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Hinaharang ng patakaran ng US Hamas ang kapayapaan sa Gitnang Silangan
Henry Siegman
Nabigo ang bilateral talks nitong nakaraan 16 taon ay nagpakita na ang isang kasunduang pangkapayapaan sa Gitnang Silangan ay hindi kailanman makakamit ng mga partido mismo. Naniniwala ang mga gobyerno ng Israel na maaari nilang labanan ang internasyonal na pagkondena sa kanilang iligal na kolonyal na proyekto sa West Bank dahil maaasahan nila ang US na tutulan ang mga internasyonal na parusa. Bilateral talks na hindi naka-frame sa pamamagitan ng US-formulated parameters (batay sa mga resolusyon ng Security Council, ang mga kasunduan ng Oslo, ang Arab Peace Initiative, ang "mapa ng daan" at iba pang mga nakaraang kasunduan ng Israeli-Palestinian) hindi magtagumpay. Naniniwala ang gobyerno ng Israel na hindi papahintulutan ng US Congress ang isang Amerikanong presidente na mag-isyu ng mga naturang parameter at hingin ang kanilang pagtanggap. Ano ang pag-asa para sa bilateral talks na magpapatuloy sa Washington DC sa Setyembre 2 ganap na nakasalalay kay Pangulong Obama na nagpapatunay na mali ang paniniwalang iyon, at kung ang mga "bridging proposal" ba ay ipinangako niya, kung ang mga pag-uusap ay umabot sa isang hindi pagkakasundo, ay isang euphemism para sa pagsusumite ng mga parameter ng Amerikano. Ang ganitong inisyatiba ng US ay dapat mag-alok ng Israel ng mga katiyakan para sa seguridad nito sa loob ng mga hangganan nito bago ang 1967, ngunit sa parehong oras ay dapat linawin ang mga katiyakang ito ay hindi magagamit kung ang Israel ay igiit na ipagkait sa mga Palestinian ang isang mabubuhay at soberanong estado sa West Bank at Gaza. Nakatuon ang papel na ito sa iba pang malaking balakid sa isang permanenteng kasunduan sa katayuan: ang kawalan ng isang epektibong Palestinian interlocutor. Pagtugon sa mga lehitimong hinaing ng Hamas - at tulad ng nabanggit sa isang kamakailang ulat ng CENTCOM, Ang Hamas ay may mga lehitimong hinaing - maaaring humantong sa pagbabalik nito sa isang Palestinian coalition government na magbibigay sa Israel ng isang mapagkakatiwalaang partner sa kapayapaan. Kung nabigo ang outreach na iyon dahil sa pagtanggi ng Hamas, ang kakayahan ng organisasyon na pigilan ang isang makatwirang kasunduan na napag-usapan ng iba pang mga partidong pampulitika ng Palestinian ay lubhang nahadlangan. Kung ang administrasyong Obama ay hindi mamumuno sa isang internasyonal na inisyatiba upang tukuyin ang mga parameter ng isang Israeli-Palestinian na kasunduan at aktibong isulong ang Palestinian political reconciliation, Dapat gawin ito ng Europa, at sana sumunod ang America. Sa kasamaang palad, walang pilak na bala na magagarantiyahan ang layunin ng "dalawang estado na magkatabi sa kapayapaan at seguridad."
Ngunit ang kasalukuyang kurso ni Pangulong Obama ay ganap na humahadlang dito.
| Sep 07, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 halalan. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
| Sep 05, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Islam at Demokrasya
ITAC
Kung may magbasa ng press o nakikinig sa mga komentarista sa mga pang-internasyonal na gawain, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| Sep 04, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Tess Lee Eisenhart
As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of
Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Kapatiran) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, gayunpaman, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
rehimen: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores
the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.
| Sep 01, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
BETWEEN YESTERDAY AND TODAY
HASAN AL-BANNA
The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in it, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, at provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. Ang Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.
| Aug 28, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Demokrasya sa Kaisipang Pampulitika ng Islam
Azzam S. Tamimi
Ang demokrasya ay pinagkakaabalahan ng mga Arabong nag-iisip sa pulitika simula pa noong simula ng modernong Arab renaissance mga dalawang siglo na ang nakararaan.. Simula noon, ang konsepto ng demokrasya ay nagbago at umunlad sa ilalim ng impluwensya ng iba't ibang panlipunan at pampulitika na pag-unlad.Ang talakayan ng demokrasya sa Arab Islamic literatura ay maaaring traced pabalik sa Rifa'a Tahtawi, ang ama ng Egyptian democracy ayon kay Lewis Awad,[3] na ilang sandali matapos ang kanyang pagbabalik sa Cairo mula sa Paris ay naglathala ng kanyang unang libro, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, sa 1834. Binubuod ng aklat ang kanyang mga obserbasyon sa mga asal at kaugalian ng modernong Pranses,[4] at pinuri ang konsepto ng demokrasya tulad ng nakita niya ito sa France at habang nasaksihan niya ang pagtatanggol at muling paninindigan nito sa pamamagitan ng 1830 Rebolusyon laban kay Haring Charles X.[5] Sinubukan ni Tahtawi na ipakita na ang demokratikong konsepto na ipinapaliwanag niya sa kanyang mga mambabasa ay tugma sa batas ng Islam. Inihambing niya ang political pluralism sa mga anyo ng ideological at jurisprudential pluralism na umiral sa karanasang Islamiko.:
Ang kalayaan sa relihiyon ay ang kalayaan ng paniniwala, ng opinyon at ng sekta, basta't hindi ito sumasalungat sa mga batayan ng relihiyon . . . Ang parehong ay naaangkop sa kalayaan ng pampulitikang kasanayan at opinyon ng mga nangungunang administrador, na nagsisikap na bigyang-kahulugan at ilapat ang mga tuntunin at probisyon alinsunod sa mga batas ng kanilang sariling mga bansa. Ang mga hari at mga ministro ay may lisensya sa larangan ng pulitika upang ituloy ang iba't ibang ruta na sa huli ay nagsisilbing isang layunin: mabuting administrasyon at hustisya.[6] Isang mahalagang palatandaan sa bagay na ito ay ang kontribusyon ni Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), pinuno ng kilusang reporma noong ika-19 na siglo sa Tunisia, WHO, sa 1867, bumuo ng pangkalahatang plano para sa reporma sa isang aklat na pinamagatang Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- bumalik (Ang Tuwid na Daan sa Pagrereporma ng mga Pamahalaan). Ang pangunahing pinagkakaabalahan ng aklat ay sa pagharap sa usapin ng repormang pampulitika sa mundo ng Arabo. Habang sumasamo sa mga pulitiko at iskolar sa kanyang panahon na hanapin ang lahat ng posibleng paraan upang mapabuti ang katayuan ng
pamayanan at paunlarin ang pagkamagalang nito, binalaan niya ang pangkalahatang publikong Muslim laban sa pag-iwas sa mga karanasan ng ibang mga bansa batay sa maling kuru-kuro na ang lahat ng mga akda, mga imbensyon, ang mga karanasan o saloobin ng mga di-Muslim ay dapat tanggihan o balewalain.
Nanawagan pa si Khairuddin na wakasan ang absolutist rule, na sinisi niya sa pang-aapi ng mga bansa at pagkasira ng mga sibilisasyon.
| Aug 27, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Mga Partido ng Islamista : why they can’t be democratic
Bassam Tibi
Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, marami
Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take
an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has
become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on
clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam
and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate
consequences.
Intelligent discussion of Islamism, demokrasya, and Islam requires
clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into
confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after
thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and
democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious
reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what
I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-
Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment
of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.
In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds
this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is
that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty
because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.
Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment
upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of
all practical wisdom.
| Aug 20, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Islamist parties : Three kinds of movements
Tamara Cofman
Sa pagitan ng 1991 at 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Today, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
Nonetheless, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. Ang diskurso ng relihiyon ng mga Islamista ay hindi maiiwasang sentro ng politika sa Arab. Ang mga maginoo na talakayan sa patakaran ay tatak sa mga Islamista alinman sa "katamtaman" o "radikal,"Sa pangkalahatan ay ikinategorya ang mga ito ayon sa dalawang medyo maluwag at hindi nakakatulong na pamantayan. Ang una ay karahasan: Ginagamit ito ng mga radical at hindi ginagamit ng mga moderate. Nagtatanong ito kung paano uuriin ang mga pangkat na hindi sa kanilang sarili nagsasagawa ng karahasan ngunit kinukunsinti, bigyan ng katwiran, o kahit na aktibong sumusuporta sa karahasan ng iba. Isang segundo, medyo mas mahigpit na pamantayan lamang kung ang mga pangkat o indibidwal na pinag-uusapan
tanggapin ang mga patakaran ng demokratikong larong elektoral. Ang popular na soberanya ay hindi maliit na konsesyon para sa tradisyunal na Islamists, marami sa kanino ang tumatanggi sa mga gobyernong nahalal sa demokratikong bilang usurpers ng soberanya ng Diyos.
Gayunpaman ang paninindigan sa mga panuntunang pamaraan ng demokratikong halalan ay hindi katulad ng pangako sa demokratikong politika o pamamahala.
| Aug 18, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?
Emad El-Din Shahin
The voluminous literature on reform and democratization in the Middle East region reveals a number of facts: a main obstacle to reform is the incumbent regimes that have been trying to resist and circumvent genuine democratic transformations; political reform cannot be credible without integrating moderate Islamists in the process; and external actors (mainly the US and the EU) have not yet formulated a coherent approach to reform that could simultaneously achieve stability and democracy in the region. This paper explores the possibilities and implications of a European engagement with moderate Islamists on democracy promotion in the region. It argues that the EU approach to political reform in the Middle East region needs to be enhanced and linked to realities on the ground. Political reform cannot be effective without the integration of non-violent Islamic groups in a gradual, multifaceted process. It should be highlighted that the process of engagement is a risky one for both the EU and the Islamists, yet both stand to gain from a systematic dialogue on democracy. To reduce the risks, the engagement with political Islam should come within a broader EU strategy for democracy promotion in the region. Sa totoo lang, what the Islamists would expect from Europe is to maintain a
consistent and assertive stand on political reforms that would allow for a genuine representation of the popular will through peaceful means.
Kaugnay nito, a number of questions seem pertinent. Does the EU really need to engage political Islam in democratic reforms? Is political Islam ready for engagement and will it be willing to engage? How can an engagement policy be formulated on the basis of plausible implementation with minimal risks to the interests of the parties involved?
| Aug 18, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Ang Maling Sukat ng Politikal na Islam
Martin Kramer
Marahil walang pag-unlad sa huling dekada ng ikadalawampu siglo ang nagdulot ng labis na kalituhan sa Kanluran gaya ng paglitaw ng politikal na Islam.. Kung ano lang ang inilalarawan nito? Labag ba ito sa modernidad, o ito ba ay epekto ng modernidad? Labag ba sa nasyonalismo, o ito ba ay a
anyo ng nasyonalismo? Ito ba ay isang pagsusumikap para sa kalayaan, o isang pag-aalsa laban sa kalayaan?
Iisipin ng isa na mahirap sagutin ang mga tanong na ito, at na sila ay pumukaw ng malalim na mga debate. Gayunpaman sa nakalipas na ilang taon, isang nakakagulat na malawak na pinagkasunduan ang lumitaw sa loob ng akademya tungkol sa paraan kung paano dapat sukatin ang politikal na Islam. Ang pinagkasunduan na ito ay may
nagsimula na ring kumalat sa mga bahagi ng pamahalaan, lalo na sa U.S. at Europa. Isang paradigma ang binuo, at sinasabi ng mga tagabuo nito na ang pagiging maaasahan at bisa nito ay hindi mapag-aalinlanganan.
Ang kasalukuyang nangingibabaw na paradigm na ito ay tumatakbo bilang mga sumusunod. Ang Arab Middle East at North Africa ay gumagalaw. Ang mga tao sa mga lupaing ito ay nasa ilalim pa rin ng mga uri ng awtoritaryan o despotikong paghahari. Ngunit sila ay naantig ng parehong unibersal na pagnanasa para sa demokrasya na nagbago sa Silangang Europa at Latin America. totoo, walang mga kilusan na madaling makikilala natin bilang mga kilusang demokrasya. Ngunit para sa makasaysayang at kultural na mga kadahilanan, ang unibersal na pananabik na ito ay nagkaroon ng anyo ng mga kilusang protestang Islamista. Kung ang mga ito ay hindi tumingin
tulad ng mga kilusang demokrasya, ito ay bunga lamang ng ating dating pagkiling sa Islam. Kapag ang tabing ng pagtatangi ay naalis, makikita ng isa ang mga kilusang Islamista kung ano sila: ang functional na katumbas ng mga demokratikong kilusang reporma. totoo, sa mga gilid ng mga kilusang ito ay mga pangkat na atavistiko at awtoritaryan. Ang ilan sa kanilang mga miyembro ay madaling kapitan ng karahasan. Ito ang mga “mga ekstremista.” Ngunit ang pangunahing mga paggalaw ay mahalagang bukas, pluralistic, at walang dahas, pinangunahan ni “katamtaman” o “mga repormista.” Ang mga ito “katamtaman” mapapalakas kung sila ay gagawing katuwang sa proseso ng pulitika, at ang isang paunang hakbang ay dapat na diyalogo. Ngunit sa huli, ang pinaka-epektibong paraan upang mahalin ang mga Islamista ay ang payagan silang magbahagi o magkaroon ng kapangyarihan. Walang banta dito maliban kung nilikha ito ng Kanluran, sa pamamagitan ng pagsuporta sa mga pagkilos ng panunupil ng estado na magtatanggi sa mga Islamista ng access sa partisipasyon o kapangyarihan.
| Aug 18, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Mga Partido ng Islamista , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?
Tarek Masoud
Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. At saka, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Halimbawa, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Islamic Action Front ng Jordan, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.
| Aug 17, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts, and Social Movements
Paul M. Lubeck
Bryana Britts
Cities are processes, not products. The three Islamic elements that set in motion the processes that give rise to Islamic cities were: a distinction between the members of the Umma and the outsiders, which led to juridical and spatial distinction by neighborhoods; the segregation of the sexes which gave rise to a particular solution to the question of spatial organization; and a legal system which, rather than imposing general regulations over land uses of various types in various places, left to the litigation of the neighbors the detailed adjudication of mutual rights over space and use. (Janet Abu Lughod 1987: 173)
Framing: Muslim Movements in Urban Situations We live in an intellectual moment when the complexity of the global Islamic
revival renders it difficult to generalize about Muslim institutions, social movements, and discursive practices. While diversity and locality remain paramount features of Muslim cities, globalization has inadvertently nurtured transnational Muslim networks from the homeland of Islam and extended them into the web of interconnected world cities. Quite opportunistically, urban-based
Muslim networks and insurrectionist movements now thrive in the interstitial spaces created by the new global communication and transportation infrastructures. What, then, are the long-term patterns for Muslims in cities? Since the last millennium, as Janet Abu-Lughod reminds us, “the Islamic city” has been the primary site for: defining power relations between ruler and subject, specifying the rights and identities of spatial communities, and regulating urban social relations between genders. Today’s Muslim city remains the epicenter of a burgeoning public sphere in which informed publics debate highly contested Islamic discourses regarding social justice,
| Aug 06, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
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