RSS所有帶有標籤的條目: "巴基斯坦"

伊斯蘭教與國家權力的形成

賽義德·禮薩·瓦利納斯爾

在 1979 穆罕默德·齊亞·哈克將軍, 巴基斯坦的軍事統治者, 宣布巴基斯坦將成為伊斯蘭國家. 伊斯蘭價值觀和規範將成為民族認同的基礎, 法律, 經濟, 和社會關係, 並將激發所有政策制定. 在 1980 馬哈蒂爾·穆罕默德, 馬來西亞新首相, 引入了一項類似的基礎廣泛的計劃,以將國家政策制定錨定在伊斯蘭價值觀中, 並使他的國家的法律和經濟實踐符合伊斯蘭教義. 為什麼這些統治者要為自己的國家選擇“伊斯蘭化”的道路? 曾經的世俗後殖民國家如何成為伊斯蘭化的代理人和“真正的”伊斯蘭國家的先兆?
自 1970 年代末至 1980 年代初以來,馬來西亞和巴基斯坦走上了一條與其他第三世界國家不同的獨特發展道路. 在這兩個國家,宗教身份被整合到國家意識形態中,以伊斯蘭價值觀為發展目標和進程提供信息.
這項工作還呈現了一幅非常不同的圖景,即伊斯蘭教與穆斯林社會中的政治之間的關係. 在馬來西亞和巴基斯坦, 是國家機構而不是伊斯蘭活動家 (那些主張對伊斯蘭教進行政治解讀的人; 也被稱為複興主義者或原教旨主義者) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, 更廣泛地說,文化和宗教如何服務於國家權力和發展的需要. 這裡的分析依賴於理論討論
在國家行為的社會科學以及文化和宗教在其中的作用. 更重要, 它從正在審查的案例中得出推論,以得出學科感興趣的更廣泛的結論.

巴基斯坦的伊斯蘭化

The Middle East Institute

自從 2007, 巴基斯坦, though not on the verge of becoming a failed state, nonetheless has been gripped by a series of interrelated crises. As the contributors to this volume demonstrate, Pakistan’s current travails have deep and tangled historical roots. They also demonstrate that Pakistan’s domestic situation historically has been influenced by, and has affected developments in neighboring countries as well as those farther afield.
The origins of many of Pakistan’s troubles today lie not just in the circumstances in which the state of Pakistan emerged, but in the manner in which various domestic political forces have defined and sought to advance their competing visions of the state since independence. Over the years, successive national political leaders, the military, and other actors have appropriated the symbols, 機構, tools of statecraft, and even the rhetoric of Pakistan’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in order to advance their own narrow agendas.
As the contributors emphasize, much of the present turmoil in Pakistan dates from the late 1970s, when the rise to power of General Zia ul Haq and his Islamization program intersected with the momentous events of 1979, most importantly, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
該 18 essays comprising this volume examine the tight interplay between these domestic and regional factors, discuss the key domestic and foreign policies adopted during the Zia years, and disclose the heavy cost that Pakistan and its people have borne as a consequence. Taken together, the essays present a grim, tragic account of the past 30 years — of a country’s founding creed violated, much of its resources misspent, and its social fabric rent. And they suggest an uncertain future. 同時, 然而, they point hopefully, if not confidently, to what Pakistan’s fragile civilian government must seek to reclaim and can achieve — provided that its leaders prove to be moderate, resourceful, and determined, and that the West (especially the United States) implements policies which support rather than undermine them.
In his Eid-ul-Azha Message to the Nation on October 24, 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared: “My message to you all is of hope, courage and confidence. Let us mobilize all our resources in a systematic and organized way and tackle the grave issues that confront us with grim determination and discipline worthy of a great nation.” More than a half-century has elapsed since Jinnah made this statement, yet the issues facing Pakistan are no less grave. One hopes that the current and next generation of Jinnah’s successors, together with Pakistan’s friends will be able to summon the necessary will and bolster the state’s capacity to deal with these issues effectively.

約旦和巴基斯坦伊斯蘭教教義的回教兄弟會

NEHA Sahgal

伊斯蘭行動主義的研究對社會運動理論是新的. 社會運動獎學金因其獨特的信仰性質而忽略了伊斯蘭運動。. 最近,學者們已經認識到,社會運動理論所概念化的競爭過程可以應用於伊斯蘭激進主義,以在這兩個研究領域中尋求理論上的完善。, 我考察了伊斯蘭運動根據政府政策採取的策略的變化. 各國採取了各種政策來控制伊斯蘭反對勢力的潮流. 一些州選擇使用令人壓抑的手段 (埃及, 喬丹之前 1989), 而其他人, 在他們歷史的不同時期都採用了寬鬆政策 (喬丹之後 1989, 巴基斯坦, 馬來西亞). 我考察了政府適應對伊斯蘭運動策略的影響。我認為適應對伊斯蘭運動策略的影響可能不同,這取決於隨後採取的寬鬆政策的性質。. 政府在與伊斯蘭反對派的脆弱關係中採用了兩種不同類型的寬鬆政策,即伊斯蘭化和自由化. 伊斯蘭化試圖通過提高國家和社會的宗教參與度來選擇運動。自由化允許運動在國家和社會層面上開展活動,而不必增加國家的宗教參與度1。. 伊斯蘭主義剝奪了伊斯蘭主義者的權力,而自由化則通過提供影響力來賦予他們權力.

伊斯蘭運動與暴力使用:

也先Kirdis

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儘管最近學術界和民眾都將注意力集中在暴力跨國伊斯蘭恐怖網絡上,伊斯蘭運動眾多. 這種多樣性給學者帶來了兩個難題. 第一個難題是要理解為什麼作為對世俗民族國家建立的反應而形成的面向家庭的伊斯蘭運動將其活動和目標轉移到多層跨國空間上. 第二個難題是要理解為什麼目標和目標相似的群體在“跨國”時採用不同的使用暴力或非暴力的策略。本文將要解決的兩個主要問題是: 為什麼伊斯蘭運動走向跨國? 和, 他們為何在跨國化時採取不同的形式? 第一, 我認為,跨國層面為伊斯蘭運動提供了新的政治場所,伊斯蘭運動在國內的主張受到限制. 第二, 我認為跨國化在跨國層面上為群體帶來了關於身份和主張的不確定性. 所採用的媒介, 即. 使用暴力與非暴力, 取決於跨國化的類型, 演員在跨國層面遇到, 和領導對運動下一步走向的解釋. 回答我的問題, 我來看四種情況: (1) 土耳其伊斯蘭教, (2) 穆斯林兄弟會, (3) 伊斯蘭祈禱團, 和 (4) 塔比吉·賈瑪(Tablighi Jamaat)