RSSが付けられているすべてのエントリー: "イスラム教徒"

イスラム立憲主義を求めて

Nadirsyahパンツ

While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. 例えば, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. として
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. しかし、, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
最初, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts

イスラム政治文化, 民主主義, 人権

て、Daniel E. 価格

イスラム教の権威を容易にすることを主張してきました, と矛盾する

西洋社会の価値観, 重要な政治的成果に大きく影響します

イスラム諸国では. この結果, 学者, コメンテーター, と政府

当局者はしばしば「イスラム原理主義」を次のように指摘します

自由民主主義に対するイデオロギーの脅威. このビュー, しかし、, 主に基づいています

テキストの分析について, イスラム政治理論, およびアドホック研究

個々の国の, 他の要因を考慮しない. それは私の主張です

イスラム教のテキストと伝統, 他の宗教のものと同じように,

さまざまな政治システムや政策をサポートするために使用できます. 国

具体的で記述的な研究は、私たちが役立つパターンを見つけるのに役立ちません

イスラム教と政治の間のさまざまな関係を説明します

イスラム世界の国々. したがって、, の研究への新しいアプローチ

イスラームと政治のつながりが求められている.
私は提案します, イスラームとの関係の厳密な評価を通じて,

民主主義, と国を超えたレベルでの人権, それが多すぎる

政治力としてのイスラムの力に重点が置かれている. 私が最初に

比較ケーススタディを使用する, 相互作用に関連する要因に焦点を当てています

イスラムグループと政権の間, 経済的影響, 民族の劈開,

と社会の発展, の影響の分散を説明する

8カ国の政治に関するイスラム教.

イスラム国 : なぜ、彼らは民主主義することはできません

私たちバッサム

イスラム主義の増大する魅力と地上での強さに注目する, たくさんの

西洋の学者や当局者は、何らかの方法をとるために把握してきました

それに対する包括的アプローチ. この願望に沿って, それは持っています

主張するという考えを却下するために、軽蔑的にファッショナブルになります

「アカデミック」としての明確で厳密な区別。イスラム教に関しては

と民主主義, この嘆かわしいファッションは不幸に満ちています

結果.

イスラム主義の知的な議論, 民主主義, とイスラム教は必要です

明確で正確な定義. 彼らがいなければ, 分析は崩壊します

混乱と政策決定は苦しむでしょう. 私自身の見解, 後に形成された

この問題に関する30年間の研究と考察, そのイスラム教と

民主主義は確かに互換性があります, ただし、特定の必要な宗教

改革が行われる. そのような改革を実現する傾向は何ですか

私は政治的イスラム教に欠けていると思います. アラブ人としての私自身の公言した関心-

イスラム教徒の民主主義の理論家および実践者—設立を促進することです

イスラム文明の範囲内の世俗的な民主主義の.

あまりにも頻繁に取り巻く混乱を取り除くのを助けるために

このトピック, 心に留めておくべきいくつかの基本的なポイントをレイアウトします. 最初は

それ, これまでのところ, 政治的イスラム教に対する西洋の慣行は誤りでした

彼らは十分に根拠のある評価の基盤を欠いているからです.

盲目的な運が介入しない限り, 評価よりも優れたポリシーはありません

それが基づいている. 適切な評価はの始まりです

すべての実用的な知恵.

政治的イスラムの誤った測定

マーティンクラマー

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderates” また “reformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.

ムスリム同胞団を自由化

モハメドFayezのFarahat

Firstly, we must note that some object to the very question over whether the Muslim Brotherhood is turning into a liberal force. The notion contains a crucial flaw, since religious groups cannot be assessed based on shifting ideological frameworks. 言い換えれば、, they argue that these groups be judged based on standards taking into consideration both the groups’ characteristics and the characteristics of the cultural framework in which they operate. Most likely, this reservation is due to the debate in the Arab and Islamic world over the relationship between liberalism and secularism, and the substantial overlap between the two concepts. At its essence, these people do not believe that the Islamist movements – including the social movements – have truly accepted secularism as a prerequisite of becoming a liberal movement. They argue that there is a limit to how far the Islamist movements can go with regards to secularism, and so we should not expect the Islamist movements to become completely liberal in the Western understanding of liberalism, since they will not give up their religious nature which distinguishes them from nonreligious political movements.
しかし、, with all due respect to this point of view, there are still others firmly believing in the compatibility of liberalism with a social movement retaining its religious character. One of the main prerequisites to transitioning from being a religious movement to a liberal religious movement is distinguishing between what is religious or evangelical, and what is political. This distinction is still lacking among many Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

エジプトでは高正午

Devika Parashar

F. Andy Messing


ムバラク大統領、エジプトの間の類似シャームハンマドレザーパフラヴィー、イランの退陣, 注目なっている. に 1979, prior to the notorious Islamic Revolution, which was instigated and controlled by radical Muslim cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the shah wielded personal and authoritarian power in a manner comparable to the dictators of the time: Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and earlier, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. These rulers brandished their power with little restraint, unencumbered by the rule of law and basically insensitive to the needs of their populace. 残念ながら, Hosni Mubarak alarmingly resembles these former dictators in social, 政治, economic and security issues. He is inadvertently pushing his country towards an Islamic revolution. As an earlier example, the shah of Iran slowly strangled his country by reigning with a heavy-hand through his unfettered security force. He narrowed the sociopolitical base of his government and distorted the economy by monopolistic actions. This modus operandi reflects Mr. Mubarak’s current regime, whose survival depends on his ability to reverse these trends. によると, 氏. Mubarak uses hisCentral Security Force,” that now consists of more than half of his entire military, to impose a measure of censorship on the mass media and ban most forms of political organization, activities and literary expression. Like the shah, he has established control over physical action, selectively executing opposition, imprisoning and exiling thousands of people who oppose his policies. Recently, the leading English language newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly reported an upsurge in deaths due to police brutality. Another Arab news source reported the barring of human-rights groups from attending secret military trials. Economically, 氏. Mubarak monopolistically privatizes the highly regulated Egyptian economy, fostering creation of an exclusive industrial bourgeoisie. He invites only pro-Mubarak businesses to work within his development schemes. Like the shah, he has alienated large sections of the public and private sectors, thus suppressing any real economic growth. Politically, 氏. Mubarak cracks down on civil participation, essentially repressing political opposition; while his lack of government transparency practically guarantees rife corruption throughout the 4 million strong bureaucracy. Equally important, is the lack of government response to crises. Al-Ahram Weekly reported 20 train crashes between 1995 and August 2006. In each case, the government formed an ineffectual and disorganized crisis-management council that failed to correct
the problem. As the government failed to meet the needs of its people, ムスリム同胞団 (al-Ikhwan) filled a void by establishing social services, such as health clinics and youth programs, to effectively respond to various situations. The first and best-known example of this was their mobilization after the 1992 earthquake struck Southern Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood provided disaster relief then, and continues to do so, thereby enhancing its traction. さらに, the Muslim Brotherhood has nonviolently taken control of 15 percent of major professional associations that form the greater part of Egypt’s middle class. In the most recent parliamentary election in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood presented the largest threat to Mr. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, securing an unprecedented 34 から 454 座席. They demonstrated their ability to draw support despite government opposition. 氏. Mubarak unwittingly nurtured the regrowth of the essentially Fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood by alienating segments of the Egyptian populace and eliminating soft-line opposition (such as the secular Wafd and al-Ghad parties). He must seek more innovative methods to remain in power. 例えば, Chile managed to open the economy and encourage free enterprise under Augusto Pinochet, even though his government was considered authoritarian. 氏. Mubarak must tap into the tremendous energy of the Egyptian people by increasing the pace of capitalization and democratization, thereby improving their standard of living. If he succeeds, 氏. Mubarak could eventually create a legacy for himself as an Arab leader who effectively modernized and democratized thiskeystonenation. In doing so, he would secure major assets such as the Suez Canal, Egypt’s oil production and tourism, for not only his country but for the global economy, while providing a positive example for the entire Muslim world. さらに, 米国. ability to deal with Egypt will be enhanced, and our aid to that country will become completely justified. But if Mr. Mubarak fails, his regime will fall to the same type of radical elements that claimed the shah’s government in 1979, creating compounded turmoil for Egypt and the world. Devika Parashar spent eight months in Egypt into 2007 and is a research assistant at the National Defense Council Foundation. F. Andy Messing, a retired Special Forces officer, is NDCF’s executive director and met with a Muslim Brotherhood Representative in Cairo in 1994. He has been to 27 conflict areas worldwide.


ハサンアルバンナ

Guilain Denoelcx

ハサン・アル・バンナは、ムスリム兄弟のムスリム同胞又は社会の創設者でした, 20世紀のthelargest、最も影響力のあるスンニ派の信仰復興組織. エジプトin1928で作成, ムスリム同胞団は、第一の質量をベースとなりました, 中東の世俗と西洋思想のopposethe優勢に公然と政治的な動き. 兄弟はtheseideasに現代世界におけるイスラム社会の崩壊の根を見ました, イスラム教徒の社会を降りかかっていた病気に対する解決策として、リターンtoIslamを提唱し、. アル・バンナのリーダーシップは、1930年代と1940年代に兄弟愛の見事な成長をcriticaltoました. 1950年代初めによります,枝はシリアに確立されていました, スーダン, ヨルダン. やがて, 運動の影響はinplaces遠く湾やイランなどの非アラブ諸国として感じられるでしょう, パキスタン, インドネシア, マレーシア. Drivingthis拡張は元に具現組織モデルの魅力でした, thebrotherhoodのエジプトベースセクション, そして、アル・バンナの著作の成功. いくつかの言語に翻訳, これらの記述は、イスラム世界全体でスンニ派の宗教活動家の二世代をhaveshaped.

政治と文明対話の約束

M日付. A. Muqtedar Khan

In response to Harvard Professor SamuelHuntington’s now infamous argument predicting afuture full of clashes between civilizations, the world’sliberals responded with a call for a civilizational dialogue.After 9/11, this call for a dialogue betweenIslam and the West has become even more urgent.The philosophical assumptions behind these dialoguesare not too difficult to discern. Islam and themodern West share a common Abrahamic traditionand their foundational sources; Islamic law and philosophyand Western enlightenment philosophy havecommon roots—Hellenistic reason and Biblical revelation.The two civilizations have a common past anda common future, particularly in the light of strongeconomic relations between the West and the Muslimworld and the growing presence of Islam in nearlyevery Western society.Because the future of the two civilizations is inseparable,any clash will be devastating to both, regardlessof the asymmetry of power. A clash between Islamand the modern West would be like a collisionbetween the present and the future for both. Islam isintegral to the future of the West and Islamic civilization’sreticence toward modernity is untenable.Eventually, the Muslim world will have to modernize,democratize, and recognize that its future, それも, isinterdependent. Neither the West nor the Muslimworld can imagine a mutually exclusive future.

ベルギーのムスリム同胞団

スティーブマーリー,
上級アナリスト


The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. 例えば, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 年. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,この文脈では, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

イスラム動員

ジアドマンソン

This article examines the emergence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood inEgypt from the 1930s through the 1950s. It begins by outlining and empirically evaluatingpossible explanations for the organization’s growth based on (1) theories of politicalIslam and (2) the concept of political opportunity structure in social movementtheory. An extension of these approaches is suggested based on data from organizationaldocuments and declassiŽed U.S. State Department Žles from the period. Thesuccessful mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the wayin which its Islamic message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, andstrategies and the everyday lives of Egyptians. The analysis suggests that ideas areintegrated into social movements in more ways than the concept of framing allows.It also expands our understanding of how organizations can arise in highly repressiveenvironments.

The 500 最も影響力のイスラム教徒

scope

前書き
あなたが手にしている出版物は、私たちが望んでいるものの最初のものです
イスラム教徒の動きと揺りかごへの窓を提供する毎年恒例のシリーズ
世界. 私たちは、イスラム教徒として影響力のある人々を強調するために努力してきました, それ
は, 影響力がイスラム教の実践または事実に由来する人々
彼らがイスラム教徒であること. これにより、さまざまな分野について貴重な洞察が得られると考えています。
イスラム教徒が世界に与える影響, また、人々のやり方の多様性も示しています
今日もイスラム教徒として生きている.
影響力はトリッキーな概念です. その意味は、ラテン語の influens に由来します。
流入する意味, 目に見えない力という古い占星術のアイデアを指しています (以下のような
月) 人類に影響を与える. このリストの数字は、人類に影響を与える能力を持っています
それも. さまざまな方法で、このリストの各人物が影響力を持っています。
地球上の多くの人々の生活. The 50 最も影響力のある人物
プロファイリングされている. それらの影響はさまざまなソースから来ています; しかし、彼らは
それぞれが人類の広大な範囲に影響を与えるという事実によって統一されています.
その後、 500 にリーダー 15 カテゴリ-学術的に, 政治,
管理, 系統, 説教者, 女性, 若者, 慈善活動, 開発,
科学技術, 芸術と文化, メディア, ラジカル, 国際イスラム
ネットワーク, と今日の問題—さまざまな種類の理解を助けるために
イスラム教とイスラム教徒が今日の世界に与える影響.
影響力が異なる方法でどのように機能するかを示す 2 つの複合リスト: 国際的
イスラム ネットワークは、重要な多国籍組織のトップにいる人々を示しています。
イスラム教徒のネットワーク, また、Issues of the Day では、
重要性は、人類に影響を与える現在の問題によるものです.


この出版物は、イスラム世界の動きと揺るぎないものへの窓を提供する年次シリーズになることを私たちが望んでいるものの最初のものです.

私たちは、イスラム教徒として影響力のある人々を強調するために努力してきました, あれは, イスラム教の実践、またはイスラム教徒であるという事実から影響を受けている人々.

これにより、イスラム教徒が世界に与えるさまざまな影響について貴重な洞察が得られると考えています。, また、人々が今日のイスラム教徒としてどのように生きているかの多様性も示しています。.

影響力はトリッキーな概念です. その意味は、流入するという意味のラテン語 influens に由来します。, 目に見えない力という古い占星術のアイデアを指しています (月のように) 人類に影響を与える. このリストの数字は、人類にも影響を与える能力を持っています. このリストの各人は、さまざまな方法で、地球上の多数の人々の生活に影響を与えています。. The 50 最も影響力のある人物が紹介されています. それらの影響はさまざまなソースから来ています; しかし、それらはそれぞれが人類の膨大な範囲に影響を与えるという事実によって統一されています.

その後、 500 にリーダー 15 カテゴリ-学術的に, 政治, 管理, 系統, 説教者, 女性, 若者, 慈善活動, 開発, 科学技術, 芸術と文化, メディア, ラジカル, 国際イスラムネットワーク, 今日の問題—イスラム教とイスラム教徒が今日の世界に与えるさまざまな影響を理解するのに役立ちます.

影響力が異なる方法でどのように機能するかを示す 2 つの複合リスト: International Islamic Networks は、イスラム教徒の重要な国境を越えたネットワークの責任者である人々を示しています, そして今日の問題は、人類に影響を与える現在の問題のために重要である個人を強調します.