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The Besok Arab

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktober 6, 1981, dimaksudkan untuk menjadi hari perayaan di Mesir. Ini menandai peringatan momen kemenangan terbesar Mesir dalam tiga konflik Arab-Israel, ketika tentara yang diunggulkan negara itu melintasi Terusan Suez pada hari-hari pembukaan 1973 Perang Yom Kippur dan mengirim pasukan Israel mundur. keren, pagi tak berawan, stadion Kairo penuh sesak dengan keluarga Mesir yang datang untuk melihat militer menopang perangkat kerasnya. Di stan peninjauan, Presiden Anwar el-Sadat,arsitek perang, menyaksikan dengan puas saat pria dan mesin berparade di hadapannya. Saya berada di dekatnya, koresponden asing yang baru tiba. Tiba-tiba, salah satu truk tentara berhenti tepat di depan tribun peninjauan tepat ketika enam jet Mirage menderu di atas dalam pertunjukan akrobatik, melukis langit dengan jejak merah panjang, kuning, ungu,dan asap hijau. Sadat berdiri, tampaknya bersiap untuk saling memberi hormat dengan satu lagi kontingen pasukan Mesir. Dia menjadikan dirinya target sempurna bagi empat pembunuh Islam yang melompat dari truk, menyerbu podium, dan membanjiri tubuhnya dengan peluru. Saat para pembunuh melanjutkan untuk apa yang tampak selamanya untuk menyemprot stand dengan api mematikan mereka, Saya mempertimbangkan sejenak apakah akan jatuh ke tanah dan berisiko diinjak-injak sampai mati oleh penonton yang panik atau tetap berjalan dan berisiko terkena peluru nyasar.. Naluri menyuruhku untuk tetap berdiri, dan rasa kewajiban jurnalistik saya mendorong saya untuk mencari tahu apakah Sadat masih hidup atau sudah mati.

US Hamas kebijakan blok perdamaian Timur Tengah

Henry Siegman


pembicaraan bilateral gagal selama masa lalu ini 16 tahun telah menunjukkan bahwa perdamaian kesepakatan Timur Tengah tidak pernah dapat dicapai oleh para pihak sendiri. Pemerintah Israel percaya bahwa mereka dapat menentang kecaman internasional atas proyek kolonial ilegal mereka di Tepi Barat karena mereka dapat mengandalkan AS untuk menentang sanksi internasional. Pembicaraan bilateral yang tidak dibingkai oleh parameter yang dirumuskan AS (berdasarkan resolusi Dewan Keamanan, kesepakatan Oslo, Inisiatif Perdamaian Arab, “peta jalan” dan perjanjian Israel-Palestina sebelumnya) tidak bisa berhasil. Pemerintah Israel percaya bahwa Kongres AS tidak akan mengizinkan seorang presiden Amerika untuk mengeluarkan parameter seperti itu dan menuntut penerimaan mereka. Apa harapan untuk pembicaraan bilateral yang dilanjutkan di Washington DC pada bulan September? 2 sepenuhnya bergantung pada Presiden Obama yang membuktikan bahwa kepercayaan itu salah, dan apakah "proposal menjembatani" yang dia janjikan, haruskah pembicaraan mencapai jalan buntu, adalah eufemisme untuk penyerahan parameter Amerika. Inisiatif AS semacam itu harus menawarkan jaminan berlapis besi kepada Israel untuk keamanannya di dalam perbatasan pra-1967, tetapi pada saat yang sama harus memperjelas bahwa jaminan ini tidak tersedia jika Israel bersikeras menyangkal Palestina sebagai negara yang layak dan berdaulat di Tepi Barat dan Gaza.. Makalah ini berfokus pada hambatan utama lainnya untuk perjanjian status permanen: tidak adanya lawan bicara Palestina yang efektif. Mengatasi keluhan sah Hamas – dan seperti yang dicatat dalam laporan CENTCOM baru-baru ini, Hamas memiliki keluhan yang sah – dapat mengarah pada pengembaliannya ke pemerintahan koalisi Palestina yang akan memberi Israel mitra perdamaian yang kredibel. Jika penjangkauan itu gagal karena penolakan Hamas, kemampuan organisasi untuk mencegah kesepakatan wajar yang dinegosiasikan oleh partai politik Palestina lainnya akan sangat terhambat. Jika pemerintahan Obama tidak akan memimpin inisiatif internasional untuk menentukan parameter kesepakatan Israel-Palestina dan secara aktif mempromosikan rekonsiliasi politik Palestina, Eropa harus melakukannya, dan berharap Amerika akan mengikuti. Sayangnya, tidak ada peluru perak yang dapat menjamin tujuan “dua negara yang hidup berdampingan dalam damai dan keamanan.”
Tapi jalan Presiden Obama saat ini benar-benar menghalanginya.

Islamisme revisited

MAHA Azzam

Ada krisis politik dan keamanan sekitarnya apa yang disebut sebagai Islamisme, krisis yang pendahulunya lama mendahului 9/11. Selama masa lalu 25 tahun, ada penekanan yang berbeda tentang bagaimana menjelaskan dan memerangi Islam. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Juli 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Irak dan Masa Depan Islam Politik

James Piscatori

Enam puluh lima tahun yang lalu salah satu ulama besar Islam modern menanyakan pertanyaan sederhana, "Ke Mana Islam?", mana dunia Islam akan? Itu adalah waktu kekacauan intens baik di Barat dan dunia Muslim - runtuhnya imperialisme dan kristalisasi dari sebuah sistem negara baru di luar Eropa; penciptaan dan pengujian neo- Wilsonian dunia ketertiban dalam Liga Bangsa-Bangsa; munculnya fasisme Eropa. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, sekularisme, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(sebuah) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islamophobia dan Kejahatan Hate Anti-Muslim

JONATHAN GITHENS-Mazer

ROBERT Lambert MBE

The perils of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime threaten to undermine basic human rights, fundamental aspects of citizenship and co-existing partnerships for Muslims and non- Muslims alike in contemporary Europe. Routine portrayals of Islam as a religion of hatred, violence and inherent intolerance have become key planks for the emergence of extremist nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe – planks which seek to exploit populist fears and which have the potential to lead to Muslim disempowerment in Europe. Sections of the media have created a situation where the one serves to heighten the unfounded claims and anxieties of the other – such that politicians from Austria to the Britain, and the Netherlands to Spain, feel comfortable in using terms like “Tsunamis of Muslim immigration”, and accuse Islam of being a fundamental threat to a “European way of life”. While in many cases, the traction of this populist approach reflects an ignorance of Islamic faith, practice and belief, there are many think-tanks which are currently engaged in promoting erroneous depictions of Islam and Muslim political beliefs through unsubstantiated and academically baseless studies, and a reliance on techniques such as ‘junk-polling’. Prior to researching Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime in London, we worked with Muslim Londoners to research the contested notion of what is widely termed by academics and policy makers as “violent radicalisation” (Githens-Mazer, 2010, Lambert 2010). To a large extent it was that prior research experience that persuaded us to embark on this new project. That is to say, there is an important link between the two areas
of work which we should explain at the outset. Since 9/11 Muslim Londoners, no less than Muslims in towns and cities across Europe, have often been unfairly stigmatised as subversive threats to state security and social cohesion, sometimes characterised as a fifth column (Cox and Marks 2006, Gove 2006, Mayer and Frampton 2009). We do not suggest that this stigmatisation did not exist before 9/11, still less do we argue that it revolves solely around the issues of security and social cohesion, but we do claim that the response to 9/11 – ‘the war on terror’ – and much of the rhetoric that has surrounded it has played a significant part in increasing the public perception of European Muslims as potential enemies rather than potential partners and neighbours.

Dari Akar Nasionalisme di Dunia Islam

Shabir Ahmed

Dunia Muslim telah ditandai oleh kegagalan, perpecahan, pertumpahan darah, penindasan dan keterbelakangan. Pada ini, tidak ada negara Muslim di dunia benar dapat mengklaim untuk menjadi pemimpin dalam setiap bidang kegiatan manusia. Memang, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Selanjutnya, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Arab, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Misalnya, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Agak, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

Demokrasi dalam Pemikiran Politik Islam

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, bapak demokrasi Mesir menurut Lewis Awad,[3] yang tak lama setelah kembali ke Kairo dari Paris menerbitkan buku pertamanya, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, di 1834. Buku itu merangkum pengamatannya tentang tata krama dan kebiasaan orang Prancis modern,[4] dan memuji konsep demokrasi seperti yang dia lihat di Prancis dan saat dia menyaksikan pembelaan dan penegasannya melalui 1830 Revolusi melawan Raja Charles X.[5] Tahtawi mencoba menunjukkan bahwa konsep demokrasi yang ia jelaskan kepada para pembacanya sesuai dengan hukum Islam. Ia membandingkan pluralisme politik dengan bentuk-bentuk pluralisme ideologis dan yurisprudensi yang ada dalam pengalaman Islam:
Kebebasan beragama adalah kebebasan berkeyakinan, pendapat dan sekte, asalkan tidak bertentangan dengan asas-asas agama . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, siapa, di 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Budaya Politik Islam, Demokrasi, dan Hak Asasi Manusia

Daniel E. Harga

Telah berpendapat bahwa Islam memfasilitasi otoriterisme, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Karenanya, sarjana, komentator, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, Namun, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Karenanya, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

IMAN ISLAM di AMERIKA

JAMES A. Beverley

AMERICA BEGINS A NEW MILLENNIUM AS ONE OF THE MOST RELIGIOUSLY diverse nations of all time. Nowhere else in the world do so many people—offered a choice free from government influence—identify with such a wide range of religious and spiritual communities. Nowhere else has the human search for meaning been so varied. In America today, there are communities and centers for worship representing all of the world’s religions.
The American landscape is dotted with churches, temples, synagogues, and mosques. Zen Buddhist zendos sit next to Pentecostal tabernacles. Hasidic Jews walk the streets with Hindu swamis. Most amazing of all, relatively little conflict has occurred among religions in America. This fact, combined with a high level of tolerance of each other’s beliefs and practices, has let America produce people of goodwill ready to try to resolve any tensions that might emerge. The Faith in America series celebrates America’s diverse religious heritage.
People of faith and ideals who longed for a better world have created a unique society where freedom of religious expression is a keynote of culture. The freedom that America offers to people of faith means that not only have ancient religions found a home
sini, but that newer ways of expressing spirituality have also taken root. From huge churches in large cities to small spiritual communities in towns and villages, faith in America has never been stronger. The paths that different religions have taken through
American history is just one of the stories readers will find in this series. Like anything people create, religion is far from perfect. Namun, its contribution to the culture and its ability to help people are impressive, and these accomplishments will be found in all the books in the series. Sementara itu, awareness and tolerance of the different paths our neighbors take to the spiritual life has become an increasingly important part of citizenship in America.
Hari ini, lebih dari sebelumnya, America as a whole puts its faith in freedom—the freedom to believe.

Pihak Islam : kembali ke asal

Husain Haqqani

Hillel Fradkin

Bagaimana seharusnya kita memahami munculnya dan sifat partai-partai Islam? Dapatkah mereka cukup diharapkan tidak hanya untuk berpartisipasi dalam politik demokratis tetapi bahkan untuk menghormati norma-norma demokrasi liberal? Pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini terletak di jantung masalah yang kita telah diminta untuk mengatasi.
In our view, any response that is historically and thus practically relevant must begin with the following observation: Until very recently, even the idea of an Islamist party (let alone a democratic Islamist party) would have seemed, from the perspective of Islamism itself, a paradox if not a contradiction in terms. Islamism’s original conception of a healthy Islamic political life made no room for—indeed rejected—any role for parties of any sort. Islamist groups described themselves as the vanguard of Islamic revival, claiming that they represented the essence of Islam and reflected the aspiration of the global umma (community of believers) for an Islamic polity. Pluralism, which is a precondition for the operation of political parties, was rejected by most Islamist political
thinkers as a foreign idea.
As should be more or less obvious, the novelty not only of actually existing Islamist parties but of the very idea of such parties makes it exceptionally difficult to assess their democratic bona fides. But this difficulty merely adds another level of complication to a problem that stems from the very origins of Islamism and its conception of the true meaning of Islam and of Islam’s relationship to political life

Orang Jerman Masuk Islam dan Hubungan Ambivalen Mereka dengan Imigran Muslim

Esra Ozyurek

“I would never have become a Muslim if I had met Muslims before I met Islam.” I heard these words over and over again during my yearlong ethnographic research among ethnic German converts to Islam in Berlin.1 The first time, it was uttered by a self-declared German imam who had converted to Islam while trying to convert Arabs and Turks to Christianity. The second time, the speaker was a twenty-five-year-old former East German woman who came to Islam through her Bosnian boyfriend, whose family never accepted her. The third time, the comment was made by a fifty-year-old man who converted to Islam about thirty years ago after meeting Iranians who came to Europe to collect money and organize for the Iranian revolution. After that I stopped counting. Although all of the several dozen German converts I talked to (and the dozens of converts whose narratives I read on the internet) claim that they embraced Islam in a context of significant personal relationships with Muslims,2 a substantial portion of German Muslims are quite discontented with born Muslims, especially those of immigrant backgrounds. This paper is an attempt to comprehend the paradoxical feelings of love and hate for Islam and Muslims that many German Muslims experience. My aim in exploring this issue is to understand what it takes to be a (supposed) Islamophile in a political and social context that is highly Islamophobic.

PILIH DAFTAR PUSTAKA TENTANG ISLAM DAN DEMOKRASI

Saliba Sarsar

Alexander Keller

Democracy is highly promoted and sought these days but its principles are hard to practice and protect. Once secured, Namun, it generates real life in human communities. Its sunrises provide energy to freedom and growth to civil society and culture, while its sunsets store energy to sustain deliberative citizenship and liberty and bridge past accomplishments to future aspirations.
Namun, what do we mean by democracy? Are there perfect democratic societies around the world? Are democracy’s rays likely to shine on all landscapes? Is Muslim culture hospitable to deepening democracy’s impact? Do Muslims have a different understanding of democracy? If democracy is the preferred goal, how can democracy’s supporters move democratization forward in Muslim countries?
What we know is that no “one model fits all environments” exists. The journey of democracy is a “generational initiative” that must carefully consider internal and external dynamics. If Muslims, like others, wish to promote democracy, then they can detect their country’s place on the democratic terrain and determine how best to improve their practices and standing at home and abroad given their culture, historical experiences, resources, and vision for the future.
This select bibliography is designed to help all those interested in understanding the link between Islam and Muslims on the one hand and democracy on the other. It consists of over 100 entries, divided among books, articles, presentations, and reports; government sources; and institutes and organizations.

Ikhwanul Muslimin di Yordania

Gerakan Islam di Yordania menjadi perhatian internasional pada bulan April 1989 gangguan dan November berikutnya 1989 pemilu parlemen. Perkembangan ini menyoroti pengaruh politik gerakan tersebut dan membangkitkan momok di Barat tentang revolusi Islam gaya Iran di Yordania., dipicu oleh gerakan Islam radikal seperti Mesir dan Maghrib. Sementara berbagai tren politik bersaing memperebutkan pengaruh selama bulan-bulan sebelum pemilu, Ikhwanul Muslimin memiliki keuntungan yang jelas; infrastrukturnya di masjid, Sekolah-sekolah Al-Qur'an dan universitas memberinya basis politik yang siap pakai. Kelompok sayap kiri dan pro-rezim, di samping itu, harus membuat partai politik de facto — yang masih dilarang secara hukum — dan membangun basis organisasinya nyaris ex nihilo, atau untuk mengubah infrastruktur klandestin menjadi infrastruktur politik yang terbuka. Seharusnya hanya ada sedikit kejutan, karena itu, ketika Ikhwanul Muslimin dan kandidat Islam lainnya memenangkan rejeki nomplok 32 dari 80 kursi di Parlemen. Politisasi Islam bukanlah hal baru di Yordania.1 Sejak berdirinya Emirat Trans jordan oleh 'Abdallah, Islam telah menjadi salah satu blok bangunan legitimasi rezim dan pembangunan bangsa. Silsilah keluarga Hashemite sebagai keturunan suku Nabi adalah sumber legitimasi penting untuk pemerintahannya di Suriah, Irak dan Yordania, seperti yang terjadi di Hijaz. Ideologi "Pemberontakan Arab Hebat" tidak kalah Islami dari pada ideologi Arab, dan kontrol atas Yerusalem setelahnya 1948 ditafsirkan oleh rezim sebagai tanggung jawab Islam dan bukan hanya tanggung jawab Arab.2 Raja 'Abdallah dan cucunya Hussein, berhati-hati untuk menampilkan diri mereka sebagai Muslim yang beriman, muncul di ritual dan doa, menunaikan ibadah haji ke Mekah dan menghiasi pidato mereka dengan motif Islami.3 Status Islam di Kerajaan juga diformalkan dalam konstitusi Yordania (1952) dengan menetapkan bahwa Islam adalah agama kerajaan dan rajanya haruslah seorang Muslim dan orang tua Muslim. Hukum Islam(Syariah) didefinisikan dalam konstitusi sebagai salah satu pilar peraturan perundang-undangan di kerajaan, sementara hukum keluarga berada di tangan eksklusif pengadilan Syariah.

Mengklaim Pusat yang: Politik Islam dalam Transisi

John L. Edwards

Pada 1990-an politik Islam, apa yang disebut “fundamentalisme Islam,” tetap kehadiran utama dalam pemerintahan dan politik oposisi dari Afrika Utara ke Asia Tenggara. Islam politik yang berkuasa dan dalam politik telah menimbulkan banyak masalah dan pertanyaan: “Apakah Islam bertentangan dengan modernisasi?,” “Apakah Islam dan demokrasi tidak sejalan?,” “Apa implikasi dari pemerintahan Islam bagi pluralisme, minoritas dan hak-hak perempuan,” “Betapa representatifnya para Islamis,” “Apakah ada moderat Islam?,” “Haruskah Barat takut akan ancaman Islam transnasional atau benturan peradaban?” Revivalisme Islam Kontemporer Pemandangan dunia Muslim saat ini mengungkapkan munculnya republik-republik Islam baru (Iran, Sudan, Afganistan), perkembangan gerakan Islam yang berfungsi sebagai aktor politik dan sosial utama dalam sistem yang ada, dan politik konfrontatif dari ekstremis brutal radikal. Berbeda dengan tahun 1980-an ketika politik Islam hanya disamakan dengan Iran revolusioner atau kelompok klandestin dengan nama-nama seperti Jihad Islam atau Tentara Tuhan, dunia Muslim pada tahun 1990-an adalah dunia di mana kaum Islamis telah berpartisipasi dalam proses pemilihan dan terlihat sebagai perdana menteri., petugas kabinet, pembicara dari majelis nasional, anggota parlemen, dan walikota di negara yang beragam seperti Mesir, Sudan, Turki, Iran, Libanon, Kuwait, Yaman, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, dan Israel / Palestina. Di awal abad kedua puluh satu, politik Islam terus menjadi kekuatan utama untuk ketertiban dan kekacauan dalam politik global, salah satu yang berpartisipasi dalam proses politik tetapi juga dalam tindakan terorisme, tantangan bagi dunia Muslim dan Barat. Memahami sifat politik Islam saat ini, dan khususnya masalah dan pertanyaan yang muncul dari pengalaman di masa lalu, tetap penting bagi pemerintah, pembuat kebijakan, dan mahasiswa politik internasional.

KEBANGKITAN DARI "MUSLIM DEMOKRASI”

Gubernur Nasr

momok adalah menghantui dunia Muslim. Ini momok tertentu memfitnah notthe dan banyak dibahas semangat fundamentalis ekstremisme, bukan juga harapan hantu yang dikenal sebagai Islam liberal. Sebagai gantinya, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Hukum Islam) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

LEMBAGA MUSLIM DAN POLITIK Mobilisasi

SARA Silvestri

Di Eropa, dan sebagian besar dunia Barat, kehadiran Muslim di publicsphere adalah fenomena baru yang ditandai dekade terakhir 20thcentury dan telah sangat menandai awal 21. This visiblepresence, which amounts to something between 15 dan 20 millionindividuals, can best be analysed if dissected into a number of components.The first part of this chapter illustrates where, when and why organisedMuslim voices and institutions have emerged in Europe, and which actorshave been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.