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FEMINISMI Á MILLI VERJALÆMI OG ÍSLAMISMI: PALESTÍNA MÁLIÐ

Doktor, Islam Jad

Löggjafarkosningar haldnar á Vesturbakkanum og Gaza-svæðinu í 2006 kom íslamistahreyfingunni Hamas til valda, sem síðan myndaði meirihluta palestínska löggjafarráðsins og einnig fyrstu meirihlutastjórn Hamas. Þessar kosningar leiddu til þess að fyrsti kvenkyns ráðherra Hamas var skipaður, sem varð ráðherra kvennamála. Milli mars 2006 og júní 2007, tveir ólíkir kvenkyns ráðherrar Hamas tóku við þessu embætti, en báðir áttu erfitt með að stjórna ráðuneytinu þar sem flestir starfsmenn þess voru ekki Hamas-menn heldur tilheyrðu öðrum stjórnmálaflokkum, og flestir voru meðlimir Fatah, ríkjandi hreyfing sem stjórnar flestum stofnunum palestínsku heimastjórnarinnar. Spennu tímabil baráttu kvenna Hamas í kvennamálaráðuneytinu og kvenkyns meðlima Fatah lauk í kjölfar valdatöku Hamas á Gaza ströndinni og í kjölfarið fall ríkisstjórnar þeirra á Vesturbakkanum – barátta. sem tók stundum ofboðslega stefnu. Ein ástæða sem síðar var nefnd til að útskýra þessa baráttu var munurinn á veraldlegri femínískri orðræðu og íslamskri orðræðu um málefni kvenna.. Í palestínsku samhengi tók þessi ágreiningur á sig hættulegt eðli þar sem hann var notaður til að réttlæta að viðhalda blóðugu pólitísku baráttunni., brottvísun Hamas-kvenna úr embættum sínum eða embætti, og pólitísk og landfræðileg skil sem ríktu á þeim tíma bæði á Vesturbakkanum og á hernumdu Gaza-svæðinu.
Þessi barátta vekur upp ýmsar mikilvægar spurningar: eigum við að refsa íslamistahreyfingunni sem er komin til valda, eða ættum við að íhuga ástæðurnar sem leiddu til bilunar Fateh á pólitískum vettvangi? Getur femínismi boðið upp á alhliða ramma fyrir konur, óháð félagslegum og hugmyndafræðilegum tengslum þeirra? Getur orðræða um sameiginlegan grunn kvenna hjálpað þeim að átta sig á og koma sér saman um sameiginleg markmið sín? Er föðurhyggja aðeins til staðar í hugmyndafræði íslamista, og ekki í þjóðernishyggju og ættjarðarást? Hvað er átt við með femínisma? Er bara einn femínismi, eða nokkrir femínismar? Hvað meinum við með íslam – er það hreyfingin sem er þekkt undir þessu nafni eða trúarbrögðin, heimspekina, eða réttarkerfið? Við þurfum að fara til botns í þessum málum og íhuga þau vel, og við verðum að koma okkur saman um þær svo að við getum ákveðið síðar, sem femínistar, ef gagnrýni okkar á föðurhyggju ætti að beinast að trúarbrögðum (trú), sem ætti að vera bundið við hjarta hins trúaða og fá ekki að ná stjórn á heiminum í heild, eða lögfræðinni, sem tengist mismunandi trúarskólum sem útskýra réttarkerfið sem er að finna í Kóraninum og orðum spámannsins – Sunnah.

Íslamista kvenna aðgerða í Uppteknum PALESTINE

Viðtöl við Khaled Amayreh

Viðtal við Sameera Al-Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka er kjörinn meðlimur palestínska löggjafarráðsins. Hún var

fæddur í þorpinu Shoyoukh nálægt Hebron í 1964. Hún er með BA í Sharia (Íslamskt

Lögfræði) frá Hebron háskólanum. Hún starfaði sem blaðamaður frá 1996 til 2006 hvenær

hún kom inn í palestínska löggjafarráðið sem kjörinn meðlimur í 2006 kosningar.

Hún er gift og á sjö börn.

Q: Það er almenn tilfinning í sumum vestrænum löndum að konur fái

óæðri meðferð innan íslamskra andspyrnuhópa, eins og Hamas. Er þetta satt?

Hvernig er komið fram við baráttukonur í Hamas?
Réttindi og skyldur múslimskra kvenna stafa fyrst og fremst af íslömskum Sharia eða lögum.

Þetta eru ekki sjálfviljugar eða góðgerðaraðgerðir eða bendingar sem við fáum frá Hamas eða öðrum

Annar. Svona, hvað snertir pólitíska þátttöku og aktívisma, konur hafa almennt

sömu réttindi og skyldur og karlar. Eftir allt, konur gera upp að minnsta kosti 50 prósent af

samfélag. Í vissum skilningi, þeir eru allt samfélagið vegna þess að þeir fæða, og hækka,

nýja kynslóðin.

Þess vegna, Ég get sagt að staða kvenna innan Hamas sé í fullu samræmi við hana

stöðu í íslam sjálfum. Þetta þýðir að hún er fullgildur félagi á öllum stigum. Einmitt, það væri

ósanngjarnt og óréttlátt fyrir íslamska (eða íslamista ef þú vilt) kona að vera félagi í þjáningum

á meðan hún er útilokuð frá ákvarðanatökuferlinu. Þetta er ástæðan fyrir því að hlutverk konunnar í

Hamas hefur alltaf verið brautryðjandi.

Q: Finnst þér að tilkoma pólitískrar aktívisma kvenna innan Hamas sé

náttúruleg þróun sem samrýmist klassískum íslömskum hugtökum

varðandi stöðu og hlutverk kvenna, eða er það bara nauðsynlegt svar við

þrýstingur nútímans og kröfur um pólitískar aðgerðir og áframhaldandi

Ísraelshernám?

Það er enginn texti í íslamskri lögfræði né í sáttmála Hamas sem hindrar konur frá

stjórnmálaþátttöku. Ég trúi því að hið gagnstæða sé satt — það eru fjölmargar kóranvísur

og orðatiltæki Múhameðs spámanns sem hvetur konur til að vera virkar í stjórnmálum og almenningi

málefni sem snerta múslima. En það er líka satt að fyrir konur, eins og það er fyrir karlmenn, pólitísk aktívismi

er ekki skylda heldur frjáls, og er að miklu leyti ákveðið í ljósi getu hverrar konu,

hæfi og einstaklingsaðstæður. Engu að síður, sýna almenningi umhyggju

mál eru lögbundin fyrir hvern og einn múslimska karl og konu. Spámaðurinn

sagði Muhammed: „Sá sem sýnir ekki umhyggju fyrir málefnum múslima er ekki múslimi.

Ennfremur, Palestínskar íslamskar konur verða að taka alla hlutlæga þætti á vettvangi með í reikninginn

reikningsskil þegar ákveðið er hvort eigi að taka þátt í stjórnmálum eða taka þátt í pólitískri aðgerð.


Starf, Nýlendustefnunnar, Apartheid?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (nefnilega, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, og
Gaza, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. Á sama tíma, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, og, ef svo, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, samráði, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. Á sama tíma, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, þar að auki, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

ÍSLAM, LÝÐRÆÐI & BANDARÍKIN:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Ennfremur, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, nefnilega, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, US, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

Hamas-stefna Bandaríkjanna hindrar frið í Miðausturlöndum

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Því miður, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Múslima Brothers EGYPT'S: Árekstra eða samþætta?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 kosningar. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Á sama tíma, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Íslam og lýðræði

ITAC

Ef maður les blöðin eða hlustar á fréttaskýrendur um alþjóðamál, það er oft sagt – og jafnvel oftar gefið í skyn en ekki sagt – að íslam samrýmist ekki lýðræði. Á tíunda áratugnum, Samuel Huntington kom af stað vitsmunalegum eldstormi þegar hann gaf út The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, þar sem hann setur fram spár sínar fyrir heiminn - skrifað stórt. Á pólitíska sviðinu, hann bendir á að á meðan Tyrkland og Pakistan gætu haft smá tilkall til „lýðræðislegs lögmæti“, voru öll önnur „... múslimalönd að mestu ólýðræðisleg: konungsveldi, eins flokks kerfi, herstjórnir, persónuleg einræði eða einhver samsetning af þessu, hvílir venjulega á takmarkaðri fjölskyldu, ættin, eða ættbálka“. Forsendan sem röksemdafærsla hans byggir á er að þeir séu ekki aðeins „ekki eins og við“, þeir eru í raun andvígir grundvallar lýðræðislegum gildum okkar. Hann trúir, eins og aðrir, að á meðan verið sé að mótmæla hugmyndinni um vestræna lýðræðisvæðingu annars staðar í heiminum, átökin eru mest áberandi á þeim svæðum þar sem íslam er ríkjandi trú.
Rökin hafa líka komið fram frá hinni hliðinni líka. Íranskur trúarfræðingur, að velta fyrir sér stjórnarkreppu snemma á tuttugustu öld í landi sínu, lýst því yfir að íslam og lýðræði séu ekki samrýmanleg vegna þess að fólk sé ekki jafnt og löggjafarstofnun sé óþörf vegna þess hve íslömsk trúarlög eru innifalin.. Svipaða afstöðu tók nýlega af Ali Belhadj, alsírskur menntaskólakennari, prédikari og (í þessu samhengi) leiðtogi FIS, þegar hann lýsti því yfir að „lýðræði væri ekki íslamskt hugtak“. Kannski var dramatískasta yfirlýsingin um þetta efni frá Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leiðtogi súnní-uppreisnarmanna í Írak sem, þegar horfur eru á kosningar, fordæmdi lýðræði sem „illt meginregla“.
En samkvæmt sumum múslimskum fræðimönnum, Lýðræði er enn mikilvæg hugsjón í íslam, með þeim fyrirvara að það lúti alltaf trúarlegum lögum. Áherslan á aðalsæti sharía er þáttur í næstum öllum íslömskum athugasemdum um stjórnarhætti, hófsamur eða öfgakenndur. Aðeins ef valdhafinn, sem tekur við vald sitt frá Guði, takmarkar gjörðir sínar við „eftirlit með stjórnun sharía“ á að hlýða honum. Ef hann gerir annað en þetta, hann er trúlaus og staðráðnir múslimar eiga að gera uppreisn gegn honum. Hér liggur réttlætingin fyrir miklu af ofbeldinu sem hefur hrjáð múslimska heiminn í baráttu eins og ríkjandi var í Alsír á tíunda áratugnum

Skipulagssamfella í múslimska bræðralagi Egyptalands

Tess Lee Eisenhart

Sem elsta og mest áberandi stjórnarandstöðuhreyfing Egyptalands, Félagið um

múslimska bræður, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, hefur lengi skapað áskorun fyrir aðra veraldlega
stjórnarfar með því að bjóða upp á yfirgripsmikla sýn á íslamskt ríki og víðtæka félagslega
velferðarþjónustu. Frá stofnun þess í 1928, bræðralagið (Ikhwan) hefur dafnað í a
samhliða trúar- og félagsþjónustu, forðast almennt bein árekstra við
ríkjandi stjórnarfar.1 Nýlega undanfarna tvo áratugi, þó, bræðralagið hefur
dundaði sér við flokksræði á hinu formlega pólitíska sviði. Þessi tilraun náði hámarki
kosning áttatíu og átta bræðra á alþýðuþingið árið 2005 — sá stærsti
stjórnarandstæðinga í nútíma Egyptalandi sögu – og handtökur næstum því í kjölfarið
1,000 Bræður.2 Kosningaframfarir í almennum stjórnmálum veita nægt fóður
fyrir fræðimenn að prófa kenningar og spá fyrir um framtíð Egypta
stjórn: mun það falla undir íslamista andstöðu eða verða áfram leiðarljós veraldarhyggju í landinu
Arabaheimur?
Þessi ritgerð víkur sér undan því að vera með svona víðtækar vangaveltur. Í staðinn, það kannar

að hve miklu leyti Bræðralag múslima hefur aðlagast að stofnun í fortíðinni
Áratugur.

MILLI GÆR OG Í DAG

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, og provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. The Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

Lýðræði í íslamskri pólitískri hugsun

Azzam S. Tamimi

Lýðræði hefur upptekið arabíska stjórnmálahugsendur frá upphafi nútíma arabískrar endurreisnar fyrir um tveimur öldum.. Síðan þá, lýðræðishugtakið hefur breyst og þróast undir áhrifum margvíslegrar félagslegrar og pólitískrar þróunar. Umfjöllun um lýðræði í arabísku íslömskum bókmenntum má rekja til Rifa'a Tahtawi, faðir egypsks lýðræðis samkvæmt Lewis Awad,[3] sem skömmu eftir heimkomuna til Kaíró frá París gaf út sína fyrstu bók, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, í 1834. Bókin tók saman athuganir hans á siðum og siðum nútíma Frakka,[4] og lofaði hugmyndina um lýðræði eins og hann sá það í Frakklandi og þegar hann varð vitni að vörn þess og áréttingu í gegnum 1830 Bylting gegn Karli X konungi.[5] Tahtawi reyndi að sýna fram á að lýðræðishugtakið sem hann var að útskýra fyrir lesendum sínum samrýmist lögum íslams.. Hann líkti pólitískum fjölhyggju við form hugmyndafræðilegrar og lögfræðilegrar fjölhyggju sem var til í íslamskri reynslu:
Trúfrelsi er trúfrelsi, skoðana og sértrúarsöfnuðar, að því gefnu að það stangist ekki á við grundvallaratriði trúarbragða . . . Sama ætti við um frelsi til stjórnmálastarfa og skoðana hjá leiðandi stjórnendum, sem leitast við að túlka og beita reglum og ákvæðum í samræmi við lög síns lands. Konungar og ráðherrar hafa leyfi á sviði stjórnmála til að fara ýmsar leiðir sem á endanum þjóna einum tilgangi: góða stjórnsýslu og réttlæti.[6] Eitt mikilvægt kennileiti í þessu sambandi var framlag Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leiðtogi umbótahreyfingar 19. aldar í Túnis, WHO, í 1867, mótaði almenna áætlun um umbætur í bók sem ber titilinn Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- skila (Bein leið til umbótastjórna). Aðaláhugamál bókarinnar var að takast á við spurninguna um pólitískar umbætur í arabaheiminum. Á meðan hann höfðaði til stjórnmálamanna og fræðimanna á sínum tíma að leita allra leiða til að bæta stöðu þjóðarinnar.
samfélag og þróa siðmennsku þess, hann varaði almennan múslimskan almenning við að forðast reynslu annarra þjóða á grundvelli þeirrar misskilnings að öll skrifin, uppfinningar, Reynsla eða viðhorf annarra en múslima ætti að hafna eða virða að vettugi.
Khairuddin hvatti ennfremur til að binda enda á alræðisvald, sem hann kenndi um kúgun þjóða og eyðileggingu siðmenningar.

Íslamistaflokkar : hvers vegna þeir geta ekki verið lýðræðislegir

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, lýðræði, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

íslamistaflokkar : Þrenns konar hreyfingar

Tamara Cofman

Between 1991 og 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Today, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
Engu að síður, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.

Pólitískt íslam: Tilbúinn fyrir trúlofun?

Emad El-Din Shahin

The voluminous literature on reform and democratization in the Middle East region reveals a number of facts: a main obstacle to reform is the incumbent regimes that have been trying to resist and circumvent genuine democratic transformations; political reform cannot be credible without integrating moderate Islamists in the process; and external actors (mainly the US and the EU) have not yet formulated a coherent approach to reform that could simultaneously achieve stability and democracy in the region. This paper explores the possibilities and implications of a European engagement with moderate Islamists on democracy promotion in the region. It argues that the EU approach to political reform in the Middle East region needs to be enhanced and linked to realities on the ground. Political reform cannot be effective without the integration of non-violent Islamic groups in a gradual, multifaceted process. It should be highlighted that the process of engagement is a risky one for both the EU and the Islamists, yet both stand to gain from a systematic dialogue on democracy. To reduce the risks, the engagement with political Islam should come within a broader EU strategy for democracy promotion in the region. Reyndar, what the Islamists would expect from Europe is to maintain a
consistent and assertive stand on political reforms that would allow for a genuine representation of the popular will through peaceful means.
In this regard, a number of questions seem pertinent. Does the EU really need to engage political Islam in democratic reforms? Is political Islam ready for engagement and will it be willing to engage? How can an engagement policy be formulated on the basis of plausible implementation with minimal risks to the interests of the parties involved?

The Mismeasure of Political Islam

Martin Kramer

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderates” eða “reformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.

Íslamistaflokkar , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?

Tarek Masoud

Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. Ennfremur, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Til dæmis, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (stofnað í 1928), but also Hamas, Islamic Action Front Jórdaníu, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.

Borgaralegt samfélag múslima í almenningsrými í þéttbýli: Hnattvæðing, Umræðubreytingar, og Félagslegar hreyfingar

Paul M. Lubeck
Bryana Britt
Cities are processes, not products. The three Islamic elements that set in motion the processes that give rise to Islamic cities were: a distinction between the members of the Umma and the outsiders, which led to juridical and spatial distinction by neighborhoods; the segregation of the sexes which gave rise to a particular solution to the question of spatial organization; and a legal system which, rather than imposing general regulations over land uses of various types in various places, left to the litigation of the neighbors the detailed adjudication of mutual rights over space and use. (Janet Abu Lughod 1987: 173)
Framing: Muslim Movements in Urban Situations We live in an intellectual moment when the complexity of the global Islamic
revival renders it difficult to generalize about Muslim institutions, social movements, and discursive practices. While diversity and locality remain paramount features of Muslim cities, globalization has inadvertently nurtured transnational Muslim networks from the homeland of Islam and extended them into the web of interconnected world cities. Quite opportunistically, urban-based
Muslim networks and insurrectionist movements now thrive in the interstitial spaces created by the new global communication and transportation infrastructures. What, then, are the long-term patterns for Muslims in cities? Since the last millennium, as Janet Abu-Lughod reminds us, “the Islamic cityhas been the primary site for: defining power relations between ruler and subject, specifying the rights and identities of spatial communities, and regulating urban social relations between genders. Today’s Muslim city remains the epicenter of a burgeoning public sphere in which informed publics debate highly contested Islamic discourses regarding social justice,