RSSEntries Tagged Kwa: "muslim"

Arab Kesho

Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'

Oktoba 6, 1981, Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan' 1973 Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan',Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.,moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.. moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.. moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.. moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., na hisia yangu ya wajibu wa uandishi wa habari ilinisukuma kwenda kujua kama Sadat alikuwa hai au amekufa.

amani Marekani Hamas sera vitalu Mashariki ya Kati

Henry Siegman


Imeshindwa mazungumzo baina ya nchi zaidi ya hizi siku za nyuma 16 Miaka umeonyesha kuwa Mashariki ya Kati amani wa haiwezi kufikiwa na vyama vya wenyewe. Serikali za Israel zinaamini kuwa zinaweza kukaidi lawama za kimataifa za mradi wao haramu wa ukoloni katika Ukingo wa Magharibi kwa sababu wanaweza kutegemea Marekani kupinga vikwazo vya kimataifa.. Mazungumzo baina ya nchi mbili ambayo hayajaandaliwa na vigezo vilivyoundwa na Marekani (kwa kuzingatia maazimio ya Baraza la Usalama, makubaliano ya Oslo, Mpango wa Amani wa Kiarabu, "ramani ya barabara" na makubaliano mengine ya hapo awali ya Israeli na Palestina) haiwezi kufanikiwa. Serikali ya Israel inaamini kwamba Bunge la Marekani halitamruhusu rais wa Marekani kutoa vigezo hivyo na kutaka kukubalika kwao. Kuna matumaini gani kwa mazungumzo ya pande mbili ambayo yataanza tena huko Washington DC mnamo Septemba 2 inategemea kabisa na Rais Obama kuthibitisha imani hiyo kuwa si sahihi, na kama "mapendekezo ya kuweka madaraja" ambayo ameahidi, iwapo mazungumzo yatafikia mkwamo, ni neno la kusisitiza kwa uwasilishaji wa vigezo vya Amerika. Mpango kama huo wa Marekani lazima uipe Israeli uhakikisho wa vazi la chuma kwa usalama wake ndani ya mipaka yake ya kabla ya 1967., lakini wakati huo huo lazima iweke wazi hakikisho hizi hazipatikani ikiwa Israel itasisitiza kuwanyima Wapalestina taifa linaloweza kujitawala katika Ukingo wa Magharibi na Gaza.. Karatasi hii inazingatia kikwazo kingine kikubwa kwa makubaliano ya hali ya kudumu: kutokuwepo kwa interlocutor yenye ufanisi wa Palestina. Kushughulikia malalamiko halali ya Hamas - na kama ilivyobainishwa katika ripoti ya hivi majuzi ya CENTCOM, Hamas ina malalamiko halali - inaweza kusababisha kurejea kwa serikali ya mseto ya Palestina ambayo itaipatia Israel mshirika wa amani anayeaminika.. Ikiwa mawasiliano hayo yatashindwa kwa sababu ya kukataliwa kwa Hamas, uwezo wa shirika kuzuia mwafaka unaojadiliwa na vyama vingine vya kisiasa vya Palestina utakuwa umezuiliwa kwa kiasi kikubwa.. Ikiwa utawala wa Obama hautaongoza mpango wa kimataifa wa kufafanua vigezo vya makubaliano ya Israeli na Palestina na kuendeleza kikamilifu maridhiano ya kisiasa ya Palestina., Ulaya lazima kufanya hivyo, na natumai Amerika itafuata. Kwa bahati mbaya, hakuna risasi ya fedha inayoweza kuthibitisha lengo la “majimbo mawili kuishi bega kwa bega kwa amani na usalama.”
Lakini kozi ya sasa ya Rais Obama inaizuia kabisa.

Uislam upya

Matta Azzam

Kuna siasa na usalama mgogoro jirani kile ni inajulikana kama Uislam, mgogoro ambao utangulizi Hutangulia muda 9/11. Katika kipindi cha 25 miaka, kumekuwa na msisitizo tofauti juu ya jinsi ya kuelezea na kupambana Uislam. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji., imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji..
imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji., imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Julai 2005 ilidhihirika zaidi kuwa baadhi ya vijana walikuwa wakisisitiza kujitolea kwa kidini kama njia ya kudhihirisha ukabila. Uhusiano kati ya Waislamu kote ulimwenguni na mtazamo wao kwamba Waislamu wako hatarini kumesababisha watu wengi katika sehemu mbali mbali za dunia kuunganisha matatizo yao ya ndani na kuwa Waislamu wengi zaidi., kuwa na kitambulisho kitamaduni, ama kimsingi au sehemu, na Uislamu unaojulikana kwa mapana.

Iraq na Baadaye ya Uislamu wa Kisiasa

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Uislamu na Uhalifu wa chuki dhidi ya Waislamu

Jonathan GITHENS-MAZER

Robert Lambert MBE

The perils of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime threaten to undermine basic human rights, fundamental aspects of citizenship and co-existing partnerships for Muslims and non- Muslims alike in contemporary Europe. Routine portrayals of Islam as a religion of hatred, violence and inherent intolerance have become key planks for the emergence of extremist nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe – planks which seek to exploit populist fears and which have the potential to lead to Muslim disempowerment in Europe. Sections of the media have created a situation where the one serves to heighten the unfounded claims and anxieties of the other – such that politicians from Austria to the Britain, and the Netherlands to Spain, feel comfortable in using terms like “Tsunamis of Muslim immigration”, and accuse Islam of being a fundamental threat to a “European way of life”. While in many cases, the traction of this populist approach reflects an ignorance of Islamic faith, practice and belief, there are many think-tanks which are currently engaged in promoting erroneous depictions of Islam and Muslim political beliefs through unsubstantiated and academically baseless studies, and a reliance on techniques such as ‘junk-polling’. Prior to researching Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime in London, we worked with Muslim Londoners to research the contested notion of what is widely termed by academics and policy makers as “violent radicalisation” (Githens-Mazer, 2010, Lambert 2010). To a large extent it was that prior research experience that persuaded us to embark on this new project. That is to say, there is an important link between the two areas
of work which we should explain at the outset. Since 9/11 Muslim Londoners, no less than Muslims in towns and cities across Europe, have often been unfairly stigmatised as subversive threats to state security and social cohesion, sometimes characterised as a fifth column (Cox and Marks 2006, Gove 2006, Mayer and Frampton 2009). We do not suggest that this stigmatisation did not exist before 9/11, still less do we argue that it revolves solely around the issues of security and social cohesion, but we do claim that the response to 9/11 – ‘the war on terror’ – and much of the rhetoric that has surrounded it has played a significant part in increasing the public perception of European Muslims as potential enemies rather than potential partners and neighbours.

Mizizi Ya Utaifa Katika Ulimwengu Wa Kiislamu

Shabir Ahmed

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. Kwa kweli, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Zaidi ya hayo, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Arab, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Kwa mfano, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Rather, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

Demokrasia katika Mawazo ya Kisiasa ya Kiislamu

Azzam S. Tamimi

Demokrasia imewashughulisha wanafikra wa kisiasa wa Kiarabu tangu mwanzo wa mwamko wa kisasa wa Waarabu yapata karne mbili zilizopita.. Tangu wakati huo, dhana ya demokrasia imebadilika na kukuzwa chini ya ushawishi wa aina mbalimbali za maendeleo ya kijamii na kisiasa.Mjadala wa demokrasia katika fasihi ya Kiislamu ya Kiarabu unaweza kufuatiliwa nyuma hadi Rifa'a Tahtawi., baba wa demokrasia ya Misri kulingana na Lewis Awad,[3] ambaye muda mfupi baada ya kurejea Cairo kutoka Paris alichapisha kitabu chake cha kwanza, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, ndani 1834. Kitabu hiki kilifanya muhtasari wa uchunguzi wake wa adabu na desturi za Wafaransa wa kisasa,[4] na kusifu dhana ya demokrasia kama alivyoiona Ufaransa na huku akishuhudia utetezi na utetezi wake kupitia 1830 Mapinduzi dhidi ya Mfalme Charles X.[5] Tahtawi alijaribu kuonyesha kwamba dhana ya kidemokrasia aliyokuwa akiwaeleza wasomaji wake ilikuwa inaendana na sheria ya Uislamu.. Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu:
Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu, Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu, Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu . . . Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu, Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu. Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu: Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu[6] Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu (1810- 99), Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu, Alilinganisha wingi wa kisiasa na aina za wingi wa kiitikadi na kifiqhi zilizokuwepo katika uzoefu wa Kiislamu, ndani 1867, alitengeneza mpango wa jumla wa mageuzi katika kitabu kiitwacho Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al.- kurudi (Njia Iliyo Nyooka ya Kurekebisha Serikali). Kushughulishwa kuu kwa kitabu hicho ilikuwa katika kushughulikia suala la mageuzi ya kisiasa katika ulimwengu wa Kiarabu. Huku akitoa wito kwa wanasiasa na wasomi wa wakati wake kutafuta njia zote zinazowezekana ili kuboresha hadhi ya
jamii na kuendeleza ustaarabu wake, alionya umma wa Kiislamu kwa ujumla dhidi ya kuepuka uzoefu wa mataifa mengine kwa msingi wa dhana potofu kwamba maandishi yote., uvumbuzi, uzoefu au mitazamo ya wasio Waislamu inapaswa kukataliwa au kupuuzwa.
Khairuddin zaidi alitoa wito wa kukomeshwa kwa utawala wa utimilifu, ambayo alilaumu kwa ukandamizaji wa mataifa na uharibifu wa ustaarabu.

Islamic Culture Political, Demokrasia, na Haki za Binadamu

Daniel E. Bei

Imesemekana kwamba Uislamu kuwezesha ubabe, inapingana na

maadili ya jamii za Magharibi, na inaathiri sana matokeo muhimu ya kisiasa
katika mataifa ya Waislamu. Kwa hiyo, wasomi, wachambuzi, na serikali
maafisa mara nyingi huelekeza kwa '' misingi ya Kiislam '' kama inayofuata
tishio la kiitikadi kwa demokrasia za huria. Mtazamo huu, hata hivyo, inategemea kimsingi
juu ya uchambuzi wa maandishi, Nadharia ya kisiasa ya Kiislamu, na masomo ya muda
ya nchi binafsi, ambazo hazizingatii mambo mengine. Ni ubishi wangu
kwamba maandiko na mila ya Uislamu, kama zile za dini zingine,
inaweza kutumika kusaidia mifumo na sera anuwai za kisiasa. Nchi
masomo maalum na ya kuelezea hayatusaidii kupata mifumo ambayo itasaidia
tunaelezea uhusiano tofauti kati ya Uislamu na siasa kote
nchi za ulimwengu wa Kiislamu. Kwa hivyo, mbinu mpya ya utafiti wa
uhusiano kati ya Uislamu na siasa unahitajika.
ninashauri, kupitia tathmini kali ya uhusiano kati ya Uislamu,
demokrasia, na haki za binadamu katika ngazi ya kitaifa, hiyo sana
mkazo umewekwa juu ya nguvu ya Uislamu kama nguvu ya kisiasa. Mimi kwanza
tumia masomo ya kulinganisha, ambayo huzingatia mambo yanayohusiana na mwingiliano
kati ya vikundi vya Kiislamu na tawala, ushawishi wa kiuchumi, machafuko ya kikabila,

na maendeleo ya jamii, kuelezea utofauti katika ushawishi wa

Uislamu juu ya siasa katika mataifa manane.

IMANI YA KIISLAMU nchini AMERIKA

JAMES A. Beverley

AMERICA BEGINS A NEW MILLENNIUM AS ONE OF THE MOST RELIGIOUSLY diverse nations of all time. Nowhere else in the world do so many people—offered a choice free from government influence—identify with such a wide range of religious and spiritual communities. Nowhere else has the human search for meaning been so varied. In America today, there are communities and centers for worship representing all of the world’s religions.
The American landscape is dotted with churches, temples, synagogues, and mosques. Zen Buddhist zendos sit next to Pentecostal tabernacles. Hasidic Jews walk the streets with Hindu swamis. Most amazing of all, relatively little conflict has occurred among religions in America. This fact, combined with a high level of tolerance of each other’s beliefs and practices, has let America produce people of goodwill ready to try to resolve any tensions that might emerge. The Faith in America series celebrates America’s diverse religious heritage.
People of faith and ideals who longed for a better world have created a unique society where freedom of religious expression is a keynote of culture. The freedom that America offers to people of faith means that not only have ancient religions found a home
hapa, but that newer ways of expressing spirituality have also taken root. From huge churches in large cities to small spiritual communities in towns and villages, faith in America has never been stronger. The paths that different religions have taken through
American history is just one of the stories readers will find in this series. Like anything people create, religion is far from perfect. Hata hivyo, its contribution to the culture and its ability to help people are impressive, and these accomplishments will be found in all the books in the series. Wakati huo huo, awareness and tolerance of the different paths our neighbors take to the spiritual life has become an increasingly important part of citizenship in America.
Leo, more than ever, America as a whole puts its faith in freedom—the freedom to believe.

Vyama vya Kiisilamu : kurudi kwenye asili

Husain Haqqani

Hillel Fradkin

How should we understand the emergence and the nature of Islamist parties? Can they reasonably be expected not just to participate in democratic politics but even to respect the norms of liberal democracy? These questions lie at the heart of the issues that we have been asked to address.
In our view, any response that is historically and thus practically relevant must begin with the following observation: Until very recently, even the idea of an Islamist party (let alone a democratic Islamist party) would have seemed, from the perspective of Islamism itself, a paradox if not a contradiction in terms. Islamism’s original conception of a healthy Islamic political life made no room for—indeed rejected—any role for parties of any sort. Islamist groups described themselves as the vanguard of Islamic revival, claiming that they represented the essence of Islam and reflected the aspiration of the global umma (community of believers) for an Islamic polity. Pluralism, which is a precondition for the operation of political parties, was rejected by most Islamist political
thinkers as a foreign idea.
As should be more or less obvious, the novelty not only of actually existing Islamist parties but of the very idea of such parties makes it exceptionally difficult to assess their democratic bona fides. But this difficulty merely adds another level of complication to a problem that stems from the very origins of Islamism and its conception of the true meaning of Islam and of Islam’s relationship to political life

Wageuza Wajerumani kwenda Uisilamu na Mahusiano yao ya Kinyume na Waislamu wahamiaji

Esra Ozyurek

“I would never have become a Muslim if I had met Muslims before I met Islam.” I heard these words over and over again during my yearlong ethnographic research among ethnic German converts to Islam in Berlin.1 The first time, it was uttered by a self-declared German imam who had converted to Islam while trying to convert Arabs and Turks to Christianity. The second time, the speaker was a twenty-five-year-old former East German woman who came to Islam through her Bosnian boyfriend, whose family never accepted her. The third time, the comment was made by a fifty-year-old man who converted to Islam about thirty years ago after meeting Iranians who came to Europe to collect money and organize for the Iranian revolution. After that I stopped counting. Although all of the several dozen German converts I talked to (and the dozens of converts whose narratives I read on the internet) claim that they embraced Islam in a context of significant personal relationships with Muslims,2 a substantial portion of German Muslims are quite discontented with born Muslims, especially those of immigrant backgrounds. This paper is an attempt to comprehend the paradoxical feelings of love and hate for Islam and Muslims that many German Muslims experience. My aim in exploring this issue is to understand what it takes to be a (supposed) Islamophile in a political and social context that is highly Islamophobic.

CHAGUA BIBLIA JUU YA UISLAMU NA DEMOKRASIA

Saliba Sarsar

Alexander Keller

Democracy is highly promoted and sought these days but its principles are hard to practice and protect. Once secured, hata hivyo, it generates real life in human communities. Its sunrises provide energy to freedom and growth to civil society and culture, while its sunsets store energy to sustain deliberative citizenship and liberty and bridge past accomplishments to future aspirations.
Hata hivyo, what do we mean by democracy? Are there perfect democratic societies around the world? Are democracy’s rays likely to shine on all landscapes? Is Muslim culture hospitable to deepening democracy’s impact? Do Muslims have a different understanding of democracy? If democracy is the preferred goal, how can democracy’s supporters move democratization forward in Muslim countries?
What we know is that no “one model fits all environments” exists. The journey of democracy is a “generational initiative” that must carefully consider internal and external dynamics. If Muslims, like others, wish to promote democracy, then they can detect their country’s place on the democratic terrain and determine how best to improve their practices and standing at home and abroad given their culture, historical experiences, resources, and vision for the future.
This select bibliography is designed to help all those interested in understanding the link between Islam and Muslims on the one hand and democracy on the other. It consists of over 100 entries, divided among books, articles, presentations, and reports; government sources; and institutes and organizations.

Udugu wa Waislam huko Jordan

The Islamic movement in Jordan came to international attention in thewake of the April 1989 disturbances and the subsequent November 1989 uchaguzi wa wabunge. These developments highlighted the movement’s political clout and raised the spectre in the West of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Jordan, fuelled by radical Islamic movements such as those of Egypt and the Maghrib. While various political trends competed for influence during the months prior to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear advantage; its infrastructure in the mosques, the Qur’anicschools and the universities gave it a ready-made political base. The leftistand pro-regime groups, on the other hand, had to create de facto politicalparties—still legally banned—and to build their organizational base almostex nihilo, or to transform a clandestine infrastructure into an overt politicalone. There should have been very little surprise, kwa hiyo, when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist candidates won a windfall of 32 of the 80seats in Parliament.Politicization of Islam is not new in Jordan.1 Since the foundation of the Emirate of Trans jordan by ‘Abdallah, Islam has served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet’s tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been inthe Hijaz. The ideology of the “Great Arab Revolt” was no less Islamic than it was Arab, and the control of Jerusalem after 1948 was interpretedby the regime as an Islamic responsibility and not only an Arab one.2King ‘Abdallah and his grandson Hussein, took care to present themselvesas believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs.3The status of Islam in the Kingdom was also formalized in the Jordanian constitution (1952) by stipulating that Islam is the religion of the kingdom and that the king must be a Muslim and of Muslim parents. Islamic law(Shari‘a) is defined in the constitution as one of the pillars of legislation in the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the Shari‘a courts.

Kudai Kituo hicho: Uislamu wa Kisiasa Katika Mpito

John L. Esposito

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Uturuki, Iran, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

KUPANDA KWA “DEMOKRASI YA WAISLAMU”

Vali Nasr

A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Instead, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Islamic law) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

TAASISI ZA WAISLAMU NA UHAMASISHAJI WA SIASA

SARA SILVESTRI

In Europe, and most of the Western world, Muslim presence in the publicsphere is a recent phenomenon that characterised the last decade of the 20thcentury and has deeply marked the beginning of the 21st. This visiblepresence, which amounts to something between 15 na 20 millionindividuals, can best be analysed if dissected into a number of components.The first part of this chapter illustrates where, when and why organisedMuslim voices and institutions have emerged in Europe, and which actorshave been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.