Totes les entrades etiquetades amb: "Palestina"

Eleccions legislatives celebrades a Cisjordània i a la Franja de Gaza 2006 va portar al poder el moviment islamista Hamàs, que va passar a formar la majoria del Consell Legislatiu Palestí i també el primer govern majoritari de Hamàs. Aquestes eleccions van donar lloc al nomenament de la primera dona ministra de Hamàs, que esdevingué la ministra d'Afers de la Dona. Entre març 2006 i juny 2007, dues ministres diferents de Hamàs van assumir aquest càrrec, però a tots dos els va costar gestionar el ministeri, ja que la majoria dels seus empleats no eren membres de Hamàs sinó que pertanyien a altres partits polítics., i la majoria eren membres de Fatah, el moviment dominant que controla la majoria de les institucions de l'Autoritat Palestina. Un tens període de lluita entre les dones de Hamàs al Ministeri d'Afers de la Dona i les dones membres de Fatah va acabar després de la presa de poder per part de Hamàs a la Franja de Gaza i la consegüent caiguda del seu govern a Cisjordània: una lluita. que de vegades donava un gir violent. Una de les raons esmentades més tard per explicar aquesta lluita va ser la diferència entre el discurs feminista laic i el discurs islamista sobre els problemes de les dones.. En el context palestí, aquest desacord va adquirir un caràcter perillós ja que va servir per justificar la perpetuació de la cruenta lluita política., l'eliminació de les dones de Hamàs dels seus càrrecs o càrrecs, i les divisions polítiques i geogràfiques que hi havia en aquell moment tant a Cisjordània com a la Franja de Gaza ocupada.

Aquesta lluita planteja una sèrie de preguntes importants: hem de castigar el moviment islamista que ha arribat al poder, o hem de considerar les raons que van portar al fracàs de Fateh en l'àmbit polític? El feminisme pot oferir un marc integral per a les dones?, independentment de les seves afiliacions socials i ideològiques? Pot un discurs d'un punt en comú compartit per a les dones ajudar-les a realitzar i a consensuar els seus objectius comuns?? El paternalisme només està present en la ideologia islamista?, i no en nacionalisme i patriotisme? Què entenem per feminisme? Hi ha només un feminisme?, o diversos feminismes? Què entenem per islam – és el moviment conegut amb aquest nom o la religió, la filosofia, o l'ordenament jurídic? Hem d'anar al fons d'aquests problemes i considerar-los acuradament, i les hem de posar d'acord per després decidir, com a feministes, si la nostra crítica al paternalisme s'ha de dirigir a la religió (fe), que s'hauria de limitar al cor del creient i que no se'ls permeti prendre el control del món en general, o la jurisprudència, que es relaciona amb diferents escoles de fe que expliquen el sistema legal contingut a l'Alcorà i les dites del profeta – la Sunnah.

El Consell de Recerca en Ciències Humanes de Sud-àfrica va encarregar aquest estudi per provar la hipòtesi plantejada pel professor John Dugard en l'informe que va presentar al Consell de Drets Humans de l'ONU al gener. 2007, en la seva qualitat de relator especial de l'ONU sobre la situació dels drets humans als territoris palestins ocupats per Israel (és a dir, Cisjordània, inclosa Jerusalem Est, i

Gaza, d'ara endavant OPT). El professor Dugard va plantejar la pregunta: Israel està clarament en ocupació militar dels TPO. Al mateix temps, elements de l'ocupació constitueixen formes de colonialisme i d'apartheid, que són contraris al dret internacional. Quines són les conseqüències legals d'un règim d'ocupació prolongada amb trets de colonialisme i apartheid per al poble ocupat?, la potència ocupant i tercers estats?

Per tenir en compte aquestes conseqüències, aquest estudi es va proposar examinar legalment les premisses de la pregunta del professor Dugard: Israel és l'ocupant dels TPO, i, si és així, elements de la seva ocupació d'aquests territoris equivalen a colonialisme o apartheid? Sud-àfrica té un interès evident en aquestes preguntes donada la seva amarga història d'apartheid, que va comportar la negació de l'autodeterminació

a la seva població majoritària i, durant la seva ocupació de Namíbia, l'extensió de l'apartheid a aquell territori que Sud-àfrica pretenia efectivament colonitzar. Aquestes pràctiques il·legals no s'han de reproduir en cap altre lloc: els altres pobles no han de patir com han patit les poblacions de Sud-àfrica i Namíbia.

Per explorar aquestes qüestions, es va reunir un equip internacional d'estudiosos. L'objectiu d'aquest projecte era examinar la situació des de la perspectiva no partidista del dret internacional, en lloc de participar en el discurs polític i la retòrica. Aquest estudi és el resultat d'un procés col·laboratiu d'investigació intensiva de quinze mesos, consulta, escriptura i revisió. Conclou i, és d'esperar, argumenta de manera persuasiva i demostra clarament que Israel, des 1967, ha estat el poder ocupant bel·ligerant als TPO, i que la seva ocupació d'aquests territoris s'ha convertit en una empresa colonial que implementa un sistema d'apartheid. L'ocupació bel·ligerant en si mateixa no és una situació il·legal: s'accepta com a possible conseqüència d'un conflicte armat. Al mateix temps, sota el dret dels conflictes armats (també conegut com a dret internacional humanitari), l'ocupació pretén ser només un estat de coses temporal. El dret internacional prohibeix l'annexió unilateral o l'adquisició permanent de territori com a conseqüència de l'amenaça o l'ús de la força.: en cas que això passi, cap Estat pot reconèixer o donar suport a la situació il·lícita resultant. En contrast amb l'ocupació, tant el colonialisme com l'apartheid són sempre il·legals i, de fet, es consideren infraccions especialment greus del dret internacional perquè són fonamentalment contraris als valors fonamentals de l'ordenament jurídic internacional.. El colonialisme viola el principi d'autodeterminació,

que la Cort Internacional de Justícia (ICJ) ha afirmat com "un dels principis essencials del dret internacional contemporani". Tots els estats tenen el deure de respectar i promoure l'autodeterminació. L'apartheid és un cas agreujat de discriminació racial, que es constitueix d'acord amb la Convenció internacional per a la repressió i el càstig del crim d'apartheid (1973,

d'ara endavant "Convenció de l'apartheid") per "actes inhumans comesos amb el propòsit d'establir i mantenir el domini d'un grup racial de persones sobre qualsevol altre grup racial de persones i oprimir-los sistemàticament".. La pràctica de l'apartheid, a més, és un crim internacional.

El professor Dugard en el seu informe al Consell de Drets Humans de l'ONU a 2007 va suggerir que es demanés a la CIJ una opinió consultiva sobre les conseqüències legals de la conducta d'Israel. Aquest dictamen consultiu, sens dubte, complementaria l'opinió que va emetre la CIJ 2004 sobre les conseqüències jurídiques de la construcció d'un mur als territoris palestins ocupats (d'ara endavant "l'opinió consultiva del Mur"). Aquest curs d'acció legal no esgota les opcions obertes a la comunitat internacional, ni tampoc els deures de tercers estats i organitzacions internacionals quan s'avaluen que un altre Estat es dedica a les pràctiques del colonialisme o l'apartheid..

In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 ha consolidat realment els recels a través de la posició dels Estats Units sobre l'islam polític. Ha creat un mur de negativitat tal com ha trobat worldpublicopinion.org, segons el qual 67% dels egipcis creuen que a nivell mundial Amèrica està jugant un paper "principalment negatiu"..

Per tant, la resposta dels Estats Units ha estat encertada. Amb l'elecció d'Obama, molts d'arreu del món estan tenint les seves esperances per desenvolupar un país menys bel·ligerant, però una política exterior més justa envers el món musulmà. La prova per a Obama, mentre comentem, és com Amèrica i els seus aliats promouen la democràcia. Serà facilitador o imposant?

A més, Pot ser important ser un corredor honest en zones prolongades de confl ictes? Reclutar l'experiència i la visió de prolifi

c estudiosos, acadèmics, periodistes i polítics experimentats, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, és a dir, in Indonesia and Malaysia.

We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, EUA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the

demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn

– membre del Sinn Féin que va suportar quatre anys de presó per activitats republicanes irlandeses i activista de Guildford 4 i Birmingham 6, reflexiona sobre el seu recent viatge a Gaza, on va presenciar l'impacte de la brutalitat i la injustícia contra els palestins.; Dr. Marie Breen-Smyth, El director del Centre per a l'Estudi de la Radicalització i la Violència Política Contemporània parla dels reptes de la investigació crítica del terror polític; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, escriptor i dramaturg, discuteix les perspectives de pau a Darfur; i, finalment, el periodista i activista dels drets humans Ashur Shamis mira de manera crítica la democratització i la politització dels musulmans d'avui.

We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. En resposta, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic

Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 eleccions. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Al mateix temps, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.

The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.

But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, en 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:

Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, Qui, en 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the

community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.

Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Between 1991 i 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. avui, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.

No obstant això, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question

accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.

Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.

The voluminous literature on reform and democratization in the Middle East region reveals a number of facts: a main obstacle to reform is the incumbent regimes that have been trying to resist and circumvent genuine democratic transformations; political reform cannot be credible without integrating moderate Islamists in the process; and external actors (mainly the US and the EU) have not yet formulated a coherent approach to reform that could simultaneously achieve stability and democracy in the region. This paper explores the possibilities and implications of a European engagement with moderate Islamists on democracy promotion in the region. It argues that the EU approach to political reform in the Middle East region needs to be enhanced and linked to realities on the ground. Political reform cannot be effective without the integration of non-violent Islamic groups in a gradual, multifaceted process. It should be highlighted that the process of engagement is a risky one for both the EU and the Islamists, yet both stand to gain from a systematic dialogue on democracy. To reduce the risks, the engagement with political Islam should come within a broader EU strategy for democracy promotion in the region. De fet, what the Islamists would expect from Europe is to maintain a

consistent and assertive stand on political reforms that would allow for a genuine representation of the popular will through peaceful means.

In this regard, a number of questions seem pertinent. Does the EU really need to engage political Islam in democratic reforms? Is political Islam ready for engagement and will it be willing to engage? How can an engagement policy be formulated on the basis of plausible implementation with minimal risks to the interests of the parties involved?

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a

form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?

One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has

begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.

This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look

like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are the “extremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led by “moderates” o “reformists.” These “moderates” can be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.

Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. A més, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,

our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.

But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Per exemple, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, i mantenir llaços organitzatius entre ells, és a dir, aquells partits que sorgeixen del MB internacional. Aquests inclouen l'organització mare egípcia (fundada a 1928), però també Hamàs, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Moviment d'Algèria per una societat pacífica, el Partit Islàmic iraquià, Grup Islàmic del Líban, i altres.