RSSTous les articles taggés avec: "Les musulmans"

À la recherche du constitutionnalisme islamique

Pantalon Nadirsyah

Alors que le constitutionnalisme en Occident est surtout identifié avec la pensée laïque, constitutionnalisme islamique, qui intègre certains éléments religieux, a suscité un intérêt croissant ces dernières années. For instance, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. Cependant, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
First, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts

La culture islamique politiques, Démocratie, et droits de l'homme

Daniel E. Prix

Il a été avancé que l'islam facilite l'autoritarisme, contredit le

valeurs des sociétés occidentales, et affecte de manière significative des résultats politiques importants

dans les pays musulmans. par conséquent, savants, commentateurs, et gouvernement

les responsables désignent fréquemment le «fondamentalisme islamique» comme le prochain

menace idéologique pour les démocraties libérales. Cette vue, cependant, est basé principalement

sur l'analyse des textes, Théorie politique islamique, et études ad hoc

de pays individuels, qui ne tiennent pas compte d'autres facteurs. C'est mon argument

que les textes et traditions de l'islam, comme ceux des autres religions,

peut être utilisé pour soutenir une variété de systèmes politiques et de politiques. De campagne

des études spécifiques et descriptives ne nous aident pas à trouver des modèles qui aideront

nous expliquons les relations variables entre l'islam et la politique à travers le

pays du monde musulman. D'où, une nouvelle approche de l'étude des

un lien entre l'islam et la politique est nécessaire.
je suggère, par une évaluation rigoureuse de la relation entre l'Islam,

la démocratie, et les droits de l'homme au niveau transnational, trop

l'accent est mis sur le pouvoir de l'islam en tant que force politique. Je l'ai fait en premier

utiliser des études de cas comparatives, qui se concentrent sur les facteurs liés à l'interaction

entre groupes et régimes islamiques, influences économiques, clivages ethniques,

et développement sociétal, pour expliquer la variance de l'influence de

L'Islam et la politique dans huit pays.

Les partis islamistes : pourquoi ils ne peuvent pas être démocratique

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate


Intelligent discussion of Islamism, la démocratie, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

cette, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

The Mismeasure of Political Islam

Martin Kramer

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderatesorreformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.

Liberalizing the Muslim Brotherhood

Farahat Fayez Mohamed

Firstly, we must note that some object to the very question over whether the Muslim Brotherhood is turning into a liberal force. The notion contains a crucial flaw, since religious groups cannot be assessed based on shifting ideological frameworks. In other words, they argue that these groups be judged based on standards taking into consideration both the groups’ characteristics and the characteristics of the cultural framework in which they operate. Most likely, this reservation is due to the debate in the Arab and Islamic world over the relationship between liberalism and secularism, and the substantial overlap between the two concepts. At its essence, these people do not believe that the Islamist movements – including the social movements – have truly accepted secularism as a prerequisite of becoming a liberal movement. They argue that there is a limit to how far the Islamist movements can go with regards to secularism, and so we should not expect the Islamist movements to become completely liberal in the Western understanding of liberalism, since they will not give up their religious nature which distinguishes them from nonreligious political movements.
Cependant, with all due respect to this point of view, there are still others firmly believing in the compatibility of liberalism with a social movement retaining its religious character. One of the main prerequisites to transitioning from being a religious movement to a liberal religious movement is distinguishing between what is religious or evangelical, and what is political. This distinction is still lacking among many Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

midi en Egypte

Devika Parashar

F. Andy Messing

Les parallèles entre le président égyptien Hosni Moubarak et le déposa Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi d'Iran, sont de capter l'attention. In 1979, prior to the notorious Islamic Revolution, which was instigated and controlled by radical Muslim cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the shah wielded personal and authoritarian power in a manner comparable to the dictators of the time: Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and earlier, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. These rulers brandished their power with little restraint, unencumbered by the rule of law and basically insensitive to the needs of their populace. Unfortunately, Hosni Mubarak alarmingly resembles these former dictators in social, political, economic and security issues. He is inadvertently pushing his country towards an Islamic revolution. As an earlier example, the shah of Iran slowly strangled his country by reigning with a heavy-hand through his unfettered security force. He narrowed the sociopolitical base of his government and distorted the economy by monopolistic actions. This modus operandi reflects Mr. Mubarak’s current regime, whose survival depends on his ability to reverse these trends. Accordingly, m. Mubarak uses hisCentral Security Force,” that now consists of more than half of his entire military, to impose a measure of censorship on the mass media and ban most forms of political organization, activities and literary expression. Like the shah, he has established control over physical action, selectively executing opposition, imprisoning and exiling thousands of people who oppose his policies. Récemment,, the leading English language newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly reported an upsurge in deaths due to police brutality. Another Arab news source reported the barring of human-rights groups from attending secret military trials. Economically, m. Mubarak monopolistically privatizes the highly regulated Egyptian economy, fostering creation of an exclusive industrial bourgeoisie. He invites only pro-Mubarak businesses to work within his development schemes. Like the shah, he has alienated large sections of the public and private sectors, thus suppressing any real economic growth. Politically, m. Mubarak cracks down on civil participation, essentially repressing political opposition; while his lack of government transparency practically guarantees rife corruption throughout the 4 million strong bureaucracy. Equally important, is the lack of government response to crises. Al-Ahram Weekly reported 20 train crashes between 1995 and August 2006. In each case, the government formed an ineffectual and disorganized crisis-management council that failed to correct
the problem. As the government failed to meet the needs of its people, les Frères musulmans (al-Ikhwan) filled a void by establishing social services, such as health clinics and youth programs, to effectively respond to various situations. The first and best-known example of this was their mobilization after the 1992 earthquake struck Southern Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood provided disaster relief then, and continues to do so, thereby enhancing its traction. Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood has nonviolently taken control of 15 percent of major professional associations that form the greater part of Egypt’s middle class. In the most recent parliamentary election in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood presented the largest threat to Mr. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, securing an unprecedented 34 out of 454 seats. They demonstrated their ability to draw support despite government opposition. m. Mubarak unwittingly nurtured the regrowth of the essentially Fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood by alienating segments of the Egyptian populace and eliminating soft-line opposition (such as the secular Wafd and al-Ghad parties). He must seek more innovative methods to remain in power. Par exemple, Chile managed to open the economy and encourage free enterprise under Augusto Pinochet, even though his government was considered authoritarian. m. Mubarak must tap into the tremendous energy of the Egyptian people by increasing the pace of capitalization and democratization, thereby improving their standard of living. If he succeeds, m. Mubarak could eventually create a legacy for himself as an Arab leader who effectively modernized and democratized thiskeystonenation. In doing so, he would secure major assets such as the Suez Canal, Egypt’s oil production and tourism, for not only his country but for the global economy, while providing a positive example for the entire Muslim world. en outre, États-Unis. ability to deal with Egypt will be enhanced, and our aid to that country will become completely justified. But if Mr. Mubarak fails, his regime will fall to the same type of radical elements that claimed the shah’s government in 1979, creating compounded turmoil for Egypt and the world. Devika Parashar spent eight months in Egypt into 2007 and is a research assistant at the National Defense Council Foundation. F. Andy Messing, a retired Special Forces officer, is NDCF’s executive director and met with a Muslim Brotherhood Representative in Cairo in 1994. He has been to 27 conflict areas worldwide.

Hasan Al-Banna

Guilain Denoelcx

Hasan al-Banna est le fondateur des Frères musulmans ou Société des Frères musulmans, thelargest et la plus influente organisation sunnite renouveau au 20e siècle. Created in Egypt in1928, the Muslim Brotherhood became the first mass-based, overtly political movement to opposethe ascendancy of secular and Western ideas in the Middle East. The brotherhood saw in theseideas the root of the decay of Islamic societies in the modern world, and advocated a return toIslam as a solution to the ills that had befallen Muslim societies. Al-Banna’s leadership was criticalto the spectacular growth of the brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s. By the early 1950s,branches had been established in Syria, Soudan, and Jordan. Soon, the movement’s influence would be felt inplaces as far away as the Gulf and non-Arab countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Indonésie, and Malaysia. Drivingthis expansion was the appeal of the organizational model embodied in the original, Egypt-based section of thebrotherhood, and the success of al-Banna’s writings. Translated into several languages, these writings haveshaped two generations of Sunni religious activists across the Islamic world.

The Politics and the Promise of Civilizational Dialogues

M. A. Muqtedar Khan

In response to Harvard Professor SamuelHuntington’s now infamous argument predicting afuture full of clashes between civilizations, the world’sliberals responded with a call for a civilizational dialogue.After 9/11, this call for a dialogue betweenIslam and the West has become even more urgent.The philosophical assumptions behind these dialoguesare not too difficult to discern. Islam and themodern West share a common Abrahamic traditionand their foundational sources; Islamic law and philosophyand Western enlightenment philosophy havecommon roots—Hellenistic reason and Biblical revelation.The two civilizations have a common past anda common future, particularly in the light of strongeconomic relations between the West and the Muslimworld and the growing presence of Islam in nearlyevery Western society.Because the future of the two civilizations is inseparable,any clash will be devastating to both, regardlessof the asymmetry of power. A clash between Islamand the modern West would be like a collisionbetween the present and the future for both. Islam isintegral to the future of the West and Islamic civilization’sreticence toward modernity is untenable.Eventually, the Muslim world will have to modernize,democratize, and recognize that its future, aussi, isinterdependent. Neither the West nor the Muslimworld can imagine a mutually exclusive future.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Belgium

Steve Merley,
Analyste principal

The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. Par exemple, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 ans. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,dans ce contexte, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.


Ziad Munson

This article examines the emergence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood inEgypt from the 1930s through the 1950s. It begins by outlining and empirically evaluatingpossible explanations for the organization’s growth based on (1) theories of politicalIslam and (2) the concept of political opportunity structure in social movementtheory. An extension of these approaches is suggested based on data from organizationaldocuments and declassiŽed U.S. State Department Žles from the period. Thesuccessful mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the wayin which its Islamic message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, andstrategies and the everyday lives of Egyptians. The analysis suggests that ideas areintegrated into social movements in more ways than the concept of framing allows.It also expands our understanding of how organizations can arise in highly repressiveenvironments.

Le 500 Les plus influents des musulmans


La publication que vous avez entre les mains est la première de ce que nous espérons
série annuelle qui offre une fenêtre sur les acteurs et les secoueurs du musulman
monde. Nous avons cherché à mettre en évidence les personnes qui ont de l'influence que les musulmans, cette
est, les personnes dont l'influence découle de leur pratique de l'islam ou du fait
qu'ils sont musulmans. Nous pensons que cela donne un aperçu précieux des différents
l'impact des musulmans sur le monde, et montre également la diversité de la façon dont les gens
vivent en tant que musulmans aujourd'hui.
L'influence est un concept délicat. Sa signification dérive du mot latin influens
sens à affluer, pointant vers une vieille idée astrologique selon laquelle des forces invisibles (comme le
lune) affecter l'humanité. Les chiffres de cette liste ont la capacité d'affecter l'humanité
aussi. Chaque personne figurant sur cette liste a une influence sur la
la vie d'un grand nombre de personnes sur terre. Le 50 personnalités les plus influentes
sont profilés. Leur influence provient de diverses sources; comme ils sont
unifiés par le fait qu'ils affectent chacun d'énormes pans de l'humanité.
Nous avons ensuite rompu le 500 leaders en 15 catégories: savant, Politique,
Administratif, Lignée, Prédicateurs, Femmes, Jeunesse, Philanthropie, Développement,
Science et technologie, Arts et culture, Médias, Radicaux, International islamique
Réseaux, et questions du jour - pour vous aider à comprendre les différents types de
l'impact de l'islam et des musulmans sur le monde d'aujourd'hui.
Deux listes composites montrent comment l'influence fonctionne de différentes manières: International
Les réseaux islamiques montrent des personnes qui sont à la tête d'importantes
réseaux de musulmans, et Enjeux du jour met en lumière les personnes dont
l'importance est due aux problèmes actuels qui affectent l'humanité.

La publication est la première de ce que nous espérons être une série annuelle qui offre une fenêtre sur les acteurs du monde musulman..

Nous avons cherché à mettre en évidence les personnes qui ont de l'influence que les musulmans, C'est, les personnes dont l'influence découle de leur pratique de l'islam ou du fait qu'elles sont musulmanes.

Nous pensons que cela donne un aperçu précieux des différentes façons dont les musulmans ont un impact sur le monde, et montre également la diversité de la façon dont les gens vivent en tant que musulmans aujourd'hui.

L'influence est un concept délicat. Sa signification dérive du mot latin qui influence le sens de l'écoulement, pointant vers une vieille idée astrologique selon laquelle des forces invisibles (comme la lune) affecter l'humanité. Les chiffres de cette liste ont également la capacité d'affecter l'humanité. De différentes manières, chaque personne de cette liste a une influence sur la vie d'un grand nombre de personnes sur terre. Le 50 les personnages les plus influents sont profilés. Leur influence provient de diverses sources; Cependant, ils sont unifiés par le fait qu'ils affectent chacun d'énormes pans de l'humanité.

Nous avons ensuite rompu le 500 leaders en 15 catégories: savant, Politique, Administratif, Lignée, Prédicateurs, Femmes, Jeunesse, Philanthropie, Développement, Science et technologie, Arts et culture, Médias, Radicaux, Réseaux islamiques internationaux, et Questions du jour - pour vous aider à comprendre les différents types d’impact de l’islam et des musulmans sur le monde d’aujourd’hui.

Deux listes composites montrent comment l'influence fonctionne de différentes manières: International Islamic Networks montre des personnes qui sont à la tête d'importants réseaux transnationaux de musulmans, et Questions du jour met en lumière des personnes dont l'importance est due aux problèmes actuels qui affectent l'humanité.