Todas as entradas etiquetadas con: "Palestina"
O FEMINISMO ENTRE O LAICismo E O ISLAMISMO: O CASO DE PALESTINA
Dr, Islah Jad
Eleccións lexislativas celebradas en Cisxordania e na Franxa de Gaza 2006 levou ao poder ao movemento islamita Hamás, que pasou a formar a maioría do Consello Lexislativo Palestino e tamén o primeiro goberno maioritario de Hamás. Estas eleccións resultaron no nomeamento da primeira muller ministra de Hamás, que chegou a ser ministra de Asuntos da Muller. Entre marzo 2006 e xuño 2007, dúas ministras de Hamás asumiron este cargo, pero a ambos lles resultou difícil xestionar o Ministerio xa que a maioría dos seus empregados non eran membros de Hamás senón que pertencían a outros partidos políticos., e a maioría eran membros de Fatah, o movemento dominante que controla a maioría das institucións da Autoridade Palestina. Un tenso período de loita entre as mulleres de Hamás no Ministerio de Asuntos da Muller e as mulleres membros de Fatah chegou ao seu fin tras a toma de poder por Hamás na Franxa de Gaza e a consecuente caída do seu goberno en Cisxordania, unha loita. que ás veces deu un xiro violento. Unha das razóns que se citou máis tarde para explicar esta loita foi a diferenza entre o discurso feminista secular e o discurso islamista sobre os problemas das mulleres.. No contexto palestino este desacordo adquiriu un carácter perigoso xa que se utilizaba para xustificar a perpetuación da cruenta loita política., a destitución das mulleres de Hamás dos seus postos ou postos, e as divisións políticas e xeográficas que imperaban nese momento tanto en Cisxordania como na Franxa de Gaza ocupada.
Esta loita suscita unha serie de preguntas importantes: debemos castigar ao movemento islamita que chegou ao poder, ou debemos considerar as razóns que levaron ao fracaso de Fateh no ámbito político? O feminismo pode ofrecer un marco integral para as mulleres, independentemente das súas filiacións sociais e ideolóxicas? Pode un discurso sobre un terreo común compartido para as mulleres axudarlles a realizar e consensuar os seus obxectivos comúns?? O paternalismo só está presente na ideoloxía islamita, e non no nacionalismo e no patriotismo? Que entendemos por feminismo? Hai só un feminismo, ou varios feminismos? Que entendemos por islam? – é o movemento coñecido con este nome ou a relixión, a filosofía, ou o sistema xurídico? Temos que ir ao fondo destas cuestións e consideralas coidadosamente, e hai que consensualas para despois decidir, como feministas, se a nosa crítica ao paternalismo debe dirixirse á relixión (fe), que debería limitarse ao corazón do crente e non permitirse tomar o control do mundo en xeral, ou a xurisprudencia, que se relaciona con diferentes escolas de fe que explican o sistema legal contido no Corán e os ditos do Profeta – a Sunnah.
| setembro 19, 2010 | comentarios 0
O ACTIVISMO DAS MULLERES ISLAMISTAS NA PALESTINA OCUPADA
Entrevistas de Khaled Amayreh
Entrevista a Sameera Al-Halayka
Sameera Al-Halayka é membro electo do Consello Lexislativo Palestino. Ela foi
naceu na aldea de Shoyoukh preto de Hebrón en 1964. Ela ten unha licenciatura en Sharia (islámico
Xurisprudencia) da Universidade de Hebrón. Ela traballou como xornalista desde 1996 a 2006 cando
ela entrou no Consello Lexislativo Palestino como membro electo no 2006 eleccións.
Está casada e ten sete fillos.
Q: Hai unha impresión xeral nalgúns países occidentais que reciben as mulleres
trato inferior dentro dos grupos de resistencia islámica, como Hamás. Isto é certo??
Como son tratadas as mulleres activistas en Hamás?
Os dereitos e deberes das mulleres musulmás emanan en primeiro lugar da sharia ou da lei islámica.
Non son actos ou xestos voluntarios ou benéficos que recibimos de Hamás ou de ninguén
outra cousa. Así, no que a implicación política e activismo se refire, as mulleres xeralmente teñen
os mesmos dereitos e deberes que os homes. Despois de todo, as mulleres compoñen polo menos 50 por cento de
sociedade. En certo sentido, son toda a sociedade porque dan a luz, e levantar,
a nova xeración.
Polo tanto, Podo dicir que a condición da muller dentro de Hamás está en plena conformidade con ela
status no propio Islam. Isto significa que é unha compañeira completa en todos os niveis. Por suposto, sería
inxusto e inxusto para un islámico (ou islamista se o prefires) muller para ser compañeira de sufrimento
while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in
Hamas has always been pioneering.
Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is
a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts
regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to
pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued
Israeli occupation?
There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from
political participation. I believe the opposite is true — there are numerous Quranic verses
and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public
issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, activismo político
non é obrigatorio senón voluntario, e decídese en gran medida en función das capacidades de cada muller,
cualificacións e circunstancias individuais. Non obstante, mostrando preocupación polo público
asuntos é obrigatorio para todos os homes e mulleres musulmáns. O Profeta
dixo Muhammed: "Quen non mostra preocupación polos asuntos dos musulmáns non é musulmán".
Ademais, As mulleres islamitas palestinas teñen que incorporar todos os factores obxectivos sobre o terreo
ter en conta á hora de decidir se participar en política ou involucrarse no activismo político.
| setembro 19, 2010 | comentarios 0
Ocupación, colonialismo, apartheid?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (a saber, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, e
Gaza, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, e, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consulta, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. At the same time, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| setembro 07, 2010 | comentarios 0
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah faliq
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, adoita favorecer as ditaduras e os réximes de títeres que fan de boca en boca os valores democráticos e os dereitos humanos, a réplica de 9/11 verdadeiramente cimentou aínda máis os receos a través da posición de Estados Unidos sobre o islam político. Creou un muro de negatividade como atopou worldpublicopinion.org, segundo o cal 67% dos exipcios cren que a nivel mundial América está a desempeñar un papel "principalmente negativo"..
Así, a resposta de Estados Unidos foi axeitada. Ao elixir a Obama, moitos en todo o mundo están poñendo as súas esperanzas para desenvolver un menos belixerante, pero unha política exterior máis xusta cara ao mundo musulmán. A proba para Obama, como comentamos, é como Estados Unidos e os seus aliados promoven a democracia. Será facilitador ou impoñente?
Ademais, pode ser importante un corredor honesto en zonas prolongadas de confl ictos? Reclutando a experiencia e a percepción de prolifi
c estudosos, académicos, xornalistas e políticos experimentados, Arches Quarterly saca á luz a relación entre o Islam e a Democracia e o papel de América, así como os cambios provocados por Obama., na procura do terreo común. Anas Altikriti, o conselleiro delegado da Fundación Córdoba ofrece a táctica de apertura deste debate, onde reflexiona sobre as esperanzas e os retos que descansa no camiño de Obama. Seguindo Altikriti, o antigo conselleiro do presidente Nixon, O doutor Robert Crane ofrece unha análise exhaustiva do principio islámico do dereito á liberdade. Anwar Ibrahim, ex-vice-primeiro ministro de Malaisia, enriquece a discusión coas realidades prácticas da implantación da democracia nas sociedades dominantes musulmás, a saber, en Indonesia e Malaisia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, EUA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
| setembro 07, 2010 | comentarios 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henry Siegman
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| setembro 07, 2010 | comentarios 0
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 eleccións. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
| setembro 05, 2010 | comentarios 0
Islam e Democracia
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| setembro 04, 2010 | comentarios 0
Continuidade organizativa nos Irmáns Musulmáns de Exipto
Tess Lee Eisenhart
Como o movemento de oposición máis antigo e destacado de Exipto, a Sociedade de
Irmáns musulmáns, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, supuxo durante moito tempo un desafío aos sucesivos seculares
réximes ao ofrecer unha visión integral dun Estado islámico e unha ampla visión social
servizos asistenciais. Dende a súa fundación en 1928, a Irmandade (irmán) prosperou nun
sector relixioso e dos servizos sociais paralelos, en xeral evitando a confrontación directa con
réximes gobernantes.1 Máis recentemente durante as dúas últimas décadas, con todo, a Irmandade ten
incursionado co partidismo no ámbito político formal. Este experimento culminou
a elección dos oitenta e oito Irmáns á Asemblea Popular en 2005, a maior
bloque de oposición na historia moderna exipcia—e as detencións posteriores de case
1,000 Irmáns.2 O avance electoral na política dominante proporciona forraxe abundante
para que os estudiosos poñan a proba teorías e fagan predicións sobre o futuro do exipcio
réxime: recaerá na oposición islamita ou seguirá sendo un faro de laicismo no
mundo árabe?
Esta tese evita facer especulacións tan amplas. Pola contra, explora
a medida en que os Irmáns Musulmáns se adaptaron como organización no pasado
década.
| setembro 01, 2010 | comentarios 0
BETWEEN YESTERDAY AND TODAY
HASAN AL-BANNA
The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in it, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, e provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. O Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.
| Agosto 28, 2010 | comentarios 0
Democracy in Islamic Political Thought
Azzam S. Tamimi
Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, en 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, en 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.
| Agosto 27, 2010 | comentarios 0
Islamist Parties : why they can’t be democratic
Bassam Tibi
Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many
Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take
an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, posúe
become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on
clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam
and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate
consequences.
Intelligent discussion of Islamism, democracy, and Islam requires
clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into
confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after
thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and
democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious
reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what
I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-
Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment
of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.
In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds
this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is
that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty
because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.
Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment
upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of
all practical wisdom.
| Agosto 20, 2010 | comentarios 0
Islamist parties : Three kinds of movements
Tamara Cofman
Between 1991 e 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Hoxe, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
Nonetheless, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.
| Agosto 18, 2010 | comentarios 0
Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?
Emad El-Din Shahin
The voluminous literature on reform and democratization in the Middle East region reveals a number of facts: a main obstacle to reform is the incumbent regimes that have been trying to resist and circumvent genuine democratic transformations; political reform cannot be credible without integrating moderate Islamists in the process; and external actors (mainly the US and the EU) have not yet formulated a coherent approach to reform that could simultaneously achieve stability and democracy in the region. This paper explores the possibilities and implications of a European engagement with moderate Islamists on democracy promotion in the region. It argues that the EU approach to political reform in the Middle East region needs to be enhanced and linked to realities on the ground. Political reform cannot be effective without the integration of non-violent Islamic groups in a gradual, multifaceted process. It should be highlighted that the process of engagement is a risky one for both the EU and the Islamists, yet both stand to gain from a systematic dialogue on democracy. To reduce the risks, the engagement with political Islam should come within a broader EU strategy for democracy promotion in the region. Centrais, what the Islamists would expect from Europe is to maintain a
consistent and assertive stand on political reforms that would allow for a genuine representation of the popular will through peaceful means.
In this regard, a number of questions seem pertinent. Does the EU really need to engage political Islam in democratic reforms? Is political Islam ready for engagement and will it be willing to engage? How can an engagement policy be formulated on the basis of plausible implementation with minimal risks to the interests of the parties involved?
| Agosto 18, 2010 | comentarios 0
The Mismeasure of Political Islam
Martin Kramer
Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are the “extremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led by “moderates” or “reformists.” These “moderates” can be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.
| Agosto 18, 2010 | comentarios 0
Islamist Parties , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?
Tarek Masoud
Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. Ademais, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Por exemplo, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.
| Agosto 17, 2010 | comentarios 0
Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts, and Social Movements
Paul M. Lubeck
Bryana Britts
Cities are processes, not products. The three Islamic elements that set in motion the processes that give rise to Islamic cities were: a distinction between the members of the Umma and the outsiders, which led to juridical and spatial distinction by neighborhoods; the segregation of the sexes which gave rise to a particular solution to the question of spatial organization; and a legal system which, rather than imposing general regulations over land uses of various types in various places, left to the litigation of the neighbors the detailed adjudication of mutual rights over space and use. (Janet Abu Lughod 1987: 173)
Framing: Muslim Movements in Urban Situations We live in an intellectual moment when the complexity of the global Islamic
revival renders it difficult to generalize about Muslim institutions, social movements, and discursive practices. While diversity and locality remain paramount features of Muslim cities, globalization has inadvertently nurtured transnational Muslim networks from the homeland of Islam and extended them into the web of interconnected world cities. Quite opportunistically, urban-based
Muslim networks and insurrectionist movements now thrive in the interstitial spaces created by the new global communication and transportation infrastructures. What, then, are the long-term patterns for Muslims in cities? Since the last millennium, as Janet Abu-Lughod reminds us, “the Islamic city” has been the primary site for: defining power relations between ruler and subject, specifying the rights and identities of spatial communities, and regulating urban social relations between genders. Today’s Muslim city remains the epicenter of a burgeoning public sphere in which informed publics debate highly contested Islamic discourses regarding social justice,
| Agosto 06, 2010 | comentarios 0